Editing Cruiser (section)

==World War II==
Cruisers participated in a number of surface engagements in the early part of World War II, along with escorting carrier and battleship groups throughout the war. In the later part of the war, Allied cruisers primarily provided anti-aircraft (AA) escort for carrier groups and performed shore bombardment. Japanese cruisers similarly escorted carrier and battleship groups in the later part of the war, notably in the disastrous [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]] and [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]]. In 1937–41 the Japanese, having withdrawn from all naval treaties, upgraded or completed the ''Mogami'' and {{sclass|Tone|cruiser|4}}es as heavy cruisers by replacing their {{convert|6.1|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} triple turrets with {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} twin turrets.<ref>Watts, pp. 99–105</ref> Torpedo refits were also made to most heavy cruisers, resulting in up to sixteen {{convert|24|in|mm|abbr=on}} tubes per ship, plus a set of reloads.<ref>Watts, pp. 79–105</ref> In 1941 the 1920s light cruisers {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Ōi||2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Kitakami||2}} were converted to [[torpedo cruiser]]s with four {{convert|5.5|in|mm|abbr=on}} guns and forty {{convert|24|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} torpedo tubes. In 1944 ''Kitakami'' was further converted to carry up to eight ''[[Kaiten]]'' [[human torpedo]]es in place of ordinary torpedoes.<ref>Watts, pp. 70–73</ref>

Before World War II, cruisers were mainly divided into three types: heavy cruisers, light cruisers and auxiliary cruisers. Heavy cruiser tonnage reached 20–30,000 tons, speed 32–34 knots, endurance of more than 10,000 nautical miles, armor thickness of 127–203&nbsp;mm. Heavy cruisers were equipped with eight or nine {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns with a range of more than 20 nautical miles. They were mainly used to attack enemy surface ships and shore-based targets. In addition, there were 10–16 secondary guns with a caliber of less than {{convert|130|mm|in|abbr=on}}. Also, dozens of automatic [[antiaircraft]] guns were installed to fight aircraft and small vessels such as torpedo boats. For example, in World War II, American Alaska-class cruisers were more than 30,000 tons, equipped with nine {{convert|12|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns. Some cruisers could also carry three or four seaplanes to correct the accuracy of gunfire and perform reconnaissance.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stille |first=Mark |title=Imperial Japanese Navy Heavy Cruisers 1941–45. |publisher=[[Osprey Publishing]] |year=2014 |pages=38–40}}</ref>

Together with battleships, these heavy cruisers formed powerful naval task forces, which dominated the world's oceans for more than a century. After the signing of the [[Washington Naval Treaty|Washington Treaty]] on Arms Limitation in 1922, the tonnage and quantity of battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers were severely restricted. In order not to violate the treaty, countries began to develop light cruisers. Light cruisers of the 1920s had displacements of less than 10,000 tons and a speed of up to 35 knots. They were equipped with 6–12 main guns with a caliber of 127–133&nbsp;mm (5–5.5 inches). In addition, they were equipped with 8–12 secondary guns under 127&nbsp;mm (5&nbsp;in) and dozens of small caliber cannons, as well as torpedoes and mines. Some ships also carried 2–4 seaplanes, mainly for reconnaissance. In 1930 the [[London Naval Treaty]] allowed large light cruisers to be built, with the same tonnage as heavy cruisers and armed with up to fifteen {{convert|155|mm|in|abbr=on}} guns. The Japanese ''Mogami'' class were built to this treaty's limit, the Americans and British also built similar ships. However, in 1939 the ''Mogami''s were refitted as heavy cruisers with ten {{convert|203|mm|in|abbr=on}} guns.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lacroix |first=Eric |title=Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War |last2=Wells II |first2=Linton |publisher=[[Naval Institute Press]] |year=1997 |pages=331–332}}</ref>

===1939 to Pearl Harbor===
In December 1939, three British cruisers engaged the [[German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee|German "pocket battleship" ''Admiral Graf Spee'']] (which was on a commerce raiding mission) in the [[Battle of the River Plate]]; [[German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee]] then took refuge in neutral [[Montevideo]], [[Uruguay]]. By broadcasting messages indicating capital ships were in the area, the British caused ''Admiral Graf Spee''{{'}}s captain to think he faced a hopeless situation while low on ammunition and order his ship scuttled.<ref>Churchill 1948, pp. 525–526</ref> On 8 June 1940 the German capital ships {{ship|German battleship|Scharnhorst||2}} and {{ship|German battleship|Gneisenau||2}}, classed as battleships but with large cruiser armament, sank the aircraft carrier {{HMS|Glorious}} with gunfire.<ref>Howland, p. 52</ref> From October 1940 through March 1941 the German heavy cruiser (also known as "pocket battleship", see above) {{ship|German cruiser|Admiral Scheer||2}} conducted a successful commerce-raiding voyage in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.<ref>Rohwer, pp. 48–65</ref>

