Editing Joachim von Ribbentrop (section)

===Pact with Soviet Union and outbreak of World War II===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H27337, Moskau, Stalin und Ribbentrop im Kreml.jpg|thumb|alt=Two smiling men shake hands. Man on left wears a white suit and holds a cigarette. Man on right wears a black suit.|Stalin and Ribbentrop at the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, 23 August 1939]]

Ribbentrop played a key role in the conclusion of a Soviet-German [[non-aggression pact]], the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]], in 1939 and in the diplomatic action surrounding the attack on Poland. In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the ''Reich'' or to grant Polish permission for the "extra-territorial" highways, but since the matters were intended after March 1939 to be only a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused privately to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about those matters.<ref name="ReferenceA">Weinberg 1980, pp. 561–562, 583–584.</ref> Ribbentrop feared that if German–Polish talks took place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands, as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, depriving the Germans of their excuse for aggression.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> To block German–Polish diplomatic talks further, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, recalled, and he refused to see the Polish ambassador, [[Józef Lipski]].<ref name="ReferenceA"/> On 25 May 1939, Ribbentrop sent a secret message to Moscow to tell the Soviet Foreign Commissar, [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], that if Germany attacked Poland "Russia's special interests would be taken into consideration".<ref name="Weitz 208">Weitz, p. 208.</ref>

Throughout 1939, Hitler always privately referred to Britain as his main opponent but portrayed the coming destruction of Poland as a necessary prelude to any war with Britain.<ref>Weinberg 1980, pp. 579–581.</ref> Ribbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honour their commitments.<ref>Craig, p. 436.</ref> Along the same lines, Ribbentrop told Ciano on 5 May 1939, "It is certain that within a few months not one Frenchman nor a single Englishman will go to war for Poland".<ref name="Overy pp 95-128">Overy, p. 125, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref>

Ribbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by showing Hitler only the diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain nor France would honour their commitments to Poland. In that, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London, [[Herbert von Dirksen]], who reported that Chamberlain knew "the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the [[British Empire]], would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war" and so would back down over Poland.<ref>Overy, Richard & Wheatcroft, Andrew ''The Road To War'', London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 56.</ref> Furthermore, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers such as the ''[[Daily Mail]]'' and the ''[[Daily Express]]'' for Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland than it actually was.<ref>Watt, p. 385.</ref><ref name="Rothwell p 106">Rothwell, p. 106.</ref> The British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers used by Ribbentrop to provide his press summaries for Hitler were out of touch not only with British public opinion but also with British government policy in regard to Poland.<ref name="Rothwell p 106"/> The press summaries Ribbentrop provided were particularly important, as Ribbentrop had managed to convince Hitler that the British government secretly controlled the British press, and just as in Germany, nothing appeared in the British press that the British government did not want to appear. Furthermore, the Germans had broken the British diplomatic codes and were reading the messages between the Foreign Office in London to and from the Embassy in Warsaw.<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> The decrypts showed that there was much tension in Anglo-Polish relations, with the British pressuring the Poles to allow Danzig to rejoin the ''Reich'' and the Poles staunchly resisting all efforts to pressure them into concessions to Germany.<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> On the basis of such decrypts, Hitler and Ribbentrop believed that the British were bluffing with their warnings that they would go to war to defend Polish independence.<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> In mid-1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian [[Gerhard Weinberg]] to comment that "perhaps Chamberlain's haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop's beaming smile", as the countdown to a war that would kill tens of millions inexorably gathered pace.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|1980|p=650}}</ref>

