Editing Richard Helms (section)

==Ambassador to Iran==
After Helms left the leadership of the CIA, he began his service as U.S. ambassador to Iran as designated by President Nixon.<ref>See above subsection "Helms dismissed" under section "Nixon presidency". Helms served in Iran under both Nixon and [[Gerald Ford|Ford]].</ref><ref>Cf., [http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape036/036-113.mp3 Nixon White House Tapes January 1973] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100528231231/http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape036/036-113.mp3 |date=2010-05-28 }}, Nixon Presidential Library & Museum, released on 23 Jun 2009. This recording apparently presents a telephone conversation between Nixon and Helms, evidently in January 1973, after his ambassadorial appointment but before his leaving for Iran.</ref> This had caused the dismissal of the then current ambassador, [[Joseph S. Farland|Joseph Farland]].<ref>[[William Shawcross]], ''The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally'' (New York: Simon and Schuster 1988) pp. 265–266 *note.</ref> After being confirmed by the Senate, in April 1973 Helms proceeded to his new residence in Tehran, where he served as the American representative until resigning effective January 1977. During these years, however, his presence was often required in Washington, where he testified before Congress in hearings about past CIA activities, including Watergate. His frequent flights to the United States lessened somewhat his capacity to attend to being ambassador.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 341.</ref><ref>William Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally'' (New York: Simon and Schuster 1988) p. 267 *note: "Much of Helms' time in Iran was devoured by trips to Washington to testify to one or another of the various congressional committees investigating the CIA."</ref>

===At the Shah's court===
[[File:Hoveyda.jpg|thumb|[[Amir Abbas Hoveyda|Hoveyda]], prime minister of Iran 1965–1977, executed by the [[Interim Government of Iran (1979)|Provisional Revolutionary Govt.]] in 1979]]

"The presentation of ambassadorial credentials to the [[Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi|Shah]] was a rather formal undertaking," reads a photograph caption in Helms' memoirs, which shows him in formal attire, standing before the Shah who is dressed in military uniform.<ref>Helms (2003), photograph following p. 240 (at page 'xiv' of series).</ref> Helms enjoyed an elite student experience which he shared with the Shah, as circa 1930, both had attended [[Le Rosey]], a French-language prep school in Switzerland.<ref>Abbas Milani, ''The Shah'' (2011) p. 44. Not Richard Helms, but his older brother was a classmate of the Shah.</ref>

Decades later, the CIA station chief in Iran first introduced Helms to the Shah. Helms was there about an installation to spy on the Soviets:<ref name="Shawcross, 1988">Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 266.</ref> "I had first met the Shah in 1957 when I visited Tehran to negotiate permission to place some sophisticated intercept equipment in northern Iran."<ref>Helms (2003) p. 417.</ref>

A "celebrated" story was told in elite circles about Helms' appointment. The Soviet ambassador had said with a sneer, to [[Amir Abbas Hoveyda]] the Shah's prime minister, "We hear the Americans are sending their Number One spy to Iran." Hoveyda replied, "The Americans are our friends. At least they don't send us their Number Ten spy."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 206.</ref> Helms, for his part, referred to Hoveyda as "Iran's most consummate politician."<ref>Fakhreddin Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule'' (Harvard University 2008, 2010) p. 199 (Helms' quote).</ref>

For many years, the CIA had operated extensive technical installations to monitor [[Soviet Air Force|Soviet air traffic]] across Iran's northern border.<ref>Cf., [[Project Dark Gene]].</ref> Also the CIA, along with [[Mossad]] and [[United States Agency for International Development|USAID]], since the early 1950s had trained and supported the controversial Iranian intelligence and police agency [[SAVAK]].<ref>Fakhreddin Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritaian Rule'' (Harvard University 2008, 2010) at p. 164 (Savak).</ref>
Further from 1972 to 1975 the CIA was involved in assisting Iran with its project to support the [[Kurdish people|Kurdish]] struggle against Iraq. As a result of this security background and official familiarity with the government of Iran, Helms figured that as the American ambassador he could "hit the ground running" when he started work in Tehran.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 417 (intercepts, Kurds). Helms remarks that then as always "the Shah acted as his own chief of intelligence".</ref><ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 266 (CIA 'listening posts' re Soviets), pp. 72, 160–161, 198 (CIA and Savak), at pp. 163, 165* (CIA and the Kurds), p. 266 (quote). "The CIA owned in Iran one of its largest operations in the world" (p. 264).</ref>