On 27 May 1941, {{HMS|Dorsetshire|40|6}} attempted to finish off the German battleship {{ship|German battleship|Bismarck||2}} with torpedoes, probably causing the Germans to scuttle the ship.<ref>Kennedy, p. 204</ref> ''Bismarck'' (accompanied by the heavy cruiser {{ship|German cruiser|Prinz Eugen||2}}) previously sank the battlecruiser {{HMS|Hood}} and damaged the battleship {{HMS|Prince of Wales|53|6}} with gunfire in the [[Battle of the Denmark Strait]].<ref>Kennedy, p. 45</ref>

On 19 November 1941 {{HMAS|Sydney|D48|6}} sank in a mutually fatal [[Sinking of HMAS Sydney|engagement with the German raider ''Kormoran'']] in the Indian Ocean near Western Australia.

===Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean operations 1942–1944===
Twenty-three British cruisers were [[List of Royal Navy losses in World War II#Cruisers|lost to enemy action]], mostly to air attack and submarines, in operations in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean. Sixteen of these losses were in the Mediterranean.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.naval-history.net/WW2aBritishLosses10tables.htm|title=1945|website=www.naval-history.net}}</ref> The British included cruisers and anti-aircraft cruisers among convoy escorts in the Mediterranean and to northern Russia due to the threat of surface and air attack. Almost all cruisers in World War II were vulnerable to submarine attack due to a lack of anti-submarine [[sonar]] and weapons. Also, until 1943–44 the light anti-aircraft armament of most cruisers was weak.

In July 1942 an attempt to intercept [[Convoy PQ 17]] with surface ships, including the heavy cruiser ''Admiral Scheer'', failed due to multiple German warships grounding, but air and submarine attacks sank 2/3 of the convoy's ships.<ref>Rohwer, pp. 175–176</ref> In August 1942 ''Admiral Scheer'' conducted [[Operation Wunderland]], a solo raid into northern Russia's [[Kara Sea]]. She bombarded [[Dikson Island]] but otherwise had little success.<ref>Zetterling and Tamelander, pp. 150–152</ref>

On 31 December 1942 the [[Battle of the Barents Sea]] was fought, a rare action for a [[Murmansk]] run because it involved cruisers on both sides. Four British destroyers and five other vessels were escorting [[Convoy JW 51B]] from the UK to the Murmansk area. Another British force of two cruisers ({{HMS|Sheffield|C24|6}} and {{HMS|Jamaica|44|6}}) and two destroyers were in the area. Two heavy cruisers (one the "pocket battleship" ''[[German cruiser Deutschland|Lützow]]''), accompanied by six destroyers, attempted to intercept the convoy near [[North Cape (Norway)|North Cape]] after it was spotted by a U-boat. Although the Germans sank a British destroyer and a minesweeper (also damaging another destroyer), they failed to damage any of the convoy's merchant ships. A German destroyer was lost and a heavy cruiser damaged. Both sides withdrew from the action for fear of the other side's torpedoes.<ref>{{cite web |last=Kappes |first=Irwin J. |date=23 February 2010|title=Battle of the Barents Sea |publisher=German-Navy.De |url=http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/articles/feature5.html |access-date=29 May 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110607120149/http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/articles/feature5.html |url-status=live |archive-date=7 June 2011}}</ref>

On 26 December 1943 the German capital ship ''Scharnhorst'' was sunk while attempting to intercept a convoy in the [[Battle of the North Cape]]. The British force that sank her was led by Vice Admiral [[Bruce Fraser, 1st Baron Fraser of North Cape|Bruce Fraser]] in the battleship {{HMS|Duke of York|17|6}}, accompanied by four cruisers and nine destroyers. One of the cruisers was the preserved {{HMS|Belfast|C35|6}}.<ref>Garzke and Dulin, pp. 167–175</ref>

