Editing Bernard Montgomery (section)

=== Return to France ===

==== Normandy ====
{{See also|Operation Overlord}}

[[File:Simonds.jpg|left|thumb|Montgomery with officers of the [[First Canadian Army]]. From left, [[Major general|Major-General]] [[Christopher Vokes|Vokes]], General [[Harry Crerar|Crerar]], [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] Montgomery, [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Brian Horrocks|Horrocks]], [[Lieutenant-general (Canada)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Guy Simonds|Simonds]], Major-General Spry, and Major-General [[Bruce Matthews (Canadian Army officer)|Matthews]]]]

As a result of his dissatisfaction with Italy, he was delighted to receive the news that he was to return to Britain in January 1944.<ref>{{harvnb|Hart|2007|p=8}}</ref> He was assigned to command the [[21st Army Group]] consisting of all Allied ground forces participating in [[Operation Overlord]], codename for the Allied invasion of [[Normandy]]. Overall direction was assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, American General Dwight D. Eisenhower.<ref name=heath217 /> Both Churchill and Eisenhower had found Montgomery difficult to work with in the past and wanted the position to go to the more affable General Sir Harold Alexander.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56">{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=56}}</ref> However Montgomery's patron, General Sir Alan Brooke, firmly argued that Montgomery was a much superior general to Alexander and ensured his appointment.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> Without Brooke's support, Montgomery would have remained in Italy.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> At St Paul's School on 7 April and 15 May Montgomery presented his strategy for the invasion. He envisaged a ninety-day battle, with all forces reaching the [[Seine]]. The campaign would pivot on an Allied-held [[Caen]] in the east of the Normandy bridgehead, with relatively static British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder to attract and defeat German counter-attacks, relieving the US armies who would move and seize the [[Cotentin Peninsula]] and [[Brittany]], wheeling south and then east on the right forming a pincer.<ref name=odnb />

[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H35960.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery inspects men of the 5th/7th Battalion, [[Gordon Highlanders]] of the [[51st (Highland) Division]], at Beaconsfield, February 1944.]]

During the ten weeks of the [[Invasion of Normandy|Battle of Normandy]], unfavourable autumnal weather conditions disrupted the Normandy landing areas.<ref name=odnb /> Montgomery's initial plan was for the Anglo-Canadian troops under his command to break out immediately from their beachheads on the Calvados coast towards Caen with the aim of taking the city on either D Day or two days later.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=455–471}}</ref> Montgomery attempted to take Caen with the 3rd Infantry Division, the [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]] and the 3rd Canadian Division, but was stopped from 6–8 June by the [[21st Panzer Division]] and [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend|12th SS Panzer Division ''Hitlerjugend'']], who hit the advancing Anglo-Canadian troops very hard.<ref name=badsey43>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=43}}</ref> The 12th Waffen SS Division ''Hitlerjugend'', as its name implies, was drawn entirely from the more fanatical elements of the [[Hitler Youth]], and commanded by the ruthless SS-''[[Brigadeführer]]'' [[Kurt Meyer]], aka "Panzer Meyer".<ref>{{harvnb|English|2014|p=51}}</ref> Rommel followed up this success by ordering the [[2nd Panzer Division]] to Caen while Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] received permission from Hitler to have the elite [[1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler|1st SS Panzer Division ''Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'']] and [[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|2nd SS Panzer Division ''Das Reich'']] sent to Caen as well.<ref name=badsey43 /> Montgomery thus had to face what Stephen Badsey called the "most formidable" of all the German divisions in France.<ref name=badsey43 />

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5179.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|right|General Montgomery passes German POWs while being driven along a road in a jeep, shortly after arriving in Normandy, 8 June 1944. Two seem to have recognised him.]]

The failure to take Caen immediately has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with bitter nationalist overtones.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471">{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=471}}</ref> Broadly, there has been a "British school" which accepts Montgomery's post-war claim that he never intended to take Caen at once, and instead the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen were a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector to allow the Americans to stage the "break out operation" on the left flank of the German positions, which was all part of Montgomery's "Master Plan" that he had conceived long before the Normandy campaign.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471" /> By contrast, the "American school" argued that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was for the 21st Army Group to take Caen at once and move his tank divisions into the plains south of Caen, to then stage a breakout that would lead the 21st Army Group into the plains of northern France and hence into [[Antwerp]] and finally the [[Ruhr]].<ref>Powers, pp. 458, 471.</ref> Letters written by Eisenhower at the time of the battle make it clear that Eisenhower was expecting from Montgomery "the early capture of the important focal point of Caen". Later, when this plan had clearly failed, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had "evolved" the plan to have the US forces achieve the break-out instead.<ref>{{harvnb|Carafano|2008|p=22}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5787.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery in conversation with Major-General [[Douglas Graham (British Army officer)|Douglas Graham]], GOC [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]], pictured here in Normandy, 20 June 1944]]

As the campaign progressed, Montgomery altered his initial plan for the invasion and continued the strategy of attracting and holding German counter-attacks in the area north of Caen rather than to the south, to allow the U.S. First Army in the west to take [[Cherbourg]]. A memo summarising Montgomery's operations written by Eisenhower's chief of staff, General [[Walter Bedell Smith]] who met with Montgomery in late June 1944 says nothing about Montgomery conducting a "holding operation" in the Caen sector, and instead speaks of him seeking a "breakout" into the plains south of the Seine.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=461}}</ref> On 12 June, Montgomery ordered the 7th Armoured Division into an attack against the [[Panzer Lehr Division]] that made good progress at first, but ended when the Panzer Lehr was joined by the 2nd Panzer Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=44}}</ref> At the [[Battle of Villers-Bocage]] on 13 June, the British lost twenty [[Cromwell tank|Cromwell]] tanks to five [[Tiger I|Tiger]] tanks led by [[SS]] ''[[Obersturmführer]]'' [[Michael Wittmann]], in about five minutes.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44" /><!--no mention of the counter-ambushes in the town or the Battle of the Box or the depletion of the 101st SS heavy tank battalion from 44 to 16 operational Tigers?--> Despite the setback at Villers Bocage, Montgomery was still optimistic as the Allies were landing more troops and supplies than they were losing in battle, and though the German lines were holding, the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' and ''[[Waffen SS]]'' were suffering considerable attrition.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=45}}</ref> [[Air Chief Marshal]] [[Arthur Tedder, 1st Baron Tedder|Sir Arthur Tedder]] complained that it was impossible to move fighter squadrons to France until Montgomery had captured some airfields, something he asserted that Montgomery appeared incapable of doing.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=47}}</ref> The first [[V-1 flying bomb]] attacks on London, which started on 13 June, further increased the pressure on Montgomery from Whitehall to speed up his advance.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" />

