Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

== Contemporary developments ==

=== Metaphysics ===

One difference with respect to early analytic philosophy was the revival of metaphysical theorizing during the second half of the 20th century, and metaphysics remains a fertile topic of research. Although many discussions are continuations of old ones from previous decades and centuries, the debates remains active.<ref name="inwagenetall1998">Van Inwagen, Peter, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) (1998), ''Metaphysics: The Big Questions.''</ref>

==== Decline of logical positivism ====
The rise of metaphysics mirrored the decline of logical positivism, first challenged by the later Wittgenstein.

===== Sellars =====
[[Wilfrid Sellars|Wilfred Sellars]]'s criticism of the "Myth of the Given", in ''Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'' (1956), challenged logical positivism by arguing against sense-data theories. In his "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (1962), Sellars distinguishes between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the world. Sellars's goal of a [[synoptic philosophy]] that unites the everyday and scientific views of reality is the foundation and archetype of what is sometimes called the Pittsburgh School, whose members include [[Robert Brandom]], [[John McDowell]], and [[John Haugeland]].

===== Quine =====
[[File:Willard Van Orman Quine on Bluenose II in Halifax NS harbor 1980.jpg|thumb|120px|W. V. O. Quine helped to undermine logical positivism.]]

Also among the developments that resulted in the decline of logical positivism and the revival of metaphysical theorizing was [[Harvard University|Harvard]] philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. O. Quine]]'s attack on the [[analytic proposition|analytic–synthetic distinction]] in "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]", published in 1951 in ''[[The Philosophical Review]]'' and republished in Quine's book ''From A Logical Point of View'' (1953), a paper "sometimes regarded as the most important in all of [[20th century philosophy|twentieth-century philosophy]]".<ref name=qui>{{cite journal |last=Quine |first=W. V. O. |year=1951 |title=Two Dogmas of Empiricism |url=https://courses.cs.sfu.ca/2015fa-phil-880-g1/pages/quine1/view |journal=[[The Philosophical Review]] |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=20–43 |doi=10.2307/2181906 |jstor=2181906}} Reprinted in his 1953 ''From a Logical Point of View''. Harvard University Press.</ref><ref>S. Yablo and A. Gallois, ''Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?'', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 72, (1998), pp.&nbsp;229–261, 263–283 [https://www.mit.edu/%7Eyablo/om.pdf first part] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110912125408/http://www.mit.edu/%7Eyablo/om.pdf|date=12 September 2011}}</ref><ref>[[Peter Godfrey-Smith]], ''Theory and Reality'', 2003, [[University of Chicago]], {{ISBN|0-226-30062-5}}, pages 30–33 (section 2.4 "Problems and Changes")</ref>

''From a Logical Point of View'' also contains Quine's essay "[[wikisource:On What There Is|On What There Is]]" (1948), which elucidates Russell's theory of descriptions and contains Quine's famous dictum of [[ontological commitment]], "To be is to be the value of a [[Free variables and bound variables|variable]]". He also dubbed the problem of nonexistence [[Plato's beard]].

Quine sought to naturalize philosophy and saw philosophy as continuous with science, but instead of logical positivism advocated a kind of [[semantic holism]] and [[ontological relativity]], which explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world. In his magnum opus ''[[Word and Object]]'' (1960), Quine introduces the idea of [[radical translation]], an introduction to his theory of the [[indeterminacy of translation]], and specifically to prove the [[inscrutability of reference]].

===== Kripke =====
[[File:Kripke.JPG|thumb|160px|Saul Kripke helped to revive interest in metaphysics among analytic philosophers.]]

Important also for the revival of metaphysics was the further development of [[modal logic]], first introduced by pragmatist [[C. I. Lewis]], especially the work of [[Saul Kripke]] and his ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' (1980).{{efn|Named in reference to Carnap's  ''[[Meaning and Necessity]]''.}}

According to one author, ''Naming and Necessity'' "played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers—that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language."<ref name=ageofm>Soames, Scott. 2005. ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 2: The Age of Meaning''. [[Princeton University Press]]. Cited in Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. 2004. 'Necessary Truths'. ''Boston Review'' October/November 2004.</ref>

Kripke was influential in arguing that flaws in common theories of descriptions and proper names are indicative of larger misunderstandings of the [[Modal metaphysics|metaphysics]] of necessity and [[Contingency (philosophy)|possibility]]. Kripke also argued that [[Metaphysical necessity|necessity]] is a metaphysical notion distinct from the [[Epistemology|epistemic]] notion of ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'', and that there are [[Logical truth|necessary truths]] that are known ''[[A posteriori necessity|a posteriori]]'', such as that water is H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name=":1">[[Dean Zimmerman (philosopher)|Zimmerman, Dean W.]], "Prologue" in ''Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1'' (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. xix.</ref>

Kripke is widely regarded as having revived theories of [[essence]] and [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] as respectable topics of philosophical discussion.<ref name=":1" /> Kripke and [[Hilary Putnam]] argued for realism about [[natural kind]]s. Kripke holds that it is [[Essentialism|essential]] that water is H<sub>2</sub>O, or for [[gold]] to be [[atomic number]] 79.  Putnam's [[Twin Earth thought experiment]] can be used to illustrate the same point with water.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Bird |first1=Alexander |title=Natural Kinds |date=2024 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/natural-kinds/ |access-date=2024-04-22 |edition=Spring 2024 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Tobin |first2=Emma |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>

===== David Lewis =====
American philosopher [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] defended a number of elaborate metaphysical theories. In works such as ''[[On the Plurality of Worlds]]'' (1986) and ''Counterfactuals'' (1973) he argued for [[modal realism]] and [[counterpart theory]]{{snd}}the belief in real, concrete [[possible world]]s. According to Lewis, "actual" is merely an indexical label we give a world when we are in it. Lewis also defended what he called Humean [[supervenience]], a [[Counterfactual conditional|counterfactual theory]] of [[Causality|causation]],<ref>{{Citation |last=Hitchcock |first=Christopher |title=Lewis on Causation |date=6 March 2015 |work=A Companion to David Lewis |pages=295–311 |place=Oxford, UK |publisher=John Wiley & Sons, Ltd |doi=10.1002/9781118398593.ch19 |isbn=978-1-118-39859-3}}</ref> and contributed to [[Abstract and concrete|abstract object]] theory.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Lewis |first=David |date=March 1986 |title=Against structural universals |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=25–46 |doi=10.1080/00048408612342211 |issn=0004-8402}}</ref> He became closely associated with Australia, whose philosophical community he visited almost annually for more than 30 years.