''Scharnhorst''{{'}}s sister ''Gneisenau'', damaged by a mine and a submerged wreck in the [[Channel Dash]] of 13 February 1942 and repaired, was further damaged by a British air attack on 27 February 1942. She began a conversion process to mount six {{convert|38|cm|abbr=on}} guns instead of nine {{convert|28|cm|abbr=on}} guns, but in early 1943 Hitler (angered by the recent failure at the Battle of the Barents Sea) ordered her disarmed and her armament used as [[coastal defence and fortification|coast defence]] weapons. One 28&nbsp;cm triple turret survives near [[Trondheim]], Norway.<ref>Garzke and Dulin, pp. 148–150</ref>

===Pearl Harbor through Dutch East Indies campaign===
The [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] on 7 December 1941 brought the United States into the war, but with eight battleships sunk or damaged by air attack.<ref>Morison vol III, p. 158</ref> On 10 December 1941 HMS ''Prince of Wales'' and the battlecruiser {{HMS|Repulse|1916|6}} were [[Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|sunk by land-based torpedo bombers]] northeast of Singapore. It was now clear that surface ships could not operate near enemy aircraft in daylight without air cover; most surface actions of 1942–43 were fought at night as a result. Generally, both sides avoided risking their battleships until the Japanese attack at Leyte Gulf in 1944.<ref>Morison vol III, pp. 188–190</ref><ref>Morison vol XII</ref>

Six of the battleships from Pearl Harbor were eventually returned to service, but no US battleships engaged Japanese surface units at sea until the [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]] in November 1942, and not thereafter until the [[Battle of Surigao Strait]] in October 1944.<ref name=FriedBat1>Friedman battleships, pp. 345–347</ref> {{USS|North Carolina|BB-55|6}} was on hand for the initial landings at Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, and escorted carriers in the [[Battle of the Eastern Solomons]] later that month. However, on 15 September she was torpedoed while escorting a carrier group and had to return to the US for repairs.<ref name=FriedBat1/>

Generally, the Japanese held their capital ships out of all surface actions in the 1941–42 campaigns or they failed to close with the enemy; the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942 was the sole exception. The four {{sclass|Kongō|battlecruiser|0}} ships performed shore bombardment in Malaya, Singapore, and Guadalcanal and escorted the [[Indian Ocean raid|raid on Ceylon]] and other carrier forces in 1941–42. Japanese capital ships also participated ineffectively (due to not being engaged) in the [[Battle of Midway]] and the simultaneous [[Aleutian Islands Campaign|Aleutian diversion]]; in both cases they were in battleship groups well to the rear of the carrier groups. Sources state that {{ship|Japanese battleship|Yamato||2}} sat out the entire [[Guadalcanal Campaign]] due to lack of high-explosive bombardment shells, poor nautical charts of the area, and high fuel consumption.<ref name=G&D54>Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 54</ref><ref name="jackson128">Jackson (2000), p. 128</ref> It is likely that the poor charts affected other battleships as well. Except for the ''Kongō'' class, most Japanese battleships spent the critical year of 1942, in which most of the war's surface actions occurred, in home waters or at the fortified base of [[Chuuk Lagoon|Truk]], far from any risk of attacking or being attacked.

From 1942 through mid-1943, US and other Allied cruisers were the heavy units on their side of the numerous surface engagements of the [[Dutch East Indies campaign]], the Guadalcanal Campaign, and subsequent [[Solomon Islands campaign|Solomon Islands]] fighting; they were usually opposed by strong Japanese cruiser-led forces equipped with [[Long Lance]] torpedoes. Destroyers also participated heavily on both sides of these battles and provided essentially all the torpedoes on the Allied side, with some battles in these campaigns fought entirely between destroyers.

Along with lack of knowledge of the capabilities of the Long Lance torpedo, the US Navy was hampered by a deficiency it was initially unaware of—the unreliability of the Mark 15 torpedo used by destroyers. This weapon shared the [[Mark 6 exploder]] and other problems with the more famously unreliable [[Mark 14 torpedo]]; the most common results of firing either of these torpedoes were a dud or a miss. The problems with these weapons were not solved until mid-1943, after almost all of the surface actions in the Solomon Islands had taken place.<ref name=BuOrd1>Rowland and Boyd, pp. 93–94</ref> Another factor that shaped the early surface actions was the pre-war training of both sides. The US Navy concentrated on long-range 8-inch gunfire as their primary offensive weapon, leading to rigid [[battle line]] tactics, while the Japanese trained extensively for nighttime torpedo attacks.<ref name=FriedCru1>Friedman cruisers, pp. 312–315</ref><ref name=FriedDes1>Friedman destroyers, pp. 168–172</ref> Since all post-1930 Japanese cruisers had 8-inch guns by 1941, almost all of the US Navy's cruisers in the South Pacific in 1942 were the 8-inch-gunned (203&nbsp;mm) "treaty cruisers"; most of the 6-inch-gunned (152&nbsp;mm) cruisers were deployed in the Atlantic.<ref name=FriedCru1/>