[[File:The British Army in the Normandy Campaign 1944 B5634.jpg|thumb|right|[[George VI|The King]] with Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey]], GOC British Second Army, and General Montgomery, at his HQ in {{ill|Creullet castle|fr|Château de Creullet}}, 16 June 1944]]

On 18 June, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Cherbourg while the British were to take Caen by 23 June.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" /> In Operation Epsom, the British VII Corps commanded by Sir Richard O'Connor attempted to outflank Caen from the west by breaking through the dividing line between the Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS to take the strategic Hill 112.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=48}}</ref> Epsom began well with O'Connor's assault force (the British 15th Scottish Division) breaking through and with the 11th Armoured Division stopping the counter-attacks of the 12th SS Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> General [[Friedrich Dollmann]] of Seventh Army had to commit the newly arrived II SS Corps to stop the British offensive.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> Dollmann, fearing that Epsom would be a success, committed suicide and was replaced by SS ''Oberstegruppenführer'' [[Paul Hausser]]. O'Connor, at the cost of about 4,000 men, had won a salient only {{convert|5|mi|km}} deep and {{convert|2|mi|km}} wide, but placed the Germans in an unviable long-term position.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> There was a strong sense of crisis in the Allied command, as the Allies had advanced only about {{convert|15|mi|km}} inland, at a time when their plans called for them to have already taken [[Rennes]], [[Alençon]] and [[St. Malo]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> After Epsom, Montgomery had to tell General [[Harry Crerar]] that the activation of the First Canadian Army would have to wait as there was only room at present, in the Caen sector, for the newly arrived XII Corps under Lieutenant-General [[Neil Ritchie]], which caused some tension with Crerar, who was anxious to get into the field.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=247}} Epsom had forced further German forces into Caen but all through June and the first half of July Rommel, Rundstedt, and Hitler were engaged in planning for a great offensive to drive the British into the sea; it was never launched and would have required the commitment of a large number of German forces to the Caen sector.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=246}}

It was only after several failed attempts to break out in the Caen sector that Montgomery devised what he later called his "master plan" of having the 21st Army Group hold the bulk of the German forces, thus allowing the Americans to break out.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=84}} The Canadian historians [[Terry Copp]] and Robert Vogel wrote about the dispute between the "American school" and "British school" after having suffered several setbacks in June 1944:

{{Blockquote|Montgomery drew what was the indisputably correct conclusion from these events. If the British and Canadians could continue to hold the bulk of the German armoured divisions on their front through a series of limited attacks, they could wear down the Germans and create the conditions for an American breakout on the right.

This is what Montgomery proposed in his Directive of June 30th and, if he and his admirers had let the record speak for itself, there would be little debate about his conduct of the first stages of the Normandy campaign. Instead, Montgomery insisted that this Directive was a consistent part of a master plan that he had devised long before the invasion. Curiously, this view does a great disservice to 'Monty' for any rigid planning of operations before the German response was known would have been bad generalship indeed!"{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1983|p=86}}}}

Hampered by stormy weather and the [[bocage]] terrain, Montgomery had to ensure that Rommel focused on the British in the east rather than the Americans in the west, who had to take the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany before the Germans could be trapped by a general swing east.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=458}}</ref> Montgomery told General Sir Miles Dempsey, the commander of Second British Army: "Go on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially some of the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad [Bradley]."<ref name="Urban, p. 283">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=283}}</ref> The Germans had deployed twelve divisions, of which six were Panzer divisions, against the British while deploying eight divisions, of which three were Panzer divisions, against the Americans.<ref name="Urban, p. 283" /> By the middle of July Caen had not been taken, as Rommel continued to prioritise prevention of the break-out by British forces rather than the western territories being taken by the Americans.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–56}}</ref> This was broadly as Montgomery had planned, albeit not with the same speed as he outlined at St Paul's, although as the American historian Carlo D'Este pointed out the actual situation in Normandy was "vastly different" from what was envisioned at the St. Paul's conference, as only one of four goals outlined in May had been achieved by 10 July.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|pp=322–323}}

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B7767.jpg|left|thumb|Prime Minister Churchill with General Montgomery at the latter's HQ in Normandy, July 1944]]

On 7 July, Montgomery began Operation Charnwood with a [[carpet bombing]] offensive that turned much of the French countryside and the city of Caen into a wasteland.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 53">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=53}}</ref> The British and Canadians succeeded in advancing into northern Caen before the Germans, who used the ruins to their advantage and stopped the offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–54}}</ref> On 10 July, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Avranches, after which U.S. Third Army would be activated to drive towards Le Mans and Alençon.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=56}}</ref> On 14 July 1944, Montgomery wrote to his patron Brooke, saying he had chosen on a "real show down on the eastern flanks, and to loose a Corps of three armoured divisions in the open country about the Caen-Falaise road&nbsp;... The possibilities are immense; with seven hundred tanks loosed to the South-east of Caen, and the armoured cars operating far ahead, anything can happen."<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=689}}</ref> The [[French Resistance#Role in the liberation of France and casualties|French Resistance had launched Plan Violet]] in June 1944 to systematically destroy the telephone system of France, which forced the Germans to use their radios more and more to communicate, and as the code-breakers of Bletchley Park had broken many of the German codes, Montgomery had, thanks to "[[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]]" intelligence, a good idea of the German situation.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=72}}</ref> Montgomery thus knew German Army Group B had lost 96,400 men while receiving 5,200 replacements and the Panzer Lehr Division now based at St. Lô was down to only 40 tanks.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56" /> Montgomery later wrote that he knew he had the Normandy campaign won at this point as the Germans had almost no reserves while he had three armoured divisions in reserve.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=57}}</ref>

