Editing Utilitarianism (section)

== Developments in the 20th century ==

==={{Anchor|Ideal utilitarianism}}Ideal utilitarianism===
The description of ideal utilitarianism was first used by [[Hastings Rashdall]] in ''[[The Theory of Good and Evil]]'' (1907), but it is more often associated with [[G. E. Moore]]. In ''Ethics'' (1912), Moore rejects a purely [[hedonistic utilitarianism]] and argues that there is a range of values that might be maximized. Moore's strategy was to show that it is intuitively implausible that pleasure is the sole measure of what is good. He says that such an assumption:<ref name="Moore, G. E. 1912">Moore, G. E. (1912). ''Ethics'', London: Williams and Norgate, Ch. 7</ref>
{{blockquote|involves our saying, for instance, that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed—no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities—must yet be intrinsically better—better worth creating—provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed as well as pleasure.

It involves our saying that, even if the total quantity of pleasure in each was exactly equal, yet the fact that all the beings in the one possessed, in addition knowledge of many different kinds and a full appreciation of all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, whereas none of the beings in the other possessed any of these things, would give us no reason whatever for preferring the former to the latter.}}

Moore admits that it is impossible to prove the case either way, but he believed that it was intuitively obvious that even if the amount of pleasure stayed the same a world that contained such things as beauty and love would be a better world. He adds that, if a person was to take the contrary view, then "I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong."<ref name="Moore, G. E. 1912"/>

=== Act and rule utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Act utilitarianism|Rule utilitarianism}}
In the mid-20th century, a number of philosophers focused on the place of rules in utilitarian thought.<ref name=":0">Bayles, M. D., ed. 1968. ''Contemporary Utilitarianism''. Doubleday: [[Anchor Books]].</ref> It was already considered necessary to use rules to help choose the right action, because estimating the consequences every time seemed error-prone and unlikely to bring the best outcome. Paley had justified the use of rules and Mill says:<ref>{{cite book |last = Mill | first = John Stuart |editor-first= Roger |editor-last= Crisp |title = Utilitarianism |publisher = Oxford University Press |year= 1998 |page = 70 |isbn = 978-0-19-875163-2}}</ref>

{{blockquote|It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion... to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another.… The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal.{{nbsp}}... Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong.|author=|title=|source=}}

However, rule utilitarianism proposes a more central role for rules that was thought to rescue the theory from some of its more devastating criticisms, particularly problems to do with justice and promise keeping. Smart (1956) and McCloskey (1957) initially use the terms ''extreme'' and ''restricted'' utilitarianism but eventually settled on the prefixes ''act'' and ''rule'' instead.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Smart|first=J. J. C.|year=1956|title=Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism|journal=Philosophical Quarterly|volume=6|issue=25|pages=344–54|doi=10.2307/2216786|jstor=2216786|s2cid=147501349}}</ref><ref name="McCloskey1957">{{cite journal|last=McCloskey|first=H. J.|date=October 1957|title=An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism|journal=Philosophical Review|volume=66|issue=4|pages=466–85|doi=10.2307/2182745|jstor=2182745}}</ref> Likewise, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, articles were published both for and against the new form of utilitarianism, and through this debate the theory we now call ''rule utilitarianism'' was created. In an introduction to an anthology of these articles, the editor was able to say: "The development of this theory was a [[dialectic]]al process of formulation, criticism, reply and reformulation; the record of this process well illustrates the co-operative development of a philosophical theory."<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|1}}

The essential difference is in what determines whether or not an action is the right action. ''Act utilitarianism'' maintains that an action is right if it maximizes utility; ''rule utilitarianism'' maintains that an action is right if it conforms to a rule that maximizes utility.