[[Neville Chamberlain's European Policy]] in 1939 was based upon creating a "peace front" of alliances linking Western and Eastern European states to serve as a "tripwire" meant to deter any act of German aggression.<ref>Messerschmidt, p. 695.</ref> The new "containment" strategy adopted in March 1939 was to give firm warnings to Berlin, increase the pace of [[British re-armament]] and attempt to form an interlocking network of alliances that would block German aggression anywhere in Europe by creating such a formidable deterrence to aggression that Hitler could not rationally choose that option.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|1980|p=544}}</ref> Underlying the basis of the "containment" of Germany were the so-called "X documents", provided by [[Carl Friedrich Goerdeler]], in 1938–1939. They suggested that the [[Economy of Nazi Germany|German economy]], under the strain of massive military spending, was on the verge of collapse and led British policy-makers to the conclusion that if Hitler could be deterred from war and that if his regime was "contained" long enough, the German economy would collapse, and, with it, presumably the Nazi regime.<ref>Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 436–437.</ref> At the same time, British policymakers were afraid that if Hitler were "contained" and faced with a collapsing economy, he would commit a desperate "mad dog act" of aggression as a way of lashing out.<ref>Overy, p. 103, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref> Hence, emphasis was put on pressuring the Poles to allow the return of Danzig to Germany as a way of resolving the crisis peacefully by allowing Hitler to back down without him losing face.<ref>Greenwood, Sean "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pp. 225–246 from ''The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered'' Gordon Martel (ed.) Routledge: London, United Kingdom, 1999 p. 238.</ref> As part of a dual strategy to avoid war via deterrence and appeasement of Germany, British leaders warned that they would go to war if Germany attacked Poland, but at the same time, they tried to avoid war by holding unofficial talks with would-be peacemakers such as the British newspaper proprietor [[Gomer Berry, 1st Viscount Kemsley|Lord Kemsley]], the Swedish businessman [[Axel Wenner-Gren]] and another Swedish businessman [[Birger Dahlerus]], who attempted to work out the basis for a peaceful return of Danzig.<ref>Watt, pp. 394–407.</ref>

In May 1939, as part of his efforts to bully Turkey into joining the Axis, Ribbentrop had arranged for the cancellation of the delivery of 60 heavy howitzers from the [[Škoda Works]], which the Turks had paid for in advance.<ref name="Watt 304">Watt, p. 304.</ref> The German refusal either to deliver the artillery pieces or refund the 125 million ''Reichsmarks'' that the Turks had paid for them was to be a major strain on German-Turkish relations in 1939 and had the effect of causing Turkey's politically powerful army to resist Ribbentrop's entreaties to join the Axis.<ref name="Watt 304"/> As part of the fierce diplomatic competition in [[Ankara]] in the first half of 1939 between von Papen and French Ambassador [[René Massigli]] with British Ambassador, Sir [[Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen]] to win the allegiance of Turkey to either the Axis or the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]], Ribbentrop suffered a major reversal in July 1939 when Massigli was able to arrange for major French arms shipments to Turkey on credit to replace the weapons that the Germans had refused to deliver to the Turks.<ref>Watt, pp. 308–309.</ref>

In June 1939, [[Franco-German relations]] were strained when the head of the French section of the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', [[Otto Abetz]], was expelled from France following allegations that he had bribed two French newspaper editors to print pro-German articles.<ref>Adamthwaite, Anthony (1977) ''France and the Coming of the Second World War'', London: Frank Cass. p. 332. {{ISBN|978-0714630359}}.</ref> Ribbentrop was enraged by Abetz's expulsion and attacked Count Johannes von Welczeck, the German Ambassador in Paris, over his failure to have the French readmit him.<ref>Watt, p. 325.</ref> In July 1939, Ribbentrop's claims about an alleged statement of December 1938 made by French Foreign Minister [[Georges Bonnet]] were to lead to a lengthy war of words via a series of letters to the French newspapers between Ribbentrop and Bonnet over precisely what Bonnet had said to Ribbentrop.<ref>Adamthwaite, Anthony (1977) ''France and the Coming of the Second World War'', London: Frank Cass. pp. 290–292. {{ISBN|978-0714630359}}.</ref>