An American break-out was achieved with [[Operation Cobra]] and the encirclement of German forces in the [[Falaise pocket]] at the cost of British losses with the diversionary [[Operation Goodwood]].{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=202}} On the early morning of 18 July 1944, Operation Goodwood began with British heavy bombers beginning carpet bombing attacks that further devastated what was left of Caen and the surrounding countryside.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=285–286}}</ref> A British tank crewman from the Guards Armoured Division later recalled: "At 0500 hours a distant thunder in the air brought all the sleepy-eyed tank crews out of their blankets. 1,000 Lancasters were flying from the sea in groups of three or four at {{convert|3000|ft|m}}. Ahead of them the pathfinders were scattering their flares and before long the first bombs were dropping."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=281}}</ref> A German tankman from the 21st Panzer Division at the receiving end of this bombardment remembered: "We saw little dots detach themselves from the planes, so many of them that the crazy thought occurred to us: are those leaflets?&nbsp;... Among the thunder of the explosions, we could hear the wounded scream and the insane howling of men who had [been] driven mad."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=282}}</ref> The British bombing had badly smashed the German front-line units. Initially, the three British armoured divisions assigned to lead the offensive, the 7th, 11th and the Guards, made rapid progress and were soon approaching the Borguebus ridge, which dominated the landscape south of Caen, by noon.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=282–283}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B6934.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery stops his car to chat with troops during a tour of I Corps area near Caen, 11 July 1944.]]

If the British could take the Borguebus Ridge, the way to the plains of northern France would be wide open, and potentially Paris could be taken, which explains the ferocity with which the Germans defended the ridge. One German officer, Lieutenant Baron von Rosen, recalled that to motivate a Luftwaffe officer commanding a battery of four 88&nbsp;mm guns to fight against the British tanks, he had to hold his handgun to the officer's head "and asked him whether he would like to be killed immediately or get a high decoration. He decided for the latter."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=283–284}}</ref> The well dug-in 88&nbsp;mm guns around the Borguebus Ridge began taking a toll on the British Sherman tanks, and the countryside was soon dotted with dozens of burning Shermans.<ref name="Urban, p. 284">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=284}}</ref> One British officer reported with worry: "I see palls of smoke and tanks brewing up with flames belching forth from their turrets. I see men climbing out, on fire like torches, rolling on the ground to try and douse the flames."<ref name="Urban, p. 284" /> Despite Montgomery's orders to try to press on, fierce German counter-attacks stopped the British offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 284" />

The objectives of Operation Goodwood were all achieved except the complete capture of the Bourgebus Ridge, which was only partially taken. The operation was a strategic Allied success in drawing in the last German reserves in Normandy towards the Caen sector away from the American sector, greatly assisting the American breakout in Operation Cobra. By the end of Goodwood on 25 July 1944, the Canadians had finally taken Caen while the British tanks had reached the plains south of Caen, giving Montgomery the "hinge" he had been seeking, while forcing the Germans to commit the last of their reserves to stop the Anglo-Canadian offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 285">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=285}}</ref> "Ultra" decrypts indicated that the Germans now facing Bradley were seriously understrength, with Operation Cobra about to commence.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=75}}</ref> During Operation Goodwood, the British had 400 tanks knocked out, with many recovered returning to service. The casualties were 5,500 with {{convert|7|mi|km}} of ground gained.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Bradley recognised Montgomery's plan to pin down German armour and allow U.S. forces to break out:

{{Blockquote|The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=72}}</ref>}}

The long-running dispute over what Montgomery's "master plan" in Normandy led historians to differ greatly about the purpose of Goodwood. The British journalist [[Mark Urban]] wrote that the purpose of Goodwood was to draw German troops to their left flank to allow the American forces to break out on the right flank, arguing that Montgomery had to lie to his soldiers about the purpose of Goodwood, as the average British soldier would not have understood why they were being asked to create a diversion to allow the Americans to have the glory of staging the breakout with Operation Cobra.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> By contrast, the American historian Stephen Power argued that Goodwood was intended to be the "breakout" offensive and not a "holding operation", writing: "It is unrealistic to assert that an operation which called for the use of 4,500 Allied aircraft, 700 artillery pieces and over 8,000 armored vehicles and trucks and that cost the British over 5,500 casualties was conceived and executed for so limited an objective."<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=462–463}}</ref> Power noted that Goodwood and Cobra were supposed to take effect on the same day, 18 July 1944, but Cobra was cancelled owing to heavy rain in the American sector, and argued that both operations were meant to be breakout operations to trap the German armies in Normandy. American military writer Drew Middleton wrote that there is no doubt that Montgomery wanted Goodwood to provide a "shield" for Bradley, but at the same time Montgomery was clearly hoping for more than merely diverting German attention away from the American sector.<ref>{{cite news |last=Middleton |first=Drew |title=Mistake in the Master Plan |newspaper=The New York Times |date=22 January 1984 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/22/books/mistake-in-the-master-plan.html |access-date=6 June 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=396}} British historian [[John Keegan]] pointed out that Montgomery made differing statements before Goodwood about the purpose of the operation.<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|pp=191–192}}</ref> Keegan wrote that Montgomery engaged in what he called a "hedging of his bets" when drafting his plans for Goodwood, with a plan for a "break out if the front collapsed, if not, sound documentary evidence that all he had intended in the first place was a battle of attrition".<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=192}}</ref> Again Bradley confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical. The American magazine ''LIFE'' quoted Bradley in 1951:
{{Blockquote|While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.