===Dutch East Indies campaign===
Although their battleships were held out of surface action, Japanese cruiser-destroyer forces rapidly isolated and mopped up the Allied naval forces in the Dutch East Indies campaign of February–March 1942. In three separate actions, they sank five Allied cruisers ([[Battle of the Java Sea|two Dutch]] and one each [[Second Battle of the Java Sea|British]], [[Battle of Sunda Strait|Australian, and American]]) with torpedoes and gunfire, against one Japanese cruiser damaged.<ref>The British cruiser was {{HMS|Exeter|68|2}}, which previously engaged ''Graf Spee''.</ref> With one other Allied cruiser withdrawn for repairs, the only remaining Allied cruiser in the area was the damaged {{USS|Marblehead|CL-12|6}}. Despite their rapid success, the Japanese proceeded methodically, never leaving their air cover and rapidly establishing new air bases as they advanced.<ref>Morison vol. III, pp. 292–293</ref>

===Guadalcanal campaign===
After the key carrier battles of the [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Coral Sea]] and Midway in mid-1942, Japan had lost four of the six fleet carriers that launched the Pearl Harbor raid and was on the strategic defensive. On 7 August 1942 [[United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] were landed on Guadalcanal and other nearby islands, beginning the Guadalcanal Campaign. This campaign proved to be a severe test for the Navy as well as the Marines. Along with two carrier battles, several major surface actions occurred, almost all at night between cruiser-destroyer forces.

'''Battle of Savo Island'''<br />
On the night of 8–9 August 1942 the Japanese counterattacked near Guadalcanal in the [[Battle of Savo Island]] with a cruiser-destroyer force. In a controversial move, the US carrier task forces were withdrawn from the area on the 8th due to heavy fighter losses and low fuel. The Allied force included six heavy cruisers (two Australian), two light cruisers (one Australian), and eight US destroyers.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Savo/Quantock/#page4|title=HyperWar: Disaster at Savo Island, 1942|website=www.ibiblio.org}}</ref> Of the cruisers, only the Australian ships had torpedoes. The Japanese force included five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one destroyer. Numerous circumstances combined to reduce Allied readiness for the battle. The results of the battle were three American heavy cruisers sunk by torpedoes and gunfire, one Australian heavy cruiser disabled by gunfire and scuttled, one heavy cruiser damaged, and two US destroyers damaged. The Japanese had three cruisers lightly damaged. This was the most lopsided outcome of the surface actions in the [[Solomon Islands]]. Along with their superior torpedoes, the opening Japanese gunfire was accurate and very damaging. Subsequent analysis showed that some of the damage was due to poor housekeeping practices by US forces. Stowage of boats and aircraft in midships hangars with full gas tanks contributed to fires, along with full and unprotected ready-service ammunition lockers for the open-mount secondary armament. These practices were soon corrected, and US cruisers with similar damage sank less often thereafter.<ref name=FriedDmg1>Friedman cruisers, pp. 316–321</ref> Savo was the first surface action of the war for almost all the US ships and personnel; few US cruisers and destroyers were targeted or hit at Coral Sea or Midway.

'''Battle of the Eastern Solomons'''<br />
On 24–25 August 1942 the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, a major carrier action, was fought. Part of the action was a Japanese attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal with men and equipment on [[Troopship|troop transports]]. The Japanese troop convoy was attacked by Allied aircraft, resulting in the Japanese subsequently reinforcing Guadalcanal with troops on fast warships at night. These convoys were called the "[[Tokyo Express]]" by the Allies. Although the Tokyo Express often ran unopposed, most surface actions in the Solomons revolved around Tokyo Express missions. Also, US air operations had commenced from [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|Henderson Field]], the airfield on Guadalcanal. Fear of air power on both sides resulted in all surface actions in the Solomons being fought at night.

