Editing Patent (section)

==Criticism==
{{Further|Criticism of patents}}
{{see also|Biological patent#Ethics|United States Patent and Trademark Office#Criticisms}}
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Legal scholars, economists, activists, policymakers, industries, and trade organizations have held differing views on patents and engaged in contentious debates on the subject. Critical perspectives emerged in the nineteenth century that were especially based on the principles of [[free trade]].<ref name=Johns>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jFMEPUO7LS0C&q=262|title=Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates|first=Adrian|last=Johns|date=15 January 2010|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=9780226401201 |accessdate=9 June 2023|via=Google Books}}</ref>{{rp|262–263}} Contemporary criticisms have echoed those arguments, claiming that patents block innovation and waste resources (e.g. with patent-related [[Overhead (business)|overheads]]) that could otherwise be used productively to improve technology.<ref name='boldrin'>{{Cite book | last = Levine | first = David | author-link = David K. Levine | author2 = Michele Boldrin | author-link2 = Michele Boldrin | title = Against intellectual monopoly | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year = 2008| url = http://www.dklevine.com/papers/imbookfinalall.pdf | isbn = 978-0521879286 | url-status = live | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080528004226/http://www.dklevine.com/papers/imbookfinalall.pdf | archive-date = 2008-05-28 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Kinsella | first1 = N.S. | year = 2001 | title = Against Intellectual Property | url = http://mises.org/journals/jls/15_2/15_2_1.pdf | journal = Journal of Libertarian Studies | volume = 15 | issue = 2 | pages = 1–53 | url-status = live | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131101152341/http://mises.org/journals/jls/15_2/15_2_1.pdf | archive-date = 2013-11-01 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.stephankinsella.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/kinsella-case-against-ip-springer-2012.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017074916/http://www.stephankinsella.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/kinsella-case-against-ip-springer-2012.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Kinsella, S., 2013. The Case Against Intellectual Property. In Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands|pages= 1325–1357|archivedate=17 October 2016|accessdate=9 June 2023}}</ref> These and other research findings that patents decreased innovation because of the following mechanisms:
* Low quality, already known or obvious patents hamper innovation and commercialization.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Lemley | first1 = M.A. | last2 = Shapiro | first2 = C. | year = 2005 | title = Probabilistic patents | url = http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf | journal = The Journal of Economic Perspectives | volume = 19 | issue = 2 | pages = 75–98 | doi = 10.1257/0895330054048650 | url-status = live | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20051118225626/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf | archive-date = 2005-11-18 | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.vjolt.net/vol18/issue1/v18i1_1-Miller.pdf|title=Miller, S.P., 2013. Where's the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents. Va. JL & Tech., 18, p. 1|website=vjolt.net|access-date=4 May 2018|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017100206/http://www.vjolt.net/vol18/issue1/v18i1_1-Miller.pdf|archive-date=17 October 2016|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/mccall.pdf|title=McCall, D.D., 2003. Stating the Obvious: Patents and Biological Material. U. Ill. JL Tech. & Pol'y, p. 239|website=illinoisjltp.com|access-date=4 May 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017073648/http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/mccall.pdf|archive-date=17 October 2016}}</ref>
* Blocking the use of fundamental knowledge with patents creates a "[[tragedy of the anticommons]], where future innovations can not take place outside of a single firm in an entire field".<ref name=anticommons>{{cite journal|last=Heller|first=Michael|author-link=Michael Heller (law professor)|author2=Eisenberg, Sue |date=May 1, 1998|title=Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research|journal=Science|volume=280|issue=5364|pages=698–701|pmid=9563938|doi=10.1126/science.280.5364.698|citeseerx=10.1.1.336.6070|s2cid=31902564}}</ref>
* Patents weaken the [[public domain]] and innovation that comes from it.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Outterson | first1 = K | year = 2005 | title = Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law | journal = U. Pitt. L. Rev. | volume = 67 | page = 67 | doi = 10.5195/lawreview.2005.70 | doi-access = free }}</ref>
