Editing Submarine communications cable (section)

== Importance of submarine cables ==
Submarine cables, while often perceived as ‘insignificant’ parts of communication infrastructure as they lay "hidden" in the seabed,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Abildgaard |first=M. S. |date=2022 |title=The question of icebergs: A cryo-history of Arctic submarine cables |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/s0032247422000262 |journal=Polar Record |volume=58|doi=10.1017/s0032247422000262 |bibcode=2022PoRec..58E..41A }}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Bueger |first1=C. |last2=Liebetrau |first2=T. |date=2021 |title=Protecting hidden infrastructure: The security politics of the global submarine data cable network |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1907129 |journal=Contemporary Security Policy |volume=42 |issue=3|pages=391–413 |doi=10.1080/13523260.2021.1907129 }}</ref> are an essential infrastructure in the [[digital era]], carrying 99% of the data traffic across the oceans.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data |url=http://europe.newsweek.com/undersea-cables-transport-99-percent-international-communications-319072?rm=eu |access-date=2016-11-16 |newspaper=Newsweek}}</ref> This data includes all [[internet traffic]], military transmissions, and [[financial transaction]]s.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Bueger |first1=C. |last2=Liebetrau |first2=T. |last3=Franken |first3=J. |date=2022 |title=Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure –consequences for the EU |url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/702557/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557_EN.pdf |journal=European Parliament |volume=PE 702.557}}</ref><ref name=":3">Saunavaara, J. (2020). Connecting the Arctic While Installing Submarine Data Cables Between East Asia, North America and Europe 205. In M. Salminen, G. Zojer, & K. Hossain (Eds.), ''Digitalisation and human security: A multi-disciplinary approach to cybersecurity in the European high north'' (pp. 205–230). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48070-7</ref>

The total carrying capacity of a submarine cable is in the [[terabits]] per second, while a [[satellite]] typically offers only 1 [[gigabit]] per second, a ratio of more than 1000 to 1. Satellites handle less than 5%<ref name=":4">Carter, L., & Burnett, D. R. (2015). Subsea Telecommunications. In H. D. Smith, J. L. Vivero, & T. S. Agardy (Eds.), ''Routledge Handbook of Ocean Resources and Management'' (1st ed.). Routledge.</ref> – to an estimate of even 0.5% – of global data transmission,<ref name=":3" /> and are less efficient, slower, and more expensive.<ref name=":5">Frascà, D., & Galantini, L. (2023). The Issue of Submarine Cable Security. In F. Cappelletti (Ed.), ''Towards a New European Security Architecture''. ELF Study 6. https://doi.org/10.53121/ELFS6</ref> Therefore, satellites are often exclusively considered for remote areas with challenging conditions for laying submarine cables.<ref name=":6">Wasiuta, O. (2023). Russian threats to the submarine internet cable infrastructure. ''Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP'', ''87.''https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0053.9127</ref> Submarine cables are thus the essential technical infrastructure for all internet communication.

=== National security ===
As a result of these cables' cost and usefulness, they are highly valued not only by the corporations building and operating them for profit, but also by national governments. For instance, the Australian government considers its submarine cable systems to be "vital to the national economy". Accordingly, the [[Australian Communications and Media Authority]] (ACMA) has created protection zones that restrict activities that could potentially damage cables linking Australia to the rest of the world. The ACMA also regulates all projects to install new submarine cables.<ref name=":19">{{cite web |url=http://archive.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/1001/pc=PC_100223 |publisher=Australian Communications and Media Authority |date=February 5, 2010 |title=Submarine telecommunications cables}} {{Dead link|date=December 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

