Editing Phenomenology (philosophy) (section)

==Phenomenology and empirical science==
The phenomenological analysis of objects is notably different from traditional science. However, several frameworks do phenomenology with an empirical orientation or aim to unite it with the natural sciences or with [[cognitive science]].

For a classical critical point of view, [[Daniel Dennett]] argues for the wholesale uselessness of phenomenology considering ''phenomena'' as [[qualia]], which cannot be the object of scientific research or do not exist in the first place. Liliana Albertazzi counters such arguments by pointing out that empirical research on phenomena has been successfully carried out employing modern methodology. Human experience can be investigated by [[surveying]], and with [[brain scanning]] techniques. For example, ample research on color perception suggests that people with normal color vision see colors similarly and not each in their own way. Thus, it is possible to universalize phenomena of subjective experience on an empirical scientific basis.{{sfn|Albertazzi|2018|page=1993}}

In the early twenty-first century, phenomenology has increasingly engaged with cognitive science and [[philosophy of mind]]. Some approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology reduce consciousness to the physical-neuronal level and are therefore not widely acknowledged as representing phenomenology. These include the frameworks of [[neurophenomenology]], [[Embodied cognitive science|embodied constructivism]], and the cognitive neuroscience of phenomenology. Other likewise controversial approaches aim to explain life-world experience on a [[Phenomenological sociology|sociological]] or [[anthropological]] basis despite phenomenology being mostly considered descriptive rather than explanatory.{{sfn|Albertazzi|2018}}