Editing Politics of Iraq (section)

==Issues==

===Corruption===
{{main|Corruption in Iraq}}
According to [[Transparency International]], Iraq's is the most corrupt government in the [[Middle East]], and is described as a "[[hybrid regime]]" (between a "[[flawed democracy]]" and an "[[authoritarian regime]]").<ref>{{cite web|title=Did the wars bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq?|url=http://costsofwar.org/article/did-wars-bring-democracy-afghanistan-and-iraq|work=Costs of War|publisher=Brown University|access-date=18 July 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110703093122/http://costsofwar.org/article/did-wars-bring-democracy-afghanistan-and-iraq|archive-date=3 July 2011}}</ref> The 2011 report "[[Costs of War Project|Costs of War]]" from [[Brown University]]'s [[Watson Institute for International Studies]] concluded that U.S. military presence in Iraq has not been able to prevent this corruption, noting that as early as 2006, "there were clear signs that post-Saddam Iraq was not going to be the linchpin for a new democratic Middle East."<ref>{{cite web|last=Balaghi|first=Shiva|title=The War on Terror and Middle East Policy Analysis|url=http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/45/attachments/Niland%20and%20Balaghi.pdf|work=Costs of War|publisher=Brown University|access-date=18 July 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111011225136/http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/45/attachments/Niland%20and%20Balaghi.pdf|archive-date=11 October 2011|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

=== Elite cartel ruling Iraq by ''muhasasa'' ===
{{Further|Iraq#Post-Saddam (2003 – present)}}
During the [[Ba'athist Iraq|regime]] of [[Saddam Hussein]] (1979–2003), several Iraqi opposition groups created a quota system by which [[Sunni Islam]]ic, [[Shia Islam]]ic, [[Kurds#Iraq|Kurdish]] and other religious or ethnic groups would be proportionally represented in a future new government. The U.S. in July 2003 selected the members of the [[Iraqi Governing Council]], the forerunner of the first post–Hussein sovereign [[Iraqi Interim Government|Iraqi (interim) government]], according to that ethno-sectarian quota system.<ref name=Arwa,Ibr>{{Cite web |last=Ibrahim |first=Arwa |date=4 Dec 2019 |title=Muhasasa, the political system reviled by Iraqi protesters |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=www.aljazeera.com |language=en |archive-date=2022-10-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221018224019/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters |url-status=live }}</ref>

Also in 2003, a "pact" (''muhasasa ta’ifa'') was struck by "the elite", holding that after a national election, the winning parties divide the ministerial positions in direct relationship to their success at the ballot box.<ref name=chatham,2019>{{Cite web|date=1 October 2019|title=Corruption Continues to Destabilize Iraq|url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/corruption-continues-destabilize-iraq|url-status=live|access-date=2019-11-04|website=Chatham House|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200328190454/https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/corruption-continues-destabilize-iraq |archive-date=2020-03-28 }}</ref> After 2003, a second agreement (''muhasasa'') was made, holding that ministries and their budgets and other political positions must be proportionally placed under the "control" of "religious [or sectarian or ethnic] groups", "depending mostly on a group's size", presuming such "groups" to be fully represented by one or several parties or lists taking part in the elections,<ref name=U4,muhas,trench>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (sections 'Drivers of corruption', 'The Muhasasa power-sharing agreement' and 'Entrenched but diminishing sectarianism') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> or that national governments should "represent the different ethnic, religious and sectarian identities that make up the Iraqi society", presuming that such "identities" are expressed or represented by existing political parties.<ref name="al-Hasan2015">{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (section: 'Roots of the quota system') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Such agreements between members of the [[elite]] to [[Collusion|collude]] in order to avoid competition, improve their own profits, and dominate the market (of voters in a democracy), have been labeled "elite [[cartel]]".<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> The political parties themselves, once they win any ministry through the ''muhasasa'' system, benefit financially from state contracts awarded by them to companies run by their party members (see below, section [[#Clientelism, patronage|Clientelism, patronage]]) what makes it even harder for them to step out of the ''muhasasa'' arrangements.<ref name=chatham,2019/> Or, as a researcher phrased it in 2020: "Such elite pacts are notoriously resistant to reform, particularly if any proposed change is perceived to undermine elite interests (…)".<ref name=U4,muhas/>

