Editing Miranda warning (section)

===The voluntariness standard===
The voluntariness standard applies to all police interrogations regardless of the custodial status of the suspect and regardless of whether the suspect has been formally charged. The remedy for a violation of the standard is complete suppression of the statement and any evidence derived from the statement. The statement cannot be used as either substantive evidence of guilt or to impeach the defendant's testimony.{{refn|group="Note"|Originally Miranda was regarded as a "prophylactic" rule—the rule itself was not a constitutional right but a " judicially–created enforcement mechanism" devised to protect the underlying constitutional rights. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court "constitutionalized" the Miranda rule—although the decision did not perforce change the rule concerning the use of a Miranda-defective statement for impeachment purposes.}} The reason for the strictness is the common law's aversion to the use of coerced confessions because of their inherent unreliability. Further the rights to be free from coerced confession cannot be waived nor is it necessary that the victim of coercive police conduct assert his right. In considering the voluntariness standard one must consider the Supreme Court's decision in ''Colorado v. Connelly''.<ref>''Colorado v. Connelly'', 479 U.S. 157 (1986)</ref> Although federal courts' application of the ''Connelly'' rule has been inconsistent and state courts have often failed to appreciate the consequences of the case, ''Connelly'' clearly marked a significant change in the application of the voluntariness standard. Before ''Connelly,'' the test was whether the confession was voluntary considering the totality of the circumstances.<ref>See ''Mincey v. Arizona'', 437 U.S. 385 (1978); ''Greenwald v. Wisconsin'', 390 U. S. 519, 390 U.S. 521 (1968) ("Considering the totality of these circumstances, we do not think it credible that petitioner's statements were the product of his free and rational choice"); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 367 U.S. 440 (1961) ("If [a defendant's will was overborne], the confession cannot be deemed 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will'")</ref> "Voluntary" carried its everyday meaning: the confession had to be a product of the exercise of the defendant's free will rather than police coercion.<ref>See e.g., ''Culombe v. Connecticut'', 367 U.S. 568, 367 U.S. 583 (1961) ("[A]n extrajudicial confession, if it was to be offered in evidence against a man, must be the product of his own free choice")</ref> After ''Connelly,'' the totality of circumstances test is not even triggered unless the defendant can show coercive police conduct.<ref>Bloom & Brodin, ''Criminal Procedure'' (Aspen 1996) at 247.</ref> Questions of free will and rational decision making are irrelevant to a due process claim unless police misconduct existed and a causal connection can be shown between the misconduct and the confession.<ref>Bloom & Brodin, ''Criminal Procedure'' (Aspen 1996)</ref>