Editing J. Robert Oppenheimer (section)

=== Panels and study groups ===
[[File:Los Alamos colloquium.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|left|The 1946 [[Los Alamos National Laboratory|Los Alamos]] colloquium on the [[History of the Teller–Ulam design|Super]]. In the front row are [[Norris Bradbury]], [[John H. Manley|John Manley]], [[Enrico Fermi]] and J. M. B. Kellogg. Behind Manley is Oppenheimer (wearing jacket and tie), and to his left is [[Richard Feynman]]. The Army colonel on the far left is [[Oliver Haywood]]. In the third row between Haywood and Oppenheimer is [[Edward Teller]].|alt=A group of formally dressed people sit in the audience, on folding chairs, and listen to a lecture]]

Oppenheimer played a role on a number of government panels and study projects during the late 1940s and early 1950s, some of which thrust him into controversies and power struggles.<ref>{{harvnb|Hewlett|Holl|1989|pp=47–48}}</ref>

In 1948, Oppenheimer chaired the Department of Defense's Long-Range Objectives Panel, a body created by AEC liaison [[Donald F. Carpenter]].<ref name="nichols-1987">{{harvnb|Nichols|1987|p=264}}</ref> It looked at the military utility of nuclear weapons, including how they might be delivered.<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=90, 102}}</ref> After a year's worth of study, in spring 1952, Oppenheimer wrote the draft report of [[Project GABRIEL]], which examined the dangers of [[nuclear fallout]].<ref name="pais-189">{{harvnb|Pais|2006|p=189}}</ref> Oppenheimer was also a member of the Science Advisory Committee of the [[Office of Defense Mobilization]].<ref>{{harvnb|Bird|Sherwin|2005|p=450}}</ref>

Oppenheimer participated in [[Project Charles]] during 1951, which examined the possibility of creating an effective air defense of the United States against atomic attack, and in the follow-on Project East River in 1952, which, with Oppenheimer's input, recommended building a warning system that would provide one-hour notice of an impending atomic attack against American cities.<ref name="pais-189"/> Those two projects led to [[Project Lincoln]] in 1952, a large effort on which Oppenheimer was one of the senior scientists.<ref name="pais-189"/> Undertaken at the [[MIT Lincoln Laboratory]], which had recently been founded to study issues of air defense, this in turn led to the Lincoln Summer Study Group, in which Oppenheimer became a key figure.<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=125–126}}</ref> Oppenheimer's and other scientists' urging that resources be allocated to air defense in preference to large retaliatory strike capabilities brought an immediate response of objection from the [[United States Air Force]] (USAF),<ref>{{harvnb|Bird|Sherwin|2005|pp=445–446}}</ref> and debate ensued about whether Oppenheimer and allied scientists, or the Air Force, was embracing an inflexible "[[Maginot Line]]" philosophy.<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=126–127}}</ref> In any case, the Summer Study Group's work eventually led to the building of the [[Distant Early Warning Line]].<ref>{{cite magazine |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=31iE3uChRGwC&pg=RA1-PA257 |author-first=Clement L. |author-last=Grant |title=Air Defense of North America |magazine=[[Air Force Magazine]] |date=August 1957 |page=257 |access-date=July 14, 2020 |archive-date=July 16, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716174559/https://books.google.com/books?id=31iE3uChRGwC&pg=RA1-PA257 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Teller, who had been so uninterested in work on the atomic bomb at Los Alamos during the war that Oppenheimer had given him time instead to work on his own project of the hydrogen bomb,<ref>{{harvnb|Pais|2006|pp=126–128}}</ref> left Los Alamos in 1951 to help found, in 1952, a second laboratory at what would become the [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]].<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|p=68}}</ref> Oppenheimer had defended the history of work done at Los Alamos and opposed the creation of the second laboratory.<ref>{{harvnb|McMillan|2005|p=4}}</ref>

[[Project Vista]] looked at improving U.S. tactical warfare capabilities.<ref name="pais-189"/> Oppenheimer was a late addition to the project in 1951 but wrote a key chapter of the report that challenged the doctrine of strategic bombardment and advocated smaller [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s which would be more useful in a limited theater conflict against enemy forces.<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=118–119}}</ref> Strategic thermonuclear weapons delivered by long-range jet bombers would necessarily be under the control of the U.S. Air Force, whereas the Vista conclusions recommended an increased role for the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy as well.<ref>{{harvnb|McMillan|2005|pp=152–153}}</ref> The Air Force reaction to this was immediately hostile,<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|p=121}}</ref> and it succeeded in getting the Vista report suppressed.<ref>{{harvnb|McMillan|2005|p=154}}</ref>

During 1952, Oppenheimer chaired the five-member [[State Department Panel of Consultants on Disarmament]],<ref name="y-s-92-93">{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=92–93}}</ref> which first urged that the United States postpone its planned first test of the hydrogen bomb and seek a thermonuclear test ban with the Soviet Union, on the grounds that avoiding a test might forestall the development of a catastrophic new weapon and open the way for new arms agreements between the two nations.<ref>{{harvnb|McMillan|2005|pp=140–141}}</ref> But the panel lacked political allies in Washington, and the [[Ivy Mike]] shot went ahead as scheduled.<ref name="y-s-92-93"/> The panel then issued a final report in January 1953, which, influenced by many of Oppenheimer's deeply felt beliefs, presented a pessimistic vision of the future in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could establish effective nuclear superiority but both sides could inflict terrible damage on the other.<ref name="b-s-451">{{harvnb|Bird|Sherwin|2005|p=451}}</ref>

One of the panel's recommendations, which Oppenheimer felt was especially important,<ref>{{harvnb|Bundy|1988|p=289}}</ref> was that the U.S. government practice less secrecy and more openness toward the American people about the realities of the nuclear balance and the dangers of nuclear warfare.<ref name="b-s-451"/> This notion found a receptive audience in the new [[Eisenhower administration]] and led to the creation of [[Operation Candor]].<ref>{{harvnb|Pais|2006|pp=194–195}}</ref> Oppenheimer subsequently presented his view on the lack of utility of ever-larger nuclear arsenals to the American public in a June 1953 article in ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Rhodes|1995|p=528}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Oppenheimer |first1=J Robert |title=Atomic Weapons and American Policy |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/robert-oppenheimer-atomic-weapons-american-policy |journal=Foreign Affairs |date=July 1953 |volume=31 |issue=July 1953 |pages=525–535 |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations |doi=10.2307/20030987 |jstor=20030987 |access-date=July 21, 2023 |archive-date=August 5, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230805150337/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/robert-oppenheimer-atomic-weapons-american-policy |url-status=live }}</ref> and it received attention in major American newspapers.<ref>{{harvnb|Pais|2006|pp=195}}</ref>

Thus by 1953, Oppenheimer had reached another peak of influence, being involved in multiple different government posts and projects and having access to crucial strategic plans and force levels.<ref name="Pais 2006 33"/> But at the same time, he had become the enemy of the proponents of strategic bombardment, who viewed his opposition to the H-bomb, followed by these accumulated positions and stances, with a combination of bitterness and distrust.<ref>{{harvnb|Young|Schilling|2019|pp=124, 127}}</ref> This view was paired with their fear that Oppenheimer's fame and powers of persuasion had made him dangerously influential in government, military, and scientific circles.<ref>{{harvnb|Bundy|1988|pp=307–308}}</ref>