Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

===Search for KAL&nbsp;007 in international waters===
[[File:USNS Narragansett (T-ATF 167) deploys Deep Drone RSV.jpg|thumb|The submersible ''[[Deep Drone]]'' is deployed from the fleet tug, USNS ''Narragansett'' (T-ATF 167).]]
Immediately after the shoot-down, South Korea, the owner of the aircraft and therefore prime considerant for jurisdiction, designated the United States and Japan as search and salvage agents, thereby making it illegal for the Soviet Union to salvage the aircraft, providing it was found outside Soviet territorial waters. If it did so, the United States would now be legally entitled to use force against the Soviets, if necessary, to prevent retrieval of any part of the plane.<ref name=":0">''Shootdown'', R.W. Johnson, Viking, New York, 1985, p. 194</ref>

On the same day as the shoot-down, Rear Admiral William A. Cockell, Commander, Task Force 71, and a skeleton staff, taken by helicopter from Japan, embarked in {{USS|Badger |FF-1071|6}} (stationed off Vladivostok at the time)<ref name=":0"/> on September 9 for further transfer to the destroyer {{USS|Elliot|DD-967|6}} to assume duties as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of the Search and Rescue (SAR) effort. A surface search began immediately and on into September 13. U.S. underwater operations began on September 14. On September 10, 1983, with no further hope of finding survivors, Task Force 71's mission was reclassified from a "Search and Rescue" (SAR) operation to a "Search and Salvage" (SAS).<ref name="ICAO '93, pg. 17. sect. 1.11.7">ICAO '93, p. 17, sect. 1.11.7</ref>

[[File:Odarennyy1983.jpg|thumb|left|The Soviet [[Kashin class destroyer]] ''Odarennyy'' shadows ships of Task Force 71, [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]] as they conduct search operations for Korean Airlines Flight 007.]]
On October 17, Rear Admiral Walter T. Piotti, Jr. took command of the task force and its search and salvage mission from Rear Admiral Cockell. First to be searched was a {{convert|60|sqmi|km2|sigfig=2|adj=on}} "high probability" area. This was unsuccessful. On October 21, Task Force 71 extended its search within coordinates encompassing, in an arc around the Soviet territorial boundaries north of Moneron Island, an area of {{convert|225|mi2|0|abbr=out}}, reaching to the west of Sakhalin Island. This was the "large probability" area. The search areas were outside the {{convert|12|nmi|km|adj=on}} Soviet-claimed territorial boundaries. The northwesternmost point of the search touched the Soviet territorial boundary closest to the naval port of Nevelsk on Sakhalin. Nevelsk was {{convert|46|nmi|km}} from Moneron. This larger search was also unsuccessful.<ref name="ICAO '93, pg. 17. sect. 1.11.7"/>

The vessels used in the search, for the Soviet side as well as the US side (US, South Korea, Japan) were both civilian trawlers, specially equipped for both the SAR and SAS operations, and various types of warships and support ships. The Soviet side also employed both civilian and military divers. The Soviet search, beginning on the day of the shoot-down and continuing until November 6, was confined to the {{convert|60|sqmi|km2|sigfig=2|adj=on}} "high probability" area in international waters, and within Soviet territorial waters to the north of Moneron Island. The area within Soviet territorial waters was off-limits to the U.S., South Korean, and Japanese boats. From September 3 to 29, four ships from South Korea joined in the search.

Piotti Jr, commander of Task Force 71 of the 7th Fleet would summarize the US and Allied, and then the Soviets', Search and Salvage operations:

{{blockquote|
Not since the search for the [[1966 Palomares B-52 crash|hydrogen bomb lost off Palomares, Spain]], has the U.S. Navy undertaken a search effort of the magnitude or import of the search for the wreckage of KAL Flight 007.