==== Universals ====
In response to the [[Problem of universals|problem]] of [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], Australian [[David Malet Armstrong]] defended a kind of [[moderate realism]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Jackson |first=Frank |title=Armstrong, David Malet (1926–2014) |date=2016 |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/armstrong-david-malet-1926-2014/v-1 |access-date=21 July 2020 |edition=1 |place=London |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-v035-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |encyclopedia=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Armstrong |first=David Malet |title=Universals and scientific realism |date=1995 |publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press |isbn=0-521-28033-8 |oclc=174240749}}</ref> Quine and Lewis defended [[nominalism]].<ref name=":2" />

==== Mereology ====
Polish philosopher [[Stanisław Leśniewski]] coined the term [[mereology]], which is the formal study of parts and wholes, a subject that arguably goes back to the time of the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-Socratics]].<ref>Cotnoir, A. J., and Varzi, Achille C.. Mereology. United Kingdom, OUP Oxford, 2021. p. 2</ref> David Lewis believed in [[perdurantism]] and introduced the term '[[Gunk (mereology)|gunk]]'. [[Peter Van Inwagen]] believes in [[mereological nihilism]], except for living beings, a view called [[organicism]].

==== Free will and determinism ====
Peter van Inwagen's 1983 [[monograph]] ''An Essay on Free Will''{{sfn|van Inwagen|1983}} played an important role in rehabilitating [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarianism]] with respect to [[free will]], in mainstream analytical philosophy.{{sfn|Kane|2005|p=23}} In the book, he introduces the [[consequence argument]] and the term [[incompatibilism]] about free will and [[determinism]], to stand in contrast to [[compatibilism]]—the view that free will is compatible with determinism. [[C. D. Broad|Charlie Broad]] had previously made similar arguments.

==== Personal identity ====
Since [[John Locke]], philosophers have been concerned with the problem of [[personal identity]]. [[Derek Parfit]] in ''[[Reasons and Persons]]'' (1984) defends a kind of [[bundle theory]], while David Lewis again defends perdurantism. [[Bernard Williams]] in ''The Self and the Future'' (1970) argues that personal identity is bodily identity rather than mental continuity.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=54nvGHWVfqY |title=Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self |pages=103}}</ref>

==== Principle of sufficient reason ====
Since [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] philosophers have discussed the [[principle of sufficient reason]] or PSR. Van Inwagen criticizes the PSR.{{sfn|van Inwagen|1983}} [[Alexander Pruss]] defends it.<ref>Pruss, "Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments"</ref>

==== Philosophy of time ====
Analytic [[Philosophy of space and time|philosophy of time]] traces its roots to the British idealist [[J. M. E. McTaggart]]'s article "[[The Unreality of Time]]"  (1908). In it, McTaggart distinguishes between the dynamic, [[A series and B series|A-, or tensed, theory]] of time (past, present, future), in which [[flow of time|time flows]]; and the static or tenseless [[B-theory of time]] (earlier than, simultaneous with, later than). [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)|Eternalism]] holds that past, present, and future are equally real. In contrast, [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|Presentism]] holds that only entities in the present exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=206, 214–215}}</ref>

The theory of special relativity seems to advocate a B-theory of time. David Lewis's perdurantism, or [[four-dimensionalism]], requires a B-theory of time.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=-9MYDQAAQBAJ Personal Identity and Resurrection]</ref> [[A. N. Prior]], who invented [[tense logic]], advocated the A-theory of time.

==== Logical pluralism ====
[[Many-valued logic|Many-valued]] and [[Non-classical logic|non-classical]] logics have been popular since the Polish logician [[Jan Łukasiewicz|Jan Lukasiewicz]]. [[Graham Priest]] is a [[Dialetheism|dialetheist]], seeing it as the most natural solution to problems such as the [[liar paradox]]. [[JC Beall]], together with [[Greg Restall]], is a pioneer of a widely-discussed version of [[logical pluralism]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Logical Pluralism |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/logical-pluralism-9780199288410?cc=us&lang=en& |accessdate=February 5, 2017 |publisher=global.oup.com}}</ref>

=== Epistemology ===
{{Main|Epistemology}}

==== Justification ====

===== Gettier =====
[[File:Edmund L Gettier III ca 1960s umass.jpg|thumb|140px|Edmund Gettier helped to revitalize analytic epistemology.]]

Owing largely to [[Edmund Gettier]]'s 1963 paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",<ref>{{Citation |last=Gettier |first=Edmund |title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? |date=15 July 2020 |url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%20Gettier%20Conocimiento.pdf |work=Arguing About Knowledge |pages=14–15 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9781003061038-5 |isbn=978-1-003-06103-8 |s2cid=243290967}}</ref> and the so-called [[Gettier problem]], epistemology has enjoyed a resurgence as a topic of analytic philosophy during the last 50 years. A large portion of current epistemological research is intended to resolve the problems that Gettier's examples presented to the traditional "justified true belief" model of knowledge, found as early as Plato's dialogue ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]''. These include developing [[Theory of justification|theories of justification]] to deal with Gettier's examples, or giving alternatives to the justified-true-belief model.

===== Theories =====
Chisholm defended [[foundationalism]]. Quine defended [[coherentism]], a "web of belief".<ref>The Web of Belief</ref> Quine proposed [[naturalized epistemology]].