'''Battle of Cape Esperance'''<br />
The [[Battle of Cape Esperance]] occurred on the night of 11–12 October 1942. A Tokyo Express mission was underway for Guadalcanal at the same time as a separate cruiser-destroyer bombardment group loaded with high explosive shells for bombarding Henderson Field. A US cruiser-destroyer force was deployed in advance of a convoy of US Army troops for Guadalcanal that was due on 13 October. The Tokyo Express convoy was two seaplane tenders and six destroyers; the bombardment group was three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, and the US force was two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five destroyers. The US force engaged the Japanese bombardment force; the Tokyo Express convoy was able to unload on Guadalcanal and evade action. The bombardment force was sighted at close range ({{convert|5000|yd|m}}) and the US force opened fire. The Japanese were surprised because their admiral was anticipating sighting the Tokyo Express force, and withheld fire while attempting to confirm the US ships' identity.<ref>Morison vol. V, pp. 156–160</ref> One Japanese cruiser and one destroyer were sunk and one cruiser damaged, against one US destroyer sunk with one light cruiser and one destroyer damaged. The bombardment force failed to bring its torpedoes into action, and turned back. The next day US aircraft from Henderson Field attacked several of the Japanese ships, sinking two destroyers and damaging a third.<ref>Morison vol. V, p. 169</ref> The US victory resulted in overconfidence in some later battles, reflected in the initial after-action report claiming two Japanese heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers sunk by the gunfire of {{USS|Boise|CL-47|2}} alone.<ref name=FriedDmg1/> The battle had little effect on the overall situation, as the next night two Kongō-class battleships bombarded and severely damaged Henderson Field unopposed, and the following night another Tokyo Express convoy delivered 4,500 troops to Guadalcanal. The US convoy delivered the Army troops as scheduled on the 13th.<ref>Morison vol. V, p. 171</ref>

'''Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands'''<br />
The [[Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands]] took place 25–27 October 1942. It was a pivotal battle, as it left the US and Japanese with only two large carriers each in the South Pacific (another large Japanese carrier was damaged and under repair until May 1943). Due to the high carrier attrition rate with no replacements for months, for the most part both sides stopped risking their remaining carriers until late 1943, and each side sent in a pair of battleships instead. The next major carrier operations for the US were the [[carrier raid on Rabaul]] and support for the [[Battle of Tarawa|invasion of Tarawa]], both in November 1943.

'''Naval Battle of Guadalcanal'''<br />
The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal occurred 12–15 November 1942 in two phases. A night surface action on 12–13 November was the first phase. The Japanese force consisted of two Kongō-class battleships with high explosive shells for bombarding Henderson Field, one small light cruiser, and 11 destroyers. Their plan was that the bombardment would neutralize Allied airpower and allow a force of 11 transport ships and 12 destroyers to reinforce Guadalcanal with a Japanese division the next day.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1>Morrison vol. V, pp. 254–274</ref> However, US reconnaissance aircraft spotted the approaching Japanese on the 12th and the Americans made what preparations they could. The American force consisted of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two anti-aircraft cruisers,<ref>Although these ships were designated light cruisers at the time, the term "anti-aircraft" is used to distinguish them from larger London Treaty light cruisers.</ref> and eight destroyers. The Americans were outgunned by the Japanese that night, and a lack of pre-battle orders by the US commander led to confusion. The destroyer {{USS|Laffey|DD-459|6}} closed with the battleship {{ship|Japanese battleship|Hiei||2}}, firing all torpedoes (though apparently none hit or detonated) and raking the battleship's bridge with gunfire, wounding the Japanese admiral and killing his chief of staff. The Americans initially lost four destroyers including ''Laffey'', with both heavy cruisers, most of the remaining destroyers, and both anti-aircraft cruisers damaged. The Japanese initially had one battleship and four destroyers damaged, but at this point they withdrew, possibly unaware that the US force was unable to further oppose them.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/> At dawn US aircraft from Henderson Field, {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|6}}, and [[Espiritu Santo]] found the damaged battleship and two destroyers in the area. The battleship (''Hiei'') was sunk by aircraft (or possibly scuttled), one destroyer was sunk by the damaged {{USS|Portland|CA-33|6}}, and the other destroyer was attacked by aircraft but was able to withdraw.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/> Both of the damaged US anti-aircraft cruisers were lost on 13 November, one ({{USS|Juneau|CL-52|2}}) torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, and the other sank on the way to repairs. ''Juneau''{{'}}s loss was especially tragic; the submarine's presence prevented immediate rescue, over 100 survivors of a crew of nearly 700 were adrift for eight days, and all but ten died. Among the dead were the five [[Sullivan brothers]].<ref>Kurzman</ref>

