Editing Robert McNamara (section)

===Other steps===
====Cost reductions====
McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decision-making on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars.... You have to make a judgment on how much is enough."{{Citation needed|date=June 2023}} Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program, which, he reported, saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary for national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures.<ref name="Historical Office Robert S. McNamara" />

Due to the nuclear arms race, the Vietnam War buildup and other projects, [[total obligational authority|Total Obligational Authority]] (TOA) increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year TOA increased from $48.4 billion in 1962 (equal to ${{Inflation|US-GDP|48.4|1962|r=0}}&nbsp;billion in {{Inflation-year|US-GDP}}) to $49.5 (${{Inflation|US-GDP|49.5|1965|r=0}}) billion in 1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to $74.9 (${{Inflation|US-GDP|74.9|1968|r=0}}) billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in office (though he left office in February).{{Inflation-fn|US-GDP}} Not until FY 1984 did DoD's total obligational authority surpass that of FY 1968 in [[constant dollars]].{{Citation needed|date=September 2017}}

{{see|Convair B-58 Hustler#Excessive program expenditure}}
McNamara was an early opponent of the [[Convair B-58 Hustler]], the Air Force's first supersonic bomber. It had an operating cost one-third greater than the [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]], and he did not consider it a viable weapon system due to limited range that was overcome at the cost of additional midair refueling tankers.{{sfn|Miller|1985|p=69}}{{sfn|Sorenson|1995|p=131}} In late 1965, five years after it became operational, McNamara ordered retirement of the B-58 by 1970; the principal reasons given for this directive was the high sustainment cost for the fleet and the planned introduction of the replacement FB-111A.{{sfn|Gunston|Gilchrist|1993|p=179}}

{{see|North American XB-70 Valkyrie#Downsizing, upswing, cancellation}}
After President Kennedy reduced the supersonic [[North American XB-70 Valkyrie]] project to experimental, McNamara fully supported the decision in Congressional hearings, calling the bomber unjustifiable.{{sfn|Pace|1988|p=20-21}}

====Program consolidation====
McNamara's actions in mandating a premature across-the-board adoption of the untested [[M16 rifle]] proved catastrophic when the weapons began to fail in combat, though later congressional investigations revealed the causes of these failures as negligence and borderline sabotage on behalf of the Army ordnance corps' officers.{{sfn|Rottman|2011|p=20, 24}}

One major hallmark of McNamara's cost reductions was the consolidation of programs from different services, most visibly in aircraft acquisition, believing that the redundancy created waste and unnecessary spending. 

McNamara directed the Air Force to adopt the Navy's [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II#United States Air Force|McDonnell F-4 Phantom II]] and [[LTV A-7 Corsair II#United States Air Force A-7D|LTV A-7 Corsair II]] combat aircraft, consolidations that were quite successful, and the success was bidirectional: the Navy would later adopt improvements first made by the Air Force.{{sfn|Munzenmaier|2009}} The Phantom II USAF adoption was part of McNamara's November 1961 decision to end production of the [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief]].{{sfn|Davis|2002|p=130}}

McNamara tried to extend his success by merging development programs as well, resulting in the TFX, later known as the F-111 dual service project. He combined Navy requirements for a Fleet Air Defense (FAD) aircraft - the original proposal, the [[Douglas F6D Missileer]], was cancelled in December 1961{{sfn|Simonsen|2016|p=108}} - and Air Force requirements for a low-level bomber. His experience in the corporate world led him to believe that adopting a single type for different missions and services would save money. He insisted on the [[General Dynamics]] entry over the DOD's preference for [[Boeing]] because of commonality issues. Though heralded as a fighter that could do everything (fast supersonic dash, slow carrier and short airfield landings, tactical strike and even close air support), in the end it involved too many compromises to fully succeed at all of them. The [[General Dynamics–Grumman F-111B|Navy version (F-111B)]] was drastically overweight and difficult to land on carriers, and eventually canceled after a [[Grumman]] study showed it was incapable of matching the abilities of the newly revealed Soviet [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23|MiG-23]] and [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25|MiG-25]] aircraft. The aircraft eventually found niches as a [[General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark|tactical bomber (F-111A)]], a [[General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark#FB-111A / F-111G|light strategic bomber (FB-111A)]], and an [[General Dynamics–Grumman EF-111A Raven|electronic warfare aircraft (EF-111A)]] with the Air Force.<ref group=Note>However, many analysts believe that even though the TFX project itself was a partial failure, McNamara was ahead of his time as the trend in fighter design has continued toward consolidation—the [[General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16 Falcon]] and [[McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet|F/A-18 Hornet]] emerged as multi-role fighters, and most modern designs combine many of the roles the TFX would have had. In many ways, the [[Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II|Joint Strike Fighter]] is seen as a rebirth of the TFX project, according to defense analyst David S. Grantham, in that it purports to satisfy the needs of three American air arms (as well as several foreign customers), fulfilling the roles of strike fighter, carrier-launched fighter, [[V/STOL]], and [[close air support]] (and drawing many criticisms similar to those leveled against the TFX).</ref>{{sfn|Grantham|1997}}