Although the system functions informally, a group of Norwegian researchers in late 2020 asserted—while citing other researchers but not a basic source—that 54% of the ministry posts would 'normally' go to the Shia, 24% to the Sunni, 18% to the Kurds, and 4% to minorities including the Christians.<ref name=U4>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> They suggested that the ''muhasasa'' system leads to "a closed system of elite rule… recycling the political elites irrespective of their performance", not urging or inciting the Iraqi politicians to act transparently or accountably or to respond to citizen demands and deliver benefits to the Iraqi population as a whole, but instead making them easily susceptible to corruption, nepotism, clientelism and patronage while focusing on their own (group's) interests and (elite's) survival and consolidation.<ref name=U4/>

This ''muhasasa'' elite cartel (and connected problems) led to massive protests in Iraq in [[2011 Iraqi protests|2011]], [[2012–2013 Iraqi protests|2012–2013]], [[2015–2018 Iraqi protests|2015, 2016, 2018]] and [[2019–2021 Iraqi protests|2019–2021]]. Analysts have seen this ''muhasasa'' system to exist until at least late 2020.<ref name=U4-/> The [[Abdul Mahdi Government]] of 2018 broke with elements of ''muhasasa''. Although his anti-''muhasasa'' [[Sadrist Movement]] retained plurality in the 2021 election, [[2021–2022 Iraqi political crisis|inability to form a government]] eventually led to the party's withdrawal from Parliament, allowing the rival parties to form another ''muhasasa''-based government.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Ottaway |first1=Marina |title=Iraq and the Problem of Democracy |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-and-problem-democracy |website=Wilson Center |language=en |date=January 13, 2023 |access-date=July 13, 2023 |archive-date=July 13, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230713114715/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-and-problem-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Incompetent government ====
Those two ''muhasasa'' agreements in and after 2003 (see [[#Elite cartel ruling Iraq by muhasasa|above]]) had the effect that, starting with the first [[Al Maliki I Government|post–2003 Iraqi government after elections]] in 2006, if a party "controlled" a ministry, it appointed also the top positions in their civil services to their party followers and faction members;<ref name=chatham,2019/> also the positions for senior public service were distributed on the basis of "ethnic, religious and/or party affiliation" rather than merit,<ref name=U4,client.>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (section 'Clientelism and patronage') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> professional competence or experience.<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> This incompetence caused mismanagement in the successive Iraqi governments of [[Nouri al-Maliki|Al-Maliki (2006–2014)]], [[Haider al-Abadi|Al-Abadi (2014–2018)]],<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/><ref name=U4,muhas/> and also [[Adil Abdul-Mahdi|Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020)]],<ref name=U4->{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=chatham,2019/> leading to hundreds of billions of dollars being wasted on failed projects and the neglect of electricity networks, the transportation sector, economic legislation, and other infrastructure,<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy">{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (section: 'Economic crisis') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref> as well as citizen demands not being responded to.<ref name=U4,muhas/> Such incompetence – next to other forms of political turmoil like corruption (see [[#Clientelism, patronage|next subsection]]) and instability – is considered by many analysts to have also fostered [[Iraq#2014–2017: War against the Islamic State|the rise of ISIL, in 2014]].<ref name="vox2016">{{cite web|url=https://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|title=The political crisis rocking Baghdad and why it matters for the war on ISIS|publisher=vox.com|access-date=2016-04-30|date=19 April 2016| archive-date=2016-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422165545/http://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|url-status=live}}</ref> (During the [[Abdul Mahdi Government#Background|formation of the Abdul Mahdi Government in 2018]], this new prime minister attempted to break through the traditional ''muhasasa'' procedures, but there's no clear information as to how far he succeeded in that, or whether the Iraqi governments since 2018 worked more competently or less corruptly.)

==== Clientelism, patronage ====
Civil services being staffed – under these ''muhasasa'' agreements (see [[#Elite cartel ruling Iraq by muhasasa|above]]) – according to party loyalty had the effect that state contracts would only be awarded by them to "party-affiliated companies and businesspeople",<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> who would be paid handsomely for their contracted services; even if they hardly, or not at all, actually delivered those services. Such manner of spending state finances has been labeled governmental contracting fraud and structural political corruption: not the general public but privileged companies were being served by the government.<ref name=chatham,2019/> This culture of [[clientelism]]<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> and "systemic political [[patronage]]"<ref name=bbc26Apr16>[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36138283 'Iraq: Sadr supporters in mass protest for political reform'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230419174523/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36138283 |date=2023-04-19 }}. [[BBC]], 26 April 2016. Retrieved 14 April 2023.</ref><ref name=Arwa,Ibr/> produced a new class of entrepreneurs, getting rich through close relations with government officials and their lush government contracts.<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> Meanwhile, politicians themselves lived in wealth, self-enrichment and massive personal protection.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (sections: 'Roots of the quota system' and 'Economic crisis') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Arwa,Ibr/>