* [[Patent thicket]]s, or "an overlapping set of patent rights", in particular slow innovation.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Joel | first1 = D | year = 2009 | title = Pools, thickets and Open Source Nanotechnology | journal = European Intellectual Property Review | volume = 31 | pages = 300–306 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author-link=Carl Shapiro |first=Carl |last=Shapiro |chapter-url=http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf |chapter=Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting |year=2001 |title=Innovation Policy and the Economy |volume=I |editor-last=Jaffe |editor-first=Adam B. |pages=[https://archive.org/details/innovationpolicy00mitp/page/119 119–150] |location=Cambridge |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0262600415 |display-editors=etal |url=https://archive.org/details/innovationpolicy00mitp/page/119 }}</ref>
* Broad patents prevent companies from commercializing products and hurt innovation.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Burk | first1 = D | last2 = Lemley | first2 = M | year = 2002 | title = Is patent law technology-specific? | journal = Berkeley Technol Law J | volume = 17 | pages = 1155–1206 }}</ref> In the worst case, such broad patents are held by non-practicing entities ([[patent trolls]]), which do not contribute to innovation.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Magliocca | first1 = G.N. | year = 2007 | title = Blackberries and barnyards: Patent trolls and the perils of innovation | url = https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dr8t8dh.pdf | journal = Notre Dame Law Review | volume = 82 | pages = 1809–1838 | access-date = 2017-12-10 | archive-date = 2017-08-16 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170816004712/http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dr8t8dh.pdf | url-status = live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Merges | first1 = R.P. | year = 2010 | title = The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform | url = http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=btlj | journal = Berkeley Technology Law Journal | volume = 24 | page = 1583 | access-date = 2017-12-10 | archive-date = 2017-12-11 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171211213511/http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=btlj | url-status = live }}</ref> Enforcement by [[patent troll]]s of poor quality patents<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Allison | first1 = J.R. | last2 = Mann | first2 = R.J. | year = 2007 | title = Disputed Quality of Software Patents | journal = The. Wash. UL Rev. | volume = 85 | page = 297 }}</ref> has led to criticism of the patent office as well as the system itself.<ref name=Barker>{{cite journal |last1=Barker |first1=David G. |year=2005 |title=Troll or no Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-grant Review |journal=Duke Law & Technology Review |volume=9 |issue=11 |url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1129&context=dltr |access-date=9 June 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130309202321/http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1129&context=dltr |archive-date=9 March 2013 }}</ref> For example, in 2011, United States business entities incurred $29 billion in direct costs because of patent trolls.<ref name=BBC20120629>{{cite web |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18598559 |title='Patent trolls' cost other US bodies $29bn last year, says study |date=June 29, 2012 |publisher=BBC |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120627135454/http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18598559 |archive-date=June 27, 2012 }}</ref> Lawsuits brought by "patent assertion companies" made up 61% of all patent cases in 2012, according to the [[Santa Clara University School of Law]].<ref name=CNN20130702>{{cite web |url=https://money.cnn.com/2013/07/02/technology/enterprise/patent-troll/index.html |title=Patent troll: 'I'm ethical and moral' |last=Goldman |first=David |date=July 2, 2013 |website=CNN |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130706220343/http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/02/technology/enterprise/patent-troll/index.html |archive-date=July 6, 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
* Patents apply a "one size fits all" model to industries with differing needs,<ref name=Posner>Richard A Posner for The Atlantic. July 12, 2012. [https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ Why There Are Too Many Patents in America] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170310070433/https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ |date=2017-03-10 }}</ref> that is especially unproductive for the software industry.<ref name=BessenMeurer>[[James Bessen|Bessen, James]], and Michael J. Meurer. ''Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. {{ISBN|978-1400828692}}{{page?|date=June 2023}}</ref>
