Editing Epistemology (section)

== History ==
{{anchor|History of epistemology}}
Early reflections on the nature and sources of knowledge are found in ancient history. In [[ancient Greek philosophy]], [[Plato]] (427–347 BCE) studied [[episteme|what knowledge is]], examining how it differs from true [[Doxa|opinion]] by being based on good reasons.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=260}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} }}</ref> He proposed that learning is [[Anamnesis (philosophy)|a form of recollection]] in which the soul remembers what it already knew but had forgotten.<ref name="auto5">{{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}}</ref>{{efn|To argue for this point, Plato used the example of a slave boy, who manages to answer a series of geometry questions even though he never studied geometry.<ref name="auto5"/>}} Plato's student [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE) was particularly interested in scientific knowledge, exploring the role of sensory experience and the process of making inferences from general principles.<ref name=":0">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=260}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=7}} }}</ref> Aristotle's ideas influenced the [[Hellenistic philosophy|Hellenistic schools of philosophy]], which began to arise in the 4th century BCE and included [[Epicureanism]], [[Stoicism]], and [[Philosophical skepticism#Ancient Greek skepticism|skepticism]]. The Epicureans had an [[Empiricism|empiricist]] outlook, stating that sensations are always accurate and act as the supreme standard of judgments.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=287–288}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=8}} }}</ref> The Stoics defended a similar position but confined their trust to lucid and specific sensations, which they regarded as true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=288}} | {{harvnb|Vogt|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4s-X8wfhemsC&pg=PA44 44]}} }}</ref> The skeptics questioned that knowledge is possible, recommending instead [[Epoche|suspension of judgment]] to attain a [[Ataraxia|state of tranquility]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=8}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} }}</ref> Emerging in the 3rd century CE and inspired by Plato's philosophy,<ref>{{harvnb|Adkins|Adkins|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zGY1Sqjwf8kC&pg=PA393 393]}}</ref> [[Neoplatonism]] distinguished knowledge from true belief, arguing that knowledge is infallible and limited to the realm of immaterial forms.<ref>{{harvnb|Gerson|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yhcWBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA266 266–267, 277–278]}}</ref>

[[File:Tibet, c. 15th-16th century - Portrait of Dharmakirti - 2010.474 - Cleveland Museum of Art.tif|thumb|alt=Photo of a statue of a monk sitting in the lotus position|The Buddhist philosopher [[Dharmakirti]] developed a causal theory of knowledge.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|Dunne|2006|p=753}}</ref>|left]]

The [[Upanishads]], philosophical scriptures composed in [[ancient India]] between 700 and 300 BCE, examined how people acquire knowledge, including the role of introspection, comparison, and deduction.<ref>{{harvnb|Black|loc=Lead section}}</ref> In the 6th century BCE, the school of [[Ajñana]] developed a radical skepticism questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fountoulakis|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 23]}} | {{harvnb|Warder|1998|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Fletcher|Romero|Talbot|Warburton|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} }}</ref> By contrast, the school of [[Nyaya]], which emerged in the 2nd century BCE, asserted that knowledge is possible. It provided a systematic treatment of how people acquire knowledge, distinguishing between valid and invalid sources.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|p=48}} | {{harvnb|Dasti|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bhatt|1989|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=upIQgJhpmsIC&pg=PA72 72]}} }}</ref> When [[Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist philosophers]] became interested in epistemology, they relied on concepts developed in Nyaya and other traditions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|p=6}} | {{harvnb|Dunne|2006|p=753}} }}</ref> Buddhist philosopher [[Dharmakirti]] (6th or 7th century CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Bonevac|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=neDwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR18 xviii]}}</ref> analyzed the process of knowing as a series of causally related events.<ref name="auto1"/>