In 1956, Urmson (1953) published an influential article arguing that Mill justified rules on utilitarian principles.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Urmson|first=J. O.|year=1953|title=The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill|journal=Philosophical Quarterly|volume=3|issue=10|pages=33–39|doi=10.2307/2216697|jstor=2216697}}</ref> From then on, articles have debated this interpretation of Mill. In all probability, it was not a distinction that Mill was particularly trying to make and so the evidence in his writing is inevitably mixed. A collection of Mill's writing published in 1977 includes a letter that seems to tip the balance in favour of the notion that Mill is best classified as an ''act utilitarian''. In the letter, Mill says:<ref>Mill, John Stuart. ''The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill'' 17, edited by J. M. Robson. Toronto: [[University of Toronto Press]]. 1963–91. p. 1881.</ref>
{{blockquote|I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the consideration of what would happen if everyone did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency of the act in the particular case.}}

Some school level textbooks and at least one British examination board make a further distinction between strong and weak rule utilitarianism.<ref>Oliphant, Jill. 2007. ''OCR Religious Ethics for AS and A2''. Routledge.</ref> However, it is not clear that this distinction is made in the academic literature. It has been argued that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be refined by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception.<ref>[[David Lyons (philosopher)|Lyons, David]]. 1965. ''Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism''.</ref> This process holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the "rules" have as many "sub-rules" as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, makes an agent seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility.<ref>Habib, Allen. [2008] 2014. "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/ Promises]." ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref>

=== Two-level utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Two-level utilitarianism}}
In ''Principles'' (1973), [[R. M. Hare]] accepts that [[rule utilitarianism]] collapses into [[act utilitarianism]] but claims that this is a result of allowing the rules to be "as specific and un-general as we please."<ref name="HareRM">{{cite journal|last=Hare|first=R. M.|author-link=R. M. Hare|date=1972–1973|title=The Presidential Address: Principles|journal=[[Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society]] |series=New Series|volume=73|pages=1–18|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/73.1.1|jstor=4544830}}</ref> He argues that one of the main reasons for introducing rule utilitarianism was to do justice to the general rules that people need for moral education and character development and he proposes that "a difference between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism can be introduced by limiting the specificity of the rules, i.e., by increasing their generality."<ref name="HareRM"/>{{rp|14}} This distinction between a "specific rule utilitarianism" (which collapses into act utilitarianism) and "general rule utilitarianism" forms the basis of Hare's ''two-level utilitarianism''.

When we are "[[Playing God (ethics)|playing God]] or the [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]]", we use the specific form, and we will need to do this when we are deciding what general principles to teach and follow. When we are "[[Inculcate|inculcating]]" or in situations where the biases of our human nature are likely to prevent us doing the calculations properly, then we should use the more general rule utilitarianism.

Hare argues that in practice, most of the time, we should be following the general principles:<ref name="HareRM"/>{{rp|17}}

{{blockquote|One ought to abide by the general principles whose general inculcation is for the best; harm is more likely to come, in actual moral situations, from questioning these rules than from sticking to them, unless the situations are very extra-ordinary; the results of sophisticated felicific calculations are not likely, human nature and human ignorance being what they are, to lead to the greatest utility.}}

In ''Moral Thinking'' (1981), Hare illustrated the two extremes. The "archangel" is the hypothetical person who has perfect knowledge of the situation and no personal biases or weaknesses and always uses critical moral thinking to decide the right thing to do. In contrast, the "prole" is the hypothetical person who is completely incapable of critical thinking and uses nothing but intuitive moral thinking and, of necessity, has to follow the general moral rules they have been taught or learned through imitation.<ref name="Hare 1981 b">{{cite book | last = Hare | first = R.M. | author-link = R. M. Hare | title = Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point | publisher = Clarendon Press Oxford University Press | location = Oxford New York | year = 1981 | isbn = 978-0-19-824660-2 | url = https://archive.org/details/moralthinkingits0000hare }}</ref> It is not that some people are [[archangel]]s and others proles, but rather that "we all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at different times."<ref name="Hare 1981 b"/>

Hare does not specify when we should think more like an "archangel" and more like a "prole" as this will, in any case, vary from person to person. However, the critical moral thinking underpins and informs the more intuitive moral thinking. It is responsible for formulating and, if necessary, reformulating the general moral rules. We also switch to critical thinking when trying to deal with unusual situations or in cases where the intuitive moral rules give conflicting advice.