* [[Rent-seeking]] by owners of pharmaceutical patents have also been a particular focus of criticism, as the high prices they enable puts life-saving drugs out of reach of many people.<ref name="Banta, D.H. 2001">{{cite journal | last1 = Banta | first1 = D.H. | year = 2001 | title = Worldwide Interest in Global Access to Drugs | journal = Journal of the American Medical Association | volume = 285 | issue = 22| pages = 2844–2846 | pmid = 11401589 | doi = 10.1001/jama.285.22.2844-jmn0613-3-1 }}</ref>
* "With the partial exception of the pharmaceutical industry, we just do not have clear evidence to support the assumption that patents provide significant incentives to inventive activity".<ref>Biagioli, M. (2019). Weighing intellectual property: Can we balance the social costs and benefits of patenting? History of Science, 57(1), 140–163. {{doi|10.1177/0073275318797787}}</ref>

Boldrin and Levine conclude "Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it."<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Boldrin | first1 = M. | last2 = Levine | first2 = D.K. | year = 2013 | title = The case against patents | journal = The Journal of Economic Perspectives | volume = 27 | issue = 1 | pages = 3–22 | doi = 10.1257/jep.27.1.3 | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>McKendrick, J., 2012. Time to eliminate patents altogether? Fed paper urges more open innovation. ZDNet. Available at: {{cite web |url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/time-to-eliminate-patents-altogether-fed-paper-urges-more-open-innovation/ |title=Time to eliminate patents altogether? Fed paper urges more open innovation |website=[[ZDNet]] |access-date=2016-08-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160821044431/http://www.zdnet.com/article/time-to-eliminate-patents-altogether-fed-paper-urges-more-open-innovation/ |archive-date=2016-08-21 }}</ref> Abolishing patents may be politically challenging in some{{which|date=October 2020}} countries,{{Citation needed|date=August 2016}} however, as the primary economic theories supporting patent law hold that inventors and innovators need patents to recoup the costs associated with research, inventing, and commercializing;<ref name="olson"/> this reasoning is weakened if the new technologies decrease these costs.<ref name="Osborn" /> A 2016 paper argued for substantial weakening of patents because current technologies (e.g. [[3D printing]], [[cloud computing]], [[synthetic biology]], etc.) have reduced the cost of innovation.<ref name="Osborn">{{Cite journal|url=https://www.academia.edu/11677580|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107185910/https://www.academia.edu/11677580/The_Case_for_Weaker_Patents|url-status=dead|title=The Case for Weaker Patents|first1=Lucas|last1=Osborn|first2=Joshua M.|last2=Pearce|first3=Amberlee|last3=Haselhuhn|date=9 June 2015|archivedate=7 January 2023|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.2585764 |access-date=9 June 2023|via=www.academia.edu}}</ref>

Debates over the usefulness of patents for their primary objective are part of a larger discourse on [[Intellectual property|intellectual property protection]],<!-- Non-neutral term; see talk --> which also reflects differing perspectives on [[Opposition to copyright|copyright]].

=== Anti-patent initiatives ===
* [[Criticism of patents#Pharmaceutical patents|Patents on expensive medications]] are often used as examples that can highlight the inadequacy of patent-based mechanisms. One workaround solution that has been applied by South Africa in the past is passing explained domestic law that gives the state the right to import inexpensive generic versions without permission and wait for international regulations and incentive-systems to get upgraded at a later point.<ref>{{cite news |title=There's a Precedent for Overriding Patents on Vital Medications |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-11/aids-drugs-in-south-africa-shows-precedent-for-overriding-patents-on-medications |access-date=23 November 2021 |work=Bloomberg |archive-date=2023-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230828081826/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-11/aids-drugs-in-south-africa-shows-precedent-for-overriding-patents-on-medications |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Amin |first1=Tahir |title=High drug prices caused by US patent system, not 'foreign freeloaders' |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html |access-date=23 November 2021 |work=CNBC |date=27 June 2018 |archive-date=23 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123175528/https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vincent Rajkumar |first1=S. |title=The high cost of prescription drugs: causes and solutions |journal=Blood Cancer Journal |date=23 June 2020 |volume=10 |issue=6 |page=71 |doi=10.1038/s41408-020-0338-x|pmid=32576816 | pmc=7311400 |language=en |issn=2044-5385}}</ref>
