Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Recent===

In addition to already discussed theories of dualism (particularly the Christian and Cartesian models) there are new theories in the defense of dualism. [[Naturalistic dualism]] comes from Australian philosopher, [[David Chalmers]] (born 1966) who argues there is an explanatory gap between objective and subjective experience that cannot be bridged by reductionism because consciousness is, at least, logically autonomous of the physical properties upon which it supervenes. According to Chalmers, a naturalistic account of property dualism requires a new fundamental category of properties described by new laws of [[supervenience]]; the challenge being analogous to that of understanding electricity based on the mechanistic and Newtonian models of materialism prior to [[Maxwell's equations]].

A similar defense comes from Australian philosopher [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]] (born 1943) who revived the theory of [[epiphenomenalism]] which argues that mental states do not play a role in physical states. Jackson argues that there are two kinds of dualism:

# ''substance dualism'' that assumes there is second, non-corporeal form of reality. In this form, body and soul are two different substances.
# ''property dualism'' that says that body and soul are different ''properties'' of the same body.

He claims that functions of the mind/soul are internal, very private experiences that are not accessible to observation by others, and therefore not accessible by science (at least not yet). We can know everything, for example, about a bat's facility for echolocation, but we will never know how the bat experiences that phenomenon.

In 2018, ''The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism'' was published that contains arguments for and against Cartesian dualism, emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism, emergent individualism and nonreductive physicalism.<ref name="Oldhoff 2019">{{cite journal|author=Oldhoff, Martine C. L.|year=2019|title=Review of The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism|journal=Journal of Analytic Theology|url=https://jat-ojs-baylor.tdl.org/jat/index.php/jat/article/view/316/541|volume=7|issue=1|pages=753–758|doi=10.12978/jat.2019-7.1200-51141105|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Prestes III, Flavio|year=2019|title=Review: The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism|journal=Andrews University Seminary Studies |url=https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/auss/vol57/iss2/21/|volume=57|issue=2|pages=414–418}}</ref> Contributors include [[Charles Taliaferro]], Edward Feser, William Hasker, J. P. Moreland, Richard Swinburne, [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], John W. Cooper and Timothy O'Connor.<ref name="Oldhoff 2019"/>