Editing World War I reparations (section)

==Analysis==

===Effect on the German economy===

====Overall====
During the period of reparations, Germany received between 27 and 38&nbsp;billion marks in loans.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=417}}{{sfn|Henig|1995|p=62}}{{sfn|Mantoux|1952|p=155}} By 1931, German foreign debt stood at 21.514&nbsp;billion marks; the main sources of aid were the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.{{sfn|Tooze|2007|p=7}} [[Detlev Peukert]] argued the financial problems that arose in the early 1920s, were a result of post-war loans and the way Germany funded her war effort, and not the result of reparations.{{sfn|Peukert|1993|p=62}} During the First World War, Germany did not raise taxes or create new ones to pay for war-time expenses. Rather, loans were taken out, placing Germany in an economically precarious position as more money entered circulation, destroying the link between paper money and the gold reserve that had been maintained before the war. With its defeat, Germany could not impose reparations and pay off her war debts now, which were now colossal.{{sfn|Peukert|1993|p=62}}

Historian [[Niall Ferguson]] partially supports this analysis: had reparations not been imposed, Germany would still have had significant problems caused by the need to pay war debts and the demands of voters for more social services.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=420–421}} Ferguson argued that these problems were aggravated by a trade deficit and a weak exchange rate for the mark during 1920. Afterwards, as the value of the mark rose, inflation became a problem. None of these were the result of reparations.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=413}} According to Ferguson, even without reparations total public spending in Germany between 1920 and 1923 was 33 per cent of total net national product.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=420–421}} [[A.J.P. Taylor]] wrote "Germany was a net gainer by the financial transactions of the nineteen-twenties: she borrowed far more from private American investors&nbsp;...&nbsp;than she paid in reparations".{{sfn|Taylor|1991|p=44}} P.M.H. Bell stated the creation of a multi-national committee, which resulted in the [[Dawes Plan]], was done to consider ways the German budget could be balanced, the currency stabilized, and the German economy fixed to ease reparation payments.{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=37}} [[Max Winkler]] wrote that from 1924 onward, German officials were "virtually flooded with loan offers by foreigners". Overall, the German economy performed reasonably well until the foreign investments funding the economy and the loans funding reparations payments were suddenly withdrawn after the [[Wall Street Crash 1929|1929 Stock Market Crash]]. This collapse was magnified by the volume of loans provided to German companies by US lenders. Even the reduced payments of the Dawes Plan were mainly financed through a large volume of international loans.{{sfn|Winkler|1933|pp=86–87}}

While Germany initially had a trade deficit, British policy during the early 1920s was to reintegrate Germany into European trade as soon as possible. Likewise, France attempted to secure trade deals with Germany.{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=24}} During the mid-to-late 1920s, trade between France and Germany grew rapidly. French imports of German goods "increased by 60 per cent", highlighting the close links between French industrial growth and German production, and the increase in cooperation between the countries.{{sfn|Bell|1997|pp=38–39}}

Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer provide a different perspective on the effect of reparations on the German economy. They wrote that focusing on the reparations and inflation ignores "the fact that the restriction of the German military to 115,000 men relieved the German central budget considerably".{{sfn|Hantke|Spoerer|2010|p=849}} Hantke and Spoerer argue that their findings show "that even under quite rigorous assumptions the net economic burden of the Treaty of Versailles was much less heavy than has been hitherto thought, in particular if we confine our perspective to the Reich's budget".{{sfn|Hantke|Spoerer|2010|p=851}} They say, "though politically a humiliation", the limitation on the military "was beneficial in fiscal terms" and that their economic models show that "the restriction of the size of the army was clearly beneficial for the Reich budget".{{sfn|Hantke|Spoerer|2010|p=860}} Additionally, their economic scenarios indicate that while the Treaty of Versailles was "overall clearly a burden on the German economy", it "also offered a substantial peace dividend for Weimar's non-revanchist budget politicians." They conclude that, "The fact that [these politicians] did not make sufficient use of this imposed gift supports the hypothesis that the Weimar Republic suffered from home-made political failure".{{sfn|Hantke|Spoerer|2010|p=861}}

====Hyperinflation====
{{further|Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic}}
[[File:Germany Hyperinflation.svg|thumb|alt=A chart with a black line depicting the rapid increase of hyperinflation.|A logarithmic scale depicting Weimar hyperinflation to 1923. One paper Mark per Gold Mark increased to one trillion paper Marks per Gold Mark.]]