* In 2020, multiple initiatives, including by India and South Africa, called for a waiver of [[TRIPS Agreement|TRIPS]] vaccine patents for accelerated [[deployment of COVID-19 vaccines]] around the world.<ref>{{cite news |title=WTO again fails to agree on Covid vaccine patent waiver |url=https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-10-wto-covid-vaccine-patent-waiver.html |access-date=16 November 2021 |language=en |archive-date=16 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116164227/https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-10-wto-covid-vaccine-patent-waiver.html |url-status=live }}</ref> However, no mechanisms of alternative medical [[research and development]] incentive-systems<ref name="10.1136/bmj.n2375"/> or technical details of proposed "sharing" after certain amounts of profit<ref>{{cite news |title=Canada lacks 'political will' to waive COVID-19 vaccine patents, Bolivian minister says {{!}} Globalnews.ca |url=https://globalnews.ca/news/8243635/bolivian-minister-canada-covid-vaccine-waiver/ |access-date=16 November 2021 |work=Global News |archive-date=15 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211115211759/https://globalnews.ca/news/8243635/bolivian-minister-canada-covid-vaccine-waiver/ |url-status=live }}</ref> were reported and some argue that, instead of intellectual property rights, manufacturing know-how is the main barrier to expanding capacity.<ref name="10.1136/bmj.n2375">{{cite journal |last1=Feinmann |first1=Jane |title=Covid-19: global vaccine production is a mess and shortages are down to more than just hoarding |url=https://www.bmj.com/content/375/bmj.n2375 |journal=BMJ |access-date=16 November 2021 |page=n2375 |language=en |doi=10.1136/bmj.n2375 |date=28 October 2021 |volume=375 |pmid=34711605 |s2cid=240001631 |doi-access=free |archive-date=16 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116164227/https://www.bmj.com/content/375/bmj.n2375 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* The [[Patent Busting Project]] is an [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]] (EFF) initiative challenging patents that the organization claims are illegitimate and suppress innovation or limit online expression. The initiative launched in 2004 and involves two phases: documenting the damage caused by these patents,<ref>{{Cite web|title=Patent Busting Project|url=https://www.eff.org/patent-busting|access-date=2020-06-10|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|language=en|archive-date=2020-08-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806032230/https://www.eff.org/patent-busting|url-status=dead}}</ref> and submitting challenges to the [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] (USPTO).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/188718/article.html|title=Patent Office to Review VoIP Patent|date=2010-02-05|website=PCWorld|access-date=4 May 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160927225408/http://www.pcworld.com/article/188718/article.html|archive-date=27 September 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/05/novell-signs-on-to-eff-patent-busting-project/|title=Novell signs on to EFF patent busting project|date=2007-05-23|website=arstechnica.com|access-date=4 May 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171022032224/https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/05/novell-signs-on-to-eff-patent-busting-project/|archive-date=22 October 2017}}</ref>
* Patent critic, [[Joseph Stiglitz]] has proposed [[Prizes as an alternative to patents]] in order to further advance solutions to global problems such as AIDS.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nalebuff |first1=Barry J. |last2=Stiglitz |first2=Joseph E. |year=1983 |title=Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition |journal=The Bell Journal of Economics |volume=14 |issue=1 |pages=21–43 |doi=10.2307/3003535 |jstor=3003535|url=https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D86D63XN/download }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | doi=10.1016/s1573-4471(88)01008-3|chapter= Economic organization, information, and development| volume=1| pages=93–160|year = 1988|last1 = Stiglitz|first1 = Joseph E.| isbn=978-0444703378|title= Handbook of Development Economics|series= <!-- Handbook of Development Economics -->}}</ref>
* In 2012, [[Stack Exchange]] launched Ask Patents, a forum for crowdsourcing prior art to invalidate patents.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.wired.com/2012/09/patent-busting-crowdsourced/|title=Open Season on Patents Starts Thursday, Thanks to Crowdsourced Platform|date=2012-09-20|magazine=Wired|access-date=4 May 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171021215931/https://www.wired.com/2012/09/patent-busting-crowdsourced/|archive-date=21 October 2017|last1=Singel|first1=Ryan}}</ref>
