Editing Chinese unification (section)

=== People's Republic of China ===
A 2019 phone survey conducted in nine major cities found that 53.1% of respondents supported military force for unification (武统; ''wu tong'') with Taiwan while 39.1% stated that they would oppose military force for unification under any circumstance.<ref name=":122" />{{Rp|page=37}}<ref name=":1222" />{{RP|page=62}} The study concluded that education level and unfavorable views of the Taiwan government were the greatest predictors of support for military force for unification.<ref name=":1222">{{Cite book |last1=Qi |first1=Dongtao |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |last2=Zhang |first2=Suixin |last3=Lin |first3=Shengqiao |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Urban Chinese Support for Armed Unification with Taiwan: Social Status, National Pride, and Understanding of Taiwan |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=46}} Politically, economically, and socially privileged respondents, as well as respondents with greater understandings of Taiwan, were also more likely to support military force for unification.<ref name=":1222" />{{Rp|page=46}} Residents of Xiamen and Guangzhou (on the coast) were less likely to support  military force.<ref name=":1222" />{{Rp|page=46}}

A 2020-2021 national public opinion poll conducted in China by academics Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li analyzed public approval for a range of policies, including military force for unification, limited warfare in offshore islands, economic sanctions, maintaining the status quo, and de facto Taiwan independence.<ref name=":122">{{Cite book |last1=Liu |first1=Adam Y. |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |last2=Li |first2=Xiaojun |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=|pages=33-34}} The resulting study, published in 2023 in the ''[[Journal of Contemporary China]]'', concludes that 55% of respondents support using military force for unification, although that amount was not greater than various less aggressive policy options.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tang |first=Kelly |date=2024-01-17 |title=China's Nationalists Urge War to Reunify Taiwan After Presidential Election |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-nationalists-urge-war-to-reintegrate-taiwan-after-presidential-election/7444075.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240506180420/https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-nationalists-urge-war-to-reintegrate-taiwan-after-presidential-election/7444075.html |archive-date=6 May 2024 |access-date=2024-01-17 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Liu |first1=Adam Y. |last2=Li |first2=Xiaojun |date=14 May 2023 |title=Assessing Public Support for (Non)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=33 |issue=145 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2023.2209524 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref><ref name=":122" />{{Rp|page=34}} Approximately one-third of respondents were explicitly opposed to military force for unification.<ref name=":122" />{{Rp|page=45}} Respondents with college degrees or more advanced degrees were more likely to endorse the more aggressive policy options.<ref name=":122" />{{Rp|page=43}}