Editing Warren G. Harding (section)

===Foreign policy===

====European relations and formally ending the war====
[[File:League of Nations (Warren G. Harding).ogg|thumb|Warren G. Harding explains his unwillingness to have the U.S. join the [[League of Nations]].]]
Harding made it clear when he appointed Hughes as Secretary of State that the former justice would run foreign policy, a change from Wilson's hands-on management of international affairs.{{sfn|Russell|p=43}} Hughes had to work within some broad outlines; after taking office, Harding hardened his stance on the League of Nations, deciding the U.S. would not join even a scaled-down version of the League. With the Treaty of Versailles unratified by the Senate, the U.S. remained technically at war with [[Weimar Republic|Germany]], [[First Austrian Republic|Austria]], and [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]]. Peacemaking began with the [[Knox–Porter Resolution]], declaring the U.S. at peace and reserving any rights granted under Versailles. Treaties [[U.S.–German Peace Treaty (1921)|with Germany]], [[U.S.–Austrian Peace Treaty (1921)|Austria]] and [[U.S.–Hungarian Peace Treaty (1921)|Hungary]], each containing many of the non-League provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, were ratified in 1921.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=142–145}}

This still left the question of relations between the U.S. and the League. Hughes' State Department initially ignored communications from the League, or tried to bypass it through direct contacts with member nations. By 1922, though, the U.S., through its consul in Geneva, was dealing with the League, and though the U.S. refused to participate in any meeting with political implications, it sent observers to sessions on technical and humanitarian matters.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=145–147}}

By the time Harding took office, there were calls from foreign governments for reduction of the massive war debt owed to the United States, and the German government sought to reduce [[World War I reparations|the reparations]] that it was required to pay. The U.S. refused to consider any multilateral settlement. Harding sought passage of a plan proposed by Mellon to give the administration broad authority to reduce war debts in negotiation, but [[67th United States Congress|Congress]], in 1922, passed a more restrictive bill. Hughes negotiated an agreement for [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]] to pay off its war debt over 62 years at low interest, reducing the [[present value]] of the obligations. This agreement, approved by Congress in 1923, served as a model for negotiations with other nations. Talks with Germany on reduction of reparations payments resulted in the [[Dawes Plan]] of 1924.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=162–163}}

A pressing issue not resolved by Wilson was U.S. policy towards [[Bolshevik]] Russia. The U.S. had been among the nations that [[American Expeditionary Force, North Russia|sent troops there]] after the [[Russian Revolution]]. Afterwards, Wilson refused to recognize the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]]. Harding's Commerce Secretary Hoover, with considerable experience in Russian affairs, took the lead on policy. When [[Russian famine of 1921|famine struck Russia in 1921]], Hoover had the [[American Relief Administration]], which he had headed, negotiate with the Russians to provide aid. Leaders of the [[U.S.S.R.]] (established in 1922) hoped in vain that the agreement would lead to recognition. Hoover supported trade with the Soviets, fearing U.S. companies would be frozen out of the Soviet market, but Hughes opposed this, and the matter was not resolved under Harding's presidency.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=116–126}}

====Disarmament====
{{Main|Washington Naval Conference}}
[[File:Charles Evans Hughes-01.jpg|thumb|right|[[Charles Evans Hughes]], former Supreme Court justice and Harding's Secretary of State]]
Harding urged disarmament and lower defense costs during the campaign, but it had not been a major issue. He gave a speech to a joint session of Congress in April 1921, setting out his legislative priorities. Among the few foreign policy matters he mentioned was disarmament; he said the government could not "be unmindful of the call for reduced expenditure" on defense.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=149–150}}

Idaho Senator [[William Borah]] had proposed a conference at which the major naval powers, the U.S., Britain, and Japan, would agree to cuts in their fleets. Harding concurred, and after diplomatic discussions, representatives of nine nations convened in Washington in November 1921. Most of the diplomats first attended [[Veterans Day|Armistice Day]] ceremonies at [[Arlington National Cemetery]], where Harding spoke at the entombment of the [[Tomb of the Unknowns|Unknown Soldier of World War I]], whose identity, "took flight with his imperishable soul. We know not whence he came, only that his death marks him with the everlasting glory of an American dying for his country."{{sfn|Dean|pp=130–131}}

