Editing Israeli–Palestinian conflict (section)

=== Oslo Accords (1993, 1995) ===
{{Main|Oslo Accords}}
[[File:Israel and Palestine Peace.svg|thumb|left|A [[peace movement]] poster: [[Flag of Israel|Israeli]] and [[Palestinian flag]]s and the word ''peace'' in [[Arabic language|Arabic]] and [[Hebrew language|Hebrew]]]]
[[File:Bill Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat at the White House 1993-09-13.jpg|right|thumb|[[Yitzhak Rabin]], [[Bill Clinton]], and [[Yasser Arafat]] during the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993]]
In 1993, Israeli officials led by [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and Palestinian leaders from the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] led by [[Yasser Arafat]] strove to find a peaceful solution through what became known as the Oslo peace process. A crucial milestone in this process was Arafat's letter of recognition of Israel's right to exist. Emblematic of the asymmetry in the Oslo process, Israel was not required to, and did not, recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist. In 1993, the [[Declaration of Principles]] (or Oslo I) was signed and set forward a framework for future Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, in which key issues would be left to "final status" talks. The stipulations of the Oslo agreements ran contrary to the international consensus for resolving the conflict; the agreements did not uphold Palestinian self-determination or statehood and repealed the internationally accepted interpretation of [[UN Resolution 242]] that land cannot be acquired by war.<ref name="pop christison" /> With respect to access to land and resources, Noam Chomsky described the Oslo agreements as allowing "Israel to do virtually what it likes."<ref name="ft Chomsky">{{cite book |first=Noam |last=Chomsky |author-link=Noam Chomsky |title=Fateful Triangle |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHphMCIkhK0C&pg=PA |year=1999 |publisher=[[Pluto Press]] |isbn=978-0-7453-1530-0 |pages=Chapter 10}}</ref> The Oslo process was delicate and progressed in fits and starts.

The process took a turning point at the [[assassination of Yitzhak Rabin]] in November 1995 and the election of Netanyahu in 1996, finally unraveling when Arafat and [[Ehud Barak]] failed to reach an agreement at Camp David in July 2000 and later at Taba in 2001.<ref name="Pappé 2022" /><ref name="giim norman">{{cite book |first=Norman G. |last=Finkelstein |author-link=Norman Finkelstein |title=Gaza |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qo84DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA |year=2018 |publisher=[[University of California Press]] |isbn=978-0-520-29571-1 |pages=Chapter 2}}</ref> The interim period specified by Oslo had not built confidence between the two parties; Barak had failed to implement additional stages of the interim agreements and settlements expanded by 10% during his short term.<ref name="p kimmerling">{{cite book |first=Baruch |last=Kimmerling |author-link=Baruch Kimmerling |title=Politicide |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TE8oCW2J2F4C&pg=PA |year=2003 |publisher=[[Verso Books]] |isbn=978-1-85984-517-2 |pages=The Road to Sharonism}}</ref> The disagreement between the two parties at Camp David was primarily on the acceptance (or rejection) of international consensus.<ref name="pwh ben-ami">{{cite book |first=Shlomo |last=Ben-Ami |title=Prophets Without Honor |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA |year=2022 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-006047-3 |pages=e-book section 38 |quote=Camp David failed because of the two sides' conflicting interpretations of the terms of reference of the peace process. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on "international legitimacy" and "all UN relevant resolutions."}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Finkelstein|2007|p=352}}</ref> For Palestinian negotiators, the international consensus, as represented by the yearly vote in the UN General Assembly which passes almost unanimously, was the starting point for negotiations. The Israeli negotiators, supported by the American participants, did not accept the international consensus as the basis for a settlement.<ref>{{harvnb|Finkelstein|2007|p=352}}: "In a letter to President Clinton, who presided over the proceedings, Palestinian representatives stated that their aim was implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and that "[w]e are willing to accept adjustments of the border between the two countries, on condition that they be equivalent in value and importance." Repeatedly the Palestinian negotiators asked: "Will you accept the June 4border [as the basis of discussion]? Will you accept the principle of the exchange of territories?" The Israeli position was that "[w]e can't accept the demand for a return to the borders of June 1967as a pre-condition for the negotiation," while Clinton "literally yells," in response to the Palestinian view that "international legitimacy means Israeli retreat to the border of 4 June 1967," that "[t]his isn't the Security Council here. This isn't the U.N. General Assembly."</ref> Both sides eventually accepted the Clinton parameters "with reservations" but the talks at Taba were "called to a halt" by Barak, and the peace process itself came to a stand-still.<ref name="giim norman"/> Ben-Ami, who participated in the talks at Camp David as Israel's foreign minister, would later describe the proposal on the table: "The Clinton parameters... are the best proof that Arafat was right to turn down the summit's offers".<ref name="pwh ben-ami"/>