Ancient [[Chinese philosophy|Chinese philosophers]] understood knowledge as an interconnected phenomenon fundamentally linked to ethical behavior and social involvement. Many saw wisdom as the goal of attaining knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rošker|2021|loc=Lead section, § 2.1 Relational Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|pp=215–216, 219}} }}</ref> [[Mozi]] (470–391 BCE) proposed a pragmatic approach to knowledge using historical records, sensory evidence, and practical outcomes to validate beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2a. The Mozi, Later Mohists and Debaters (bianshi)}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref> [[Mencius]] ({{circa|372–289 BCE}}) explored analogical reasoning as a source of knowledge and employed this method to criticize Mozi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2c. Mencius (Mengzi, c. 372-289 B.C.E.) and Analogical Reasoning}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref> [[Xunzi (philosopher)|Xunzi]] ({{circa|310–220 BCE|lk=no}}) aimed to combine empirical observation and rational inquiry. He emphasized the importance of clarity and standards of reasoning without excluding the role of feeling and emotion.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2d. Xunzi (310-220 B.C.E.): Dispelling Obsessions}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref>

The relation between [[reason]] and [[faith]] was a central topic in the [[Medieval philosophy|medieval period]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=10–11}} | {{harvnb|Koterski|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0Ejsz-WHGh4C&pg=PA9 9–10]}} }}</ref> In [[Islamic philosophy|Arabic–Persian philosophy]], [[al-Farabi]] ({{circa|870–950|lk=no}}) and [[Averroes]] (1126–1198) discussed how philosophy and [[theology]] interact, debating which one is a better vehicle to truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}} | {{harvnb|Schoenbaum|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YeYyBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA181 181]}} }}</ref> [[Al-Ghazali]] ({{circa|1056–1111|lk=no}}) [[Incoherence of the Philosophers|criticized many core teachings]] of previous Islamic philosophers, saying that they relied on unproven assumptions that did not amount to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Griffel|2020|loc=Lead section, § 3. Al-Ghazâlî's 'Refutations' of Falsafa and Ismâ'îlism}} | {{harvnb|Vassilopoulou|Clark|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bI59DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA303 303]}} }}</ref> Similarly in Western philosophy, [[Anselm of Canterbury]] (1033–1109) proposed that theological teaching and philosophical inquiry are in harmony and complement each other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}} | {{harvnb|Holopainen|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x5FiMR3kd_8C&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref> Formulating a more critical approach, [[Peter Abelard]] (1079–1142) argued against unquestioned theological authorities and said that all things are open to rational doubt.<ref>{{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}}</ref> Influenced by Aristotle, [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1225–1274) developed an empiricist theory, stating that "nothing is in the intellect unless it first appeared in the senses".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=289–290}} }}</ref> According to an early form of [[direct realism]] proposed by [[William of Ockham]] ({{circa|1285–1349|lk=no}}), perception of mind-independent objects happens directly without intermediaries.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kaye|loc=Lead section, § 4a. Direct Realist Empiricism}} | {{harvnb|Antognazza|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MzATEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 86]}} }}</ref> Meanwhile, in 14th-century India, [[Gaṅgeśa]] developed a reliabilist theory of knowledge and considered the problems of testimony and fallacies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Phillips|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|pp=2, 8, 200–202}} }}</ref> In China, [[Wang Yangming]] (1472–1529) explored the unity of knowledge and action, holding that moral knowledge is inborn and can be attained by overcoming self-interest.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2g. Wang Yangming on liangzhi: Direct, Clear, Universal Knowledge, § 3h. Wang Yangming: Moral Willing as Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|pp=219–222}} }}</ref>

[[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting of a bearded man with long hair wearing a dark formal attire|[[René Descartes]] used [[Cartesian doubt|methodological doubt]] to seek certain foundations for philosophy.<ref>{{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=14–15}}</ref>|left]]

The course of [[modern philosophy]] was shaped by [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650), who stated that philosophy must begin from a position of indubitable knowledge of first principles. Inspired by skepticism, he aimed to find absolutely certain knowledge by encountering truths that cannot be doubted. He thought that this is the case for the assertion "[[I think, therefore I am]]", from which he constructed the rest of his philosophical system.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=291}} }}</ref> Descartes, together with [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677) and [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] (1646–1716), belonged to the school of [[rationalism]], which asserts that the mind possesses [[innate ideas]] independent of experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=261}} | {{harvnb|Evans|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Oo9xDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA298 298]}} }}</ref> [[John Locke]] (1632–1704) rejected this view in favor of an empiricism according to which the mind is a [[blank slate]]. This means that all ideas depend on experience, either as "ideas of sense", which are directly presented through the senses, or as "ideas of reflection", which the mind creates by reflecting on its own activities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=17–18}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=298–299}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=261}} | {{harvnb|Uzgalis|2024|loc=§ 2. The Limits of Human Understanding}}}}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776) used this idea to explore the limits of what people can know. He said that knowledge of facts is never certain, adding that knowledge of relations between ideas, like mathematical truths, can be certain but contains no information about the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coventry|Merrill|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=X950DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA161 161]}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=22–23}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) sought a middle ground between rationalism and empiricism by identifying a type of knowledge overlooked by Hume. For Kant, this knowledge pertains to principles that underlie and structure all experience, such as spatial and temporal relations and fundamental [[categories of understanding]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=27–30}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} | {{harvnb|Thorpe|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TTBuBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5]}} }}</ref>