The Japanese transport force was rescheduled for the 14th and a new cruiser-destroyer force (belatedly joined by the surviving battleship {{ship|Japanese battleship|Kirishima||2}}) was sent to bombard Henderson Field the night of 13 November. Only two cruisers actually bombarded the airfield, as ''Kirishima'' had not arrived yet and the remainder of the force was on guard for US warships. The bombardment caused little damage. The cruiser-destroyer force then withdrew, while the transport force continued towards Guadalcanal. Both forces were attacked by US aircraft on the 14th. The cruiser force lost one heavy cruiser sunk and one damaged. Although the transport force had fighter cover from the carrier {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Jun'yō||2}}, six transports were sunk and one heavily damaged. All but four of the destroyers accompanying the transport force picked up survivors and withdrew. The remaining four transports and four destroyers approached Guadalcanal at night, but stopped to await the results of the night's action.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/>

On the night of 14–15 November a Japanese force of ''Kirishima'', two heavy and two light cruisers, and nine destroyers approached Guadalcanal. Two US battleships ({{USS|Washington|BB-56|2}} and {{USS|South Dakota|BB-57|2}}) were there to meet them, along with four destroyers. This was one of only two battleship-on-battleship encounters during the Pacific War; the other was the lopsided Battle of Surigao Strait in October 1944, part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The battleships had been escorting ''Enterprise'', but were detached due to the urgency of the situation. With nine 16-inch (406&nbsp;mm) guns apiece against eight 14-inch (356&nbsp;mm) guns on ''Kirishima'', the Americans had major gun and armor advantages. All four destroyers were sunk or severely damaged and withdrawn shortly after the Japanese attacked them with gunfire and torpedoes.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/> Although her main battery remained in action for most of the battle, ''South Dakota'' spent much of the action dealing with major electrical failures that affected her radar, [[Fire-control system|fire control]], and radio systems. Although her armor was not penetrated, she was hit by 26 shells of various calibers and temporarily rendered, in a US admiral's words, "deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent".<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/><ref name="FriedBat1"/> ''Washington'' went undetected by the Japanese for most of the battle, but withheld shooting to avoid "friendly fire" until ''South Dakota'' was illuminated by Japanese fire, then rapidly set ''Kirishima'' ablaze with a jammed rudder and other damage. ''Washington'', finally spotted by the Japanese, then headed for the [[Russell Islands]] to hopefully draw the Japanese away from Guadalcanal and ''South Dakota'', and was successful in evading several torpedo attacks. Unusually, only a few Japanese torpedoes scored hits in this engagement. ''Kirishima'' sank or was scuttled before the night was out, along with two Japanese destroyers. The remaining Japanese ships withdrew, except for the four transports, which beached themselves in the night and started unloading. However, dawn (and US aircraft, US artillery, and a US destroyer) found them still beached, and they were destroyed.<ref name=MorNvlGuad1/>

'''Battle of Tassafaronga'''<br />
The [[Battle of Tassafaronga]] took place on the night of 30 November – 1 December 1942. The US had four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. The Japanese had eight destroyers on a Tokyo Express run to deliver food and supplies in drums to Guadalcanal. The Americans achieved initial surprise, damaging one destroyer with gunfire which later sank, but the Japanese torpedo counterattack was devastating. One American heavy cruiser was sunk and three others heavily damaged, with the bows blown off of two of them.<ref>Morison vol. V, pp. 299–307</ref> It was significant that these two were not lost to Long Lance hits as happened in previous battles; American battle readiness and damage control had improved.<ref name=FriedDmg1/> Despite defeating the Americans, the Japanese withdrew without delivering the crucial supplies to Guadalcanal. Another attempt on 3 December dropped 1,500 drums of supplies near Guadalcanal, but Allied strafing aircraft sank all but 300 before the Japanese Army could recover them. On 7 December [[PT boat]]s interrupted a Tokyo Express run, and the following night sank a Japanese supply submarine. The next day the Japanese Navy proposed stopping all destroyer runs to Guadalcanal, but agreed to do just one more. This was on 11 December and was also intercepted by PT boats, which sank a destroyer; only 200 of 1,200 drums dropped off the island were recovered.<ref>Morison vol. V, pp. 318–321</ref> The next day the Japanese Navy proposed abandoning Guadalcanal; this was approved by the [[Imperial General Headquarters]] on 31 December and the Japanese left the island in early February 1943.<ref>Evans and Tanaka, pp. 208–209</ref>

