Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

===Henderson Field===
{{Main|Battle for Henderson Field}}

====Battleship bombardment====
Despite the U.S. victory off Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued with plans and preparations for their large offensive scheduled for later in October. The Japanese decided to risk a rare departure from their usual practice of only using fast warships to deliver men and materiel to the island. On 13 October, a convoy comprising six cargo ships escorted by eight screening destroyers departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal. The convoy carried 4,500 troops from the 16th and 230th Infantry Regiments, some naval marines, two batteries of heavy artillery, and one company of tanks.<ref>Frank, pp. 313–315. The 16th was from the 2nd Division and the 230th from the 38th Division.</ref>

[[File:Haruna 1934.jpg|thumb|left|{{Ship|Japanese battleship|Haruna}}]]

To protect the approaching convoy from attack by CAF aircraft, Yamamoto sent the 3rd Battleship Division from Truk to bombard Henderson Field, under the command of [[Takeo Kurita]]. At 01:33 on 14 October, IJN battleships {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Kongō||2}} and {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Haruna||2}}, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers, reached Guadalcanal and opened fire on Henderson Field from a distance of {{convert|16000|m|yd|sigfig=3|sp=us}}. At this range, over ten miles (16 km), Allied shore batteries had no prospect of returning effective fire. Over the next one hour and 23 minutes, the two battleships fired 973 {{convert|14|in|mm|sigfig=3|adj=on}} shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of which fell in and around the {{cvt|2200|m2}} area of the airfield. Many of the shells were [[fragmentation (weaponry)|fragmentation]] shells, specifically designed to destroy land targets.{{Citation needed|date=January 2025|reason=The Japanese battleships carried and used Type-3 shells which was anti-aircraft in purpose. What is the source for these BB carrying specially designed anti-land shells?}} The bombardment heavily damaged both runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, and destroyed 48 of the CAF's 90 aircraft. 41 men were killed, including six CAF pilots. Few CAF aircraft survived entirely unscathed, and only about a dozen remained in flyable condition the next day. Wrecked and damaged planes were lined up wingtip to wingtip, in the hopes of diverting Japanese attention from the few surviving aircraft. After exhausting their ammunition around 3 a.m., the Japanese battleship force immediately returned to Truk.<ref>Evans, pp. 181–182; Frank, pp. 315–320; Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' pp. 171–175. [[Raizo Tanaka]] commanded Destroyer Squadron 2 which was part of the battleship's screen.</ref> Allied troops stationed at Henderson Field colloquially referred to this bombardment, the heaviest they had endured thus far in the campaign, as "The Night".<ref name=":0" /> 

Despite the heavy damage, Henderson personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours. Seventeen [[Douglas SBD Dauntless|SBD-3 Dauntless]] [[dive bomber]]s and 20 [[Grumman F4F Wildcat|F4F Wildcats]] at Espiritu Santo were quickly flown to Henderson, and U.S. Army and Marine transport aircraft shuttled aviation gasoline from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. Aware of the approach of the large Japanese reinforcement convoy, the U.S. desperately sought a way to interdict the convoy before it could reach Guadalcanal. Using fuel drained from destroyed aircraft and from a cache in the nearby jungle, the CAF attacked the convoy twice on 14 October but caused no damage.<ref>Frank pp. 319–321</ref>

The Japanese convoy reached [[Tassafaronga Point]] at midnight on 14 October and began unloading. Throughout the day of 15 October, a string of CAF aircraft from Henderson bombed and strafed the unloading convoy, destroying three of the cargo ships. The remainder of the convoy departed that night, having unloaded all of the troops and about two-thirds of the supplies and equipment. Several Japanese heavy cruisers also bombarded Henderson on the nights of 14 and 15 October, destroying a few additional CAF aircraft but failing to inflict further significant damage to the airfield.<ref>Frank, pp. 321–326; Hough, pp. 327–328.</ref>

====Battle for Henderson Field====
[[File:Clifton B. Cates and battalion commanders, 1st Marine Regiment on Guadalcanal, 1942.jpg|thumb|From left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Leonard B. Cresswell (1st Battalion), Lieutenant Colonel [[Edwin A. Pollock]] (Executive Officer 1st Marines), Colonel [[Clifton B. Cates]] (Commanding Officer 1st Marines), Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy (3rd Battalion) and Lieutenant Colonel [[William W. Stickney (USMC)|William W. Stickney]] (2nd Battalion) on Guadalcanal, October 1942]]

Between 1 and 17 October, the Japanese delivered 15,000 troops to Guadalcanal, giving Hyakutake 20,000 total troops to employ for his planned offensive. Because of the loss of their positions on the east side of the Matanikau, the Japanese decided that an attack on the U.S. defenses along the coast would be prohibitively difficult. Therefore, Hyakutake decided that the main thrust of his planned attack would be from south of Henderson Field. His 2nd Division (augmented by troops from the 38th Division), under Maruyama and comprising 7,000 soldiers in three infantry regiments of three battalions each was ordered to march through the jungle and attack the American defenses from the south, near the east bank of the Lunga River.<ref>Shaw, p. 34; and Rottman, p. 63.</ref> The date of the attack was set for 22 October, then changed to 23 October. To distract the Americans from the planned attack from the south, Hyakutake's heavy artillery plus five battalions of infantry (about 2,900 men) under Major General [[Tadashi Sumiyoshi]] were to attack the American defenses from the west along the coastal corridor. The Japanese estimated that there were 10,000 American troops on the island, when in fact there were about 23,000.<ref>Rottman, p. 61; Frank, pp. 289–340; Hough, pp. 322–330; Griffith, pp. 186–187; Dull, pp. 226–230; Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' pp. 149–171. The Japanese troops delivered to Guadalcanal during this time comprised the entire 2nd (Sendai) Infantry Division, two battalions from the 38th Infantry Division, and various artillery, tank, engineer, and other support units. Kawaguchi's forces also included what remained of the 3rd Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, which was originally part of the 35th Infantry Brigade commanded by Kawaguchi during the [[Battle of Edson's Ridge]].</ref> Despite this, American commanders were pessimistic about their ability to repulse another concerted Japanese attack on the airfield. Units were given orders to fight as guerrillas should they be overrun by the Japanese, and the 1st Marine Division's intelligence staff began burning their classified records. Speaking to reporters in Washington, D.C., [[United States Secretary of the Navy|Secretary of the Navy]] Frank Knox refused to publicly guarantee that Guadalcanal could be held. 
[[File:GuadBattleOct20-25.gif|thumb|left|Map of the battle, 23–26 October. Sumiyoshi's forces attack in the west at the Matanikau (left) while Maruyama's 2nd division attacks the Lunga perimeter from the south (right).]]