On 11 August 1939, Ribbentrop met the Italian Foreign Minister, Count [[Galeazzo Ciano]], and the Italian Ambassador to Germany, [[Bernardo Attolico|Count Bernardo Attolico]], in [[Salzburg]]. During that meeting, both Ciano and Attolico were horrified to learn from Ribbentrop that Germany planned to attack Poland and that the Danzig issue was just a pretext for aggression.<ref name="Watt pp 426-427">Watt, pp. 426–429.</ref> When Ciano asked if there was anything Italy could do to broker a Polish-German settlement that would avert a war, he was told by Ribbentrop, "We want war!"<ref>Wheeler-Bennett, p. 454.</ref> Ribbentrop expressed his firmly held belief that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland, but if that occurred, he fully expected the Italians to honour the terms of the [[Pact of Steel]], which was both an offensive and defensive treaty, and to declare war not only on Poland but on the Western powers if necessary.<ref name="Watt pp 426-427"/> Ribbentrop told his Italian guests that "the localisation of the conflict is certain" and "the probability of victory is infinite".<ref name="Watt pp 426-427"/> Ribbentrop brushed away Ciano's fears of a general war. He claimed, "France and England cannot intervene because they are insufficiently prepared militarily and because they have no means of injuring Germany".<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> Ciano complained furiously that Ribbentrop had violated his promise given earlier that year, when Italy signed the Pact of Steel, that there would be no war for the next three years. Ciano said that it was absurd to believe that the ''Reich'' could attack Poland without triggering a wider war and that now the Italians were left with the choice of going to war when they needed three more years to rearm or being forced into the humiliation of having to violate the terms of the Pact of Steel by declaring neutrality, which would make the Italians appear cowardly.<ref name="Watt pp 426-427"/> Ciano complained in his diary that his arguments "had no effect" on Ribbentrop, who simply refused to believe any information that did not fit in with his preconceived notions.<ref name="Watt pp 426-427"/> Despite Ciano's efforts to persuade Ribbentrop to put off the attack on Poland until 1942 to allow the Italians time to get ready for war, Ribbentrop was adamant that Germany had no interest in a diplomatic solution of the Danzig question but wanted a war to wipe Poland off the map.<ref name="Watt pp 426-427" /> The Salzburg meeting marked the moment when Ciano's dislike of Ribbentrop was transformed into outright hatred and of the beginning of his disillusionment with the pro-German foreign policy that he had championed.<ref>Watt, pp. 428–429.</ref>

On 21 August 1939, Hitler received a message from Stalin: "The Soviet Government has instructed me to say they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August".<ref name="Weitz 208"/> The same day, Hitler ordered German mobilisation.<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> The extent that Hitler was influenced by Ribbentrop's advice can be seen in Hitler's orders for a limited mobilisation against Poland alone.<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> Weizsäcker recorded in his diary throughout the first half of 1939 repeated statements from Hitler that any German–Polish war would be a localized conflict and that there was no danger of a general war if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to stay neutral.<ref name="ReferenceB">Overy, pp. 124–125, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref> Hitler believed that British policy was based upon securing Soviet support for Poland, which led him to perform a diplomatic U-turn and support Ribbentrop's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the best way of ensuring a local war.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> That was especially the case as decrypts showed the British military attaché to Poland arguing that Britain could not save Poland in the event of a German attack and that only Soviet support offered the prospect of Poland holding out.

[[File:MolotovRibbentropStalin.jpg|thumb|Ribbentrop during the signing of the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship in Moscow, 1939]]
The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on 23 August 1939 was the crowning achievement of Ribbentrop's career. He flew to Moscow, where, over the course of a 13-hour visit, Ribbentrop signed both the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocols, which partitioned much of Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Germans.<ref>Bloch, pp. 247–249.</ref> Ribbentrop had expected to see only the Soviet Foreign Commissar [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] and was most surprised to be holding talks with [[Joseph Stalin]] himself.<ref>Watt, p. 457.</ref> During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceeded very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of [[Latvia]], which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.<ref>Watt, p. 458.</ref> Ribbentrop had been instructed to claim the [[Daugava]] as the future boundary between the [[Greater Germanic Reich]] and the Soviet Union, but had also been ordered to grant extensive concessions to Stalin.{{Sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=34-35}} When Stalin claimed Latvia for the Soviet Union, Ribbentrop was forced to telephone Berlin for permission from Hitler to concede Latvia to the Soviets.<ref>Watt, pp. 458–459.</ref> After finishing his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, at a dinner with the Soviet leaders, launched into a lengthy diatribe against the British Empire, with frequent interjections of approval from Stalin, and exchanged toasts with Stalin in honour of German-Soviet friendship.<ref>Watt, pp. 459–460.</ref> For a brief moment in August 1939, Ribbentrop convinced Hitler that the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union would cause the fall of the Chamberlain government and lead to a new British government that would abandon the Poles to their fate.<ref>Bloch, p. 251.</ref> Ribbentrop argued that with Soviet economic support, especially in the form of oil, Germany was now immune to the effects of a British naval blockade and so the British would never take on Germany. On 23 August 1939, at a secret meeting of the ''Reich'''s top military leadership at the [[Berghof (residence)|Berghof]], Hitler argued that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland without the Soviet Union, and fixed "X-Day", the date for the invasion of Poland, for 26 August.<ref>Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 446–447.</ref> Hitler added, "My only fear is that at the last moment some ''Schweinehund'' will make a proposal for mediation".<ref>Wheeler-Bennett, p. 447.</ref> Unlike Hitler, who saw the Non-Aggression Pact as merely a pragmatic device forced on him by circumstances, the refusal of Britain or Poland to play the roles that Hitler had allocated to them, Ribbentrop regarded the Non-Aggression Pact as integral to his anti-British policy.<ref name="michalka 1993 169"/>