Historians and economists differ on the subject of whether, and to what extent, reparations were a cause of hyper-inflation in the Weimar republic.

Amongst those stating that it was a cause, Erik Goldstein wrote that in 1921, the payment of reparations caused a crisis and that the [[occupation of the Ruhr]] had a disastrous effect on the German economy, resulting in the German Government printing more money as the currency collapsed. Hyperinflation began and printing presses worked overtime to print Reichsbank notes; by November 1923 one US dollar was worth {{nowrap|4,200,000,000,000 marks.}}{{sfn|Martel|2010|p=156}} Ferguson writes that the policy of the Economics Minister [[Robert Schmidt (German politician)|Robert Schmidt]] led Germany to avoid economic collapse from 1919 to 1920, but that reparations accounted for most of Germany's budget deficit in 1921 and 1922 and that reparations were the cause of the hyperinflation.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=409–410, 425}}

Several historians counter the argument that reparations caused the inflation and collapse of the mark, particular on the grounds that reparations payments, and particularly hard-cash payments, were in large part not made during the period of hyper-inflation and so could not be the cause of it. Gerhard Weinberg writes that Germany refused to pay, and by doing so destroyed their own currency.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=16}} Anthony Lentin agrees and writes that inflation was "a consequence of the war rather than of the peace" and that hyperinflation was a result of the "German government's reckless issue of paper money" during the Allied occupation of the Ruhr.{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=26}}

Contemporary British and French experts believed that the Mark was being sabotaged to avoid budgetary and currency reform and to evade reparations, a view supported by Reich Chancellery records. Historian [[Sally Marks]] endorsed that view, writing that historians who say reparations caused hyperinflation have overlooked "that the inflation long predated reparations" and the way "inflation mushroomed" between mid-1921 and the end of 1922 "when Germany was actually paying very little in reparations" and have failed to explain why "the period of least inflation coincided with the period of largest reparation payments&nbsp;...&nbsp;or why Germans claimed after 1930 that reparations were causing deflation". She writes "there is no doubt that British and French suspicions late in 1922 were sound".{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=239}} Marks also writes that the "astronomic inflation which ensued was a result of German policy", whereby the government paid for passive resistance in the Ruhr "from an empty exchequer" and paid off its domestic and war debts with worthless marks.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=245}}{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=24}} Bell agrees and writes that "inflation had little direct connection with reparation payments themselves, but a great deal to do with the way the German government chose to subsidize industry and to pay the costs of passive resistance to the occupation [of the Ruhr] by extravagant use of the printing press". Bell also writes that hyperinflation was not an inevitable consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, but was among the actual results.{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=25}}

===Criticism and commentary===

====Contemporaneous====
[[File:Keynes 1933.jpg|thumb|John Maynard Keynes in 1933.]]

According to historian Claude Campbell, [[John Maynard Keynes]] "set the fashion for critics of the economic aspects of the treaty" and "made probably the severest and most sweeping indictment of its economic provisions".{{sfn|Campbell|1942|p=161}} Keynes was temporarily attached to the [[HM Treasury|British Treasury]] during the war and was their official representative at the peace conference. He later resigned "when it became evident that hope could no longer be entertained of substantial modifications in the draft Terms of Peace" due to the "policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of Europe".{{sfn|Keynes|1920|loc=preface}}

In 1919, Keynes wrote ''[[The Economic Consequences of the Peace]]'' based on his objections to the Versailles treaty.{{sfn|Keynes|1920|loc=preface}} He wrote that he believed "that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible",{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=146}} and called the treaty a "[[Carthaginian peace]]" that would economically affect all of Europe.{{sfn|Keynes|1920|pp=86–87}} Keynes said that the figures being bandied about by politicians at the time of the signing of the treaty, such as {{USD|25 billion}} or even {{USD|50 billion}}, as "not within the limits of reasonable possibility". He instead calculated that {{USD|10 billion}} was the "safe maximum figure", but though he also "not believe that [Germany could] pay as much".{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=200}} He predicted that the Reparation Commission was a tool that could "be employed to destroy Germany's commercial and economic organization as well as to exact payment".{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=79}}

