Editing Luftwaffe (section)

===Production failures===
The failure of German production was evident from the start of the Battle of Britain. By the end of 1940, the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses and needed to regroup. Deliveries of new aircraft were insufficient to meet the drain on resources; the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, was failing to expand its pilot and aircraft numbers.<ref name="Overy 1980, p. 32">{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=32}}</ref> This was partly owing to production planning failures before the war and the demands of the army. Nevertheless, the German aircraft industry was being outproduced in 1940. In terms of fighter aircraft production, the British exceeded their production plans by 43%, while the Germans remained 40% "behind" target by summer 1940. In fact, German production in fighters fell from 227 to 177 per month between July and September 1940.<ref name="Overy 1980, p. 32"/> One of the many reasons for the failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940 was that it did not have the operational and material means to destroy the British aircraft industry,<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=33}}</ref> something that the much-anticipated ''Bomber B'' design competition was intended to address.

The so-called "Göring programme", had largely been predicated on the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941. After the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}}<nowiki/>'s failure in front of Moscow, industrial priorities for a possibility in increasing aircraft production were largely abandoned in favor to support the army's increased attrition rates and heavy equipment losses.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=133}}</ref> Milch's reforms expanded production rates. In 1941 an average of 981 aircraft (including 311 fighters) were produced each month.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133" /> In 1942 this rose to 1,296 aircraft of which 434 were fighters.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133" /> Milch's planned production increases were initially opposed. But in June, he was granted materials for 900 fighters per month as the average output. By the summer of 1942, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe's}} operational fighter force had recovered from a low of 39% (44% for fighters and 31% for bombers) in the winter of 1941–1942, to 69% by late June (75% for fighters and 66% for bombers) in 1942. However, after increased commitments in the east, overall operational ready rates fluctuated between 59% and 65% for the remaining year.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 138">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=138}}</ref> Throughout 1942 the Luftwaffe was out produced in fighter aircraft by 250% and in twin-engine aircraft by 196%.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 139">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=139}}</ref>

The appointment of [[Albert Speer]] as Minister of Armaments increased production of existing designs and the few new designs that had originated from earlier in the war. However, the intensification of Allied bombing caused the dispersion of production and prevented an efficient acceleration of expansion. German aviation production reached about 36,000 combat aircraft for 1944. However, by the time this was achieved the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel and trained pilots to make this achievement worthwhile.<ref name="Murray 1983, pp. 253-255">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|pp=253–255}}</ref>

The failure to maximise production immediately after the failures in the Soviet Union and North Africa ensured the Luftwaffe's effective defeat in the period of September 1943 – February 1944. Despite the tactical victories won, they failed to achieve a decisive victory. By the time production reached acceptable levels, as so many other factors had for the Luftwaffe – and for the entire {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}}<nowiki/>'s weapons and ordnance technology as a whole – late in the war, it was "too little, too late".<ref name="Murray 1983, pp. 253-255" />