Long before Helms arrived in country his embassy, and other western embassies as well, entertained an "almost uncritical approval of the Shah. He was a strong leader, a reformer who appreciated the needs of his people and who had a vision of a developed, pro-Western, anti-Communist, prosperous Iran." The shah remained an ally. "Too much had been invested in the Shah—by European nations as well as by the U.S.—for any real changes in policy."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 263 ("uncritical" quote), p. 270 ("invested" quote).</ref><ref>David Harris, ''The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam'' (Boston: Little, Brown 2004) p. 44. Later in 1978–1979 revolutionary crowds in Tehran "called him 'the American Shah' and they were right on the mark."</ref> Helms inspected and adjusted the security provided for the embassy, which was located in the city on 25-acres with high walls. A CIA officer accompanied Helms wherever he went. The usual ambassador's car was "a shabby beige Chevrolet" with armor-plating. There was "the traditional ambassador's big black Cadillac, with the flag flying from the front fender" but Helms used it only once, accompanied by his wife.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 418–419, 421.</ref><ref>Cf., Cynthia Helms, ''An Ambassador's Wife in Iran'' (1981).</ref>

===The ruler and Iran===
Most important for his effectiveness would be to establish a good working relationship with the ruler. All the while, the shah's terminal illness of prostate cancer remained a well-kept secret from everyone.<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 292: "The Shah had been terminally ill since 1974, although this fact was kept a secret for a considerable time from his closest confidants, foreign allies, and even from himself."</ref><ref>Milani, ''The Shah'' (2008, 2010) pp. 370–371. Of symptoms discovered in 1973, the shah's fatal cancer in 1974 was confirmed, and kept secret.</ref> Helms found himself satisfied with his "as much as might be asked for" dealings with the Shah. The monarch was notorious for an "I speak, you listen" approach to dialogue.<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 209 ("I speak" quote), p. 270 (meeting with the Shah as his monologue).</ref> Yet Helms describes lively conversations with "polite give-and-take" in which the shah never forgot his majesty; these discussions could end with an agreement to disagree. The shah allowed that they by happenstance might meet at a social function and then "talk shop". Usually they met in private offices, the two alone, where it was "tête à tête with no note-takers or advisors."<ref>Helms (2003) p. 417 ("tête à tête"), p. 419 ("as much" quote, "give-and-take" quote, "talk shop"). Helms commented that the shah was well disposed to CIA officials.</ref><ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 367. Helms remembered, "Dean Rusk used to say that [the Shah] was the best-informed man in the world save for the U.S. President. Maybe that's a slight exaggeration."</ref>

[[File:Iran (orthographic projection).svg|thumb|left|150px]]

British author and journalist [[William Shawcross]] several times makes the point that the shah prohibited foreign governments from any contact with his domestic political opposition. Replying to one such request for access, by the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]], an 'irritated' shah replied "I will not have any guest of mine waste a moment on these ridiculous people." As with other ambassadors before and during his tenure, Helms was reluctant to cross the shah on this point because of the fear of "being PNG'ed (made [[persona non grata]])." For any ambassador to do so "would at the very least have jeopardized his country's export opportunities in Iran." Consequently, "American and other diplomats swam in a shallow pool of courtiers, industrialists, lawyers, and others who were somehow benefiting from the material success of the regime. ¶ ... people more or less licensed by the Shah." About the immediate court, however, a U.N. official wrote, "There was an atmosphere of overwhelming nouveau-riche, meretricious chi-chi and sycophancy ..."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally'' (Simon and Schuster 1988) pp. 264–265 (no contact with opposition), p. 270 (Shah "guest" quote); p. 265 ("jeopardized" quote, "shallow pool" quote), p. 268 (Helms' "PNG" quote), p. 271 (U.N.'s [[Brian Urquhart]]'s quote).</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 285: "In the twilight years of the monarchy it was increasingly clear that the shah and his elite had cacooned themselves in an impenetrable web of collective self-deception."</ref> Helms himself managed to circulate widely among the traditional elites, e.g., becoming a "close friend" of the aristocrat Ahmad Goreishi.<ref>Abbas Milani, ''The Shah'' (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) p. 386.</ref>