Writing of his proposed {{USD|10 billion}} figure, fixing reparations "well within Germany's capacity to pay" would "make possible the renewal of hope and enterprise within her territory" and "avoid the perpetual friction and opportunity of improper pressure arising out of the Treaty clauses".{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=265}} Keynes identified reparations as the "main excursion into the economic field" by the Treaty of Versailles, but said that the treaty excluded provisions for rehabilitating Europe's economies, for improving relations between the Allies and the defeated Central Powers, for stabilizing Europe's new nations, for "reclaim[ing] Russia", or for promoting economic solidarity between the Allies.{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=226}} Coal provides an example of these destabilizing effects in Germany and beyond. Keynes said the "surrender of the coal will destroy German industry" but conceding that without coal shipments as reparations, the French and Italian industries damaged directly by the war or indirectly by damage to coal mines would be affected. He writes that this is "not yet the whole problem". The repercussions would also affect Central and Northern Europe, and neutral states such as Switzerland and Sweden, which made up for their own coal deficiencies by trading with Germany. Likewise, Keynes said Austria would now be consigned to "industrial ruin" as "nearly all the coalfields of the former Empire lie outside of what is now [[Republic of German-Austria|German-Austria]]".{{sfn|Keynes|1920|pp=94–95}}

Campbell writes that the "apparent majority did not regard the treaty as perfect". [[Bernard Baruch]] writes in ''[[The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty]]'' that most believed it to be the best agreement obtainable under the circumstances and that it was a minority that attacked the treaty, but these attacks "centered upon its economic provisions".{{sfn|Campbell|1942|p=160}} [[James T. Shotwell]], writing in ''What Germany Forgot'', said, "the only 'unendurable servitudes' in the treaty were in the sections on Reparation and the Polish settlement and raised the question as to what part of Germany's grievance against the peace lay in the substance of its exactions and what part in the manner of their imposition". Sir Andrew McFayden, who also represented the British Treasury at the peace conference and later worked with the Reparation Commission, published his work ''Don't Do it Again''. McFayden's position "falls somewhere between the views of Keynes and Shotwell". His attack on reparations "was as harsh as Keynes" but he conceded that the "fault did not lie primarily in the provisions of the treaty but in their execution". He also believed "that the Polish settlement was the only readjustment&nbsp;...&nbsp;which was decidedly unwise".{{sfn|Campbell|1942|pp=161–162}}

[[René Albrecht-Carrié|Albrecht-Carrié]] writes that before the German surrender, Woodrow Wilson dispatched a note to the German Government on 5 November 1918 stating that the Allies "under-stand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air", the terms of which they accepted.{{sfn|Albrecht-Carrié|1940|p=15}} Regardless of which, Albrecht-Carrié says the reparation section of the treaty proved "to be a dismal failure".{{sfn|Albrecht-Carrié|1940|p=16}} Campbell says, "although there was much in the peace that was 'petty, unjust, and humiliating', there was little aside from reparation clauses and certain territorial concessions, which had much real bearing upon Germany's economic future".{{sfn|Campbell|1942|p=162}} Summarizing the view of economists throughout the 1920s, she says the territorial changes to Germany were "not necessarily&nbsp;...&nbsp;economically unsound", but than the removal of the [[Saar (League of Nations)|Saar]] and territory to Poland "depriv[ed] Germany of her resources in excess of the amount necessary to fulfill the legitimate economic demands of the victors&nbsp;...&nbsp;[and] was indefensible". Campbell also said the treaty failed to include "provisions looking to the restoration of Germany to her former position as the chief economic and financial stabilizing influence in central Europe" and that this was economically shortsighted and was an economic failing of the treaty.{{sfn|Campbell|1942|p=163}}