Within six days of the downing of KAL&nbsp;007, the Soviets had deployed six ships to the general crash site area. Over the next 8 weeks of observation by U.S. naval units this number grew to a daily average of 19 Soviet naval, naval-associated, and commercial (but undoubtedly naval-subordinated) ships in the Search and Salvage (SAS) area. The number of Soviet ships in the SAS area over this period ranged from a minimum of six to a maximum of thirty-two and included at least forty-eight different ships comprising forty different ship classes.<ref>After Action Report Department of the Navy, Commander, Surface Combat Force Seventh Fleet. CTF75/N32:kpm,4730, Ser 011, 15 November 1983</ref>}}

[[File:After Action Report Map.jpg|thumb|U.S. Task Force 71 After action report map of search area in international waters]]
These missions met with interference by the Soviets,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://sterett.net/public/kal_007_search_ops.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100221084124/http://sterett.net/public/kal_007_search_ops.htm |archive-date=February 21, 2010 |title=USS Sterett Association |publisher=Sterett.net |date=September 1, 1983 |access-date=April 5, 2010}}</ref> in violation of the [[U.S.–Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement|1972 Incidents at Sea agreement]], and included [[false flag]] and fake light signals, sending an armed [[Boarding (attack)|boarding]] party to threaten to board a U.S.-chartered Japanese auxiliary vessel (blocked by U.S. warship interposition), interfering with a helicopter coming off the USS ''Elliot'' (Sept. 7), attempted ramming of rigs used by the South Koreans in their quadrant search, hazardous maneuvering of ''Gavril Sarychev'' and near-collision with the {{USS|Callaghan|DDG-994|6}} (September 15, 18), removing U.S. [[sonar]]s, setting false [[Emergency position-indicating radiobeacon station|pingers]] in deep international waters, sending [[Tupolev Tu-22M|Backfire]] bombers armed with [[Air-to-surface missile|air-to-surface]] nuclear-armed missiles to threaten U.S. naval units, criss-crossing in front of U.S. combatant vessels (October 26), cutting and attempted cutting of moorings of Japanese auxiliary vessels, particularly ''Kaiko Maru III'', and [[Fire-control radar|radar]] [[Missile lock-on|lock-ons]] by a Soviet {{sclass2|Kara|cruiser}}, ''[[Russian cruiser Petropavlovsk|Petropavlovsk]]'', and a {{sclass2|Kashin|destroyer}}, ''[[Soviet destroyer Odaryonny|Odarennyy]]'', targeting U.S. naval ships and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter [[SLNS Vijayabahu (P627)|USCGC ''Douglas Munro'' (WHEC-724)]], {{USS|Towers|DDG-9|6}}, escorting {{USS|Conserver|ARS-39|6}}, experienced all of the above interference and was involved in a near-collision with ''Odarennyy'' (September 23–27).<ref name="winkler">Winkler, p. 47</ref><ref>Commander of Task Force 71 of U.S. 7th Fleet, stated in his After Action Report (Department of the Navy, Commander, Surface Combat Force Seventh Fleet. CTF75/N32:kpm,4730, Ser 011, November 15, 1983)</ref>

According to the ICAO: "The location of the main wreckage was not determined... the approximate position was {{Coord|46|34|N|141|17|E|type:event|name=KAL007}}, which was in international waters." This point is about {{convert|41|mi|km}} from Moneron Island, about {{convert|45|mi|km}} from the shore of [[Sakhalin]] and {{convert|33|mi|km}} from the point of attack.<ref>ICAO Report, p. 28</ref>

Piotti Jr, commander of Task Force 71 of [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]], believed the search for KAL&nbsp;007 in international waters to have been a search in the wrong place and assessed:<ref>After Action Report (Department of the Navy, Commander, Surface Combat Force Seventh Fleet. CTF75/N32:kpm,4730, Ser 011, November 15, 1983)</ref>

<blockquote>Had TF [task force] 71 been permitted to search without restriction imposed by claimed territorial waters, the aircraft stood a good chance of having been found. No wreckage of KAL&nbsp;007 was found. However, the operation established, with a 95% or above confidence level, that the wreckage, or any significant portion of the aircraft, does not lie within the probability area outside the 12 nautical mile area claimed by the Soviets as their territorial limit.<ref name="Maier"/>
</blockquote>

At a hearing of the ICAO on September 15, 1983, J. Lynn Helms, the head of the [[Federal Aviation Administration]], stated:<ref name="Congressional Record 1983"/> "The USSR has refused to permit search and rescue units from other countries to enter Soviet territorial waters to search for the remains of KAL&nbsp;007. Moreover, the Soviet Union has blocked access to the likely crash site and has refused to cooperate with other interested parties, to ensure prompt recovery of all technical equipment, wreckage, and other material."