While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasising the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure.<ref>''Life'' magazine, 16 April 1951, p. 99.</ref>}} With Goodwood drawing the Wehrmacht towards the British sector, U.S. First Army enjoyed a two-to-one numerical superiority. Bradley accepted Montgomery's advice to begin the offensive by concentrating at one point instead of a "broad front" as Eisenhower would have preferred.<ref name="Urban, p. 288">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=288}}</ref>

Operation Goodwood almost cost Montgomery his job, as Eisenhower seriously considered sacking him and only chose not to do so because to sack the popular "Monty" would have caused such a political backlash in Britain against the Americans at a critical moment in the war that the resulting strains in the Atlantic alliance were not considered worth it.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=469}}</ref> Montgomery expressed his satisfaction at the results of Goodwood when calling the operation off. Eisenhower was under the impression that Goodwood was to be a break-out operation. Either there was a miscommunication between the two men or Eisenhower did not understand the strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Lehrman|2016|p=146}}</ref> Bradley fully understood Montgomery's intentions. Both men would not give away to the press the true intentions of their strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|pp=74–75}}</ref>

[[File:General Montgomery with Generals Patton (left) and Bradley (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944. B6551.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery with Lieutenant Generals [[George S. Patton]] (left) and [[Omar Bradley]] (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, 7 July 1944]]

Many American officers had found Montgomery a difficult man to work with, and after Goodwood, pressured Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Although the Eisenhower–Montgomery dispute is sometimes depicted in nationalist terms as being an Anglo-American struggle, it was the British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder who was pressing Eisenhower most strongly after Goodwood to fire Montgomery.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=690}}</ref> An American officer wrote in his diary that Tedder had come to see Eisenhower to "pursue his current favourite subject, the sacking of Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=287}}</ref> With Tedder leading the "sack Monty" campaign, it encouraged Montgomery's American enemies to press Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> Brooke was sufficiently worried about the "sack Monty" campaign to visit Montgomery at his Tactical Headquarters (TAC) in France and as he wrote in his diary; "warned [Montgomery] of a tendency in the PM [Churchill] to listen to suggestions that Monty played for safety and was not prepared to take risks".<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Brooke advised Montgomery to invite Churchill to Normandy, arguing that if the "sack Monty" campaign had won the Prime Minister over, then his career would be over, as having Churchill's backing would give Eisenhower the political "cover" to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> On 20 July, Montgomery met Eisenhower and on 21 July, Churchill, at the TAC in France.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> One of Montgomery's staff officers wrote afterwards that it was "common knowledge at Tac that Churchill had come to sack Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> No notes were taken at the Eisenhower–Montgomery and Churchill–Montgomery meetings, but Montgomery was able to persuade both men not to sack him.<ref name="Urban, p. 288" />

With the success of Cobra, which was soon followed by unleashing Patton's Third Army, Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery: "Am delighted that your basic plan has begun brilliantly to unfold with Bradley's initial success."<ref name="Urban, p. 289">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=289}}</ref> The success of Cobra was aided by Operation Spring, when the II Canadian Corps under General [[Guy Simonds]] (the only Canadian general whose skill Montgomery respected) began an offensive south of Caen that made little headway, but which the Germans regarded as the main offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=69}}</ref> Once Third Army arrived, Bradley was promoted to take command of the newly created 12th Army Group, consisting of U.S. First and Third Armies. Following the American breakout, there followed the Battle of Falaise Gap. British, Canadian, and Polish soldiers of 21st Army Group commanded by Montgomery advanced south, while the American and French soldiers of Bradley's 12th Army Group advanced north to encircle the German Army Group B at Falaise, as Montgomery waged what Urban called "a huge battle of annihilation" in August 1944.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Montgomery began his offensive into the ''Suisse Normande'' region with [[Operation Bluecoat]], with Sir Richard O'Connor's VIII Corps and [[Gerard Bucknall]]'s XXX Corps heading south.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=73}}</ref> A dissatisfied Montgomery sacked Bucknall for being insufficiently aggressive and replaced him with General [[Brian Horrocks]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" /> At the same time, Montgomery ordered Patton—whose Third Army was supposed to advance into Brittany—to instead capture [[Nantes]], which was soon taken.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" />

Hitler waited too long to order his soldiers to retreat from Normandy, leading Montgomery to write: "He [Hitler] refused to face the only sound military course. As a result the Allies caused the enemy staggering losses in men and materials."<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Knowing via "Ultra" that Hitler was not planning to retreat from Normandy, Montgomery, on 6 August 1944, ordered an envelopment operation against Army Group B—with the First Canadian Army under Harry Crerar to advance towards Falaise, British Second Army under Miles Dempsey to advance towards [[Argentan]], and Patton's Third Army to advance to [[Alençon]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=77}}</ref> On 11 August, Montgomery changed his plan, with the Canadians to take Falaise and to meet the Americans at Argentan.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77" /> The First Canadian Army launched two operations, Operation Totalize on 7 August, which advanced only {{convert|9|mi|km}} in four days in the face of fierce German resistance, and Operation Tractable on 14 August, which finally took Falaise on 17 August.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=79–80}}</ref> In view of the slow Canadian advance, Patton requested permission to take Falaise, but was refused by Bradley on 13 August. This prompted much controversy, many historians arguing that Bradley lacked aggression and that Montgomery should have overruled Bradley.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=80}}</ref>

The so-called [[Falaise pocket|Falaise Gap]] was closed on 22 August 1944, but several American generals, most notably Patton, accused Montgomery of being insufficiently aggressive in closing it. About 60,000 German soldiers were trapped in Normandy, but before 22 August, about 20,000 Germans had escaped through the Falaise Gap.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> About 10,000 Germans had been killed in the Battle of the Falaise Gap, which led a stunned Eisenhower, who viewed the battlefield on 24 August, to comment with horror that it was impossible to walk without stepping on corpses.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=84}}</ref> The successful conclusion of the Normandy campaign saw the beginning of the debate between the "American school" and "British school" as both American and British generals started to advance claims about who was most responsible for this victory.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Brooke wrote in defence of his protégé Montgomery: "Ike knows nothing about strategy and is 'quite' unsuited to the post of Supreme Commander. It is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when 'national' spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=289–290}}</ref> About Montgomery's conduct of the Normandy campaign, Badsey wrote:

{{Blockquote|Too much discussion on Normandy has centered on the controversial decisions of the Allied commanders. It was not good enough, apparently, to win such a complete and spectacular victory over an enemy that had conquered most of Europe unless it was done perfectly. Most of the blame for this lies with Montgomery, who was foolish enough to insist that it ''had'' been done perfectly, that Normandy—and all his other battles—had been fought accordingly to a precise master plan drawn up beforehand, from which he never deviated. It says much for his personality that Montgomery found others to agree with him, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His handling of the Battle of Normandy was of a very high order, and as the person who would certainly have been blamed for losing the battle, he deserves the credit for winning it.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=87}}</ref>}}

