Editing Veto (section)

== Veto theories ==

In political science, the broader [[power (social and political)|power]] of people and groups to prevent change is sometimes analyzed through the frameworks of '''veto points''' and '''veto players'''. Veto players are actors who can potentially exercise some sort of veto over a change in government [[policy]].{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} Veto points are the institutional opportunities that give these actors the ability to veto.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} The theory of veto points was first developed by [[Ellen M. Immergut]] in 1990, in a comparative case study of healthcare reform in different political systems.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=4}} Breaking with earlier scholarship, Immergut argued that "we have veto ''points'' within political systems and not veto ''groups'' within societies."<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Immergut
  | author-first = Ellen M.
  | year = 1990
  | title = Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care
  | journal = Journal of Public Policy
  | volume = 10
  | issue = 4 
  | doi = 10.1017/s0143814x00006061
  | page = 391
| s2cid = 55825849
 }}</ref>

Veto player analysis draws on [[game theory]]. [[George Tsebelis]] first developed it in 1995 and set it forth in detail in 2002 ''[[Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work]]''.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=85}} A veto player is a political actor who has the ability to stop a change from the status quo.{{sfn|Croissant|2003|p=74}} There are institutional veto players, whose consent is required by constitution or statute; for example, in US federal legislation, the veto players are the House, Senate and presidency.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=107}} There are also partisan veto players, which are groups that can block policy change from inside an institutional veto player.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=19}} In a [[coalition government]] the partisan veto players are typically the members of the governing coalition.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=19}}<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000106 | doi=10.1017/S1755773913000106 | title=Coalition theory: A veto players' approach | date=2014 | last1=Tsebelis | first1=George | last2=Ha | first2=Eunyoung | journal=European Political Science Review | volume=6 | issue=3 | pages=331–357 }}</ref>

According to Tsebelis' veto player theorem, policy change becomes harder the more veto players there are, the greater the ideological distance between them, and the greater their internal coherence.{{sfn|Croissant|2003|p=74}} For example, Italy and the United States have stable policies because they have many veto players, while Greece and the United Kingdom have unstable policies because they have few veto players.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=4}}

While the veto player and veto point approaches complement one another, the veto players framework has become dominant in the study of policy change.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=2}} Scholarship on [[rational choice theory]] has favored the veto player approach because the veto point framework does not address ''why'' political actors decide to use a veto point.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} In addition, because veto player analysis can apply to any political system, it provides a way of comparing very different political systems, such as presidential and parliamentary systems.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} Veto player analyses can also incorporate people and groups that have ''de facto'' power to prevent policy change, even if they do not have the legal power to do so.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=6}}

Some literature distinguishes cooperative veto points (within institutions) and competitive veto points (between institutions), theorizing competitive veto points contribute to [[obstructionism]].<ref name="McGann"/> Some literature disagrees with the claim of veto player theory that multiparty governments are likely to be [[Gridlock (politics)|gridlocked]].<ref name="McGann">{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463883 | doi=10.1177/0010414012463883 | title=The Calculus of Consensus Democracy | date=2013 | last1=McGann | first1=Anthony J. | last2=Latner | first2=Michael | journal=Comparative Political Studies | volume=46 | issue=7 | pages=823–850 }}</ref>