* Several authors have argued for developing defensive [[prior art]] to prevent patenting based on obviousness using lists<ref name="chin1">{{cite journal |first=Andrew |last=Chin|url=http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/artfulpriorart.pdf |title=Artful prior art and the quality of DNA patents |journal=Alabama Law Review |volume=57 |year=2005 |page=975 |access-date=2016-08-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017074432/http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/artfulpriorart.pdf |archive-date=2016-10-17 }}</ref> or algorithms.<ref name="3dp">{{Cite journal|url=https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02111333/file/A_Novel_Approach_to_Obviousness_An_Algor.pdf|doi=10.1016/j.wpi.2015.07.003|title=A Novel Approach to Obviousness: An Algorithm for Identifying Prior Art Concerning 3-D Printing Materials|journal=World Patent Information|volume=42|pages=13–18|last1=Pearce|first1=Joshua|year=2015|bibcode=2015WPatI..42...13P |s2cid=106963553|access-date=2016-08-20}}</ref> For example, a professor of law at the [[University of North Carolina School of Law]], has demonstrated a method to protect [[DNA]] research,<ref name="chin1" /> which could apply to other technology. Chin wrote an [[algorithm]] to generate 11 million "obvious" nucleotide sequences to count as prior art and his algorithmic approach has already<ref>{{cite journal |first=Andrew |last=Chin |url=http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/printedmatter.pdf |title=Gene Probes As Unpatentable Printed Matter |journal=The Federal Circuit Bar Journal |volume=20 |issue=4|access-date=2016-08-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017074211/http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/printedmatter.pdf |archive-date=2016-10-17 }}</ref> proven effective at anticipating prior art against oligonucleotide composition claims filed since his publication of the list and has been cited by the [[United States Patent and Trademark Office|U.S. patent office]] a number of times.<ref name="chin2" /> More recently, [[Joshua Pearce]] developed an [[Open-source model|open-source]] algorithm for identifying prior art for [[3D printing]] materials to make such materials obvious by patent standards.<ref name="3dp" /> As the 3-D printing community is already grappling with legal issues,<ref>[http://www.3ders.org/articles/20151130-what-are-the-legal-aspects-of-3d-printing-a-european-law-firm-weighs-in.html What are the legal aspects of 3D printing? A European law firm weighs in.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160913201308/http://www.3ders.org/articles/20151130-what-are-the-legal-aspects-of-3d-printing-a-european-law-firm-weighs-in.html |date=2016-09-13 }} – 3Ders</ref> this development was hotly debated in the technical press.<ref>[http://3dprint.com/103675/3d-print-material-ip-algorithm/ Shots Fired: The 3D Printing Materials IP War Has Begun as Joshua Pearce Releases Algorithm for Obviousness] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160818225303/https://3dprint.com/103675/3d-print-material-ip-algorithm/ |date=2016-08-18 }} – 3DPrint</ref><ref>[http://3dprintingindustry.com/2015/11/02/new-algorithm-fights-to-keep-3d-printing-materials-open-to-all/ New Algorithm Fights to Keep 3D Printing Materials Open to All] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160524164525/http://3dprintingindustry.com/2015/11/02/new-algorithm-fights-to-keep-3d-printing-materials-open-to-all |date=2016-05-24 }} – 3D Printing Industry</ref><ref>[http://www.3ders.org/articles/20151103-joshua-pearce-algorithm-for-obviousness-to-prevent-3d-printing-material-patents.html Joshua Pearce creates new algorithm for obviousness to prevent 3D printing material patents] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017073721/http://www.3ders.org/articles/20151103-joshua-pearce-algorithm-for-obviousness-to-prevent-3d-printing-material-patents.html |date=2016-10-17 }} – 3ders</ref> Chin made the same algorithm-based obvious argument in DNA probes.<ref name="chin2">{{cite journal |first=Andrew |last=Chin |url=http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/printedmatter.pdf |title=Gene Probes As Unpatentable Printed Matter |journal=The Federal Circuit Bar Journal |volume=20 |issue=4 |year=2010 |page=527 |access-date=2016-08-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017074211/http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/printedmatter.pdf |archive-date=2016-10-17 }}</ref>
* [[Google]] and other technology companies founded the [[LOT Network]] in 2014 to combat [[Patent troll|patent assertion entities]] by cross-licensing patents, thereby preventing legal action by such entities.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Tech-auto-companies-join-forces-to-thwart-patent-6791654.php|title=Tech, auto companies join forces to thwart patent trolls|work=San Francisco Chronicle |access-date=2016-08-23|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160613094258/http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Tech-auto-companies-join-forces-to-thwart-patent-6791654.php|archive-date=2016-06-13|date=2016-02-03 |last1=Said |first1=By Carolyn }}</ref>