On 12 October, a company of Japanese engineers began to break a trail, called the "Maruyama Road", from the Matanikau towards the southern portion of the U.S. Lunga perimeter. The {{convert|15|mi|km|adj=mid|-long|0}} trail traversed some of the most difficult terrain on Guadalcanal, including numerous rivers and streams, deep, muddy ravines, steep ridges, and dense jungle. Between 16 and 18 October, the 2nd Division began their march along the Maruyama Road.<ref>Miller, p. 155; Frank, pp. 339–341; Hough, p. 330; Rottman, p. 62; Griffith, pp. 187–188. Hyakutake sent Colonel [[Masanobu Tsuji]], a member of his staff, to monitor the 2nd Division's progress along the trail and to report to him on whether the attack could begin on 22 October as scheduled. Masanobu Tsuji has been identified by some historians as the most likely culprit behind the [[Bataan death march]].</ref>

By 23 October, Maruyama's forces were still struggling through the jungle to reach the American lines. That evening, after learning that his forces had yet to reach their attack positions, Hyakutake postponed the attack to 19:00 on 24 October. The Americans remained unaware of the approach of Maruyama's forces.<ref>Griffith, p. 193; Frank, pp. 346–348; Rottman, p. 62.</ref>

[[File:PackHowitzer.jpg|thumb|A U.S. 11th Marines [[M116 howitzer|75mm pack howitzer]] and crew]]
Sumiyoshi was informed by Hyakutake's staff of the postponement of the offensive to 24 October, but he was unable to contact his troops to inform them of the delay. Thus, at dusk on 23 October, two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the nine tanks of the 1st Independent Tank Company launched attacks on the U.S. Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matanikau. U.S. Marine artillery, cannon, and small arms fire repulsed the attacks, destroying all the tanks and killing many of the Japanese soldiers while suffering only light casualties.<ref>Hough, pp. 332–333; Frank, pp. 349–350; Rottman, pp. 62–63; Griffith, pp. 195–196; Miller, pp. 157–158. The Marines lost 2 killed in the action. Japanese infantry losses are not recorded but were, according to Frank, "unquestionably severe." Griffith says that 600 Japanese soldiers were killed. Only 17 of the 44 members of the 1st Independent Tank Company survived the battle.</ref>

Finally, late on 24 October, Maruyama's forces reached the Lunga perimeter. Over two consecutive nights Maruyama's forces conducted numerous frontal assaults on positions defended by troops of the [[1st Battalion, 7th Marines]] under Lieutenant Colonel [[Chesty Puller]] and the U.S. Army's 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Hall (National Guard officer)|Robert Hall]]. U.S. Marine and Army units armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery, including direct [[Canister shot|canister]] fire from [[37 mm gun M3|37 mm anti-tank guns]], "wrought terrible carnage" on the Japanese.<ref>Frank pp. 361–362</ref> A few small groups of Japanese broke through the American defenses, but were hunted down and killed over the next several days. More than 1,500 of Maruyama's troops were killed in the attacks, while the Americans lost about 60 killed. Over the same two days American aircraft from Henderson Field defended against attacks by Japanese aircraft and warships, destroying 14 aircraft and sinking a light cruiser.<ref>Hough, p. 336; Frank, pp. 353–362; Griffith, pp. 197–204; Miller, pp. 147–151, 160–162; Lundstrom, pp. 343–352. The 164th became the first Army unit to engage in combat in the war and was later awarded the [[Presidential Unit Citation (United States)|Presidential Unit Citation]].</ref>

Further Japanese attacks near the Matanikau on 26 October were also repulsed with heavy losses for the Japanese. As a result, by 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake called off any further attacks and ordered his forces to retreat. About half of Maruyama's survivors were ordered to retreat back to the upper Matanikau Valley while the 230th Infantry Regiment under Colonel [[Toshinari Shōji]] was told to head for Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter. Leading elements of the 2nd Division reached the 17th Army headquarters area at Kokumbona, west of the Matanikau on 4 November. The same day, Shōji's unit reached Koli Point and made camp. Decimated by combat losses, malnutrition, and tropical diseases, the 2nd Division was incapable of further offensive action and fought as a defensive force along the coast for the rest of the campaign. In total, the Japanese lost 2,200–3,000 troops in the battle while the Americans lost around 80 killed.<ref>Frank, pp. 63–406, 418, 424, and 553; Zimmerman, pp. 122–123; Griffith, p. 204; Hough, p. 337; Rottman, p. 63. [[Silver Star]] medals were awarded to Sgt. Norman Greber of Ohio, Pvt. Don Reno of Texas, Pvt. Jack Bando of Oregon, Pvt. Stan Ralph of New York, and Cpl. Michael Randall of New York for their actions during the battle.</ref>