The shah's policy of keeping foreign agents and officials away from his domestic foes applied equally to the CIA. In fact, the Agency remained somewhat uninformed about his foes, but for what information SAVAK (Iran's state security) gave it.{{citation needed|reason=Alleged statement of fact|date=September 2023}} The CIA evidently did not even closely monitor the shah's activities. During Helms' last year this situation was being reviewed, but the State Department seemed complacent and willing to rely on the shah's soliloquies and its own diplomatic queries.<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 271 (CIA excluded), pp. 271–272 (CIA not monitoring shah), p. 272 (State Dept.), p. 273 (depending on Savak), 272–273 (CIA review). "The Shah would never have tolerated the necessary investigations" (p. 270).</ref><ref>Yet "coded confidential telegrams" between the shah and the Iranian embassy in Washington were "regularly intercepted" and read by the USG. Milani, ''The Shah'' (Harvard 2008, 2010) p. 370.</ref> While Helms' 'notorious' connection to the CIA might have been considered an asset by the shah and his circle, many Iranians viewed the American embassy and its spy Agency as distressing reminders of active foreign meddling in their country's affairs, and of the CIA's [[1953 Iranian coup d'état|1953 coup]] against the civil democrat [[Mohammad Mossadegh]].<ref>Cf., Shawcross (1988) at 249, 333, 351–352. <blockquote>Helms' appointment to Tehran inevitably gave rise to lurid speculations about the nature of CIA control over the Shah. For the shah's enemies it was clear confirmation that the shah was merely a CIA puppet." Shawcross (1988) at 266.</blockquote></ref><ref>Weiner (2007) p. 368.</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) pp. 144, 146, 149, 158 (CIA and 1953 coup); pp. 260–264 (America and CIA in Iran). "The Iranian public increasingly resented the U.S. predominance" (p. 260).</ref><ref>See above section "Iran: Mossadegh" for the coup and for Helms' reflections on the CIA and the subsequent Islamic revolution in Iran.</ref> "[F]ew politically minded Iranians doubted that the American embassy was deeply involved in Iranian domestic politics and in promoting particular individuals or agendas" including actions by "the CIA station chief in Tehran".<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 262.</ref>

===Events and views===

During his first year as ambassador, Helms had fielded the American and Iranian reaction to the 1973 [[1973 oil crisis|Arab oil embargo]] and consequent price hikes following the [[Yom Kippur War]]. Immediately, Helms made requests to the shah regarding fueling favors for the United States Navy near [[Bandar Abbas]]. Subsequently, the Shah, flush with increased oil revenue, had placed huge orders for foreign imports and American military hardware, e.g., high performance warplanes. Helms wrote in his memoirs, "Foreign businessmen flooded Tehran. Few had any knowledge of the country; fewer could speak a word of Persian." Tens of thousands of foreign commercial agents, technicians and experts, took up temporary residence. "There is no doubt [the Shah] tried to go too fast. Which led to the ports' congestion and the overheating of the economy," Helms later commented.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 419 (fueling favors; imports, warplanes).</ref><ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 266 (Helms "Shah" quote).</ref><ref>Said Amir Arjomand, ''The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran'' (Oxford University 1988) on the 1973 [[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries|OPEC]] effect: "The sudden increase in the price of oil generated a boom for the next three years while seriously distorting the path of economic development" (at 110).</ref><ref>"In 1977 the number of American citizens working in Iran in various areas totaled about 31,000." Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Foreign Relations" pp. 221–239, at 231, in ''Iran: A Country Study'' (American Univ., 3d ed. 1978), edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Cf., p. 415: 1,400 U.S. Dept. of Defense personnel.</ref> The 'oil bonanza' followed by the rapid expenditure of 'petrodollars' led to an accelerated corruption involving enormous sums.<ref>Arjomand, ''The Turban for the Crown'' (Oxford Univ. 1988), about the "oil bonanza" and "petrodollars": "Corruption among the high civilian officials became phenomenal and spread to the generals as billions of dollars were being siphoned off through government and army contracts" (at 111). Arjomand noted its political results, "the utter lack of any moral commitment to the shah's regime among those who had a stake in it, the top civil servants and the well-to-do entrepreneurs" (at 111).</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (2008, 2010) pp. 244–247 (corruption), p. 273 (oil revenues quadruple), pp. 325–326 (opulence of "the one-thousand families"). "Corruption in its broad sense was intrinsic to the functioning of the regimes" (pp. 244–245). Professor Fakhreddin Azimi, about the shah's labored rule, mentions former premier (1961–1962) [[Ali Amini]] and his belief that 'although the Shah undoubtedly loved his country, the love did not extend to the people" (p. 301).</ref>