Hughes, in his speech at the opening session of the conference on November 12, 1921, made the American proposal—the U.S. would decommission or not build 30 warships if Great Britain did likewise for 19 vessels, and Japan for 17.{{sfn|Russell|p=481}} Hughes was generally successful, with agreements reached on this and other points, including settlement of disputes over islands in the Pacific, and limitations on the use of poison gas. The naval agreement applied only to battleships, and to some extent aircraft carriers, and ultimately did not prevent rearmament. Nevertheless, Harding and Hughes were widely applauded in the press for their work. Senator Lodge and the [[Senate Minority Leader]], Alabama's [[Oscar Underwood]], were part of the U.S. delegation, and they helped ensure the treaties made it through the Senate mostly unscathed, though that body added reservations to some.{{sfn|Sinclair|pp=241–245}}{{sfn|Dean|pp=132–134}}

The U.S. had acquired over a thousand vessels during World War I, and still owned most of them when Harding took office. Congress had authorized their disposal [[Merchant Marine Act of 1920|in 1920]], but the Senate would not confirm Wilson's nominees to the [[United States Shipping Board|Shipping Board]]. Harding appointed Albert Lasker as its chairman; the advertising executive undertook to run the fleet as profitably as possible until it could be sold. Few ships were marketable at anything approaching the government's cost. Lasker recommended a large subsidy to the [[merchant marine]] to facilitate sales, and Harding repeatedly urged Congress to enact it. The resulting bill was unpopular in the Midwest, and though it passed the House, it was defeated by a [[filibuster]] in the Senate, and most government ships were eventually scrapped.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=174–178}}

====Latin America====
Intervention in Latin America had been a minor campaign issue, though Harding spoke against Wilson's decision to [[United States occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–24)|send U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic]] and Haiti, and attacked the Democratic vice presidential candidate, Franklin Roosevelt, for his role in the [[United States occupation of Haiti|Haitian intervention]]. Once Harding was sworn in, Hughes worked to improve relations with Latin American countries who were wary of the American use of the [[Monroe Doctrine]] to justify intervention; at the time of Harding's inauguration, the U.S. also had troops in Cuba and Nicaragua. The troops stationed in Cuba were withdrawn in 1921, but U.S. forces remained in the other three nations throughout Harding's presidency.{{efn|By Hughes's departure from office in 1925, American forces had left the Dominican Republic and were about to leave Nicaragua. The departure from Haiti was still being planned. See {{harvnb|Trani & Wilson|p=135}}.}}{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=133–135}} In April 1921, Harding gained the ratification of the [[Thomson–Urrutia Treaty]] with Colombia, granting that nation $25 million (equivalent to ${{Inflation|US|25|1921|r=2}}&nbsp;million in {{Inflation-year|US}}) as settlement for the U.S.-provoked [[Separation of Panama from Colombia|Panamanian revolution of 1903]].{{sfn|Murray 1969|pp=340–341}} The Latin American nations were not fully satisfied, as the U.S. refused to renounce interventionism, though Hughes pledged to limit it to nations near the Panama Canal, and to make it clear what the U.S. aims were.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=136–137}}

The U.S. had intervened repeatedly in Mexico under Wilson, and had withdrawn diplomatic recognition, setting conditions for reinstatement. The Mexican government under President [[Álvaro Obregón]] wanted recognition before negotiations, but Wilson and his final Secretary of State, [[Bainbridge Colby]], refused. Both Hughes and Fall opposed recognition; Hughes instead sent a draft treaty to the Mexicans in May 1921, which included pledges to reimburse Americans for losses in Mexico since the [[Mexican Revolution|1910 revolution]] there. Obregón was unwilling to sign a treaty before being recognized, and worked to improve the relationship between American business and Mexico, reaching agreement with creditors, and mounting a public relations campaign in the United States. This had its effect, and by mid-1922, Fall was less influential than he had been, lessening the resistance to recognition. The two presidents appointed commissioners to reach a deal, and the U.S. recognized the Obregón government on August 31, 1923, just under a month after Harding's death, substantially on the terms proffered by Mexico.{{sfn|Trani & Wilson|pp=130–132}}