In the 19th century and influenced by Kant's philosophy, [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) rejected empiricism by arguing that sensory impressions alone cannot amount to knowledge since all knowledge is actively structured by the knowing subject.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} }}</ref> [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873), by contrast, defended a wide-sweeping form of empiricism and explained knowledge of general truths through [[inductive reasoning]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=312}} }}</ref> [[Charles Peirce]] (1839–1914) thought that all knowledge is [[fallible]], emphasizing that knowledge seekers should remain open to revising their beliefs in light of new [[evidence]]. He used this idea to argue against Cartesian foundationalism, which seeks absolutely certain truths.<ref>{{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}}</ref>

In the 20th century, fallibilism was further explored by [[J. L. Austin]] (1911–1960) and [[Karl Popper]] (1902–1994).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} | {{harvnb|Kvasz|Zeleňák|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R3aywtFIKKsC&pg=PA71 71]}} }}</ref> In [[continental philosophy]], [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) applied the skeptical idea of suspending judgment to the [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|study of experience]]. By not judging whether an experience is accurate, he tried to describe its internal structure instead.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rockmore|2011|pp=131–132}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=44}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=312}} }}</ref> Influenced by earlier empiricists, [[logical positivists]], like [[A. J. Ayer]] (1910–1989), said that all knowledge is either empirical or analytic, rejecting any form of metaphysical knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} }}</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) developed an empiricist sense-datum theory, distinguishing between direct [[knowledge by acquaintance]] of sense data and indirect knowledge by description, which is inferred from knowledge by acquaintance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=315}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=48–49}} }}</ref> [[Common sense]] had a central place in [[G. E. Moore]]'s (1873–1958) epistemology. He used trivial observations, like the fact that he has two hands, to argue against abstract philosophical theories that deviate from common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baldwin|2010|loc=§ 6. Common Sense and Certainty}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=49}} }}</ref> [[Ordinary language philosophy]], as practiced by the late [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] (1889–1951), is a similar approach that tries to extract epistemological insights from how ordinary language is used.<ref>{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=317–318}}</ref>

[[Edmund Gettier]] (1927–2021) conceived [[Gettier problem#Gettier's two original counterexamples|counterexamples]] against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. These counterexamples prompted many philosophers to suggest alternative [[definitions of knowledge]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} | {{harvnb|Beilby|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=omdQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} }}</ref> Developed by philosophers such as [[Alvin Goldman]] (1938–2024), [[reliabilism]] emerged as one of the alternatives, asserting that knowledge requires reliable sources and shifting the focus away from justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goldman|Beddor|2021|loc=Lead section, § 1. A Paradigm Shift in Analytic Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century, § Recent Issues}} }}</ref> [[Virtue epistemology|Virtue epistemologists]], such as [[Ernest Sosa]] (1940–present) and [[Linda Zagzebski]] (1946–present), analyse belief formation in terms of the intellectual virtues or cognitive competencies involved in the process.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goldman|Beddor|2021|loc=§ 4.1 Virtue Reliabilism}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=175}} | {{harvnb|Battaly|2018|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> [[Naturalized epistemology]], as conceived by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000), employs concepts and ideas from the natural sciences to formulate its theories.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=183–184, 188–189}}</ref> Other developments in late 20th-century epistemology were the emergence of [[social epistemology|social]], [[feminist epistemology|feminist]], and [[historical epistemology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Recent Issues}} | {{harvnb|Vagelli|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hT33DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96]}} }}</ref>