The signing of the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] on 23 August 1939 not only won Germany an informal alliance with the Soviet Union but also neutralized Anglo-French attempts to win Turkey to the "peace front". The Turks always believed that it was essential to have the Soviet Union as an ally to counter Germany, and the signing of the pact undercut completely the assumptions behind Turkish security policy.<ref>Watt, p. 310.</ref> The Anglo-French effort to include the Balkans into the "peace front" had always rested on the assumption that the cornerstone of the "peace front" in the Balkans was to be Turkey, the regional superpower.<ref name="Watt 309">Watt, p. 309.</ref> Because the Balkans were rich in raw materials such as iron, zinc and Romanian oil, which could help Germany survive a British blockade, it was viewed as highly important by the Allies to keep German influence in the Balkans to a minimum. That was the principal motivation behind efforts to link British promises to support Turkey in the event of an Italian attack, in exchange for Turkish promises to help defend Romania from a German attack.<ref>Watt, p. 276.</ref> British and French leaders believed that the deterrent value of the "peace front" could be increased if Turkey were a member, and the [[Turkish Straits]] were open to Allied ships.<ref name="Watt 309"/> That would allow the Allies to send troops and supplies to Romania over the [[Black Sea]] and through Romania to Poland.<ref name="Watt 309"/>

On 25 August 1939, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler wavered for a moment when the news reached Berlin of the ratification of the [[Anglo-Polish military alliance]] and a personal message from Mussolini that told Hitler that Italy would dishonour the Pact of Steel if Germany attacked Poland.<ref name="Kaillis 161">Kaillis, p. 161.</ref> This was especially damaging to Ribbentrop, as he always assured Hitler, "Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis".<ref name="Kaillis 161"/> As a result of the message from Rome and the ratification of the Anglo-Polish treaty, Hitler cancelled the invasion of Poland planned for 26 August but ordered it held back until 1 September to give Germany some time to break up the unfavourable international alignment.<ref name="Kaillis 161"/> Though Ribbentrop continued to argue that Britain and France were bluffing, both he and Hitler were prepared, as a last resort, to risk a general war by invading Poland.<ref name="Kaillis pp 163-164">Kaillis, pp. 163–164.</ref> Because of Ribbentrop's firmly-held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much-desired war with Britain came.<ref name="Kaillis pp 163-164"/> The Greek historian Aristotle Kaillis wrote that it was Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler and his insistence that the Western powers would fail to go to war for Poland that was the most important reason that Hitler did not cancel [[Fall Weiß (1939)|''Fall Weiß'']], the German invasion of Poland, altogether, instead of only postponing "X-day" for six days.<ref name="Kaillis pp 163-164"/> Ribbentrop told Hitler that his sources showed that Britain would not be militarily prepared to take on Germany at the earliest until 1940 or more probably 1941, so that meant that the British were bluffing.<ref name="Kaillis 163">Kaillis, p. 163.</ref> Even if the British were serious in their warnings of war, Ribbentrop took the view that since a war with Britain was inevitable, the risk of a war with Britain was acceptable and so he argued that Germany should not shy away from such challenges.<ref name="Kaillis 163"/>

On 27 August 1939, Chamberlain sent a letter to Hitler that was intended to counteract reports Chamberlain had heard from intelligence sources in Berlin that Ribbentrop had convinced Hitler that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact would ensure that Britain would abandon Poland. In his letter, Chamberlain wrote:

{{blockquote|Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfil.

It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|1980|p=623}}</ref>}}

Ribbentrop told Hitler that Chamberlain's letter was just a bluff and urged his master to call it.<ref name="Kaillis 163"/>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-C06536, Sir Nevile Henderson.jpg|right|thumb|The British Ambassador to Germany, Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], in 1937. Though Henderson was a leading supporter of appeasement, his relations with Ribbentrop were extremely poor throughout his ambassadorship. On the night of 30–31 August 1939, he and Ribbentrop almost came to blows.]]