[[Étienne Mantoux]], a French economist, was the harshest contemporaneous critic of Keynes. In his posthumously published book, ''The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes'', Mantoux said that Keynes "had been wrong on various counts, especially with respect to his predictions about Germany's coal, iron and steel production&nbsp;...&nbsp;and its level of national saving".{{sfn|Cord|2013|p=41}} Keynes said Europe's overall output of iron would decrease; Mantoux said the opposite occurred. By 1929, European iron output had increased by ten per cent from that of 1913. Keynes believed that this European trend would also affect German iron and steel production. Mantoux says this prediction was also incorrect. By 1927, German steel output had increased by 30 per cent and iron output increased by 38 per cent from 1913. Keynes predicted that German coal extraction would also decrease and that Germany would not be able to export coal immediately after the war. Mantoux also counters these arguments. By 1920, German was exporting 15 million tons of coal a year and reached 35&nbsp;million tons by 1926. By 1929, German coal mining had risen by 30 per cent on the 1913 figures because of her increased labor efficiency methods. In regard to national savings, Keynes stated that 2&nbsp;billion marks would only be possible after the adoption of the treaty. Mantoux says that the 1925 German national savings figure was estimated at 6.4&nbsp;billion marks, rising to 7.6&nbsp;billion marks by 1927.{{sfn|Mantoux|1952|pp=162–163}} Mantoux calculated that Germany borrowed between 8&nbsp;billion and 35&nbsp;billion marks in the period 1920–1931, while only paying 21&nbsp;billion in reparations. This, he says, allowed Germany to re-equip, expand, and modernize her industry.{{sfn|Henig|1995|p=62}} Highlighting the rearmament under Hitler, Mantoux said Germany "had been in a stronger position to pay reparations than Keynes had made out".{{sfn|Cord|2013|p=41}} He also says that Germany could have paid all of the reparations if she had wanted to, and that the problem was not that Germany was unable to pay, but that she was unwilling to pay.{{sfn|Taylor|1991|p=70}}

In 1954, [[United States Secretary of State]] [[John Foster Dulles]]{{mdash}}one of the authors of Article 231{{mdash}}said that, "Efforts to bankrupt and humiliate a nation merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to break the bonds imposed upon them&nbsp;...&nbsp;Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited."{{sfn|Immerman|1998|p=10}}

====Modern====

[[Geoff Harcourt]] writes that Keynes' arguments that reparations would lead to German economic collapse have been adopted "by historians of almost all political persuasions" and have influenced the way historians and the public "see the unfolding events in Germany and the decades between Versailles and the outbreak of the Second World War". He says Mantoux's work "is not simply a critique of Keynes", but "a stimulus to question the received wisdom's interpretation of the unfolding events in Germany". Harcourt says that despite it discussing Keynes' errors "in great detail", Mantoux's work "has not led us to revise our general judgment of Keynes", yet "it does make us question the soundness of theoretical and empirical aspects" of his arguments.{{sfn|Harcourt|2012|p=21}} A.J.P. Taylor writes that in 1919 "many people believed that the payment of reparations would reduce Germany to a state of Asiatic poverty", and that Keynes "held this view, as did all Germans; and probably many Frenchmen". However, he also says these "apprehensions of Keynes and the Germans were grotesquely exaggerated".{{sfn|Taylor|1991|p=44}}

According to Martel, Taylor "shrewdly concludes that Étienne Mantoux had the better of his controversy with John Maynard Keynes".{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=42}} Stephen Schuker writes that Keynes' "tendentious but influential" book was "ably refuted" by Mantoux.{{sfn|Schuker|1988|p=7}} [[Richard J. Evans]] says "the economic history of the 1920s and early 1930s seemed to confirm" the arguments of Keynes, yet "as we now know" Keynes' reparation arguments were wrong. Evans says the economic problems that arose were a result of the inflation of 1923, which lay with the German government rather than reparations.{{sfn|Evans|2008|loc=Hitler and the Origins of the War}}