=== Preference utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Preference utilitarianism}}
Preference utilitarianism entails promoting actions that fulfil the preferences of those beings involved.<ref>Peter Singer, ''Practical Ethics'', 2011, p. 13</ref> The concept of preference utilitarianism was first proposed in 1977 by [[John Harsanyi]] in ''Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour'',<ref>[[John Harsanyi|Harsanyi, John C.]] 1977. "Morality and the theory of rational behavior." ''[[Social Research (journal)|Social Research]]'' 44 (4):623–56. {{JSTOR|40971169}}.</ref><ref name="Harsanyi">[[John Harsanyi|Harsanyi, John C.]] [1977] 1982. "Morality and the theory of rational behaviour." Pp. 39–62 in ''Utilitarianism and Beyond'', edited by [[Amartya Sen|A. Sen]] and [[Bernard Williams|B. Williams]]. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-511-61196-4}}.</ref> however the concept is more commonly associated with [[R. M. Hare]],<ref name="Hare 1981 b"/> [[Peter Singer]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Singer |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Singer |title=Practical ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge New York |year=1979 |edition=1st |isbn=978-0-521-29720-2 }}:{{cite book |last=Singer |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Singer |title=Practical ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge/New York |year=1993 |edition=2nd |isbn=978-0-521-43971-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/practicalethics00sing }}</ref> and [[Richard Brandt]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Brandt |first=Richard B. |author-link=Richard Brandt |title=A Theory of the Good and the Right |publisher=Clarendon Press |location=Oxford/New York |year=1979 |isbn=978-0-19-824550-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryofgood00bran }}</ref>

Harsanyi claims that his theory is indebted to:<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|42}}

* [[Adam Smith]], who equated the moral point of view with that of an impartial but sympathetic observer;
* [[Immanuel Kant]], who insisted on the criterion of [[Universality (philosophy)|universality]], which may also be described as a criterion of [[Reciprocity (social and political philosophy)|reciprocity]];
* the classical utilitarians who made maximizing social utility the basic criterion of morality; and 
* "the modern theory of rational behaviour under risk and uncertainty, usually described as [[Thomas Bayes|Bayesian]] [[decision theory]]."

Harsanyi rejects [[hedonistic utilitarianism]] as being dependent on an outdated psychology saying that it is far from obvious that everything we do is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. He also rejects ideal utilitarianism because "it is certainly not true as an empirical observation that people's only purpose in life is to have 'mental states of intrinsic worth'."<ref name="Harsanyi" />{{rp|54}}

According to Harsanyi, "preference utilitarianism is the only form of utilitarianism consistent with the important philosophical principle of preference autonomy. By this I mean the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences."<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|55}}

Harsanyi adds two caveats. Firstly, people sometimes have [[Irrationality|irrational]] preferences. To deal with this, Harsanyi distinguishes between "'''manifest'''" preferences and "'''true'''" preferences. The former are those "manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs,{{clarify|date=September 2016}} or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]]"; whereas the latter are "the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice."<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|55}} It is the latter that preference utilitarianism tries to satisfy.

The second caveat is that [[Anti-social behaviour|antisocial]] preferences, such as [[Sadistic personality disorder|sadism]], [[envy]], and [[resentment]], have to be excluded. Harsanyi achieves this by claiming that such preferences partially exclude those people from the moral community:
{{blockquote|Utilitarian ethics makes all of us members of the same moral community. A person displaying ill will toward others does remain a member of this community, but not with his whole personality. That part of his personality that harbours these hostile antisocial feelings must be excluded from membership, and has no claim for a hearing when it comes to defining our concept of social utility.<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|56}}}}

===Negative utilitarianism===
{{Main|Negative utilitarianism}}
In ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies|The Open Society and its Enemies]]'' (1945), [[Karl Popper]] argues that the principle "maximize pleasure" should be replaced by "minimize pain". He believes that "it is not only impossible but very dangerous to attempt to maximize the pleasure or the happiness of the people, since such an attempt must lead to totalitarianism."<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper|first=Karl|title=The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 2|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-27842-3|page=339}}</ref> He claims that:<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper|first=Karl|title=The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 1: The Spell of Plato|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-23731-4|pages=284–85}}</ref>

