Editing Carlos Salinas de Gortari (section)

==1994 election year==
As the 1994 presidential election approached, Salinas had the crucial decision to designate the candidate for the PRI; that person had always gone on to win the presidential election. "The shipwreck of the 1988 succession should have sufficed to teach Salinas to prevent another disaster from befalling the system he had inherited."<ref>Castañeda, ''Perpetuating Power'', p. 89.</ref> At the time Salinas made the choice, popularity and credibility was high over the course of his presidency,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Villarreal |first1=Andres |title=Public Opinion of the Economy and the President among Mexico City Residents: The Salinas Sexenio |journal=Latin American Research Review |date=1999 |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=132–151 |doi=10.1017/S0023879100038607 |jstor=2503915 |s2cid=158042964 |doi-access=free }}</ref> but a series of events in the final year of his presidency changed that.

===Choosing the PRI nominee===

The "unveiling" of the PRI candidate for the presidency was on 28 November 1993, with Salinas choosing [[Luis Donaldo Colosio]]. Those considered for the position were [[Manuel Camacho Solis|Manuel Camacho]] and Colosio, with earlier contenders, such as [[Jesús Silva Herzog Flores|Jesús Silva Herzog]] and [[Pedro Aspe]] being eliminated. Aspe, a graduate of [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]] had a high international profile, but was considered unlikely to actually attract voters.  The changed circumstances of the Mexican political system, as demonstrated by Salinas's own election to the presidency, meant that being designated the PRI did not guarantee election. Aspe was not a charismatic prospect as a candidate who could energize and charm voters.  With the potential that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was likely to run again for the presidency, the PRI needed to field someone who could garner votes.<ref>Castañeda, ''Perpetuating Power'', pp. 92–96.</ref>

===Zapatista rebellion===
{{Main|Zapatista Army of National Liberation}}
[[File:Flag of the EZLN.jpg|thumb|Flag of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)]]
The uprising in Chiapas on 1 January 1994 coincided with the date that the NAFTA came into effect. The [[Zapatista Army of National Liberation]] (''Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional'', EZLN) issued their first declaration from the state of [[Chiapas]] in southern Mexico. Salinas's immediate response was to find for a peaceful solution: offering pardon to deposed arms, ordering a cease fire, appointing a peace negotiator, and sending the Mexican Congress a General Amnesty Law. Salinas' presidential successor took a harder line when he was inaugurated. Salinas' more peaceful solution to the [[1995 Zapatista Crisis|uprising]] was legal and politically pragmatic, likely saving many lives in Mexico.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://enlineadirecta.info/?option=view&article=12183|title=La Única línea es que no tenemos línea|website=Enlineadirecta.info|date=30 November 2019 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.buzos.com.mx/images/pdf/buzos195.pdf|title=Buzos|website=Buzos.com.mx|access-date=2 December 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://hemeroteca.proceso.com.mx/?page_id=278958&a51dc26366d99bb5fa29cea4747565fec=169802&rl=wh&#93; |title=Archived copy |access-date=17 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180825194625/https://hemeroteca.proceso.com.mx/?page_id=278958 |archive-date=25 August 2018 |url-status=dead |df=mdy-all }}</ref> The Zapatista rebellion spread regionally, not nationwide, but the fact that it happened and that international attention was drawn to this poor region of Mexico just as NAFTA was implemented meant that Salinas' careful plans for a peaceful political transition with his legacy intact were obliterated.<ref>Castañeda, ''Perpetuating Power'', p. 106</ref> Salinas appointed Manuel Camacho, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the government's peace mediator. For Salinas, this had political benefits, since Camacho, having been passed over as the PRI presidential candidate, could have bolted from the party. With this important appointment, he was in the public limelight again.<ref>Castañeda, ''Perpetuating Power'', p. 107.</ref>