According to Slavieck, the "traditional interpretation of the treaty's impact on Germany" was that it "plunged the nation into an economic free fall".{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=95}} This view was shared by the German people, who believed the treaty was robbing Germany of its wealth. German banker [[Max Warburg]] said the terms of the treaty were "pillage on a global scale".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=401}} Niall Ferguson says the German view was incorrect and "not many historians would today agree with Warburg".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=424}} However, several historians agree with Warburg. [[Norman Davies]] writes that the treaty forced Germany to "pay astronomic reparations",{{sfn|Davies|2007|p=133}} while Tim McNeese states, "France and Britain had placed war damages on Germany to the tune of billions of gold marks, which the defeated Germans could not begin to pay in earnest".{{sfn|McNeese|2010|p=19}} Ferguson says the reparations were "less of a burden than Keynes and others claimed" and that the "potential burden on national income of the annuity vary from 5 percent to 10 percent".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=424}} However, he cautions against underestimating the initial German effort to pay. Before the implementation of the Dawes Plan, Germany transferred between eight and 13&nbsp;billion gold marks, which amounted to "between 4 and 7 percent of total national income". Ferguson says "the annuity demanded in 1921 put an intolerable strain on the state's finances" and that total expenditure between 1920 and 1923 amounted to "at least 50 percent of Reich revenue, 20 percent of total Reich spending and 10 percent of total public spending".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=425}} Thus, Ferguson says, reparations "undermined confidence in the Reich's creditworthiness" and "''were'' therefore excessive{{mdash}}as the German government claimed".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=426}}

Hantke and Spoerer write that "reparation payments were indeed a severe economic burden for Germany" and that "the German economy was deprived of between one and 2.2&nbsp;billion Reichsmark (RM) annually, which amounted in the late 1920s to nearly 2.5 per cent of Germany's GDP".{{sfn|Hantke|Spoerer|2010|p=849}} [[Gerald Feldman]] writes, "there can be no question that the entire London schedule could be viewed as a way of reducing the reparations bill without the Allied publics being fully informed of what was going on. This was recognized by at least some German politicians, one of whom optimistically argued that 'the entente will only demand the 50&nbsp;billion marks, not the rest. They have only called for the rest for domestic political reasons.'"{{sfn|Feldman|1997|p=339}} Feldman also says the prospect that the 'C' bonds would be evoked hung over the German Government like a "[[Damocles|Damocles Sword]]".{{sfn|Feldman|1997|p=430}} In addition to Feldman and Ferguson's opposition, Peter Kruger, Barry Eichengreen, and Steven Webb agree that "the initial German effort to pay reparations" was substantial and "produced an immense strain" on the German economy.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=445–446}}

Several historians take the middle ground between condemning reparations and supporting the argument that they were not a complete burden upon Germany. Detlev Peukert states, "Reparations did not, in fact, bleed the German economy" as had been feared, however the "psychological effects of reparations were extremely serious, as was the strain that the vicious circle of credits and reparations placed the international financial system".{{sfn|Peukert|1993|p=197}} P.M.H. Bell writes that while reparations were unwelcome in Germany and caused a "strain on the German balance of payments", they could be paid and were "compatible with a general recovery in European commerce and industry".{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=38}} According to Martel, [[Robert Boyce (historian)|Robert Boyce]] said reparations were "a heavy burden on Germany, both as a financial charge&nbsp;...&nbsp;and as a charge on Germany's balance of payments". However, he says that while "Germany claimed it could not afford to pay reparations" this was far from the truth, and that "&nbsp;...&nbsp;Germany had made little effort to pay reparations. It refused to levy the necessary taxes, and far from accumulating the foreign exchange required for their payment by collecting some of the overseas earnings of German exporters, it allowed them to leave their earnings abroad".{{sfn|Martel|2010|p=183}} William R. Keylor agrees with Boyce, and says, "an increase in taxation and reduction in consumption in the Weimar Republic would have yielded the requisite export surplus to generate the foreign exchange needed to service the reparation debt".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=502}} However, [[Charles Feinstein]] writes that these kind of arguments overlook the extreme reluctance of the Germans "to accept even a modest increase in taxation to meet what was universally regarded as an unjustified and oppressive imposition by hostile adversaries". Feinstein says that "even if the economic aspects&nbsp;...&nbsp;were not as crippling as had been assumed in the 1920s, the exaction of reparations was still of deep political and psychological significance for Germany".{{sfn|Feinstein|1995|p=32}}