==== Replaced as Ground Forces Commander ====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-14059-0018, Berlin, Oberbefehlshaber der vier Verbündeten.jpg|thumb|right|The Supreme Commanders on 5 June 1945 in Berlin: Bernard Montgomery, [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Georgy Zhukov]] and [[Jean de Lattre de Tassigny]]]]
Eisenhower took over Ground Forces Command on 1 September, while continuing as Supreme Commander, with Montgomery continuing to command the 21st Army Group, now consisting mainly of British and Canadian units. Montgomery vehemently opposed this change, although it had been agreed before the D-Day invasion,<ref name="weigley">{{cite book|author=Weigley, Russell F. |author-link=Russell Weigley |title=Eisenhower's Lieutenants |publisher=[[Indiana University Press]] |location=Bloomington, IN |year=1981 |page=253 |isbn=978-0-253-13333-5}}</ref> instead proposing that either he or Bradley should remain in the job of Ground Forces command. He argued that the two roles were fundamentally different and that Eisenhower possessed the skillset for the former but not the latter; as such, he was liable to neglect the duties of one or the other, rendering the force off-balance. Instead, there was a need for a single decisive master plan under a leader free from the more administrative and political duties of the Supreme Commander - Montgomery felt he was the best equipped to deliver this, but was clear that he would also have been willing to work under Bradley.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=267-268}}

Eisenhower and many others failed to grasp this however, and would misinterpret this as Montgomery's pride being wounded at having command removed. As such, they would attempt to placate him by reassuring him of the areas remaining under his command,{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=267-287}} and Winston Churchill had Montgomery promoted to Field Marshal<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=36680|page=4055|supp=y|date=29 August 1944}}</ref> by way of compensation.<ref name="weigley"/> In addition, the British journalist Mark Urban points out that Montgomery seemed unable to grasp however that as the majority of the 2.2&nbsp;million Allied soldiers fighting against Germany on the Western Front were now American (the ratio was 3''':'''1) that it was politically unacceptable to American public opinion to have Montgomery remain as Land Forces Commander as: "Politics would not allow him to carry on giving orders to great armies of Americans simply because, in his view, [he was the best man for the job]".<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=290}}</ref>

==== Advance to the Rhine ====
By September, ports like [[Cherbourg]] were too far away from the front line, causing the Allies great logistical problems. Antwerp was the third largest port in Europe. It was a deep water inland port connected to the North Sea via the river [[Scheldt]]. The Scheldt was wide enough and dredged deep enough to allow the passage of ocean-going ships.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=129}}

On 3 September 1944 Hitler ordered Fifteenth Army, which had been stationed in the Pas de Calais region and was withdrawing north into the Low Countries, to hold the mouth of the river Scheldt to deprive the Allies of the use of Antwerp.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 148">{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=148}}</ref> Von Rundstedt, the German commander of the Western Front, ordered General [[Gustav-Adolf von Zangen]], the commander of 15th Army, that: "The attempt of the enemy to occupy the West Scheldt in order to obtain the free use of the harbor of Antwerp must be ''resisted to the utmost''" (emphasis in the original).{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=11}} Rundstedt argued with Hitler that as long as the Allies could not use the port of Antwerp, the Allies would lack the logistical capacity for an invasion of Germany.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=11}}

The ''[[Witte Brigade]]'' (White Brigade) of the Belgian resistance had captured the [[Port of Antwerp]] before the Germans could destroy key port facilities,<ref name="auto">''Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign: 13 September – 6 November 1944''; by Mark Zuehlke; pp. 45–50; D & M Publishers, 2009; {{ISBN|978-1926685809}}</ref> and on 4 September, Antwerp was captured by Horrocks with its harbour mostly intact.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=149}}</ref> The British declined to immediately advance over the [[Albert Canal]], and an opportunity to destroy the German Fifteenth Army was lost.<ref name="auto"/> The Germans had mined the river Scheldt, the mouth of the Scheldt was still in German hands making it impossible for the Royal Navy to clear the mines in the river, and therefore the port of Antwerp was still useless to the Allies.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=16, 42–43}}

On 5 September, SHAEF's naval commander, Admiral Sir [[Bertram Ramsay]], had urged Montgomery to make clearing the mouth of the Scheldt his number-one priority. Alone among the senior commanders, only Ramsay saw opening Antwerp as crucial.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=16}} Thanks to "Ultra," Montgomery was aware of Hitler's order by 5 September.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 148"/>

On 9 September, Montgomery wrote to Brooke that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be sufficient to meet all the logistical needs of the 21st Army Group, but only the supply needs of the same formation.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> At the same time, Montgomery noted that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be insufficient for the American armies in France, which would thus force Eisenhower, if for no other reasons than logistics, to favour Montgomery's plans for an invasion of northern Germany by the 21st Army Group, whereas if Antwerp were opened up, then all of the Allied armies could be supplied.{{sfn|Copp|1981|p=150}}

The importance of ports closer to Germany was highlighted with the liberation of the city of Le Havre, which was assigned to [[John Crocker]]'s I Corps.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> To take Le Havre, two infantry divisions, two tank brigades, most of the artillery of the Second British Army, the specialised armoured "gadgets" of Percy Hobart's 79th Armoured Division, the battleship {{HMS|Warspite|03|6}} and the monitor {{HMS|Erebus|I02|6}} were all committed.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> On 10 September 1944, Bomber Command dropped 4,719 tons of bombs on Le Havre, which was the prelude to [[Operation Astonia]], the assault on Le Havre by Crocker's men, which was taken two days later.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> The Canadian historian [[Terry Copp]] wrote that the commitment of this much firepower and men to take only one French city might "seem excessive", but by this point, the Allies desperately needed ports closer to the front line to sustain their advance.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/>

