Editing European Central Bank (section)

===== Effects of and critiques on the TPI =====
The TPI enables the Governing Council to a more rapid increase in interest rate,<ref name="Broeders-2023c"/><ref name="Wellink-2023d"/> the first raise in interest rates by the ECB in 11 years.<ref name="Bertoldi-2023c"/><ref name="Martin-2022b"/> and the unpredictable nature of market sentiment could justify the reason for ECB-intervention to stabilise the monetary union,<ref name="Arnold-2023c"/> more or less the same reasoning as for the PEPP.

However, the relationship between the PEPP and the TPI raises questions as the PEPP would remain the first line of defence against transmission risks.<ref name="Wellink-2023d" /> The creation of the TPI seems legally vulnerably: problems in the Euro Area are common and recurring, but it is not automatically the argument to invent a whole new anti-fragmentation tool.<ref name="Wellink-2023d" /> With the TPI, the ECB can put pressure on countries by assessing publicly if they are eligible for the TPI, that is assessing whether the government has conducted adequate fiscal policies and structural reforms to deserve the support of the ECB. This endangers the politic neutrality of the ECB.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Campoy |first1=Juan Cristóbal |last2=Negrete |first2=Juan Carlos |date=2023-08-18 |title=Quantitative easing rules as a means to achieve optimal levels of structural reforms and government deficits in a monetary union |journal=The World Economy |volume=46 |issue=9 |pages=2775 |doi=10.1111/twec.13460 |doi-access=free }}</ref> If ever deployed, the usage of the TPI will spark controversy as the conditions to be deployed are not watertight.<ref name="Wellink-2023d" /><ref name="POLITICO-2022b"/>