On the night of 30–31 August 1939, Ribbentrop had an extremely heated exchange with British Ambassador Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], who objected to Ribbentrop's demand, given at about midnight, that if a Polish plenipotentiary did not arrive in Berlin that night to discuss the German "final offer", the responsibility for the outbreak of war would not rest on the ''Reich''.<ref>Bloch, p. 256.</ref> Henderson stated that the terms of the German "final offer" were very reasonable but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the "final offer" was most unreasonable, and he also demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the "final offer" to Ambassador [[Józef Lipski]] or provide a written copy of the "final offer".<ref>Bloch, pp. 256–257.</ref> The Henderson–Ribbentrop meeting became so tense that the two men almost came to blows.<ref>Bloch, p. 257.</ref> The American historian [[Gerhard Weinberg]] described the Henderson–Ribbentrop meeting:

<blockquote>When Joachim von Ribbentrop refused to give a copy of the German demands to the British Ambassador [Henderson] at midnight of 30–31 August 1939, the two almost came to blows. Ambassador Henderson, who had long advocated concessions to Germany, recognized that here was a deliberately conceived alibi the German government had prepared for a war it was determined to start. No wonder Henderson was angry; von Ribbentrop on the other hand could see war ahead and went home beaming.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|1994|p=43}}</ref></blockquote>

As intended by Ribbentrop, the narrow time limit for acceptance of the "final offer" made it impossible for the British government to contact the Polish government in time about the German offer, let alone for the Poles to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary envoy to arrive in Berlin that night, thereby allowing Ribbentrop to claim that the Poles had rejected the German "final offer".<ref>Bloch, pp. 257–258.</ref> As it was, a special meeting of the British cabinet called to consider the "final offer" and declined to pass on the message to Warsaw under the grounds that it was not a serious proposal on the part of Berlin.<ref name="Kaillis 161"/> The "rejection" of the German proposal was one of the pretexts used for the German aggression against Poland on 1 September 1939. The British historian D.C. Watt wrote, "Two hours later, Berlin Radio broadcast the sixteen points, adding that Poland had rejected them. Thanks to Ribbentrop, they had never even seen them".<ref>Watt, p. 526.</ref> On 31 August, Ribbentrop met with Ambassador Attolico to tell him that Poland's "rejection" of the "generous" German 16-point peace plan meant that Germany had no interest in Mussolini's offer to call a conference about the status of Danzig.<ref>Watt, pp. 527–528.</ref> Besides the Polish "rejection" of the German "final offer", the aggression against Poland was justified with the [[Gleiwitz incident]] and other SS-staged incidents on the German–Polish border.<ref>Watt, pp. 532–534.</ref>

As soon as the news broke in the morning of 1 September 1939 that Germany had invaded Poland, Mussolini launched another desperate peace mediation plan intended to stop the German–Polish war from becoming a world war. Mussolini's motives were in no way altruistic. Instead, he was motivated entirely by a wish to escape the self-imposed trap of the Pact of Steel, which obliged Italy to go to war while the country was entirely unprepared. If he suffered the humiliation of having to declare neutrality, it would make him appear cowardly. French Foreign Minister [[Georges Bonnet]], acting on his own initiative, told the Italian Ambassador to France, Baron [[Raffaele Guariglia]], that France had accepted Mussolini's peace plan.<ref>Watt, p. 545.</ref> Bonnet had [[Havas]] issue a statement at midnight on 1 September: "The French government has today, as have several other Governments, received an Italian proposal looking to the resolution of Europe's difficulties. After due consideration, the French government has given a 'positive response'".<ref>Watt, p. 550.</ref> Though the French and the Italians were serious about Mussolini's peace plan, which called for an immediate ceasefire and a four-power conference in the manner of the Munich conference of 1938 to consider Poland's borders, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax stated that unless the Germans withdrew from Poland immediately, Britain would not attend the proposed conference.<ref>Watt, p. 572.</ref> Ribbentrop finally scuttled Mussolini's peace plan by stating that Germany had no interest in a ceasefire, a withdrawal from Poland or attending the proposed peace conference.<ref>Watt, pp. 583–585.</ref>

On the morning of 3 September 1939, when Chamberlain followed through with his threat of a [[United Kingdom declaration of war on Germany (1939)|British declaration of war]] if Germany attacked Poland, a visibly-shocked Hitler asked Ribbentrop "Now what?", a question to which Ribbentrop had no answer except to state that there would be a "similar message" forthcoming from French Ambassador [[Robert Coulondre]], who arrived later that afternoon to present the [[French declaration of war on Germany (1939)|French declaration of war]].<ref>Bloch, p. 260.</ref> Weizsäcker later recalled, "On 3 Sept., when the British and French declared war, Hitler was surprised, after all, and was to begin with, at a loss".<ref name="Overy pp 95-128"/> The British historian [[Richard Overy]] wrote that what Hitler thought he was starting in September 1939 was only a local war between Germany and Poland and that his decision to do so was largely based on a vast underestimate of the risks of a general war.<ref>Overy, pp. 125–126, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref> In effect, Ribbentrop's influence made Hitler go to war in 1939 with the country he wanted as his ally, the United Kingdom, and ally with the country he wanted as his enemy, the Soviet Union.<ref>Rees, p. 87.</ref>