In September 1944, Montgomery ordered Crerar and his First Canadian Army to take the French ports on the English Channel, namely Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk,<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150">{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=150}}</ref> and to clear the Scheldt, a task that Crerar stated was impossible as he lacked enough troops to perform both operations at once.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|pp=151–152}}</ref> Montgomery refused Crerar's request to have British XII Corps under Neil Ritchie assigned to help clear the Scheldt as Montgomery stated he needed XII Corps for Operation Market Garden.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=152}}</ref> On 6 September 1944, Montgomery told Crerar that "I want Boulogne badly" and that city should be taken no matter what the cost.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> On 22 September 1944, Simonds's II Canadian Corps took Boulogne, followed up by taking Calais on 1 October 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|pp=100, 112}} Montgomery was highly impatient with Simonds, complaining that it had taken Crocker's I Corps only two days to take Le Havre while it took Simonds two weeks to take Boulogne and Calais, but Simonds noted that at Le Havre, three divisions and two brigades had been employed, whereas at both Boulogne and Calais, only two brigades were sent in to take both cities.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|pp=150–151}}</ref> After an attempt to storm the [[Leopold Canal (Belgium)|Leopold Canal]] by the 4th Canadian Division had been badly smashed by the German defenders, Simonds ordered a stop to further attempts to clear the river Scheldt until his mission of capturing the French ports on the English Channel had been accomplished; this allowed the German Fifteenth Army ample time to dig into its new home on the Scheldt.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=124}} The only port that was not captured by the Canadians was Dunkirk, as Montgomery ordered the 2nd Canadian Division on 15 September to hold his flank at Antwerp as a prelude for an advance up the Scheldt.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=129}}

[[File:King George VI listens as Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery outlines his future strategy at his mobile headquarters in Holland, 13 October 1944. TR2393.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|right|Holland, 13 October 1944: Montgomery outlines his future strategy to King [[George VI]] in his mobile headquarters.]]

Montgomery pulled away from the First Canadian Army (temporarily commanded now by Simonds as Crerar was ill), the British 51st Highland Division, 1st Polish Division, British 49th (West Riding) Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, and sent all of these formations to help the Second British Army to expand the Market Garden salient with Operations Constellation, [[Operation Aintree|Aintree]], and towards the end of October [[Operation Pheasant|Pheasant]].{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=18}} However, Simonds seems to have regarded the Scheldt campaign as a test of his ability, and he felt he could clear the Scheldt with only three Canadian divisions, despite having to take on the entire Fifteenth Army, which held strongly fortified positions in a landscape that favoured the defence.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=19–20}} Simonds never complained about the lack of air support (made worse by the cloudy October weather), shortages of ammunition or having insufficient troops, regarding these problems as challenges for him to overcome, rather than a cause for complaint.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=19–20}} As it was, Simonds made only slow progress in October 1944 during the fighting in the [[Battle of the Scheldt]], although he was praised by Copp for imaginative and aggressive leadership who managed to achieve much, despite all of the odds against him.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|2006|p=289}}</ref> Montgomery had little respect for the Canadian generals, whom he dismissed as mediocre, with the exception of Simonds, whom he consistently praised as Canada's only "first-rate" general in the entire war.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/>

[[File:THE POLISH ARMY IN THE NORTH-WEST EUROPE CAMPAIGN, 1944-1945 B12101.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|left|Montgomery in conversation with Major General [[Stanisław Maczek]] during his visit to the [[1st Armoured Division (Poland)|1st Polish Armoured Division]] Headquarters in Breda, 25 November 1944]]

Admiral Ramsay, who proved to be a far more articulate and forceful champion of the Canadians than their own generals, starting on 9 October demanded of Eisenhower in a meeting that he either order Montgomery to make supporting the First Canadian Army in the Scheldt fighting his number one priority or sack him.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Ramsay in very strong language argued to Eisenhower that the Allies could only invade Germany if Antwerp was opened, and that as long as the three Canadian divisions fighting in the Scheldt had shortages of ammunition and artillery shells because Montgomery made the Arnhem salient his first priority, then Antwerp would not be opened anytime soon.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Even Brooke wrote in his diary: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp".{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} On 9 October 1944, at Ramsay's urging, Eisenhower sent Montgomery a cable that emphasised the "supreme importance of Antwerp", that "the Canadian Army will not, repeat not, be able to attack until November unless immediately supplied with adequate ammunition", and warned that the Allied advance into Germany would totally stop by mid-November unless Antwerp was opened by October.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Montgomery replied by accusing Ramsay of making "wild statements" unsupported by the facts, denying the Canadians were having to ration ammunition, and claimed that he would soon take the Ruhr thereby making the Scheldt campaign a sideshow.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Montgomery further issued a memo entitled "Notes on Command in Western Europe" demanding that he once again be made Land Forces Commander.  This led to an exasperated Eisenhower telling Montgomery that the question was not the command arrangement but rather his (Montgomery's) ability and willingness to obey orders.  Eisenhower further told Montgomery to either obey orders to immediately clear the mouth of the Scheldt or be sacked.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=43}}

A chastised Montgomery told Eisenhower on 15 October 1944 that he was now making clearing the Scheldt his "top priority", and the ammunition shortages in the First Canadian Army, a problem which he denied even existed five days earlier, were now over as supplying the Canadians was henceforth his first concern.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=43}} Simonds, now reinforced with British troops and Royal Marines, cleared the Scheldt by taking [[Walcheren]] island, the last of the German "fortresses" on the Scheldt, on 8 November 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} With the Scheldt in Allied hands, Royal Navy minesweepers removed the German mines in the river, and Antwerp was finally opened to shipping on 28 November 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} Reflecting Antwerp's importance, the Germans spent the winter of 1944–45 firing V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets at it in an attempt to shut down the port, and the German offensive in December 1944 in the Ardennes had as its ultimate objective the capture of Antwerp.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} Urban wrote that Montgomery's most "serious failure" in the entire war was not the well publicised [[Battle of Arnhem]], but rather his lack of interest in opening up Antwerp, as without it the entire Allied advance from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps stalled in the autumn of 1944 for logistical reasons.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=298}}</ref>

==== Operation Market Garden ====
Montgomery was able to persuade Eisenhower to allow him to test his strategy of a single thrust to the [[Ruhr Area|Ruhr]] with [[Operation Market Garden]] in September 1944. The offensive was strategically bold,<ref name="Lanning"/> although [[Lieutenant General]] [[Humfrey Gale]], the "senior administrative and logistics officer"<ref name="Buckley">{{cite book |last=Buckley |first=John |date=2013 |title=Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 1944-5 |location=New Haven |publisher=Yale University Press |page=213 |isbn=978-0-300-13449-0}}</ref> for SHAEF ([[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]]) considered Montgomery's narrow-thrust strategy to be "logistically unrealistic",<ref name="Buckley"/> and in his opinion "a ruse merely to demonstrate later that he had been prevented from winning the war quickly by Eisenhower's caution."<ref name="Buckley"/> At a strategy meeting on 10 September 1944, Montgomery became so belligerent that Eisenhower was prompted into saying "Steady, Monty! You can't speak to me like that. I'm your boss."<ref name="Buckley"/> Following the Allied breakout from Normandy, Eisenhower favored pursuing the German armies northwards and eastwards to the [[Rhine]] on a broad front. Eisenhower relied on speed, which in turn depended on logistics, which were "stretched to the limit".{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=254–255}} SHAEF did provide Montgomery with additional resources, principally additional [[locomotive]]s and [[rolling stock]], and priority for air supply.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=255}} Eisenhower's decision to launch Market Garden was influenced by his desire to keep the retreating Germans under pressure, and by the pressure from the United States to use the [[First Allied Airborne Army]] as soon as possible.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=269}}