{{blockquote|[T]here is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure... In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula "Maximize pleasure" is that it assumes a continuous pleasure-pain scale that lets us treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure, and especially not one man's pain by another man's pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all...|author=|title=|source=}}

The actual term ''negative utilitarianism'' itself was introduced by [[Ninian Smart|R. N. Smart]] as the title to his 1958 reply to Popper in which he argues that the principle would entail seeking the quickest and least painful method of killing the entirety of humanity.<ref name="Smart1958">{{cite journal|last=Smart|first=R.N.|date=October 1958|title=Negative Utilitarianism|journal=Mind|volume=67|issue=268|pages=542–43|doi=10.1093/mind/lxvii.268.542|jstor=2251207}}</ref>

In response to Smart's argument, Simon Knutsson (2019) has argued that classical utilitarianism and similar [[Consequentialism|consequentialist]] views are roughly equally likely to entail killing the entirety of humanity, as they would seem to imply that one should kill existing beings and replace them with happier beings if possible. Consequently, Knutsson argues:

{{blockquote|The world destruction argument is not a reason to reject negative utilitarianism in favour of these other forms of consequentialism, because there are similar arguments against such theories that are at least as persuasive as the world destruction argument is against negative utilitarianism.<ref name="Knutsson 1–20">{{Cite journal|last=Knutsson|first=Simon|date=2019-08-29|title=The world destruction argument|journal=Inquiry|volume=64|issue=10|pages=1004–1023|doi=10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658631|issn=0020-174X|doi-access=free}}</ref>}}

Furthermore, Knutsson notes that one could argue that other forms of consequentialism, such as classical utilitarianism, in some cases have less plausible implications than negative utilitarianism, such as in scenarios where classical utilitarianism implies it would be right to kill everyone and replace them in a manner that creates more suffering, but also more well-being such that the sum, on the classical [[Felicific calculus|utilitarian calculus]], is net positive. Negative utilitarianism, in contrast, would not allow such killing.<ref name="Knutsson 1–20"/>

Some versions of negative utilitarianism include:

* Negative total utilitarianism: tolerates suffering that can be compensated within the same person.<ref name=":1">Fabian, Fricke. 2002. "Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus." ''[[Kriterion]]'' 15(1): p. 14.</ref><ref>Gustav, Arrhenius. 2000. "Future Generations, A Challenge for Moral Theory" (FD-Diss.). Uppsala: [[Uppsala University]], Department of Philosophy. p. 100.</ref>
* Negative preference utilitarianism: avoids the problem of moral killing with reference to existing preferences that such killing would violate, while it still demands a justification for the creation of new lives.<ref>Fricke Fabian (2002), Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus, Kriterion, vol.15, no.1, pp. 20–22</ref> A possible justification is the reduction of the average level of preference-frustration.<ref>{[[Roger Chao|Chao]], "[http://www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201204.pdf Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism"], ''Journal of Philosophy of Life'', 2012; 2(1): 55–66</ref>
* Pessimistic representatives of negative utilitarianism, which can be found in the environment of [[Buddhism]].<ref>Bruno Contestabile: ''Negative Utilitarianism and Buddhist Intuition''. In: ''Contemporary Buddhism'' Vol.15, Issue 2, S. 298–311, London 2014.</ref>
Some see negative utilitarianism as a branch within modern [[hedonistic utilitarianism]], which assigns a higher weight to the avoidance of suffering than to the promotion of happiness.<ref name=":1" /> The moral weight of suffering can be increased by using a "compassionate" utilitarian metric, so that the result is the same as in [[prioritarianism]].<ref>Broome John (1991), Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 222</ref>

===Motive utilitarianism===
{{See also|Virtue ethics}}
Motive utilitarianism was first proposed by [[Robert Merrihew Adams]] in 1976.<ref>Robert Merrihew Adams, ''Motive Utilitarianism'', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14, On Motives and Morals (12 August 1976), pp. 467–81</ref> Whereas [[act utilitarianism]] requires us to choose our actions by calculating which action will maximize [[utility]] and [[rule utilitarianism]] requires us to implement rules that will, on the whole, maximize utility, ''motive utilitarianism'' "has the utility calculus being used to select motives and dispositions according to their general felicific effects, and those motives and dispositions then dictate our choices of actions."<ref name=":2">Goodin, Robert E. "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy." ''Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy''. Cambridge University Press.</ref>{{Rp|60}}

