Editing Solipsism (section)

===Philosophy of time===
In the paper ''The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective'', Vincent Conitzer connects [[A series and B series]] theories of time with the metaphysics of first-person perspectives. Conitzer argues that if A-theory is correct, and a given moment of time, i.e. the present, is metaphysically privileged, this implies that a given "I" is also metaphysically privileged in the same way. He argues that arguments for A-theory are more effective as arguments for the combined position of both A-theory and first-person realism, but that arguments for B-theory are ineffective against the combined position.<ref>{{cite arXiv|last=Conitzer|first=Vincent|author-link=|date=30 Aug 2020|title=The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective|eprint=2008.13207v1|class=physics.hist-ph}}</ref> Within Caspar Hare's theory of [[perspectival realism]], Hare points out that arguments in favor of a certain first-person perspective being metaphysically privileged are similar to the arguments made in favor of [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|presentism]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hare|first=Caspar|title=Realism About Tense and Perspective|journal=Philosophy Compass|date=September 2010|volume=5|issue=9|pages=760–769|url=http://web.mit.edu/~casparh/www/Papers/CJHarePerspectivalRealism.pdf|doi=10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00325.x|hdl=1721.1/115229|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Hare|first=Caspar|title=Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time|journal=The Journal of Philosophy|date=July 2007|volume=104|issue=7|pages=350–373|doi=10.5840/jphil2007104717|url=http://web.mit.edu/~casparh/www/Papers/CJHareSelfBias2.pdf}}</ref> According to presentism, if Event A is happening on [insert today's date], A is ''simply'' happening (right now), not relative to anything. It could be argued that this is similar to solipsism, in which Experience A is ''simply'' present, not relative to anything, as opposed to only being present ''to you''.