Editing Søren Kierkegaard (section)

===Philosophical criticism===
[[File:Adorno.jpg|thumb|[[Theodor Adorno]] in 1964]]

Kierkegaard's famous philosophical 20th-century critics include [[Theodor Adorno]] and [[Emmanuel Levinas]]. Non-religious philosophers such as [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] and [[Martin Heidegger]] supported many aspects of Kierkegaard's philosophical views,<ref>A recent study touches specifically on the ontological aspects of ''angst'' from a Heideggerian standpoint in: [[Nader El-Bizri]], 'Variations ontologiques autour du concept d'angoisse chez Kierkegaard', in ''Kierkegaard notre contemporain paradoxal'', ed. N. Hatem (Beirut, 2013), pp. 83–95</ref> but rejected some of his religious views.{{sfn|Sartre|1946}}{{sfn|Dreyfus|1998}} One critic wrote that Adorno's book ''Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic'' is "the most irresponsible book ever written on Kierkegaard"{{sfn|Westphal|1996|p=9}} because Adorno takes Kierkegaard's pseudonyms literally and constructs a philosophy that makes him seem incoherent and unintelligible. Another reviewer says that "Adorno is [far away] from the more credible translations and interpretations of the Collected Works of Kierkegaard we have today."{{sfn|Morgan|2003}}

[[File:Emmanuel Levinas.jpg|thumb|left|[[Emmanuel Levinas]]]]
Levinas' main attack on Kierkegaard focused on his ethical and religious stages, especially in ''[[Fear and Trembling]]''. Levinas criticises the leap of faith by saying this suspension of the ethical and leap into the religious is a type of violence. He states: "Kierkegaardian violence begins when existence is forced to abandon the ethical stage in order to embark on the religious stage, the domain of belief. But belief no longer sought external justification. Even internally, it combined communication and isolation, and hence violence and passion. That is the origin of the relegation of ethical phenomena to secondary status and the contempt of the ethical foundation of being which has led, through Nietzsche, to the amoralism of recent philosophies."<ref>Emmanuel Levinas, ''Existence and Ethics'' (1963), as cited in {{harvnb|Lippitt|2003|p=136}}.</ref>

Levinas pointed to the [[Judeo-Christian]] belief that it was God who first commanded [[Abraham]] to sacrifice [[Isaac]] and that an angel commanded Abraham to stop. If Abraham were truly in the religious realm, he would not have listened to the angel's command and should have continued to kill Isaac. To Levinas, "transcending ethics" seems like a loophole to excuse would-be murderers from their crime and thus is unacceptable.{{sfn|Katz|2003|p=64}} One interesting consequence of Levinas' critique is that it seemed to reveal that Levinas viewed God as a projection of inner ethical desire rather than an absolute moral agent.{{sfn|Hutchens|2004}} However, one of Kierkegaard's central points in ''Fear and Trembling'' was that the religious sphere ''entails'' the ethical sphere; Abraham had faith that God is always in one way or another ethically in the right, even when He commands someone to kill. Therefore, deep down, Abraham had faith that God, as an absolute moral authority, would never allow him in the end to do something as ethically heinous as murdering his own child, and so he passed the test of blind obedience versus moral choice. He was making the point that God as well as the God-Man Christ doesn't tell people everything when sending them out on a mission and reiterated this in ''Stages on Life's Way''.

<blockquote>I conceive of God as one who approves in a calculated vigilance, I believe that he approves of intrigues, and what I have read in the sacred books of the Old Testament is not of a sort to dishearten me. The Old Testament furnishes examples abundantly of a shrewdness which is nevertheless well pleasing to God, and that at a later period Christ said to His disciples, "These things I said not unto you from the beginning—I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now"—so here is a teleological suspension of the ethical rule of telling the whole truth.
:— Søren Kierkegaard, "Quidam's Diary" from ''Stages on Life's Way'', 1845. Lowrie translation, 1967, pp. 217–218.</blockquote>

[[File:Sartre 1967 crop.jpg|thumb|[[Jean-Paul Sartre]] in 1967 ]]
Sartre objected to the [[existence of God]]: If existence precedes essence, it follows from the meaning of the term sentient that a sentient being cannot be complete or perfect. In ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'', Sartre's phrasing is that God would be a ''[[pour-soi]]'' (a being-for-itself; a consciousness) who is also an ''en-soi'' (a being-in-itself; a thing) which is a contradiction in terms.{{sfn|Sartre|1946}}{{sfn|Sartre|1969|p=430}} Critics of Sartre rebutted this objection by stating that it rests on a false dichotomy and a misunderstanding of the traditional Christian view of God.<ref>Swinburne Richard, The Coherence of Theism.</ref> Kierkegaard has Judge Vilhelm express the Christian hope this way in ''Either/Or'':