====== Internalism and externalism ======
The debate between [[internalism and externalism]] still exists in analytic philosophy.<ref>Bonjour, Laurence, "Recent Work on the Internalism–Externalism Controversy" in Dancy, Sosa, and Steup (eds.), ''A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition'' (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 33.</ref> [[Alvin Goldman]] is an externalist known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. Most externalists reject the [[KK thesis]], which has been disputed since the introduction of the epistemic logic by [[Jaakko Hintikka]] in 1962.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last1=Rahman |first1=Shahid |title=Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science |last2=Symons |first2=John |last3=Gabbay |first3=Dov M. |last4=bendegem |first4=jean paul van |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4020-2807-6 |location=Dordrecht |pages=92 |language=en}}</ref>

==== Problem of the Criterion ====
While a problem since antiquity, American philosopher [[Roderick Chisholm]], in his ''Theory of Knowledge'', details the [[problem of the criterion]] with two sets of questions:

# What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?
# How do we know? or What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge in any particular case?

An answer to either set of questions will allow us to devise a means of answering the other. Answering the former question-set first is called ''[[Epistemological particularism|particularism]]'', whereas answering the latter set first is called ''[[Methodism (philosophy)|methodism]]''. A third solution is ''[[philosophical skepticism|skepticism]]'', or doubting there is such a thing as knowledge.

==== Truth ====
[[File:AlfredTarski1968.jpeg|thumb|150px|Alfred Tarski has an influential theory of truth.]]

Frege questioned standard theories of [[truth]], and sometimes advocated a [[redundancy theory of truth]]. Frank Ramsey also advocated a redundancy theory.  [[Alfred Tarski]] put forward a [[semantic theory of truth]].<ref name="Vaught">{{cite journal |last=Vaught |first=Robert L. |date=Dec 1986 |title=Alfred Tarski's Work in Model Theory |journal=[[Journal of Symbolic Logic]] |publisher=ASL |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=869–882 |doi=10.2307/2273900 |jstor=2273900}}</ref><ref name="FF">[[Lwów–Warsaw school#F-F|Feferman & Feferman]], p. 1</ref>

In ''Truth-Makers'' (1984), [[Kevin Mulligan]], [[Peter Simons (academic)|Peter Simons]], and [[Barry Smith (academic)|Barry Smith]] introduced the [[Truthmaker theory|truth-maker]] idea as a contribution to the [[correspondence theory of truth]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mulligan |first1=Kevin |last2=Simons |first2=Peter |last3=Smith |first3=Barry |date=1984 |title=Truth-Makers |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MULT |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=44 |issue=3 |pages=287–321 |doi=10.2307/2107686 |jstor=2107686}}</ref> A truth-maker is contrasted with a [[truth-bearer]].

==== Closure ====
[[File:3349839-left-hand-outstretched.jpg|thumb|140px|"Here is one hand"]]

[[Epistemic closure]] is the claim that knowledge is closed under [[Logical consequence|entailment]]; in other words epistemic closure is a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] or the [[Concept|principle]] that if a subject <math>S</math> knows <math>p</math>, and <math>S</math> knows that <math>p</math> [[Logical consequence|entails]] <math>q</math>, then <math>S</math> can thereby come to know <math>q</math>.<ref name="stanford">{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Epistemic Closure Principle |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=31 December 2001 |author=Luper, Steven |chapter-url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/closure-epistemic/#CloPri |chapter=Epistemic Closure}}</ref> Most [[Epistemology|epistemological]] theories involve a closure principle, and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle. In ''Proof of An External World'', G. E. Moore uses closure in his famous anti-skeptical "[[here is one hand]]" argument. Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein wrote ''[[On Certainty]]'' in response to Moore.

While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive,<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Brady, Michael |author2=Pritchard, Duncan |year=2005 |title=Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects |journal=[[The Philosophical Quarterly]] |volume=55 |issue=219 |pages=161–171 |doi=10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x}}</ref> philosophers, such as [[Fred Dretske]] with [[relevant alternatives theory]] and Robert Nozick in ''[[Philosophical Explanations]]'', have argued against it.

==== Induction ====
[[File:Зүмірет.jpg|thumb|150px|All emeralds are "grue".]]

In his book ''[[Fact, Fiction, and Forecast]]'', [[Nelson Goodman]] introduced the "[[new riddle of induction]]", so-called by analogy with [[David Hume|Hume]]'s classical [[problem of induction]].  Goodman's famous example was to introduce the predicates [[New riddle of induction|grue and bleen]]. "Grue" applies to all things before a certain time ''t'', just in case they are green, but also just in case they are blue after time ''t''; and "bleen" applies to all things before a certain time ''t'', just in the case they are blue, but also just in case they are green after time ''t''.

==== Other topics ====
Other, related topics of contemporary research include debates over basic knowledge, the nature of [[evidence]], the value of knowledge, [[epistemic luck]], [[virtue epistemology]], the role of [[intuition (philosophy)|intuitions]] in justification, and treating knowledge as a primitive concept.

=== Ethics ===
Due to the commitments to [[empiricism]] and [[Mathematical logic|symbolic logic]] in the early analytic period, early analytic philosophers often thought that inquiry in the ethical domain could not be made rigorous enough to merit any attention.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5lK6DTadnaQC&q=%22analytic+philosophy%22+ethics&pg=PT213|title=A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls|last=Schwartz|first=Stephen P.|year=2012|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-1-118-27172-8|language=en}}</ref> It was only with the emergence of ordinary-language philosophers that ethics started to become an acceptable area of inquiry for analytic philosophers.<ref name=":0" /> Philosophers working within the analytic tradition have gradually come to distinguish three major types of moral philosophy.

* [[Meta-ethics]], which investigates moral terms and concepts;<ref>{{Cite book|title=Key Terms in Ethics|last=Kuusela|first=Oskari|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|year=2011|isbn=978-1-4411-6610-4|location=London|page=61}}</ref>
* [[Normative ethics]], which examines and produces normative ethical judgments;
* [[Applied ethics]], which investigates how existing normative principles should be applied to difficult or borderline cases, often cases created by new technology or new scientific knowledge.

==== Meta-ethics ====
As well as Hume's famous [[Is–ought problem|is/ought distinction]], twentieth-century meta-ethics has two original strains.