The arguments for moving to some form of motive utilitarianism at the personal level can be seen as mirroring the arguments for moving to some form of rule utilitarianism at the social level.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|17}} Adams (1976) refers to [[Henry Sidgwick|Sidgwick's]] observation that "Happiness (general as well as individual) is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted."<ref name=":3">Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1976. "Motive Utilitarianism. ''[[The Journal of Philosophy]]'' 73(14).</ref>{{Rp|467}}<ref>{{cite web|title=ME Book 3 Chapter 14 Section 5|url=https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b03.c14.s05.html|access-date=2021-05-13|website=www.laits.utexas.edu}}</ref> Trying to apply the utility calculation on each and every occasion is likely to lead to a sub-optimal outcome. It is argued that applying carefully selected rules at the social level and encouraging appropriate motives at the personal level are likely to lead to better overall outcomes; even though on some individual occasions it leads to the wrong action when assessed according to act utilitarian standards.<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|471}}

Adams concludes that "right action, by act-utilitarian standards, and right motivation, by motive-utilitarian standards, are incompatible in some cases."<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|475}} The necessity of this conclusion is rejected by [[Fred Feldman (philosopher)|Fred Feldman]] who argues that "the conflict in question results from an inadequate formulation of the utilitarian doctrines; motives play no essential role in it&nbsp;... [and that]&nbsp;... [p]recisely the same sort of conflict arises even when MU is left out of consideration and AU is applied by itself."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Feldman |first=Fred |title=On the Consistency of Act- and Motive-Utilitarianism: A Reply to Robert Adams |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=70 |issue=2 |date=May 1993 |pages=211–12 |doi=10.1007/BF00989590 |s2cid=170691423 }}</ref> Instead, [[Fred Feldman (philosopher)|Feldman]] proposes a variant of act utilitarianism that results in there being no conflict between it and motive utilitarianism.

=== Wealth maximization ===
Another 20th-century offshoot of utilitarian-style thinking, often labeled [[wealth maximization]], has its economic roots in the "potential Pareto improvements" advanced by [[Nicholas Kaldor]], [[John Hicks]], and [[Tibor Scitovsky]].<ref>Kaldor, Nicholas (1939). “Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” ''The Economic Journal'' 49(195): 549–552; Hicks, John (1939). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” ''The Economic Journal'' 49(196): 696–712; Scitovsky, Tibor (1941). “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics.” ''Review of Economic Studies'' 9(1): 77–88.</ref> While traditional Pareto criteria require that no one be made worse off, wealth maximization—closely tied to the [[Kaldor–Hicks]] framework—permits changes that increase overall economic surplus even if some parties lose, so long as the winners could in principle compensate the losers.

In legal scholarship, the concept was popularized by [[Richard Posner]] in ''Economic Analysis of Law'' (1973).<ref>Posner, Richard A. (1973). ''Economic Analysis of Law''. Boston: Little, Brown.</ref> Under this approach, a policy or rule is deemed socially desirable if it produces a net increase in aggregate "wealth", typically measured by willingness-to-pay for outcomes. Advocates argue that, because willingness-to-pay translates diverse preferences into comparable monetary values, wealth maximization can reconcile the problem of interpersonally adding "utilities". Critics counter that wealthier parties can effectively "outbid" poorer ones and thus skew outcomes. Supporters respond that distributional worries can be handled by taxes and transfers, leaving wealth maximization to guide efficient resource allocation in law.<ref>Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell (1994). “Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income.” ''Journal of Legal Studies'' 23(2): 667–681; Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell (2002). ''Fairness versus Welfare''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</ref><ref>For a modern defense and historical overview of wealth maximization, see Pi, D., & Parisi, F. (2023) "Wealth Maximization Redux: A Defense of Posner’s Economic Approach to Law." ''History of Economic Ideas'' 31: 101-136, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4412431.</ref>