Editing Logical positivism (section)

===Willard V. O. Quine===

In his influential 1951 paper ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]'', American philosopher and [[logicism|logicist]] [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] challenged the [[Logical positivism#Analytic-synthetic distinction|analytic-synthetic distinction]].  Specifically, Quine examined the concept of [[Two Dogmas of Empiricism#Analyticity and circularity|analyticity]], determining that all attempts to explain the idea reduce ultimately to [[circular reasoning]]. He would conclude that, if analyticity is untenable, so too is the neo-positivist proposition to redefine its boundaries.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Willard V. O. |last=Quine |title=Two Dogmas of Empiricism |journal=Philosophical Review |year=1951 |volume=60 |pages=20–43}} collected in {{cite book |first=Willard V. O. |last=Quine |title=From a Logical Point of View |location=Cambridge MA |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=1953}}</ref> Yet [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap]]'s reconstruction of analyticity was necessary for logic and mathematics to be deemed meaningful under verificationism. Quine's arguments encompassed numerous criticisms on this topic he had articulated to Carnap since 1933.<ref name=IEPQ>{{cite encyclopedia |url=https://iep.utm.edu/quine-an/#H2 |title=Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction |last=Rocknak |first=Stefanie |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date= July 14, 2024}}</ref> His work effectively pronounced the verifiability criterion untenable, threatening to uproot the broader logical positivist project.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shieh |first=Sanford |chapter=Logical Positivism and Quine |title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Language |year=2012 |publisher=Routledge |pages=869-872 |editor1=D. Graff Fara |editor2=G. Russell}}</ref>