===== ''Principia Ethica'' =====
[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|160px|G. E. Moore was an ethical non-naturalist.]]

The first is [[G. E. Moore]]'s investigation into the nature of ethical terms (e.g., good) in his ''Principia Ethica'' (1903), which  advances a kind of [[moral realism]] called [[ethical non-naturalism]] and is known for the [[Open-question argument|open question argument]] and identifying the [[naturalistic fallacy]], a major topic of investigation for analytical philosophers. According to Moore, "[[Goodness and value theory|Goodness]] is a simple, undefinable, non-natural [[Property (philosophy)|property]]."

Contemporary philosophers, such as [[Russ Shafer-Landau]] in ''[[Moral Realism: A Defence]]'', defend ethical non-naturalism.

===== Emotivism =====
The second is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead began [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] investigations into the nature of moral terms, statements, and judgments.

The logical positivists opined that statements about [[Value (ethics)|value]]—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are [[non-cognitivism|non-cognitive]]; that is, they cannot be objectively verified or falsified. Instead, the logical positivists adopted an [[emotivism|emotivist]] theory, which was that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. It is also known as the boo/hurrah theory. For example, in this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.

While analytic philosophers generally accepted non-cognitivism, emotivism had many deficiencies. It evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories, such as the [[expressivism]] of [[Charles Stevenson (philosopher)|Charles Stevenson]], and the [[universal prescriptivism]] of [[R. M. Hare]], which was based on J. L. Austin's philosophy of [[speech acts]].

===== Critics =====
As non-cognitivism, the is/ought distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy were questioned, analytic philosophers showed a renewed interest in the traditional questions of moral philosophy.

[[Philippa Foot]] defended [[Ethical naturalism|naturalist]] moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories.{{efn|Foot was the granddaughter of former US President [[Grover Cleveland]].}} Foot introduced the famous "[[trolley problem]]" into the ethical discourse.<ref name="Philippa Foot 1978">Philippa Foot, "[https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect]" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190824083120/http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf|date=24 August 2019}} in ''Virtues and Vices'' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) (originally in the ''Oxford Review'', No. 5, 1967).</ref>

Perhaps the most influential critic was [[Elizabeth Anscombe]], whose monograph ''Intention'' was called by [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] "the most important treatment of [[Action theory (philosophy)|action]] since Aristotle".<ref>From the cover of the 2000 Harvard University Press edition of ''Intention''.</ref> A favorite student and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, her 1958 article "[[Modern Moral Philosophy]]" declared the "is-ought" impasse to be unproductive. [[J.O. Urmson]]'s article "On Grading" also called the is/ought distinction into question.

Australian [[J. L. Mackie]], in ''Ethics: Inventing Right And Wrong'', defended anti-realist [[error theory]]. [[Bernard Williams]] also influenced ethics by advocating a kind of [[moral relativism]] and rejecting all other theories.<ref>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</ref>

==== Normative ethics ====
The first half of the 20th century was marked by skepticism toward, and neglect of, normative ethics. However, contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three schools: [[consequentialism]], [[virtue ethics]], and [[deontology]].{{efn|Anscombe introduced the term "[[consequentialism]]" into the philosophical lexicon.}}

===== Consequentialism, or Utilitarianism =====

During the early 20th century, [[utilitarianism]] was the only non-skeptical type of ethics to remain popular among analytic philosophers. However, as the influence of logical positivism declined mid-century, analytic philosophers had a renewed interest in ethics. ''Utilitarianism: For and Against'' was written with [[J. J. C. Smart]] arguing for and Bernard Williams arguing against.

===== Virtue ethics =====
Anscombe, Foot, and [[Alasdair MacIntyre|Alasdair Macintyre]]'s ''After Virtue'' sparked a revival of [[Aristotle]]'s [[Virtue ethics|virtue ethical]] approach. This increased interest in virtue ethics has been dubbed the "[[Virtue ethics|aretaic turn]]" mimicking the linguistic turn.

===== Deontology =====
[[John Rawls]]'s 1971 ''[[A Theory of Justice]]'' restored interest in [[Kantian]] ethical philosophy.

==== Applied ethics ====
Since around 1970, a significant feature of analytic philosophy has been the emergence of [[applied ethics]]—an interest in the application of moral principles to specific practical issues. The philosophers following this orientation view ethics as involving humanistic values, which involve practical implications and applications in the way people interact and lead their lives socially.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions|last=Ikuenobe|first=Polycarp|publisher=Lexington Books|year=2006|isbn=978-0-7391-1131-4|location=Oxford|page=104}}</ref>

Topics of special interest for applied ethics include [[environmental ethics]], [[animal rights]], and the many challenges created by advancing [[bioethics|medical science]].<ref>Brennan, Andrew and Yeuk-Sze Lo (2002). "Environmental Ethics" [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#2 §2] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130801143528/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/ |date=1 August 2013 }}, in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref><ref>Gruen, Lori (2003). "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ The Moral Status of Animals]," in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref><ref>See Hursthouse, Rosalind (2003). "Virtue Ethics" [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#3 §3], in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' and Donchin, Anne (2004). "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-bioethics/ Feminist Bioethics]" in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref> In education, applied ethics addressed themes such as punishment in schools, [[Equal opportunity|equality of educational opportunity]], and education for democracy.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Methods in Philosophy of Education|url=https://archive.org/details/methodsphilosoph00heyt|url-access=limited|last1=Heyting|first1=Frieda|last2=Lenzen|first2=Dieter|last3=White|first3=John|publisher=Routledge|year=2002|isbn=978-0-415-24260-8|location=New York|pages=[https://archive.org/details/methodsphilosoph00heyt/page/n30 18]}}</ref>

===Political philosophy===

====Liberalism====
[[File:John Rawls (1971 photo portrait).jpg|thumb|140px|John Rawls]]

[[Isaiah Berlin]] had a lasting influence on both analytic political philosophy and liberalism with his lecture "[[Two Concepts of Liberty]]".{{Citation needed|date=August 2022}} Berlin defined 'negative liberty' as absence of coercion or interference in private actions. 'Positive liberty' Berlin maintained, could be thought of as self-mastery, which asks not what we are free from, but what we are free to do.

