Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

====Battleship bombardment====
Despite the U.S. victory off Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued with plans and preparations for their large offensive scheduled for later in October. The Japanese decided to risk a rare departure from their usual practice of only using fast warships to deliver men and materiel to the island. On 13 October, a convoy comprising six cargo ships escorted by eight screening destroyers departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal. The convoy carried 4,500 troops from the 16th and 230th Infantry Regiments, some naval marines, two batteries of heavy artillery, and one company of tanks.<ref>Frank, pp. 313–315. The 16th was from the 2nd Division and the 230th from the 38th Division.</ref>

[[File:Haruna 1934.jpg|thumb|left|{{Ship|Japanese battleship|Haruna}}]]

To protect the approaching convoy from attack by CAF aircraft, Yamamoto sent the 3rd Battleship Division from Truk to bombard Henderson Field, under the command of [[Takeo Kurita]]. At 01:33 on 14 October, IJN battleships {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Kongō||2}} and {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Haruna||2}}, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers, reached Guadalcanal and opened fire on Henderson Field from a distance of {{convert|16000|m|yd|sigfig=3|sp=us}}. At this range, over ten miles (16 km), Allied shore batteries had no prospect of returning effective fire. Over the next one hour and 23 minutes, the two battleships fired 973 {{convert|14|in|mm|sigfig=3|adj=on}} shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of which fell in and around the {{cvt|2200|m2}} area of the airfield. Many of the shells were [[fragmentation (weaponry)|fragmentation]] shells, specifically designed to destroy land targets.{{Citation needed|date=January 2025|reason=The Japanese battleships carried and used Type-3 shells which was anti-aircraft in purpose. What is the source for these BB carrying specially designed anti-land shells?}} The bombardment heavily damaged both runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, and destroyed 48 of the CAF's 90 aircraft. 41 men were killed, including six CAF pilots. Few CAF aircraft survived entirely unscathed, and only about a dozen remained in flyable condition the next day. Wrecked and damaged planes were lined up wingtip to wingtip, in the hopes of diverting Japanese attention from the few surviving aircraft. After exhausting their ammunition around 3 a.m., the Japanese battleship force immediately returned to Truk.<ref>Evans, pp. 181–182; Frank, pp. 315–320; Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' pp. 171–175. [[Raizo Tanaka]] commanded Destroyer Squadron 2 which was part of the battleship's screen.</ref> Allied troops stationed at Henderson Field colloquially referred to this bombardment, the heaviest they had endured thus far in the campaign, as "The Night".<ref name=":0" /> 

Despite the heavy damage, Henderson personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours. Seventeen [[Douglas SBD Dauntless|SBD-3 Dauntless]] [[dive bomber]]s and 20 [[Grumman F4F Wildcat|F4F Wildcats]] at Espiritu Santo were quickly flown to Henderson, and U.S. Army and Marine transport aircraft shuttled aviation gasoline from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. Aware of the approach of the large Japanese reinforcement convoy, the U.S. desperately sought a way to interdict the convoy before it could reach Guadalcanal. Using fuel drained from destroyed aircraft and from a cache in the nearby jungle, the CAF attacked the convoy twice on 14 October but caused no damage.<ref>Frank pp. 319–321</ref>

The Japanese convoy reached [[Tassafaronga Point]] at midnight on 14 October and began unloading. Throughout the day of 15 October, a string of CAF aircraft from Henderson bombed and strafed the unloading convoy, destroying three of the cargo ships. The remainder of the convoy departed that night, having unloaded all of the troops and about two-thirds of the supplies and equipment. Several Japanese heavy cruisers also bombarded Henderson on the nights of 14 and 15 October, destroying a few additional CAF aircraft but failing to inflict further significant damage to the airfield.<ref>Frank, pp. 321–326; Hough, pp. 327–328.</ref>