Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

==== Agricultural policy ====
{{Further|Agriculture in the Soviet Union}}
Khrushchev was an expert on agricultural policies and sensed an urgent need to reform the backward, inefficient system with ideas that worked in the US. He looked especially at collectivism, state farms, liquidation of machine-tractor stations, planning decentralization, economic incentives, increased labor and capital investment, new crops, and new production programs. [[Henry Ford]] had been at the center of American technology transfer to the Soviet Union in the 1930s; he sent over factory designs, engineers, and skilled craftsmen, as well as tens of thousands of Ford tractors. By the 1940s Khrushchev was keenly interested in American agricultural innovations, especially on large-scale family-operated farms in the Midwest. In the 1950s he sent several delegations to visit farms and land grant colleges, looking at successful farms that utilized high-yielding seed varieties, very large and powerful tractors and other machines, all guided by modern management techniques.<ref>Aaron Hale-Dorrell, "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture" ''Journal of World History'' (2015) 26#2 pp. 295–324.</ref> Especially after his visit to the US in 1959, he was keenly aware of the need to emulate and even match American superiority and agricultural technology.<ref>Lazar Volin, "Soviet agriculture under Khrushchev." ''American Economic Review'' 49.2 (1959): 15–32 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816099 online].</ref><ref>Lazar Volin,  ''Khrushchev and the Soviet agricultural scene'' (U of California Press, 2020).</ref>

[[File:25th_anniversary of conquering virgin land. USSR block. 1979.jpg|500px|thumbnail|A postage stamp from 1979 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the [[Virgin Lands campaign]]]]

Khrushchev became a hyper-enthusiastic crusader to grow corn ([[maize]]).<ref>Aaron Hale-Dorrell, ''Corn Crusade: Khrushchev's Farming Revolution in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union'' (2019) [https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/hd76s0171 PhD dissertation version].</ref> He established a corn institute in Ukraine and ordered thousands of hectares to be planted in the [[Virgin Lands Campaign|Virgin Lands]].{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=205}} In 1955, Khrushchev advocated an Iowa-style corn belt in the Soviet Union, and a Soviet delegation visited the U.S. state that summer. The delegation chief was approached by farmer and corn seed salesman [[Roswell Garst]], who persuaded him to visit [[Roswell and Elizabeth Garst Farmstead Historic District|Garst's large farm]].<ref>Stephen J. Frese, "Comrade Khrushchev and Farmer Garst: East-West Encounters Foster Agricultural Exchange." ''The History Teacher'' 38#1 (2004), pp. 37–65. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555626 online].</ref> The Iowan visited the Soviet Union, where he became friends with Khrushchev, and Garst sold the USSR {{convert|5000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} of seed corn.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=205–206}} Garst warned the Soviets to grow the corn in the southern part of the country and to ensure there were sufficient stocks of fertilizer, [[insecticide]]s, and [[herbicide]]s.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=373}} This, however, was not done, as Khrushchev sought to plant corn even in [[Siberia]], and without the necessary chemicals. The corn experiment was not a great success, and he later complained that overenthusiastic officials had overplanted without laying the proper groundwork, and "as a result corn was discredited as a [[silage]] crop—and so was I".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=373}}

Khrushchev sought to abolish the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) which not only owned most large agricultural machines but also provided services such as plowing, and transfer their equipment and functions to the ''kolkhozes'' and ''sovkhozes'' (state farms).{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|p=85}} After a successful test involving MTS which served one large ''kolkhoz'' each, Khrushchev ordered a gradual transition—but then ordered that the change take place with great speed.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=86–87}} Within three months, over half of the MTS facilities had been closed, and ''kolkhozes'' were being required to buy the equipment, with no discount given for older or dilapidated machines.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=87–89}} MTS employees, unwilling to bind themselves to ''kolkhozes'' and lose their state employee benefits and the right to change their jobs, fled to the cities, creating a shortage of skilled operators.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=89–91}} The costs of the machinery, plus the costs of building storage sheds and fuel tanks for the equipment, impoverished many ''kolkhozes''. Inadequate provisions were made for repair stations.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=92–93}} Without the MTS, the market for Soviet agricultural equipment fell apart, as the ''kolkhozes'' now had neither the money nor skilled buyers to purchase new equipment.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=91–92}}

In the 1940s Stalin put [[Trofim Lysenko]] in charge of agricultural research, with his ideas that flouted modern genetics science. Lysenko maintained his influence under Khrushchev, and helped block the adoption of American techniques.<ref>[[David Joravsky]], ''The Lysenko Affair'' (1970) pp. 172–80.</ref> In 1959, Khrushchev announced a goal of overtaking the US in the production of milk, meat, and butter. Local officials kept Khrushchev happy with unrealistic pledges of production. These goals were met by farmers who slaughtered their breeding herds and by purchasing meat at state stores, then reselling it back to the government, artificially increasing recorded production.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=214–216}}

In June 1962, food prices were raised, particularly on meat and butter, by 25–30%. This caused public discontent. In the southern Russian city of [[Novocherkassk]], this discontent escalated to a strike and a revolt against the authorities. The revolt was put down by the military, resulting in [[Novocherkassk massacre|a massacre]] that killed 22 people and wounded 87 according to Soviet official accounts. In addition, 116 demonstrators were convicted of involvement and seven were executed. Information about the revolt was completely suppressed in the USSR, but spread through [[Samizdat]] and damaged Khrushchev's reputation in the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=519–523}}

Drought struck the Soviet Union in 1963; the harvest of {{cvt|107500000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} of grain was down from a peak of {{cvt|134700000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} in 1958. The shortages resulted in bread lines, a fact at first kept from Khrushchev. Reluctant to purchase food in the West,{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=607}} but faced with the alternative of widespread hunger, Khrushchev exhausted the nation's hard currency reserves and expended part of its gold stockpile in the purchase of grain and other foodstuffs.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=160–161}}<ref>Il'ia E.  Zelenin, "N. S. Khrushchev's Agrarian Policy and Agriculture in the USSR." ''Russian Studies in History'' 50.3 (2011): 44–70.</ref>