Sally Marks writes, "There are those&nbsp;...&nbsp;who claim reparations were unpayable. In financial terms, that is untrue&nbsp;...&nbsp;Of course Germans did not want to pay; nobody ever wants to pay, and Weimar was determined not to do so&nbsp;...&nbsp;Raising taxes would have provided ample funds&nbsp;...&nbsp;Weimar could have borrowed from the citizenry, as France did after 1871 [to pay its indemnity to Germany]".{{sfn|Marks|2013|pp=632–659}} Marks writes that Germany could have easily paid the 50&nbsp;billion marks in reparations, but instead chose to repeatedly default on payments as part of a political strategy of undermining Versailles.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=255}} Marks says that in 1921, Germany met her requirements in full because custom posts were occupied by Allied troops.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}} Once the Allies had relinquished control of the customs posts, Germany made no further payments in cash until 1924 following the implementation of the Dawes Plan.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=238}} Marks says that while Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles "established an unlimited theoretical liability", Article 232 limited German responsibility to pay only for civilian damages. When the 1921 London conference to determine how much Germany should pay was called, the Allies calculated on the basis of what Germany could pay, not on their own needs.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=232}} In this way, Marks says, the Germans largely escaped paying for the war and instead shifted the costs onto American investors.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=254}} Marks states that the delay in establishing a final total until 1921, "was actually in Germany's interest" because the figures discussed at the peace conference were "astronomic". She says, "The British experts, Lords [[John Hamilton, 1st Viscount Sumner|Sumner]] and [[Walter Cunliffe, 1st Baron Cunliffe|Cunliffe]], were so unrealistic that they were nicknamed [[Heavenly Twins (Sumner and Cunliffe)|'the heavenly twins']]."{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=233}} Marks also says, "much ink has been wasted on the fact that civilian damages were stretched to cover war widows' pensions and allowances for military dependents". As reparations were based on what Germany could pay, Marks says the inclusion of such items did not affect German liability but altered distribution of reparations; the "inclusion of pensions and allowances increased the British share of the pie but did not enlarge the pie."{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=232}}

Bernadotte Schmitt writes that if "pensions and separation allowances&nbsp;...&nbsp;not been included, reparations would probably never have become the bogey that poisoned the post-war world for so many years.{{sfn|Schmitt|1960|p=107}} Taylor says, "no doubt the impoverishment of Germany was caused by war, not by reparations. Not doubt the Germans could have paid reparations, if they had regarded them as an obligation of honour, honestly incurred." However, he says, "reparations&nbsp; ...&nbsp;kept the passions of war alive".{{sfn|Taylor|1991|p=44}} Peter Liberman writes that while the Germans believed they could not meet such demands of them, the "French believed that Germany could pay and only lacked the requisite will" to do so. Liberman says this is "a position that has gained support from recent historical research". In regard to Germany's capacity to pay, he focuses on coal and says that German coal consumption per capita was higher than France's despite coal shipments being consistently short. He also says, "the reparations demanded at Versailles were not far out of proportion to German economic potential" and that in terms of national income it was similar to what the Germans demanded of France following the [[Franco-Prussian War]].{{sfn|Liberman|1995|p=89}} [[Martin Kitchen]] also says the impression that Germany was crippled by the reparations is a myth. Rather than a weakened Germany, he states the opposite was true.{{sfn|Kitchen|2006|p=67}}

Keylor says that literature on reparations has "long suffered from gross misrepresentation, exaggeration, and outright falsification" and that it "should finally succumb to the archive-based discoveries of scholars".{{sfn|Keylor|2013|loc=The Demonization of Versailles}} [[Diane Kunz]], summarizing the historiography on the subject, writes that historians have refuted the myth that reparations placed an intolerable burden on Germany.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=524}} Marks says a "substantial degree of scholarly consensus now suggests that paying&nbsp;...&nbsp;was within Germany's financial capacity".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=357}} Ruth Henig writes, "most historians of the Paris peace conference now take the view that, in economic terms, the treaty was not unduly harsh on Germany and that, while obligations and damages were inevitably much stressed in the debates at Paris to satisfy electors reading the daily newspapers, the intention was quietly to give Germany substantial help towards paying her bills, and to meet many of the German objections by amendments to the way the reparations schedule was in practice carried out".{{sfn|Henig|1995|p=65}}