Editing Herbert Hoover (section)

===Great Depression===
{{See also|Great Depression in the United States}}

On taking office, Hoover said that "given the chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years, we shall soon with the help of God, be in sight of the day when poverty will be banished from this nation".<ref>{{cite book|first1=James L. |last1=Roark |first2=Michael P.|last2=Johnson|first3=Patricia Cline|last3=Cohen|first4=Sarah|last4=Stage|first5=Susan M.|last5=Hartmann|title=The American Promise, Volume C: A History of the United States: Since 1890|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ozj_o6POIssC&pg=PA772|year=2012|publisher=Bedford/St. Martin's|page=772|isbn=978-0-312-56944-0}}</ref> Having seen the fruits of prosperity brought by technological progress, many shared Hoover's optimism, and the already bullish stock market climbed even higher on Hoover's accession.{{sfn|Leuchtenburg 2009|pp=80–81}} This optimism concealed several threats to sustained U.S. economic growth, including a persistent [[Farm crisis of the 1920s|farm crisis]], a saturation of [[consumer goods]] like [[Car|automobiles]], and growing [[Income inequality in the United States|income inequality]].{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=65–68}} Most dangerous of all to the economy was excessive speculation that had raised [[Share price|stock prices]] far beyond their value.{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=35–36}} Some regulators and bankers had warned Coolidge and Hoover that a failure to curb speculation would lead to "one of the greatest financial catastrophes that this country has ever seen," but both presidents were reluctant to become involved with the workings of the [[Federal Reserve System]], which regulated banks.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=68–71}}

In late October 1929, the [[Stock Market Crash of 1929|stock market crashed]], and the worldwide economy began to spiral downward into the [[Great Depression]].{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=72–74}} The [[causes of the Great Depression]] remain a matter of debate,{{sfn|Kaufman|2012|p=502}} but Hoover viewed a lack of confidence in the financial system as the fundamental economic problem facing the nation.{{sfn|Houck|2000|pp=155–156}} He sought to avoid direct federal intervention, believing that the best way to bolster the economy was through the strengthening of businesses such as banks and railroads. He also feared that allowing individuals on the "[[welfare spending|dole]]" would permanently weaken the country.{{sfn|Carcasson|1998|pp=350–351}} Instead, Hoover strongly believed that local governments and private giving should address the needs of individuals.{{sfn|Leuchtenburg 2009b}}

====Early policies====

Though he attempted to put a positive spin on [[Wall Street Crash of 1929|Black Tuesday]], Hoover moved quickly to address the [[Stock market crash|stock market collapse]].{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=74–75}} In the days following Black Tuesday, Hoover gathered business and labor leaders, asking them to avoid wage cuts and work stoppages while the country faced what he believed would be a short recession similar to the Depression of 1920–21.{{sfn|Leuchtenburg 2009|pp=104105}} Hoover also convinced railroads and public utilities to increase spending on construction and maintenance, and the [[Federal Reserve]] announced that it would cut interest rates.{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=53–55}} In early 1930, Hoover acquired from Congress an additional $100 million to continue the [[Federal Farm Board]] lending and purchasing policies.<ref>Harris Gaylord Warren, ''Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 175.</ref> These actions were collectively designed to prevent a cycle of [[deflation]] and provide a [[Stimulus (economics)|fiscal stimulus]].{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=53–55}} At the same time, Hoover opposed congressional proposals to provide federal relief to the unemployed, as he believed that such programs were the responsibility of state and local governments and philanthropic organizations.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=147–149}}

Hoover had taken office hoping to raise agricultural tariffs in order to help farmers reeling from the farm crisis of the 1920s, but his attempt to raise agricultural tariffs became connected with a bill that broadly raised tariffs.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=93–97}} Hoover refused to become closely involved in the congressional debate over the tariff, and Congress produced a tariff bill that raised rates for many goods.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=399–402, 414}} Despite the widespread unpopularity of the bill, Hoover felt that he could not reject the main legislative accomplishment of the Republican-controlled [[71st United States Congress|71st Congress]]. Over the objection of many economists, Hoover signed the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] into law in June 1930.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=414–415}} Canada, France, and other nations retaliated by raising tariffs, resulting in a contraction of [[international trade]] and a worsening of the economy.<ref>Kumiko Koyama, "The Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: Why Did the President Sign the Bill?" ''Journal of Policy History'' (2009) 21#2 pp. 163–86</ref> Progressive Republicans such as Senator [[William E. Borah]] of Idaho were outraged when Hoover signed the tariff act, and Hoover's relations with that wing of the party never recovered.{{sfn|Leuchtenburg 2009|pp=91–92}}