===Post-Guadalcanal===
After the Japanese abandoned Guadalcanal in February 1943, Allied operations in the Pacific shifted to the [[New Guinea campaign]] and [[Operation Cartwheel|isolating Rabaul]]. The [[Battle of Kula Gulf]] was fought on the night of 5–6 July. The US had three light cruisers and four destroyers; the Japanese had ten destroyers loaded with 2,600 troops destined for [[Vila, Solomon Islands|Vila]] to oppose a recent US landing on [[Rendova]]. Although the Japanese sank a cruiser, they lost two destroyers and were able to deliver only 850 troops.<ref name=MorVI-1>Morison, vol. VI</ref> On the night of 12–13 July, the [[Battle of Kolombangara]] occurred. The Allies had three light cruisers (one New Zealand) and ten destroyers; the Japanese had one small light cruiser and five destroyers, a Tokyo Express run for Vila. All three Allied cruisers were heavily damaged, with the New Zealand cruiser put out of action for 25 months by a Long Lance hit.<ref>Gardiner and Chumbley, p. 30</ref> The Allies sank only the Japanese light cruiser, and the Japanese landed 1,200 troops at Vila. Despite their tactical victory, this battle caused the Japanese to use a different route in the future, where they were more vulnerable to destroyer and PT boat attacks.<ref name=MorVI-1/>

The [[Battle of Empress Augusta Bay]] was fought on the night of 1–2 November 1943, immediately after US Marines [[Bougainville Campaign|invaded Bougainville]] in the Solomon Islands. A Japanese heavy cruiser was damaged by a nighttime air attack shortly before the battle; it is likely that Allied airborne radar had progressed far enough to allow night operations. The Americans had four of the new {{sclass|Cleveland|cruiser|0}} cruisers and eight destroyers. The Japanese had two heavy cruisers, two small light cruisers, and six destroyers. Both sides were plagued by collisions, shells that failed to explode, and mutual skill in dodging torpedoes. The Americans suffered significant damage to three destroyers and light damage to a cruiser, but no losses. The Japanese lost one light cruiser and a destroyer, with four other ships damaged. The Japanese withdrew; the Americans pursued them until dawn, then returned to the landing area to provide anti-aircraft cover.<ref>Morison, vol. VI, p. 322</ref>

After the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, both sides were short of large aircraft carriers. The US suspended major carrier operations until sufficient carriers could be completed to destroy the entire Japanese fleet at once should it appear. The Central Pacific carrier raids and amphibious operations commenced in November 1943 with a carrier raid on Rabaul (preceded and followed by [[Fifth Air Force]] attacks) and the bloody but successful invasion of Tarawa. The air attacks on Rabaul crippled the Japanese cruiser force, with four heavy and two light cruisers damaged; they were withdrawn to Truk. The US had built up a force in the Central Pacific of six large, five [[light aircraft carrier|light]], and six [[escort carrier]]s prior to commencing these operations.

From this point on, US cruisers primarily served as anti-aircraft escorts for carriers and in shore bombardment. The only major Japanese carrier operation after Guadalcanal was the disastrous (for Japan) Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, nicknamed the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" by the US Navy.

===Leyte Gulf===

The Imperial Japanese Navy's last major operation was the Battle of Leyte Gulf, an attempt to dislodge the American invasion of the Philippines in October 1944. The two actions at this battle in which cruisers played a significant role were the [[Battle off Samar]] and the Battle of Surigao Strait.

'''Battle of Surigao Strait'''<br />
The Battle of Surigao Strait was fought on the night of 24–25 October, a few hours before the Battle off Samar. The Japanese had a small battleship group composed of {{ship|Japanese battleship|Fusō||2}} and {{ship|Japanese battleship|Yamashiro||2}}, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers. They were followed at a considerable distance by another small force of two heavy cruisers, a small light cruiser, and four destroyers. Their goal was to head north through [[Surigao Strait]] and attack the invasion fleet off [[Leyte]]. The Allied force, known as the 7th Fleet Support Force, guarding the strait was overwhelming. It included six battleships (all but one previously damaged in 1941 at Pearl Harbor), four heavy cruisers (one Australian), four light cruisers, and 28 destroyers, plus a force of 39 PT boats. The only advantage to the Japanese was that most of the Allied battleships and cruisers were loaded mainly with high explosive shells, although a significant number of armor-piercing shells were also loaded. The lead Japanese force evaded the PT boats' torpedoes, but were hit hard by the destroyers' torpedoes, losing a battleship. Then they encountered the battleship and cruiser guns. Only one destroyer survived. The engagement is notable for being one of only two occasions in which battleships fired on battleships in the Pacific Theater, the other being the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Due to the starting arrangement of the opposing forces, the Allied force was in a "[[crossing the T]]" position, so this was the last battle in which this occurred, but it was not a planned maneuver. The following Japanese cruiser force had several problems, including a light cruiser damaged by a PT boat and two heavy cruisers colliding, one of which fell behind and was sunk by air attack the next day.<ref name=MorXII-1>Morison vol. XII</ref> An American veteran of Surigao Strait, {{USS|Phoenix|CL-46|6}}, was transferred to Argentina in 1951 as {{ship|ARA|General Belgrano||2}}, becoming most famous for being sunk by {{HMS|Conqueror|S48|6}} in the [[Falklands War]] on 2 May 1982. She was the first ship sunk by a nuclear submarine outside of accidents, and only the second ship sunk by a submarine since World War II.<ref>Kemp, p. 68</ref>