Due to their critical role, disruptions to these cables can lead to [[Communications blackout|communication blackouts]] and, thus, extensive economic losses.<ref name=":4" /> The impact of such disruptions is often exemplified by the [[2022 Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai eruption and tsunami|2022 Tonga volcanic eruption]] that severed the island's only submarine cable and thus connectivity to the rest of the world for several days.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last1=Clare |first1=M. A. |last2=Yeo |first2=I. A. |last3=Bricheno |first3=L. |last4=Aksenov |first4=Y. |last5=Brown |first5=J. |last6=Haigh |first6=I. D. |last7=Wahl |first7=T. |last8=Hunt |first8=J. |last9=Sams |first9=C. |last10=Chaytor |first10=J. |last11=Bett |first11=B. J. |last12=Carter |first12=L. |date=2023-02-01 |title=Climate change hotspots and implications for the global subsea telecommunications network |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0012825222003804 |journal=Earth-Science Reviews |volume=237 |pages=104296 |doi=10.1016/j.earscirev.2022.104296 |bibcode=2023ESRv..23704296C |issn=0012-8252|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8">Guilfoyle, D., Paige, T. P., & McLaughlin, R. (2022). The final frontier of cyberspace: The seabed beyond national jurisdiction and the protection of submarine cables. ''International and Comparative Law Quarterly'', ''71''(3). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020589322000227</ref><ref name=":9">McGeachy, H. (2022). The changing strategic significance of submarine cables: Old technology, new concerns. ''Australian Journal of International Affairs'', ''76''(2), 161–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2051427</ref> The cable break was declared a “national crisis,” and repairs took several weeks, leaving Tonga largely isolated during a crucial period for disaster response.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8" />

Submarine cable infrastructure may even have additional technical advantages, such as carrying SMART environmental sensors supporting national disaster [[early warning system]]s.<ref>International Telecommunication Union. (2023). ''Innovative approaches to natural disaster management: Leveraging AI for data related processes'' (1–134). https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/opb/fg/T-FG-AI4NDM-2023-3-PDF-E.pdf</ref> Furthermore, the cables are predicted to become even more critical with growing demands from [[5G network slicing|5G networks]], the ‘[[Internet of things]]’ (IoT), and [[artificial intelligence]] on large data transfers.<ref name=":0" />

=== International security ===
Submarine communication cables are a critical infrastructure within the context of [[international security]].<ref name=":0" /> Transmitting massive amounts of sensitive data every day, they are essential for both state operations and private enterprises.<ref name=":0" /> One of the catalysts for the amount and sensitivity of data flowing through these cables has been the global rise of [[cloud computing]].<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |last=Sherman |first=Justin |date=2021-09-13 |title=Cyber defense across the ocean floor: The geopolitics of submarine cable security |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/cyber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-the-geopolitics-of-submarine-cable-security/ |access-date=2024-12-05 |website=Atlantic Council |language=en-US}}</ref>

The [[United States Armed Forces|U.S military]], for example, uses the submarine cable network for data transfer from conflict zones to command staff in the United States (U.S.). Interruption of the cable network during intense operations could have direct consequences for the military on the ground.<ref name=":11">{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Bryan |date=2016 |title=Undersea cables and the future of submarine competition |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |volume=72 |issue=4 |pages=234–237 |bibcode=2016BuAtS..72d.234C |doi=10.1080/00963402.2016.1195636 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

The criticality of cable services makes their geopolitical influence profound. Scholars argue that state dominance in cable networks can exert political pressure,<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":6" /> or shape global internet governance.<ref name=":0" />

An example of such state dominance in the global cable infrastructure is China's ‘Digital Silk Road’ strategy funding the expansion of Chinese cable networks, with the Chinese company [[Huawei|HMN Technologies]] often criticised for providing networks for other states, holding up to 10% of the [[Market share|global market share]].<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023 |title=CHINA'S SUBSEA CABLE POWER PLAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ChinasGrowingInfluence_052423-1.pdf |access-date=2024-12-05 |website=Atlantic Council}}</ref> Some critiques argue that Chinese investments in critical cable infrastructure, being involvement in approximately 25% of global submarine cables,<ref name=":9" /> such as the [[PEACE Cable]] linking Eastafrica and Europe, may enable China to reroute data traffic through its own networks, and thus apply political pressure.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Caro |first=Carlo J. V. |date=2024-11-26 |title=Underwater Geopolitics {{!}} RealClearDefense |url=https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/26/underwater_geopolitics_1074698.html |access-date=2024-12-05 |website=www.realcleardefense.com |language=en}}</ref> The strategy is countered by the U.S., supporting alternative projects.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":20">{{Cite web |last1=Guarascio |first1=Francesco |last2=Nguyen |first2=Phuong |last3=Brock |first3=Joe |date=2024-09-18 |title=Exclusive: Inside the US push to steer Vietnam's subsea cable plans away from China |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/inside-us-push-steer-vietnams-subsea-cable-plans-away-china-2024-09-17/ |website=Reuters}}</ref>