After the outbreak of World War II, Ribbentrop spent most of the [[Invasion of Poland|Polish campaign]] travelling with Hitler.<ref>Bloch, pp. 262–264.</ref> On 27 September 1939, Ribbentrop made a second visit to Moscow. There, at meetings with the Soviet Foreign Commissar [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] and [[Joseph Stalin]], he was forced to agree to revising the Secret Protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact in the Soviet Union's favour, most notably agreeing to Stalin's demand for [[Lithuania]] to go to the Soviet Union.<ref>Bloch, pp. 264–265.</ref> The imposition of the [[Blockade of Germany (1939–1945)|British blockade]] had made the ''Reich'' highly dependent upon Soviet economic support, which placed Stalin in a strong negotiating position with Ribbentrop. On 1 March 1940, Ribbentrop received [[Sumner Welles]], the American Under-Secretary of State, who was on a peace mission for US President [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and did his best to abuse his American guest.<ref>Bloch, p. 274.</ref> Welles asked Ribbentrop under what terms Germany might be willing to negotiate a compromise peace, before the [[Phoney War]] became a real war. Ribbentrop told Welles that only a total German victory "could give us the peace we want". Welles reported to Roosevelt that Ribbentrop had a "completely closed and very stupid mind".<ref>Offner, Arnold "The United States and National Socialist Germany" pp. 413–427 from ''The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement'' [[Wolfgang Mommsen]] and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), London: George Allen, 1983 pp. 421–422.</ref> On 10 March 1940, Ribbentrop visited Rome to meet with Mussolini, who promised him that Italy would soon enter the war.<ref>Weitz, pp. 234–235.</ref> For his one-day Italian trip, Ribbentrop was accompanied by a staff of 35, including a gymnastics coach, a masseur, a doctor, two hairdressers and various legal and economic experts from the Foreign Office.<ref>Weitz, p. 234.</ref> After the Italo-German summit at the [[Brenner Pass]] on 18 March 1940, which was attended by Hitler and Mussolini, Count Ciano wrote in his diary: "Everyone in Rome dislikes Ribbentrop".<ref>Weitz, p. 236.</ref> On 7 May 1940, Ribbentrop founded a new section of the Foreign Office, the ''Abteilung Deutschland'' (Department of Internal German Affairs), under [[Martin Luther (diplomat)|Martin Luther]], to which was assigned the responsibility for all antisemitic affairs.<ref>Bloch, p. 272.</ref> On 10 May 1940, Ribbentrop summoned the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg ambassadors to present them with notes justifying the German invasion of their countries several hours after the Germans had invaded those nations.<ref name="Weitz 239">Weitz, p. 239.</ref> Much to Ribbentrop's fury, someone leaked the plans for the German invasion to the Dutch embassy in Berlin, which led Ribbentrop to devote the next several months to an investigation aimed at identifying the leaker. The investigation tore apart the agency, as colleagues were encouraged to denounce each other, and was ultimately unsuccessful.<ref name="Weitz 239"/>

In early June 1940, when Mussolini informed Hitler that he would finally enter the war on 10 June 1940, Hitler was most dismissive, in private calling Mussolini a cowardly opportunist who broke the terms of the Pact of Steel in September 1939 when the going looked rough, and was entering the war in June 1940 only after it was clear that France was beaten and it appeared that Britain would soon make peace.<ref name="Bloch 307">Bloch, p. 307.</ref> Ribbentrop shared Hitler's assessment of the Italians but welcomed Italy coming into war. In part, that seemed to affirm the importance of the Pact of Steel, which Ribbentrop had negotiated, and in addition, with Italy now an ally, the Foreign Office had more to do.<ref name="Bloch 307"/> Ribbentrop championed the so-called [[Madagascar Plan]] in June 1940 to deport all of [[History of the Jews in Europe|Europe's Jews]] to [[Madagascar]] after the presumed imminent defeat of Britain.<ref>Weitz, p. 241.</ref>