Current analytic political philosophy owes much to [[John Rawls]], who in a series of papers from the 1950s onward (most notably "Two Concepts of Rules" and "Justice as Fairness") and his 1971 book ''[[A Theory of Justice]]'', produced a sophisticated defense of a generally liberal [[Egalitarianism|egalitarian]] account of distributive justice. Rawls introduced the term the [[Original position|veil of ignorance]].

This was followed soon by Rawls's colleague [[Robert Nozick]]'s book ''[[Anarchy, State, and Utopia]]'', a defense of [[free-market]] [[libertarianism]].  [[Consequentialist libertarianism]] also derives from the analytic tradition {{Citation needed|date=August 2022}}.

During recent decades there have also been several critics of liberalism, including the [[feminism|feminist]] critiques by [[Catharine MacKinnon]] and [[Andrea Dworkin]], the [[multiculturalism|multiculturalist]] critiques by [[Amy Gutmann]] and [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]], and the [[communitarianism|communitarian]] critiques by [[Michael Sandel]] and [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] (although neither of them endorses the term).

==== Analytical Marxism ====
Another development of political philosophy was the emergence of the school of [[analytical Marxism]]. Members of this school seek to apply techniques of analytic philosophy and modern social science to clarify the theories of [[Karl Marx]] and his successors. The best-known member of this school is [[G. A. Cohen]], whose 1978 book, ''[[Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence]]'', is generally considered to represent the genesis of this school. In that book, Cohen used logical and linguistic analysis to clarify and defend Marx's materialist conception of history. Other prominent analytical Marxists include the economist [[John Roemer]], the social scientist [[Jon Elster]], and the sociologist [[Erik Olin Wright]]. The work of these later philosophers has furthered Cohen's work by bringing to bear modern social science methods, such as [[rational choice theory]], to supplement Cohen's use of analytic philosophical techniques in the interpretation of Marxian theory.

Cohen himself would later engage directly with Rawlsian political philosophy to advance a [[socialist]] theory of justice that contrasts with both traditional Marxism and the theories advanced by Rawls and Nozick. In particular, he indicates Marx's principle of [[from each according to his ability, to each according to his need]].

Although not an analytic philosopher, [[Jürgen Habermas]] is another influential—if controversial—author in contemporary analytic political philosophy, whose social theory is a blend of social science, Marxism, [[neo-Kantianism]], and American [[pragmatism]].{{Citation needed|date=August 2022}}

==== Communitarianism ====
[[File:Alasdair MacIntyre.jpg|thumb|130px|Alasdair MacIntyre]]

[[Communitarian]]s such as [[Alasdair MacIntyre]], [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]], [[Michael Walzer]], and [[Michael Sandel]] advance a critique of liberalism that uses analytic techniques to isolate the main assumptions of liberal individualists, such as Rawls, and then challenges these assumptions. In particular, communitarians challenge the liberal assumption that the individual can be considered as fully autonomous from the community in which he is brought up and lives. Instead, they argue for a conception of the individual that emphasizes the role that the community plays in forming his or her values, thought processes, and opinions. While in the analytic tradition, its major exponents often also engage at length with figures generally considered continental, notably [[G. W. F. Hegel]] and [[Friedrich Nietzsche]].

===Aesthetics===
{{Main|Aesthetics}}

As a result of logical positivism, as well as what seemed like rejections of the traditional aesthetic notions of beauty and sublimity from [[post-modern]] thinkers, analytic philosophers were slow to consider art and aesthetic judgment. [[Susanne Langer]]<ref>[[Susanne Langer]], ''Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art'' (1953)</ref> and [[Nelson Goodman]]<ref>[[Nelson Goodman]], ''Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols''. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976. Based on his 1960–61 John Locke lectures.</ref> addressed these problems in an analytic style during the 1950s and 1960s. Since Goodman, aesthetics as a discipline for analytic philosophers has flourished.<ref>Kivy, Peter, "Introduction: Aesthetics Today" in ''The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics'' (Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 4.</ref>

[[Arthur Danto]] argued for a "institutional definition of art" in the 1964 essay "The Artworld" in which Danto coined the term "artworld" (as opposed to the existing "[[art world]]", though they mean the same), by which he meant cultural context or "an atmosphere of [[art theory]]".<ref>Adajian, Thomas. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-definition/ "The Definition of Art"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', London, Oct 23, 2007. <!--accessed December 21, 2009--></ref>

Rigorous efforts to pursue analyses of traditional aesthetic concepts were performed by [[Guy Sircello]] in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in new analytic theories of love,<ref>[[Guy Sircello]], ''Love and Beauty.'' Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.</ref> sublimity,<ref>[[Guy Sircello]] "How Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?" ''The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism'', Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp.&nbsp;541–550</ref> and beauty.<ref>[[Guy Sircello]], ''A New Theory of Beauty.'' Princeton Essays on the Arts, 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.</ref> In the opinion of [[Władysław Tatarkiewicz]], there are six conditions for the presentation of art: beauty, form, representation, reproduction of reality, artistic expression, and innovation. However, one may not be able to pin down these qualities in a work of art.<ref>{{cite book |last=Tatarkiewicz |first=Władysław |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eD4qAQAAMAAJ |title=A History of Six Ideas: an essay in aesthetics |date=1980 |publisher=PWN/Polish Scientific Publishers |isbn=978-8301008246}}</ref>

[[George Dickie (philosopher)|George Dickie]] was an influential philosopher of art. Dickie's student [[Noël Carroll]] is a leading philosopher of art.

=== Philosophy of language ===
{{Main|Philosophy of language}}

Given the linguistic turn, it can be hard to separate logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language in analytic philosophy. Philosophy of language is a topic that has decreased in activity during the last four decades, as evidenced by the fact that few major philosophers today treat it as a primary research topic. While the debate remains fierce, it is still strongly influenced by those authors from the first half of the century, e.g. Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin, Tarski, and Quine.