==== Stagnant economy ====
The infrastructure not being maintained or modernized due to governmental incompetence and mismanagement (see [[#Incompetent government|above]]) severely hampered the development of [[Economy of Iraq|private economic activity]], therefore meaning the private sector could not absorb the half million of young people entering the job market every year.<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> This ''muhasasa''-style 'cartel' government, due to its lack of accountability – politicians being "recycled ... irrespective of their performance" – provided too little incentives for those politicians to build a diversified and competitive economy or "deliver benefits to the population".<ref name=U4,muhas>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (section 'The Muhasasa power-sharing agreement') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Lack of commitment to federalism===
Since the adoption of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005, federalism with a heavy emphasis on [[decentralisation]] has been the official model of governance in Iraq. However, certain constitutional stipulations, such as those related to the creation of the Federation Council (the upper house of the legislature) have not been implemented, which remains an issue undermining the full implementation of federalism in the country. In September 2017, a one-sided [[2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum|referendum]] was held in Iraq's [[Kurdistan Region]] regarding [[Kurdish nationalism|Kurdish independence]], which resulted in 92% (of those participating in the region) voting in favor of independence.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 September 2017 |title=92% of Iraqi Kurds back independence from Baghdad, election commission says |url=http://www.france24.com/en/20170927-iraqi-kurds-vote-overwhelmingly-independence-referendum |access-date=14 November 2017 |publisher=France 24 }}</ref> The referendum was rejected by the federal government and ruled as illegal by the [[Federal Supreme Court of Iraq|Federal Supreme Court]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 November 2017 |title=Iraq court rules no region can secede after Kurdish independence bid |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/iraqcourt-rules-no-region-can-secede-after-kurdish-independence-bid-idUSKBN1D617O |work=Reuters}}</ref>  Following this, an [[2017 Iraqi-Kurdish conflict|armed conflict]] ensued between the federal government and the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] which resulted in Kurdish defeat and capitulation; Kurdistan Region subsequently lost territory it had previously occupied, and the president of Kurdistan Region officially resigned,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/world/kurdish-leader-barzani-resigns-after-independence-vote-backfires-idUSKBN1CY0JR/|title=Kurdish leader Barzani resigns after independence vote backfires|publisher=Reuters}}</ref> and finally, the regional government announced that it would respect the Federal Supreme Court's ruling that no Iraqi province is allowed to secede, effectively abandoning the referendum.<ref>{{Cite news |date=14 November 2017 |title=Iraq's Kurdistan says to respect court decision banning secession |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/iraqs-kurdistan-says-to-respect-court-decision-banning-secession-idUSKBN1DE0XD |work=Reuters}}</ref> According to a report published by [[The Washington Institute for Near East Policy]], a U.S-based think tank, since Kurdistan Region's failed bid to gain independence, the federal government has been severely punishing it both politically and economically. In gradual steps, the federal government has consistently weakened Kurdistan Region's ability to administer its own affairs by revoking crucial authorities that had previously defined its autonomy.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/house-divided-can-kurdistan-preserve-its-autonomy|title=A House Divided: Can Kurdistan Preserve Its Autonomy?|publisher=Washington Institute}}</ref> Furthermore, since it won a pivotal [[International Chamber of Commerce|ICC]] arbitration case, the federal government has also been refusing Kurdistan Region access to its most important source of income, namely, oil exports, and the latter has had no other option but to concede.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-halts-northern-crude-exports-after-winning-arbitration-case-against-turkey-2023-03-25/|title=Iraq halts northern crude exports after winning arbitration case against Turkey|work=Reuters}}</ref> Some have argued that this signals the Iraqi government's intention to abandon federalism and return to a [[Centralized government|centralized political system]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-demise-federalism|title=Iraq: The Demise of Federalism|date=11 July 2023 |publisher=The Wilson Center}}</ref> and in a leaked letter sent in 2023 to the U.S president, the prime minister of Kurdistan region wrote of an impending collapse of Kurdistan Region.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/letter-biden-barzani-warns-iraqi-kurdistans-collapse-urges-mediation|title=In letter to Biden, Barzani warns of Iraqi Kurdistan's collapse, urges mediation|publisher=Al-Monitor}}</ref>