Montgomery's plan for Operation Market Garden (17–25 September 1944) was to outflank the [[Siegfried Line]] and cross the Rhine, setting the stage for later offensives into the Ruhr region. The 21st Army Group would attack north from Belgium, {{convert|60|mi|km}} through the Netherlands, across the Rhine and consolidate north of Arnhem on the far side of the Rhine. The risky plan required three Airborne Divisions to capture numerous intact bridges along a single-lane road, on which an entire Corps had to attack and use as its main supply route. The offensive failed to achieve its objectives.<ref>A Bridge Too Far, Cornelius Ryan.</ref>

Both Churchill and Montgomery claimed that the operation was nearly or 90% successful, "since they had got nine-tenths of the way to Arnhem",<ref name="Beevor">{{cite book |last=Beevor |first=Antony |date=2019 |title=Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 |location=London |publisher=Penguin Books |page=365 |isbn=978-0-670-91867-6}}</ref> prompting Air Chief Marshal Tedder to derisively comment that "one jumps off a cliff with an even higher success rate, until the last few inches."<ref name="Beevor"/> However, in Montgomery's equivocal acceptance of responsibility he blames lack of support, and also refers to the [[Battle of the Scheldt]], which was undertaken by Canadian troops not involved in Market Garden. Montgomery later said:

{{blockquote|It was a bad mistake on my part—I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ... In my—prejudiced—view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded ''in spite of'' my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=243, 298}}}}

In the aftermath of Market Garden, Montgomery made holding the Arnhem salient his first priority, arguing that the Second British Army might still be able to break through and reach the wide open plains of northern Germany, and that he might be able to take the Ruhr by the end of October.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=12, 14}} The Germans under ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]'' [[Walther Model]] attempted to [[Battle of the Nijmegen salient|retake the Nijmegen salient]] in early October, but were beaten back. In the meantime, the First Canadian Army finally achieved the task of clearing the mouth of the river Scheldt, despite the fact that, in the words of Copp and Vogel, "Montgomery's Directive required the Canadians to continue to fight alone for almost two weeks in a battle which everyone agreed could only be won with the aid of additional divisions".{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=14}}

==== Battle of the Bulge ====
On 16 December 1944, at the start of the [[Battle of the Bulge]], Montgomery's 21st Army Group was on the northern flank of the allied lines. Bradley's [[Twelfth United States Army Group|US 12th Army Group]] was to Montgomery's south, with [[William Hood Simpson|William Simpson]]'s [[Ninth United States Army|U.S. Ninth Army]] adjacent to 21st Army Group, [[Courtney Hodges]]' [[First United States Army|U.S. First Army]] holding the Ardennes and Patton's U.S. Third Army further south.<ref name=speer459>{{harvnb|Speer|1970|p=459}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in North-west Europe 1944-45- the Prime Minister in Germany BU2239.jpg|thumb|left|Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery talking with Lieutenant General Simpson, GOC U.S. Ninth Army and Major General [[John B. Anderson (United States Army officer)|John Anderson]], GOC [[XVI Corps (United States)|U.S. XVI Corps]]. Behind are General Bradley and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.]]

[[SHAEF]] believed the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of launching a major offensive, and that no offensive could be launched through such rugged terrain as the Ardennes Forest. Because of this, the area was held by refitting and newly arrived American formations.<ref name=speer459/> The Wehrmacht planned to exploit this by making a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest whilst bad weather grounded Allied air power, splitting the Allied Armies in two. They would then turn north to recapture the port of Antwerp.<ref>{{cite web |last=von Luttchau |first=Charles V. P. |title=The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes |url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |publisher=U.S. Army Center for Military History |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=25 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100725042713/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> If the attack were to succeed in capturing Antwerp, the whole of 21st Army Group, along with U.S. Ninth Army and most of U.S. First Army would be trapped without supplies behind German lines.<ref>{{cite book |last=Cole |first=Hugh M. |chapter=Chapter V: The Sixth Panzer Army Attack |chapter-url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |title=The Ardennes |series=United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations |publisher=[[Office of the Chief of Military History]] |location=Washington, D.C. |year=1965 |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=7 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100807183545/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The attack initially advanced rapidly, splitting U.S. 12th Army Group in two, with all of U.S. Ninth Army and the bulk of U.S. First Army on the northern shoulder of the German 'bulge'. The 12th Army Group commander, Bradley, was located in Luxembourg, making command of the U.S. forces north of the bulge problematic. As Montgomery was the nearest army group commander on the ground, on 20 December, Eisenhower temporarily transferred command of U.S. Ninth Army and U.S. First Army to Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Bradley was "concerned because it might discredit the American command" but that it might mean Montgomery would commit more of his reserves to the battle. In practice the change led to "great resentment on the part of many Americans, particularly at Headquarters, 12th Army Group, and Third Army".<ref>{{cite book|series=United States Army in World War II. European Theater of Operations | title=The Supreme Command|first=Forrest C.|last=Pogue|publisher=U.S. Department of the Army|year=1954| url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme|chapter-url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-20.html|chapter=Chapter XX. Winter Counteroffensives |location=Washington DC|id=CMH Pub. 7-1 |page=378|via=Hyperwar Foundation}}</ref>