==== Semantics ====
[[Saul Kripke]] provided a [[Kripke semantics|semantics]] for modal logic. In his book ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' (1980), Kripke challenges the descriptivist theory with a [[causal theory of reference]]. In it he introduced the term [[rigid designator]]. According to one author, "In the philosophy of language, ''Naming and Necessity'' is among the most important works ever."<ref name=ageofm /> [[Ruth Barcan Marcus]] also challenged descriptivism. So did [[Keith Donnellan]].<ref>Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions"</ref>

Hilary Putnam used the Twin Earth thought experiment to argue for [[semantic externalism]], or the view that the meanings of words are not psychological. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] uses the thought experiment of Swampman to advocate for semantic externalism.

Kripke in ''[[Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language]]'' provides a rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language and, so, calls into question the idea of meaning. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". The [[portmanteau]] "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a term for a fictional person who holds the views expressed by Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein.

Another influential philosopher, [[Pavel Tichý]] initiated Transparent Intensional Logic, an original theory of the [[logical analysis]] of [[natural language]]s—the theory is devoted to the problem of saying exactly what it is that we learn, know, and can communicate when we come to understand what a sentence means.

==== Pragmatics ====
[[Paul Grice]] and his maxims and theory of [[implicature]] established the discipline of pragmatics.

=== Philosophy of mind and cognitive science ===
[[File:John searle2.jpg|thumb|130px|John Searle]]
[[John Searle]] suggests that the obsession with the philosophy of language during the 20th century has been superseded by an emphasis on the [[philosophy of mind]].<ref>Postrel and Feser, February 2000, ''Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle'' at {{cite web |date=February 2000 |title=Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle |url=http://www.reason.com/news/show/27599.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080929023644/http://www.reason.com/news/show/27599.html |archive-date=29 September 2008 |access-date=23 September 2008}}</ref>

==== Physicalism ====
Motivated by the logical positivists' interest in verificationism, [[logical behaviorism]] was the most prominent [[philosophy of mind|theory of mind]] of analytic philosophy for the first half of the 20th century.<ref>Graham, George, "Behaviorism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/behaviorism/]</ref> Behaviorism later became much less popular, in favor of either [[Identity theory of mind|type physicalism]] or [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]]. During this period, topics of the philosophy of mind were often related strongly to topics of [[cognitive science]], such as [[modularity of mind|modularity]] or [[Psychological nativism|innateness]].

===== Behaviorism =====
Behaviorists such as [[B. F. Skinner]] tended to opine either that statements about the mind were equivalent to ''statements about'' behavior and dispositions to behave in particular ways or that mental states were directly equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave.
 
[[File:Hilary Putnam.jpg|thumb|120px|Hilary Putnam]]

Hilary Putnam criticized behaviorism by arguing that it confuses the symptoms of mental states with the mental states themselves, positing "super Spartans" who never display signs of pain.<ref>Brains and Behavior, Hilary Putnam</ref>

See also: {{slink|Verbal_Behavior#Chomsky's_review_and_replies}}

===== Type Identity =====
Type physicalism or type identity theory identified mental states with brain states. Former students of Ryle at the [[University of Adelaide]]  [[J. J. C. Smart]] and [[Ullin Place]] argued for type physicalism.

===== Functionalism =====
Functionalism remains the dominant theory. Type identity was criticized using [[multiple realizability]].

Searle's [[Chinese room]] argument criticized functionalism and holds that while a computer can understand syntax, it could never understand semantics.

===== Eliminativism =====
The view of [[eliminative materialism]] is most closely associated with [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]], who deny the existence of propositional attitudes, and with [[Daniel Dennett]], who is generally considered an eliminativist about [[qualia]] and phenomenal aspects of consciousness.

==== Dualism ====
[[File:David chalmers.jpg|thumb|140px|David Chalmers]]

Finally, analytic philosophy has featured a certain number of philosophers who were [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualists]], and recently forms of [[property dualism]] have had a resurgence; the most prominent representative is [[David Chalmers]].<ref>{{cite SEP|url-id=dualism|title=Dualism}}</ref> Kripke also makes a notable argument for dualism.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Kripke on the distinctness of the mind from the body |url=https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/415/kripke-mind-body.html |access-date=2024-04-22 |website=www3.nd.edu}}</ref>

[[Thomas Nagel]]'s "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?|What is it like to be a bat]]?" challenged the physicalist account of mind. So did [[Frank Jackson (philosopher)|Frank Jackson]]'s [[knowledge argument]], which argues for [[qualia]].

==== Theories of consciousness ====
In recent years, a central focus of research in the philosophy of mind has been [[consciousness]] and the [[philosophy of perception]]. While there is a general consensus for the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Dennett |first1=D. |year=2001 |title=Are we explaining consciousness yet? |journal=Cognition |volume=79 |issue=1–2 |pages=221–237 |doi=10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X |pmid=11164029 |s2cid=2235514}}</ref> there are many opinions as to the specifics. The best known theories are Searle's [[Naïve realism|naive realism]], [[Fred Dretske]] and [[Michael Tye (philosopher)|Michael Tye]]'s [[direct and indirect realism|representationalism]],  [[Daniel Dennett]]'s [[heterophenomenology]], and the [[Higher-order theories of consciousness|higher-order theories]] of either [[David M. Rosenthal (philosopher)|David M. Rosenthal]]—who advocates a higher-order thought (HOT) model—or [[David Malet Armstrong|David Armstrong]] and [[William Lycan]]—who advocate a higher-order perception (HOP) model. An alternative higher-order theory, the higher-order global states (HOGS) model, is offered by [[Robert van Gulick]].<ref>For summaries and some criticism of the different higher-order theories, see Van Gulick, Robert (2006) "Mirror Mirror – Is That All?" In Kriegel & Williford (eds.), ''Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness''. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The final draft is also available here {{cite web |title=Mirror Mirror – Is That All? |url=http://web.syr.edu/~rnvangul/mirror-mirror.final.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081002035247/http://web.syr.edu/~rnvangul/mirror-mirror.final.pdf |archive-date=2 October 2008 |access-date=23 September 2008}}. For Van Gulick's own view, see Van Gulick, Robert. "Higher-Order Global States HOGS: An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness." In Gennaro, R.J., (ed.) ''Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology.'' Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.</ref>

