Editing Stephen Breyer (section)

===In general===
{{further|Purposive approach}}

Breyer's [[Pragmatism|pragmatic]] approach to the law "will tend to make the law more sensible", according to [[Cass Sunstein]], who added that Breyer's "attack on [[originalism]] is powerful and convincing".<ref name="115 YALE L.J. 1719">{{Cite journal |last=Sunstein |first=Cass R. |date=May 2006 |title=Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism |url=http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/221_om87hycw.pdf |url-status=live |journal=The Yale Law Journal |volume=115 |issue=7 |pages=1719–1743 |doi=10.2307/20455667 |jstor=20455667 |s2cid=154739751 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170704041242/http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/221_om87hycw.pdf |archive-date=July 4, 2017 |quote=Breyer thinks that, as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.'}} Quote is at p. 1726.</ref>

Breyer consistently voted in favor of [[abortion]] rights,<ref name="Wittes2005">{{Cite news |last=Wittes |first=Benjamin |date=September 25, 2005 |title=Memo to John Roberts: Stephen Breyer, a cautious, liberal Supreme Court justice, explains his view of the law |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092201017.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170714053504/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092201017.html |archive-date=July 14, 2017 |access-date=September 15, 2017 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref><ref name="stenberg">''[[Stenberg v. Carhart]]'', {{ussc|530|914|2000}}.</ref> one of the most controversial areas of the Supreme Court's docket. He also defended the Court's use of foreign law and [[international law]] as persuasive (but not binding) authority in its decisions.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 13, 2005 |title=Transcript of Discussion Between Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer |url=http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070404123503/http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument |archive-date=April 4, 2007 |access-date=March 21, 2007 |publisher=AU Washington College of Law}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pearlstein |first=Deborah |date=April 5, 2005 |title=Who's Afraid of International Law |url=https://prospect.org/article/afraid-international-law/ |access-date=October 6, 2023 |work=American Prospect Online}}</ref><ref>''[[Roper v. Simmons]]'', {{ussc|543|551|2005}}; ''[[Lawrence v. Texas]]'', {{ussc|539|558|2003}}; ''[[Atkins v. Virginia]]'', {{ussc|536|304|2002}}.</ref> Breyer is also recognized as deferential to the interests of law enforcement and to legislative judgments in the Court's [[First Amendment to the United States Constitution|First Amendment]] rulings. He demonstrated a consistent pattern of deference to Congress, voting to overturn congressional legislation at a lower rate than any other Justice since 1994.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Gewirtz |first1=Paul |last2=Golder |first2=Chad |date=July 6, 2005 |title=So Who Are the Activists? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/opinion/06gewirtz.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307225205/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/opinion/06gewirtz.html |archive-date=March 7, 2008 |access-date=March 23, 2007 |work=The New York Times}}</ref>

Breyer's extensive experience in [[administrative law]] is accompanied by his staunch defense of the [[Federal Sentencing Guidelines]]. He rejects the strict interpretation of the [[Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Sixth Amendment]] espoused by [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] that all facts necessary to criminal punishment must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>''[[Blakely v. Washington]]'', {{ussc|542|296|2004}}.</ref> In many other areas on the Court, too, Breyer's pragmatism was considered the intellectual counterweight to Scalia's [[textualism|textualist]] philosophy.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sullivan |first=Kathleen M. |date=February 5, 2006 |title=Consent of the Governed |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/05sullivan.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151229082108/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/05sullivan.html |archive-date=December 29, 2015 |access-date=February 18, 2017 |work=The New York Times}}</ref>

In describing his interpretive philosophy, Breyer has sometimes noted his use of six interpretive tools: text, history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute, and the consequences of competing interpretations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lithwick |first=Dalia |date=December 6, 2006 |title=Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar |url=http://www.slate.com/id/2154993/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070303154406/http://www.slate.com/id/2154993/ |archive-date=March 3, 2007 |access-date=March 19, 2007 |work=Slate}}</ref> He has noted that only the last two differentiate him from textualists such as Scalia. Breyer argues that these sources are necessary, however, and in the former case (purpose), can in fact provide greater objectivity in legal interpretation than looking merely at what is often ambiguous statutory text.<ref>{{Cite news |date=September 30, 2005 |title=Interview with Nina Totenberg |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4929668 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070214061347/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4929668 |archive-date=February 14, 2007 |access-date=March 19, 2007 |publisher=NPR}}</ref> With the latter (consequences), Breyer argues that considering the impact of legal interpretations is a further way of ensuring consistency with a law's intended purpose.<ref name="115 YALE L.J. 1719" />