[[File:1975 Algiers Agreement.jpg|thumb|[[Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi|The Shah]], [[Houari Boumedienne|Boumedienne]], [[Saddam Hussein|Hussein]], 1975]]
In March 1975, Helms learned the shah alone had negotiated a major agreement with [[Saddam Hussein]] of Iraq while in Algiers at an [[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries|OPEC]] meeting. There the Algerian head of state [[Houari Boumedienne]] had translated the shah's French into Arabic for the negotiation. As part of the deal, the shah had disowned, quit his support for the [[Iraqi Kurdistan|Kurdish struggle in Iraq]]. The resulting [[1975 Algiers Agreement|treaty]] was evidently a surprise to the shah's own ministers, as well as to Helms and the USG.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 417–418. In exchange, the shah got changes in the border, and rights for Iranian pilgrims to visit Shi'a holy sites in Iraq. Helms notes that subsequently many anti-Shah, pro-Ayatollah audio cassettes were smuggled back into Iran by pilgrims.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) pp. 607–608.</ref> As a result, the CIA also abandoned the Kurds, whose struggling people became another of those stateless nations who would remember with "regret and bitterness" their dealings with the Agency.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 40 (quote).</ref>

Helms articulated several understandings, derived from his working knowledge and experiences as ambassador in Iran. "He came to realize that he could never understand the Iranians," writes [[William Shawcross]]. He quotes Helms, "They have a very different turn of mind. Here would be ladies, dressed in Parisian clothes. ... But before they went on trips abroad, they would ship up to [[Mashhad]] in [[chador]]s to ask for protection." Helms with his wife had visited the pilgrimage site in Mashhad, 'the tomb of the [[Ali al-Ridha|eighth Imam]]'. As to the shah's statecraft, Helms' May 1976 memo observes, "Iranian government and society are highly structured and authoritarian and all major decisions are made at the top. Often even relatively senior officials are not well informed about policies and plans and have little influence on them."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) at 267 ("Mashhad" quote), 267–268 (travel to Mashhad); at 269 ("authoritarian" quote).</ref> In July 1976 Helms send a message to the U.S. Department of State which, while confident, again voiced various concerns, e.g., about the "inadequate 'political institutionalization'" of the regime.<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) at 353.</ref> Professor [[Abbas Milani]] comments that in 1975 Helms had "captured the nature of the shah's vulnerability when he wrote that 'the conflict between rapid economic growth and modernization vis-à-vis a still autocratic rule' was the greatest uncertainty about the shah's future." Milani, looking ahead after Helms' departure, writes that the election of [[Carter administration|President Carter]] in 1976 "forced the Shah to expedite his liberalization plans."<ref>Milani, ''The Shah'' (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) p. 375.</ref><ref>Cf., above section "Iran: Mossadegh" regarding Helms's reflections on the CIA and the Islamic revolution in Iran.</ref>

During the course of his service as ambassador, Helms had dealt with the 1973 oil crisis and Iran's oil bonanza, and the shah's 1975 deal with Iraq and abandonment of the Kurds. In 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Iran. He agreed to Helms' plan to resign as ambassador before the presidential election.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 417–418, 419 (Iraq deal, oil bonanza). Helms ends here saying that he and his wife "decided it was time to begin to think about leaving Iran and government service" (pp. 419–420).</ref> Helms submitted his resignation to President Ford in the middle of October. Meanwhile, the grand jury sitting in Washington had "shifted the focus of its investigation" about past activities of the CIA.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 348. The scope of the investigation included 1970 actions by CIA, and Helms' 1973 testimony about it. The eventual result was legal action against Helms.</ref>