=== Philosophy of mathematics ===
[[File:Kurt gödel.jpg|thumb|130px|Kurt Gödel]]

Since the beginning, analytic philosophy has had an interest in the [[philosophy of mathematics]]. [[Kurt Gödel]], a student of Hans Hahn of the Vienna Circle, produced his [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems|incompleteness theorems]] showing that Russell and Whitehead's ''Principia Mathematica'' also failed to reduce arithmetic to logic. Gödel has been ranked as one  of the four greatest logicians of all time, along with [[Aristotle]], Frege, and Tarski.<ref name="Restall">{{cite web |last=Restall |first=Greg |date=2002–2006 |title=Great Moments in Logic |url=http://consequently.org/writing/logicians/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206052240/http://consequently.org/writing/logicians/ |archive-date=6 December 2008 |access-date=2009-01-03}}</ref> [[Ernst Zermelo]] and [[Abraham Fraenkel]] established [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory|Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory]]. Quine developed his own system, dubbed [[New Foundations]].

Physicist [[Eugene Wigner]]'s seminal paper "[[The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences]]" poses the question of why a formal pursuit like mathematics can have real utility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wigner|first1=E. P.|author-link=Eugene Wigner|year=1960|title=The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences. Richard Courant lecture in mathematical sciences delivered at New York University, May 11, 1959|url=http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html|journal=Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics|volume=13|issue=1|pages=1–14|bibcode=1960CPAM...13....1W|doi=10.1002/cpa.3160130102|s2cid=6112252|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210212111540/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html|archive-date=2021-02-12}}</ref> [[José Benardete]] argued for the reality of [[infinity]].<ref>Infinity: An Essay In Metaphysics</ref>

Akin to the medieval debate on universals, between realists, idealists, and nominalists; the philosophy of mathematics has the debate between logicists or platonists, conceptualists or [[Intuitionism|intuitionists]], and [[Formalism (philosophy of mathematics)|formalists]].<ref>Quine, On What There Is</ref>

==== Platonism ====
Gödel was a platonist who postulated a special kind of mathematical intuition that lets us perceive mathematical objects directly. Quine and Putnam argued for platonism with the [[Quine–Putnam indispensability argument|indispensability argument]]. [[Crispin Wright]], along with [[Bob Hale (philosopher)|Bob Hale]], led a Neo-Fregean revival with his work ''Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects''.<ref>The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics</ref>

===== Critics =====
[[Structuralism (philosophy of mathematics)|Structuralist]] [[Paul Benacerraf]] has an epistemological objection to mathematical platonism.

==== Intuitionism ====
The intuitionists, led by [[L. E. J. Brouwer]], are a [[Constructivism (philosophy of mathematics)|constructivist]] school of mathematics that argues that mathematics is a [[Cognition|cognitive]] [[Construct (philosophy)|construct]] rather than a type of [[objective truth]].

==== Formalism ====
The formalists, best exemplified by David Hilbert, considered mathematics to be merely the investigation of [[Formal system|formal axiom systems]]. [[Hartry Field]] defended [[mathematical fictionalism]].

=== Philosophy of religion ===
In ''Analytic Philosophy of Religion'', [[James Franklin Harris]] noted that:

{{blockquote|
...analytic philosophy has been a very heterogeneous 'movement'.... some forms of analytic philosophy have proven very sympathetic to the philosophy of religion and have provided a philosophical mechanism for responding to other more radical and hostile forms of analytic philosophy.<ref name=harris2001>{{cite book |last1=Harris |first1=James Franklin |title=Analytic philosophy of religion |date=2002 |publisher=Kluwer |location=Dordrecht |isbn=978-1-4020-0530-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rx2Qf9ieFKYC}} (432 pages) (volume 3 of Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, {{ISSN|1568-1556}})</ref>{{rp|3}}
}}

As with the study of ethics, early analytic philosophy tended to avoid the study of [[Philosophy of religion|religion]], largely dismissing (as per the logical positivists) the subject as a part of [[metaphysics]] and therefore meaningless.{{efn|A notable exception is the series of [[Michael Foster (philosopher)|Michael B. Foster]]'s 1934–36 ''[[Mind (journal)|Mind]]'' articles involving the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern science.}} The demise of logical positivism led to a renewed interest in the philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers not only to introduce new problems, but to re-study classical topics such as the [[existence of God]], the nature of [[miracle]]s, the [[problem of evil]], the rationality of belief in God, concepts of the nature of God, and several others.<ref>Peterson, Michael et al. (2003). ''Reason and Religious Belief''</ref> The [[Society of Christian Philosophers]] was established in 1978.

==== Reformed epistemology ====
Analytic philosophy formed the basis for some sophisticated Christian arguments, such as those of the [[reformed epistemology|reformed epistemologists]] such as [[Alvin Plantinga]], [[William Alston]], and [[Nicholas Wolterstorff]].

[[File:AlvinPlantinga.JPG|thumb|160px|Alvin Plantinga]]

Plantinga was awarded the [[Templeton Prize]] in 2017 and was once described by ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine as "America's leading orthodox [[Protestantism|Protestant]] philosopher of God".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Emeritae and Emeriti // Department of Philosophy // University of Notre Dame |url=http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/alvin-plantinga/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130831050623/http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/alvin-plantinga/ |archive-date=2013-08-31}}</ref> His seminal work ''[[God and Other Minds]]'' (1967) argues that belief in God is a properly basic belief akin to the belief in [[Problem of other minds|other minds]]. Plantinga also developed a modal [[Ontological argument#Alvin Plantinga|ontological argument]] in ''The Nature of Necessity'' (1974).

