Editing Vietnam War (section)

===American ground war===
{{See also|Buddhist Uprising}}
[[File:Vietcongsuspect.jpg|thumb|A Marine from [[1st Battalion, 3rd Marines]], moves a suspected Viet Cong during a search and clear operation held by the battalion {{Convert|15|mi|km|0}} west of [[Da Nang Air Base]], 1965.]]
On 8 March 1965, 3,500 [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marines]] were landed near [[Da Nang]], South Vietnam.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|246–247}} This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 October 2002 |title=Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq |url=http://www.people-press.org/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq |publisher=Pew Research Center|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20221121005317/https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq/|archive-date=21 November 2022}}</ref> The Marines' initial assignment was defense of [[Da Nang Air Base]]. The first deployment was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}}

General [[William Westmoreland]] informed Admiral [[U. S. Grant Sharp Jr.]], commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical,<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, p. 7.</ref> With this recommendation, Westmoreland advocated an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353}} Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win:
* Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. and allied forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
* Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down and driven back from major populated areas.
* Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of 12–18 months following Phase 2 would be required for final destruction of forces remaining in remote base areas.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 5, pp. 8–9.</ref>

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the insistence that South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the VC. Westmoreland predicted victory by December 1967.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, pp. 117–19. and vol. 5, pp. 8–12.</ref> Johnson did not communicate this change to the media, instead he emphasized continuity.<ref>''Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965.'' Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 794–99.</ref> The change in policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and VC in a contest of [[attrition warfare|attrition]] and [[morale]]. The opponents were locked in a cycle of [[Conflict escalation|escalation]].<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} However the Johnson administration ruled out invasion of North Vietnam due to fears of Chinese or Soviet intervention.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lind|first=Michael|title=Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict|publisher=Free Press|year=1999|isbn=0-684-84254-8|page=83-89|quote="Until recently, the lack of detailed information about the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the 1960s made it impossible for historians to judge whether the Johnson administration had been realistic in its fears of possible Chinese intervention or whether, as critics claimed, those fears had been exaggerated. In the 1990s, however, new archival evidence from China and Vietnam made it clear that the Johnson administration's fears were justified. The possibility that Mao would have sent combat troops to fight the United States in Vietnam had been quite real. It is now known that in late 1964 and early 1965, China clarified its commitment to North Vietnam. If the United States did not merely bomb North Vietnam but invaded it, China would send combat troops as it had during the Korean War."}}</ref> Westmoreland and McNamara touted the [[Body count#Vietnam War|body count]] system for gauging victory, a metric that proved flawed.<ref name=Mohr>{{Cite news |last=Mohr |first=Charles |date=16 May 1984 |title=McNamara on Record, Reluctantly, on Vietnam |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404185613/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archive-date=April 4, 2023 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|upright=.9|Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. Army, 1966]]
The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Washington encouraged its [[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization|SEATO]] allies to contribute troops; Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=556}} agreed. South Korea asked to join the [[Many Flags]] program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably Canada and the UK, declined troop requests.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Church |first=Peter |title=A Short History of South-East Asia |date=2006 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-82481-8 |page=193}}</ref>

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex [[search and destroy]] operations. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the [[Battle of Ia Drang]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galloway |first=Joseph |date=18 October 2010 |title=Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win |url=http://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win.htm |access-date=2 May 2016 |publisher=Historynet|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322083652/https://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win/?f|archive-date=March 22, 2023}}</ref> The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]] bombers in support.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|284–285}} These tactics continued in 1966–67, however, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, 2&nbsp;million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during [[Operation Masher]] alone,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=5 September 2017 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-5247-3310-0 |page=[{{GBurl|id=i4KyDQAAQBAJ|q=125}} 125] |language=en |quote=By the end of the year, more than 125,000 civilians in the province had lost their homes{{Nbsp}}...}}</ref> the largest search and destroy operation to that point. Operation Masher had negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after it ended.<ref name="Ward">{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=2017 |publisher=Alfred A. Knopf |isbn=978-0-307-70025-4}}</ref>{{Rp|153–156}} Despite major operations, which the VC and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit engagements.<ref name="GS">{{Cite book |title=The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 4 |at=Section 4, pp. 277–604 |chapter=Chapter 2, US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965–1968 |access-date=12 June 2018 |chapter-url=https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190626210700/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-date=26 June 2019 |url-status=dead |via=International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College}}</ref> The VC and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, and thus the PAVN/VC would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.<ref name=GS/> The PAVN and Viet Cong had developed strategies capable of countering US military doctrines and tactics: see [[NLF and PAVN battle tactics]].

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the arrival of prime minister Air Marshal [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]] and figurehead chief of state, General [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]], in mid-1965 at the head of a junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Though they were nominally a civilian government, Kỳ was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thiệu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Kỳ. Thiệu was accused of murdering Kỳ loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thiệu remained president until 1975, having won a [[1971 South Vietnamese presidential election|one-candidate election in 1971]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=706}}

Johnson employed a "policy of minimum candor"{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=18}} with the media. Military information officers sought to manage coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress. This policy damaged public trust in official pronouncements. As coverage of the war and the Pentagon diverged, a so-called [[credibility gap]] developed.{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=18}} Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating the "end is coming into view",<ref>{{Cite news |title=TWE Remembers: General Westmoreland Says the "End Begins to Come Into View" in Vietnam |language=en |work=Council on Foreign Relations |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam |access-date=12 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605025020/https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam|archive-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> internal reports in the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' indicate that VC forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. VC attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of engagements, VC/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against VC/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements only 5%.<ref name=GS/>