Editing Great White Fleet (section)

==Effects on US capital ship design==
The {{sclass|South Carolina|battleship|1}} was laid down in 1906 and entered service in 1910 as the first American dreadnought. It was coal fired. While the capital ships of the Great White Fleet were already obsolete in light of the "big gun" revolution ushered in by the construction of {{HMS|Dreadnought|1906|6}}, their behavior at sea furnished valuable information that affected future construction. For instance, in terms of [[Seakeeping|seaworthiness]], all the capital ships in the fleet proved wet in all but the calmest seas, which led to the flared bows of subsequent U.S. battleships, increased [[Freeboard (nautical)|freeboard]] forward and such spray-reducing measures as the elimination of billboards for anchors and gun [[sponson]]s. Increased freeboard was needed; this and related considerations demanded increases in [[Beam (nautical)|beam]] and overall size. Between the {{sclass|Florida|battleship|1}}s, the last American capital ships completed before data from the cruise became available, and the {{sclass|Wyoming|battleship|4}}, the first designed after this data was received, displacement (and, as a result, cost) per ship increased by one third.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75–85}}

[[File:Kosmos esquadra americana 2.jpg|thumb|12 January 1908 – Arrival at Rio de Janeiro – Fleet enters Guanabara Bay]]Deficiencies in seaworthiness in turn reduced the battle-worthiness of the fleet. Turret heights for main armament proved too low and needed to be raised. Secondary armament was useless at speed and especially in tradewind conditions (with the wind moving over the sea at {{convert|10|kn|km/h}} or greater) and needed to be moved much higher in the hull. Improved placement began with the ''Wyoming''-class battleships and was further refined in the {{sclass|Nevada|battleship|4}}. [[Casemate|Casemates]] for the bow 3-inch guns in the newer pre-dreadnoughts were untenable due to wetness and were removed. Another discovery was that, even when fully loaded, the bottom of the battleships' side armor was visible—and the ships thus vulnerable to shells that might hit beneath it to reach their machinery and magazines—in smooth to moderate seas. The profile of crests and troughs in some ships contributed to this problem. Admiral Evans concluded that the standard {{convert|8|ft|m|adj=on}} width of belt armor was inadequate.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75–79}}

One other necessity the cruise outlined was the need for tactical homogeneity. Before the cruise, critics such as then-Captain [[William Sims]] (to whom President Roosevelt listened) had argued that American warship design had remained too conservative and precluded the level of efficiency needed for the fleet to function as an effective unit. The cruise proved the charge true. This would eventually lead to the building of [[standard-type battleship]]s in the U.S. Navy. When President Roosevelt convened the 1908 Newport Conference of the [[Naval War College]], he placed responsibility for U.S. battleship design on the [[General Board of the United States Navy]]. This gave line officers and planners direct input and control over warship design, a pattern which has persisted to the present day.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75, 82}}