Plantinga, J. L. Mackie, and [[Antony Flew]] debated the use of the ''[[Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense|free will defense]]'' as a way to solve the problem of evil.<ref>Mackie, John L. (1982). ''The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God''</ref> Plantinga's [[evolutionary argument against naturalism]] contends that there is a problem in asserting both evolution and naturalism. Plantinga further issued a trilogy on epistemology, and especially justification, ''[[Warrant: The Current Debate]]'', ''[[Warrant and Proper Function]]'', and ''[[Warranted Christian Belief]].''

Alston defended [[divine command theory]] and applied the analytic philosophy of language to religious language. [[Robert Merrihew Adams]] also defended divine command theory, and worked on the relationship between faith and morality.<ref>Adams, Robert M. (1987). ''The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology''</ref> [[William Lane Craig]] defends the [[Kalam cosmological argument]] in the [[The Kalām Cosmological Argument|book]] of the same name.

==== Analytic Thomism ====
Catholic philosophers in the analytic tradition—such as Elizabeth Anscombe, [[Peter Geach]], [[Anthony Kenny]], Alasdair MacIntyre, [[John Haldane (philosopher)|John Haldane]], [[Eleonore Stump]], and others—developed an [[Analytical Thomism|analytic approach]] to [[Thomism]].

==== Orthodox ====
[[Richard Swinburne]] wrote a trilogy of books, arguing for God, consisting of ''The Coherence of Theism'', ''[[The Existence of God (book)|The Existence of God]]'', and ''Faith and Reason''.

==== Wittgenstein and religion ====
The analytic philosophy of religion has been preoccupied with Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of [[Søren Kierkegaard]]'s philosophy of religion.<ref>Creegan, Charles. (1989). ''Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method''</ref> Wittgenstein fought for the Austrian army in the [[First World War]] and came upon a copy of [[Leo Tolstoy]]'s ''Gospel in Brief''. At that time, he underwent some kind of religious conversion.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Wittgenstein Tolstoy and the Gospel in Brief (2001) |url=http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/2001/04/wittgenstein-tolstoy-and-the-gospel-in.html |access-date=2024-04-11}}</ref>

Using first-hand remarks (which were later published in ''Philosophical Investigations'', ''Culture and Value'', and other works), philosophers such as [[Peter Winch]] and [[Norman Malcolm]] developed what has come to be known as "contemplative philosophy", a Wittgensteinian school of thought rooted in the "[[Swansea University|Swansea]] school", and which includes Wittgensteinians such as [[Rush Rhees]], Peter Winch, and [[D.Z. Phillips]], among others.

The name "contemplative philosophy" was coined by D. Z. Phillips in ''Philosophy's Cool Place'', which rests on an interpretation of a passage from Wittgenstein's ''Culture and Value''.<ref>Phillips, D.Z. (1999). ''Philosophy's Cool Place''. Cornell University Press. The quote is from Wittgenstein's ''Culture and Value'' (2e): "My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them."</ref> This interpretation was first labeled "Wittgensteinian [[Fideism]]" by [[Kai Nielsen (philosopher)|Kai Nielsen]], but those who consider themselves members of the Swansea school have relentlessly and repeatedly rejected this construal as a caricature of Wittgenstein's position; this is especially true of Phillips.<ref>{{cite SEP|url-id=fideism|title=Fideism}}</ref> Responding to this interpretation, Nielsen and Phillips became two of the most prominent interpreters of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.<ref>Nielsen, Kai and D.Z. Phillips. (2005). ''Wittgensteinian Fideism?''</ref>

=== Philosophy of science ===
{{Main|Philosophy of science}}

Science and the [[philosophy of science]] have also had increasingly significant roles in analytic metaphysics. The theory of special relativity has had a profound effect on the philosophy of time, and quantum physics is routinely discussed in the free will debate.<ref name="inwagenetall1998" /> The weight given to scientific evidence is largely due to commitments of philosophers to [[scientific realism]] and [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]. Others will see a commitment to using science in philosophy as [[scientism]].

==== Confirmation theory ====
Carl Hempel advocated confirmation theory or [[Bayesian epistemology]]. He introduced the famous [[Raven paradox|raven's paradox]].<ref name="Fitelson">{{cite book |last1=Fitelson |first1=Branden |title=The Place of Probability in Science |last2=Hawthorne |first2=James |date=2010 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-90-481-3614-8 |series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science |volume=284 |pages=247–275 |chapter=How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAWHBC}}</ref>

==== Falsification ====
[[File:Karl Popper.jpg|thumb|130px|Karl Popper]]

In reaction to what he considered excesses of logical positivism, [[Karl Popper]], in ''[[The Logic of Scientific Discovery]]'', insisted on the role of [[falsifiability|falsification]] in the philosophy of science, using it to solve the [[demarcation problem]].<ref>{{cite book |author=Popper, Karl R. |title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-415-27844-7}}</ref>

==== Confirmation holism ====
The [[Duhem–Quine thesis]], or problem of [[underdetermination]], posits that no [[Hypothesis|scientific hypothesis]] can be understood in isolation, a viewpoint called [[confirmation holism]].<ref name=qui/>

==== Constructivism ====
In reaction to both the logical positivists and Popper, discussions of the philosophy of science during the last 40 years were dominated by [[social constructivism|social constructivist]] and [[cognitive relativism|cognitive relativist]] theories of science. Following Quine and Duhem, subsequent theories emphasized [[theory-ladenness]]. [[Thomas Samuel Kuhn]], with his formulation of [[paradigm shift]]s, and [[Paul Feyerabend]], with his [[epistemological anarchism]], are significant for these discussions.<ref>Glock 2008, p. 47.</ref>

==== Biology ====
The [[philosophy of biology]] has also undergone considerable growth, particularly due to the considerable debate in recent years over the nature of [[evolution]], particularly [[natural selection]].<ref>Hull, David L. and [[Michael Ruse|Ruse, Michael]], "Preface" in ''The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. xix, xx.</ref> Daniel Dennett and his 1995 book ''[[Darwin's Dangerous Idea]]'', which defends [[Neo-Darwinism]], stand at the forefront of this debate.<ref>Lennox, James G., "Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism" in Sakar and Plutynski (eds.), ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology'' (Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 89.</ref> [[Jerry Fodor]] criticizes natural selection.