Editing Consequentialism (section)

===Consequences for whom===

Moral action always has consequences for certain people or things. Varieties of consequentialism can be differentiated by the beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"

====Agent-focused or agent-neutral====
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between theories which require that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives, and theories which permit that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or [[motivation]].  These are called "agent-neutral" and "agent-focused" theories respectively.

'''Agent-neutral''' consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, an actor's personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action the actor should take. '''Agent-focused''' consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that [[Peter Railton]] outlines, the agent might be concerned with the general welfare, but the agent is ''more'' concerned with the immediate welfare of herself and her friends and family.<ref name="Scheffler">{{Cite book | title = Consequentialism and Its Critics | year = 1988 | last = Scheffler | first = Samuel | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-875073-4 | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/consequentia_xxxx_1988_000_9240564 }}</ref>

These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests.{{Citation needed|date=October 2012}} For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual, but bad for them as a citizen of their town.

====Human-centered?====
Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. [[Jeremy Bentham]], who is regarded as the founder of [[utilitarianism]], argues that animals can experience pleasure and pain, thus demanding that 'non-human animals' should be a serious object of moral concern.<ref name="Bentham">{{Cite book|title=An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation |year=1996 |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |author-link=Jeremy Bentham |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-820516-6 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080105091421/http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |archive-date=January 5, 2008 }}</ref>

More recently, [[Peter Singer]] has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them.<ref name="Singer">{{Cite book| title = Unsanctifying Human Life | last = Singer | first = Peter | author-link = Peter Singer | editor = Helga Kuhse| year = 2002 | publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-631-22507-2}}</ref> Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, any more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.