===Assassination of Colosio and the new PRI candidate===
[[File:Luis Donaldo Colosio Los Pinos Mexico 2018.jpg|thumb|Bust of Colosio at Los Pinos]]
A spectacular political event in 1994 was the assassination of Salinas's handpicked PRI presidential candidate [[Luis Donaldo Colosio]] in March 1994, upending the already complex electoral situation with elections scheduled for August of that year. The Zapatista uprising had ruined Salinas's plans for a peaceful transition of Mexico in the elections. There is evidence that Salinas and Colosio began to disagree, not unusual after the electoral transfer, but this occurred prior to it. His campaign languished with lack of funding, and Colosio had problems getting media coverage, given the high-profile events in Chiapas. Salinas prevented Colosio from going to Chiapas, with the explanation that his presence there would complicate the situation. There was the impression that Salinas would reverse his decision for Colosio, substituting someone else, perhaps [[Manuel Camacho]]. Camacho was a politically savvy former [[Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Mexico)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]], [[Head of Government of Mexico City]], as well as Peace Commissioner in Chiapas. Salinas made a public statement on 17 January 1994, affirming his choice as candidate, but this was at the insistence of Colosio. Salinas extracted a pledge from Camacho that he had no designs on the presidency, which he renounced the day before Colosio's assassination in Tijuana on 23 March 1994.<ref>Castañeda, ''Perpetuating Power'', pp. 108– 109</ref>  After a few days of weighing his options, Salinas chose Colosio's campaign manager, Ernesto Zedillo, former Minister of Education, as the new PRI candidate for the presidency. Zedillo had been Secretary of Education, a relatively unimportant ministry; he had resigned to run the campaign of Colosio. Zedillo had never held elective office, sharing that trait with De la Madrid and Salinas, and was not otherwise experienced politically. He was perceived as a weak candidate. There is speculation that Salinas wished to perpetuate his power as [[Plutarco Elías Calles]] had in the wake of the 1928 assassination of president-elect [[Alvaro Obregón]], controlling successor presidents.<ref>Thomas Legler, "Ernesto Zedillo" in ''Encyclopedia of Mexico''. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn 1997, p. 1641</ref>

===1994 general election===
{{See|1994 Mexican general election}}
After considering whether to postpone the general election scheduled for 21 August 1994, Salinas chose Zedillo to run as the PRI candidate for the presidency and the elections took place as scheduled. Voters came out in large numbers to choose between three main candidates, Zedillo for the PRI, Cárdenas for the Party of Democratic Revolution, and [[Diego Fernández de Cevallos]] for the PAN. Zedillo won a clear victory, in what was considered by foreign observers as a free and fair election. In results published by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Zedillo got 48.7%, Cevallos 25.9%, and Cárdenas 16.6%.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/RESELEC/nuevo_1994/pres_94/nac_edo/nac_pre_94.html |title= Nacional por Entidad Federativa :: ELECCION DE PRESIDENTE DE LOS E.U.M.|website= |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20061115072642/http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/RESELEC/nuevo_1994/pres_94/nac_edo/nac_pre_94.html|access-date=25 March 2019|archive-date= 15 November 2006}}</ref>

===Another political assassination===
Following the election in September 1994, Secretary General of the PRI [[José Francisco Ruiz Massieu]], Salinas' former brother-in-law, was assassinated in downtown Mexico City in broad daylight. The murder was not solved during Salinas's presidency, even when [[Mario Ruiz Massieu]] (Francisco's brother) was the [[Attorney General of Mexico|attorney general]] and in charge of the investigation.

===Economic issues===
The economic bubble gave Mexico a prosperity not seen in a generation. This period of rapid growth coupled with low inflation prompted some political thinkers and the media to state that Mexico was on the verge of becoming a "First World nation". In fact, it was the first of the "newly industrialized nations" to be admitted into the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]] (OECD) in May 1994. It was known that the peso was overvalued, but the extent of the Mexican economy's vulnerability was either not well known or downplayed by both the Salinas administration and the media.{{citation needed|date=December 2014}} This vulnerability was further aggravated by several unexpected events and macroeconomic mistakes made in the last year of his administration.

Several economists and historians have analyzed some of the events and policy mistakes that precipitated the crisis of December 1994.<ref>Hufbauer and Schoot, (2005)</ref> In keeping with the PRI election-year practices, Salinas launched a spending spree to finance popular projects, which translated into a historically high deficit. This budget deficit was coupled with a current account deficit, fueled by excessive [[consumer spending]] as allowed by the overvalued peso. In order to finance this deficit, the Salinas administration issued ''tesobonos'', an attractive debt instrument that insured payment in dollars instead of pesos.

Increasing current account deficit fostered by government spending, caused alarm among Mexican and foreign T-bill (''tesobono'') investors, who sold them rapidly, thereby depleting the already-low central bank reserves (which eventually hit a record low of $9&nbsp;billion). The economically orthodox thing to do, in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate (at 3.3 pesos per dollar, within a variation band), would have been to sharply increase interest rates by allowing the monetary base to shrink, as dollars were being withdrawn from the reserves.<ref>Hufbauer & Schott, 2005</ref> Given the fact that it was an election year, whose outcome might have changed as a result of a pre-election-day economic downturn, the [[Bank of Mexico]] decided to buy Mexican Treasury Securities in order to maintain the monetary base, and thus prevent the interest rates from rising. This, in turn, caused an even more dramatic decline in the dollar reserves. These decisions aggravated the already delicate situation, to a point at which a crisis became inevitable and devaluation was only one of many necessary adjustments.