====Later policies====
[[File:Herbert Hoover and Ted Joslin.jpg|thumb|Hoover in the Oval Office with [[Theodore Joslin|Ted Joslin]], 1932]]

By the end of 1930, the [[Unemployment in the United States|national unemployment rate]] had reached 11.9 percent, but it was not yet clear to most Americans that the economic downturn would be worse than the [[Depression of 1920–1921|Depression of 1920–21]].{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=58–59}} A series of [[bank failure]]s in late 1930 heralded a larger [[Economic collapse|collapse of the economy]] in 1931.{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=65–66}} While other countries left the [[gold standard]], Hoover refused to abandon it;{{sfn|Kennedy|1999|pp=77–78}} he derided any other [[monetary system]] as "[[Collectivism and individualism|collectivism]]".{{sfn|Eichengreen|Temin|2000|pp=196–197}} Hoover viewed the weak [[Economy of Europe|European economy]] as a major cause of economic troubles in the United States.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=143–144}} In response to the collapse of the [[Economy of Germany|German economy]], Hoover marshaled congressional support behind a one-year moratorium on European war debts.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=441–444, 449}} The [[Hoover Moratorium]] was warmly received in Europe and the United States, but Germany remained on the brink of [[Default (finance)|defaulting]] on its loans.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=450–452}} As the worldwide economy worsened, democratic governments fell; in Germany, [[Nazi Party]] leader [[Adolf Hitler]] assumed power and dismantled the [[Weimar Republic]].{{sfn|Herring|2008|pp=485–486}}

By mid-1931, the unemployment rate had reached 15 percent, giving rise to growing fears that the country was experiencing a depression far worse than recent economic downturns.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=140–141}} A reserved man with a fear of public speaking, Hoover allowed his opponents in the Democratic Party to define him as cold, incompetent, reactionary, and out-of-touch.{{sfn|Carcasson|1998|pp=351–352}} Hoover's opponents developed defamatory [[epithet]]s to discredit him, such as "[[Hooverville]]" (the shanty towns and homeless encampments), "Hoover leather" (cardboard used to cover holes in the soles of shoes), and "Hoover blanket" (old newspaper used to cover oneself from the cold).<ref>{{cite book| title=The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924| last=Cabanes| first=Bruno| page=206| publisher=Cambridge University Press| date=2014|isbn=978-1-107-02062-7}}</ref> While Hoover continued to resist direct federal relief efforts, Governor [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] of New York launched the [[Federal Emergency Relief Administration|Temporary Emergency Relief Administration]] to provide aid to the unemployed. Democrats positioned the program as a kinder alternative to Hoover's alleged apathy towards the unemployed, despite Hoover's belief that such programs were the responsibility of state and local governments.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=457–459}}

The economy continued to worsen, with unemployment rates nearing 23 percent in early 1932,{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=162–166}} and Hoover finally heeded calls for more direct federal intervention.{{sfn|Olson 1972|pp=508–511}} In January 1932, he convinced Congress to authorize the establishment of the [[Reconstruction Finance Corporation]] (RFC), which would provide government-secured loans to financial institutions, railroads, and local governments.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=153–154}} The RFC saved numerous businesses from failure, but it failed to stimulate commercial lending as much as Hoover had hoped, partly because it was run by conservative bankers unwilling to make riskier loans.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=162–163}} The same month the RFC was established, Hoover signed the [[Federal Home Loan Bank Act]], establishing 12 district banks overseen by a Federal Home Loan Bank Board in a manner similar to the Federal Reserve System.{{sfn|Rappleye|2016|pp=309}} He also helped arrange passage of the [[Glass–Steagall Act of 1932]], emergency banking legislation designed to expand banking credit by expanding the collateral on which Federal Reserve banks were authorized to lend.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=483–484}} As these measures failed to stem the economic crisis, Hoover signed the [[Emergency Relief and Construction Act]], a $2 billion public works bill, in July 1932.{{sfn|Fausold 1985|pp=162–166}}