'''Battle off Samar'''<br />
At the Battle off Samar, a Japanese battleship group moving towards the invasion fleet off Leyte engaged a minuscule American force known as "Taffy 3" (formally Task Unit 77.4.3), composed of six escort carriers with about 28 aircraft each, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. The biggest guns in the American force were [[5"/38 caliber gun|{{convert|5|in|abbr=on|0}}/38 caliber guns]], while the Japanese had {{convert|14|in|abbr=on|0}}, {{convert|16|in|abbr=on|0}}, and {{convert|18.1|in|abbr=on|0}} guns. Aircraft from six additional escort carriers also participated for a total of around 330 US aircraft, a mix of [[F6F Hellcat]] fighters and [[TBF Avenger]] torpedo bombers. The Japanese had four battleships including ''Yamato'', six heavy cruisers, two small light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The Japanese force had earlier been driven off by air attack, losing ''Yamato''{{'}}s sister {{ship|Japanese battleship|Musashi||2}}. Admiral [[William Halsey Jr.|Halsey]] then decided to use his Third Fleet carrier force to attack the Japanese carrier group, located well to the north of Samar, which was actually a decoy group with few aircraft. The Japanese were desperately short of aircraft and pilots at this point in the war, and Leyte Gulf was the first battle in which ''[[kamikaze]]'' attacks were used. Due to a tragedy of errors, Halsey took the American battleship force with him, leaving [[San Bernardino Strait]] guarded only by the small Seventh Fleet escort carrier force. The battle commenced at dawn on 25 October 1944, shortly after the Battle of Surigao Strait. In the engagement that followed, the Americans exhibited uncanny torpedo accuracy, blowing the bows off several Japanese heavy cruisers. The escort carriers' aircraft also performed very well, attacking with machine guns after their carriers ran out of bombs and torpedoes. The unexpected level of damage, and maneuvering to avoid the torpedoes and air attacks, disorganized the Japanese and caused them to think they faced at least part of the Third Fleet's main force. They had also learned of the defeat a few hours before at Surigao Strait, and did not hear that Halsey's force was busy destroying the decoy fleet. Convinced that the rest of the Third Fleet would arrive soon if it hadn't already, the Japanese withdrew, eventually losing three heavy cruisers sunk with three damaged to air and torpedo attacks. The Americans lost two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort sunk, with three escort carriers, one destroyer, and two destroyer escorts damaged, thus losing over one-third of their engaged force sunk with nearly all the remainder damaged.<ref name=MorXII-1/>

===Wartime cruiser production===
The US built cruisers in quantity through the end of the war, notably 14 {{sclass|Baltimore|cruiser|0}} heavy cruisers and 27 ''Cleveland''-class light cruisers, along with eight ''Atlanta''-class anti-aircraft cruisers. The ''Cleveland'' class was the largest cruiser class ever built in number of ships completed, with nine additional ''Cleveland''s completed as [[Independence-class aircraft carrier|light aircraft carriers]]. The large number of cruisers built was probably due to the significant cruiser losses of 1942 in the Pacific theater (seven American and five other Allied) and the perceived need for several cruisers to escort each of the numerous {{sclass|Essex|aircraft carrier|2}}s being built.<ref name=FriedCru1/> Losing four heavy and two small light cruisers in 1942, the Japanese built only five light cruisers during the war; these were small ships with six {{convert|6.1|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns each.<ref>Watts, pp. 109–113</ref> Losing 20 cruisers in 1940–42, the British completed no heavy cruisers, thirteen light cruisers ({{sclass|Fiji|cruiser|5}} and {{sclass|Minotaur|cruiser (1943)|5}} classes), and sixteen anti-aircraft cruisers (''Dido'' class) during the war.<ref>Gardiner and Chumbley, pp. 33–35</ref>