With the British and American forces under Montgomery's command holding the northern flank of the German assault, General Patton's Third Army, which was {{convert|90|mi|km}} to the south, turned north and fought its way through the severe weather and German opposition to relieve the besieged American forces in [[Bastogne]]. Four days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, the bad weather cleared and the [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] and RAF<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |title=The RAF in WWII |publisher=The Royal Air Force |date=7 May 1945 |access-date=21 October 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151019073942/http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |archive-date=19 October 2015 |url-status=dead  }}</ref> resumed operations, inflicting heavy casualties on German troops and vehicles. Six days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, Patton's Third Army relieved the besieged American forces in Bastogne. Unable to advance further, and running out of fuel, the Wehrmacht abandoned the offensive.<ref name=speer459/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |title=The Battle of the Bulge |date=20 June 1999 |publisher=US Army |access-date=5 February 2017 |archive-date=6 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206183021/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Morelock states that Montgomery was preoccupied with leading a "single thrust offensive" to Berlin as the overall commander of Allied ground forces, and that he accordingly treated the Ardennes counteroffensive "as a sideshow, to be finished with the least possible effort and expenditure of resources."{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=65}}

Montgomery subsequently wrote of his actions:
{{Blockquote|The first thing to do was to see the battle on the northern flank as one whole, to ensure the vital areas were held securely, and to create reserves for counter-attack. I embarked on these measures: I put British troops under command of the Ninth Army to fight alongside American soldiers, and made that Army take over some of the First Army Front. I positioned British troops as reserves behind the First and Ninth Armies until such time as American reserves could be created.<ref>''The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery'' (1958) p. 308</ref> }}

After the war [[Hasso von Manteuffel]], who commanded the [[5th Panzer Army]] in the Ardennes, was imprisoned awaiting trial for war crimes. During this period he was interviewed by [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], a British author who has since been accused of putting words in the mouths of German generals, and attempting to "rewrite the historical record".<ref>In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory'; by Shimon Naveh, pg 108-109. (London: Francass, 1997). {{ISBN|0-7146-4727-6}};</ref><ref>Liddell Hart and the Weight of History; by John Mearsheimer; pages 8-9, 203-204; Cornell University Press; 2010; {{ISBN|978-0-8014-7631-0}}</ref><ref>A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953, by Alaric Searle; War In History 1998 5: 327; published by SAGE for the University of Salford, Manchester; {{doi|10.1177/096834459800500304}}; available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/ and https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304</ref><ref>"Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A 'Pupil's' Retrospective" (PDF); Strategic Studies Institute.; by Jay Luvaas; 1990; pg 12-13</ref> After conducting several interviews via an interpreter, Liddell Hart in a subsequent book attributed to Manteuffel the following statement about Montgomery's contribution to the battle in the Ardennes:

{{blockquote|The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.{{sfn|Delaforce|2004|p=318}}}}

However, American historian [[Stephen E. Ambrose|Stephen Ambrose]], writing in 1997, maintained that "Putting Monty in command of the northern flank had no effect on the battle".{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2015|p=644}} Ambrose wrote that: "Far from directing the victory, Montgomery had gotten in everyone's way, and had botched the counter-attack."{{sfn|Baxter|1999|p=111}} General Omar Bradley blamed Montgomery's "stagnating conservatism" for his failure to counter-attack when ordered to do so by Eisenhower.{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=92}}

Command of U.S. First Army reverted to 12th Army Group on 17 January 1945,<ref>''The Supreme Command'', Forrest C Pogue, Chapter XX – The Winter Counteroffensives, pp. 378, 395</ref> whilst command of U.S. Ninth Army remained with 21st Army Group for the coming operations to cross the Rhine.<ref>''United States Army in World War II''; Part 3, Volume 4, United States. Dept. of the Army – Office of Military History; 1947; p. 439</ref>

==== Crossing the Rhine ====
[[File:Operationvarsity.jpg|thumb|Montgomery (left), [[Air Marshal]] [[Arthur Coningham (RAF officer)|Sir Arthur Coningham]] (centre) and the Commander of the [[Second Army (United Kingdom)|British Second Army]], Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey|Sir Miles Dempsey]], talking after a conference in which Montgomery gave the order for the Second Army to begin [[Operation Plunder]]]]
[[File:Montgomery receives Order of Victory HD-SN-99-02756.JPG|thumb|Montgomery was awarded the [[Order of Victory]] on 5 June 1945. [[Dwight Eisenhower]], [[Georgy Zhukov]] and [[Sir Arthur Tedder]] were also present.]]

In February 1945, Montgomery's 21st Army Group advanced to the Rhine in [[Operation Veritable]] and [[Operation Grenade]]. It crossed the Rhine on 24 March 1945, in [[Operation Plunder]], which took place two weeks after [[U.S. First Army]] had crossed the Rhine after capturing the [[Ludendorff Bridge]] during the [[Battle of Remagen]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Last/USA-E-Last-11.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150426074853/http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Last/USA-E-Last-11.html|url-status=dead|title=HyperWar: The Last Offensive [Chapter 11]|archive-date=26 April 2015|website=www.ibiblio.org}}</ref>

21st Army Group's river crossing was followed by the encirclement of the [[Ruhr Pocket]]. During this battle, U.S. Ninth Army, which had remained part of 21st Army Group after the Battle of the Bulge, formed the northern arm of the envelopment of German [[Army Group B]], with U.S. First Army forming the southern arm. The two armies linked up on 1 April 1945, encircling 370,000 German troops, and on 4 April 1945, Ninth Army reverted to Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-u-s-ninth-armys-breakout-crossing-the-roer-and-the-rhine/|title=The U.S. Ninth Army's Breakout: Crossing the Roer and the Rhine|date=30 December 2018|publisher=Warfare History Network|access-date=16 March 2018|archive-date=6 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180606183843/http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-u-s-ninth-armys-breakout-crossing-the-roer-and-the-rhine/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

By the war's end, the remaining formations of 21st Army group, First Canadian Army and British Second Army, had liberated the northern part of the Netherlands and captured much of north-west Germany, occupied [[Hamburg]] and [[Rostock]] and sealed off the Danish peninsula.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://militarymaps.narod.ru/eur_oper_e.html#may45|title=Second World War Military Situation Maps 1944–1945|access-date=26 May 2013}}</ref>

On 4 May 1945, on [[Lüneburg Heath]], Montgomery accepted the [[German surrender at Lüneburg Heath|surrender of German forces in north-west Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands]].<ref name="heath218">{{harvnb|Heathcote|1999|p=218}}</ref>