<blockquote>Either, "the first" contains promise for the future, is the forward thrust, the endless impulse. Or, "the first" does not impel the individual; the power which is in the first does not become the impelling power but the repelling power, it becomes that which thrusts away. .... Thus—for the sake of making a little philosophical flourish, not with the pen but with thought-God only once became flesh, and it would be vain to expect this to be repeated.
:— Søren Kierkegaard, ''Either – Or II'', 1843. Lowrie translation 1944, 1959, 1972, pp. 40–41.</blockquote>

Sartre agreed with Kierkegaard's analysis of Abraham undergoing anxiety (Sartre calls it anguish), but claimed that God told Abraham to do it. In his lecture, ''[[Existentialism is a Humanism]]'', Sartre wondered whether Abraham ought to have doubted whether God actually spoke to him.{{sfn|Sartre|1946}} In Kierkegaard's view, Abraham's certainty had its origin in that "inner voice" which cannot be demonstrated or shown to another ("The problem comes as soon as Abraham wants to be understood").<ref>''[[Fear and Trembling]]'', 1843 – Søren Kierkegaard – Kierkegaard's Writings; 6 – 1983 – Howard V. Hong, pp. 13–14.</ref> To Kierkegaard, every external "proof" or justification is merely on the outside and external to the subject.{{sfn|Stern|1990}} Kierkegaard's proof for the immortality of the soul, for example, is rooted in the extent to which one wishes to live forever.{{sfn|Kosch|1996}}

[[File:Nb pinacoteca stieler friedrich wilhelm joseph von schelling.jpg|thumb|Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling]]
Faith was something that Kierkegaard often wrestled with throughout his writing career; under both his real name and behind pseudonyms, he explored many different aspects of faith. These various aspects include faith as a spiritual goal, the historical orientation of faith (particularly toward Jesus Christ), faith being a gift from God, faith as dependency on a historical object, faith as a passion, and faith as a resolution to personal despair. Even so, it has been argued that Kierkegaard never offers a full, explicit and systematic account of what faith is.<ref name="Routledge"/> ''[[Either/Or (Kierkegaard book)|Either/Or]]'' was published 20 February 1843; it was mostly written during Kierkegaard's stay in Berlin, where he took notes on Schelling's ''Philosophy of Revelation''. According to the ''Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Religion'', Either/Or (vol. 1) consists of essays of literary and music criticism, a set of romantic-like-aphorisms, a whimsical essay on how to avoid boredom, a panegyric on the unhappiest possible human being, a diary recounting a supposed seduction, and (vol. II) two enormous didactic and hortatory ethical letters and a sermon.<ref name="ReferenceB"/><ref name="ReferenceC"/> This opinion is a reminder of the type of controversy Kierkegaard tried to encourage in many of his writings both for readers in his own generation and for subsequent generations as well.

Kierkegaardian scholar Paul Holmer<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.yale.edu/opa/arc-ybc/v33.n3/story24.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402140719/http://www.yale.edu/opa/arc-ybc/v33.n3/story24.html|title=Paul Holmer from ''The Yale Bulletin''|archive-date=2 April 2015}}</ref> described Kierkegaard's wish in his introduction to the 1958 publication of Kierkegaard's ''Edifying Discourses'' where he wrote:

{{Blockquote|Kierkegaard's constant and lifelong wish, to which his entire literature gives expression, was to create a new and rich subjectivity in himself and his readers. Unlike any authors who believe that all subjectivity is a hindrance, Kierkegaard contends that only some kinds of subjectivity are a hindrance. He sought at once to produce subjectivity if it were lacking, to correct it if it were there and needed correction, to amplify and strengthen it when it was weak and undeveloped, and, always, to bring subjectivity of every reader to the point of eligibility for Christian inwardness and concern. But the ''Edifying Discourses'', though paralleling the pseudonymous works, spoke a little more directly, albeit without authority. They spoke the real author's conviction and were the purpose of Kierkegaard's lifework. Whereas all the rest of his writing was designed to get the readers out of their lassitude and mistaken conceptions, the discourses, early and late, were the goal of the literature.|''Edifying Discourses: A Selection'', 1958. Introduction by Paul Holmer. p. xviii.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.org/stream/edifyingdiscours00kier#page/n19/mode/2up|title=Edifying discourses: a selection|access-date=27 March 2015|publisher=New York,: Harper}} See also ''Works of Love'', Hong, 1995 pp. 359ff.</ref>}}

Later, Naomi Lebowitz explained them this way: The edifying discourses are, according to Johannes Climacus, "humoristically revoked" (CUP, 244, Swenson, Lowrie 1968) for unlike sermons, they are not ordained by authority. They start where the reader finds himself, in immanent ethical possibilities and aesthetic repetitions, and are themselves vulnerable to the lure of poetic sirens. They force the dialectical movements of the making and unmaking of the self before God to undergo lyrical imitations of meditation while the clefts, rifts, abysses, are everywhere to be seen.<ref>Noami Lebowitz,''Kierkegaard: A Life of Allegory'', 1985, p. 157</ref>