Editing Pericles (section)

=== Military achievements ===
{{rquote|right|These glories may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others.|[[Thucydides]], ''Pericles' Third Oration''<ref>[[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 2#2:64|2.64]]</ref>{{efn-lg|name="Thucydides speeches"}}}}

For more than 20 years Pericles led many expeditions, mainly naval ones. Being always cautious, he never undertook of his own accord a battle involving much uncertainty and peril and he did not accede to the "vain impulses of the citizens".<ref name="Pl18">Plutarch, ''Pericles'', [[s:Lives/Pericles#18|XVIII]]</ref> He based his military policy on [[Themistocles]]' principle that Athens' predominance depends on its superior naval power and believed that the Peloponnesians were near-invincible on land.<ref name="Platias105">A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, ''Thucydides on Strategy'', 105</ref> Pericles also tried to minimize the advantages of Sparta by rebuilding the walls of Athens, which, it has been suggested, radically altered the use of force in Greek international relations.<ref name="Ober254">J. Ober, ''National Ideology and Strategic Defence of the Population'', 254</ref>

During the Peloponnesian War, Pericles initiated a defensive "[[grand strategy]]" whose aim was the exhaustion of the enemy and the preservation of the ''status quo''.<ref name="Platias86,98">A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, ''Thucydides on Strategy'', 98–99.</ref> According to Platias and Koliopoulos, Athens as the strongest party did not have to beat Sparta in military terms and "chose to foil the Spartan plan for victory".<ref name="Platias86,98" /> The two basic principles of the "Periclean Grand Strategy" were the rejection of appeasement (in accordance with which he urged the Athenians not to revoke the Megarian Decree) and the avoidance of overextension.{{efn-lg|According to Platias and Koliopoulos, the "policy mix" of Pericles was guided by five principles: a}} According to Kagan, Pericles' vehement insistence that there should be no diversionary expeditions may well have resulted from the bitter memory of the Egyptian campaign, which he had allegedly supported.<ref name="Out83">D. Kagan, ''The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War'', 83</ref> His strategy is said to have been "inherently unpopular", but Pericles managed to persuade the Athenian public to follow it.<ref name="Platias119-120">A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, ''Thucydides on Strategy'', 119–120.</ref> It is for that reason that [[Hans Delbrück]] called him one of the greatest statesmen and military leaders in history.<ref name="Delbruck">H. Delbrück, ''History of the Art of War'', I, 137</ref> Although his countrymen engaged in several aggressive actions soon after his death,<ref name="Ehr278">V.L. Ehrenberg, ''From Solon to Socrates'', 278</ref> Platias and Koliopoulos argue that the Athenians remained true to the larger Periclean strategy of seeking to preserve, not expand, the empire, and did not depart from it until the Sicilian Expedition.<ref name="Platias119-120" /> For his part, Ben X. de Wet concludes his strategy would have succeeded had he lived longer.<ref name="Wet103">B. X. de Wet, ''This So-Called Defensive Policy of Pericles'', 103–119.</ref>

Critics of Pericles' strategy, however, have been just as numerous as its supporters. A common criticism is that Pericles was always a better politician and orator than strategist.<ref name="Pap">K. Paparrigopoulos, Aa, 241–242.</ref> [[Donald Kagan]] called the Periclean strategy "a form of wishful thinking that failed", Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober have stated that "as strategist he was a failure and deserves a share of the blame for Athens' great defeat", and [[Victor Davis Hanson]] believes that Pericles had not worked out a clear strategy for an effective offensive action that could possibly force Thebes or Sparta to stop the war.<ref>V.D. Hanson, ''Peloponnesian War'', 58</ref><ref name="Athenian54">D. Kagan, ''Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War'', 54</ref><ref name="Strauss-Ober47">S. Strauss-J. Ober, ''The Anatomy of Error'', 47</ref> Kagan criticizes the Periclean strategy on four counts: first that by rejecting minor concessions it brought about war; second, that it was unforeseen by the enemy and hence lacked credibility; third, that it was too feeble to exploit any opportunities; and fourth, that it depended on Pericles for its execution and thus was bound to be abandoned after his death.<ref name="Archidamian">D. Kagan, ''The Archidamian War'', 28, 41.</ref> Kagan estimates Pericles' expenditure on his military strategy in the Peloponnesian War to be about 2,000 [[Talent (weight)|talents]] annually, and based on this figure concludes that he would have only enough money to keep the war going for three years. He asserts that since Pericles must have known about these limitations he probably planned for a much shorter war.<ref name="H74-75">V.D. Hanson, ''Peloponnesian War'', 74–75</ref><ref name="KPel61-62">D. Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 61–62.</ref> Others, such as Donald W. Knight, conclude that the strategy was too defensive and would not succeed.<ref name="Knight150-160">D. Knight, ''Thucydides and the War Strategy of Pericles'', 150–160.</ref>

In contrast, Platias and Koliopoulos reject these criticisms and state that "the Athenians lost the war only when they dramatically reversed the Periclean grand strategy that explicitly disdained further conquests".<ref name="Platias138">A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, ''Thucydides on Strategy'', 138</ref> Hanson stresses that the Periclean strategy was not innovative, but could lead to a stagnancy in favor of Athens.<ref name="H74-75" /> It is a popular conclusion that those succeeding him lacked his abilities and character.<ref name="Samons131-132">L.J. Samons, ''What's Wrong with Democracy?'', 131–132.</ref>