Editing Utilitarianism (section)

=== Henry Sidgwick ===
{{main|Henry Sidgwick}}
Sidgwick's book ''[[The Methods of Ethics]]'' has been referred to as the peak or culmination of classical utilitarianism.<ref name="Schultz">{{cite web |last1=Schultz |first1=Barton |title=Henry Sidgwick |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 December 2020 |date=2020}}</ref><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Sidgwick, Henry}}</ref><ref name="Honderich"/> His main goal in this book is to ground utilitarianism in the principles of ''common-sense morality'' and thereby dispense with the doubts of his predecessors that these two are at odds with each other.<ref name="Craig"/> For Sidgwick, ethics is about which actions are objectively right.<ref name="Schultz"/> Our knowledge of right and wrong arises from common-sense morality, which lacks a coherent principle at its core.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Duignan |first1=Brian |last2=West |first2=Henry R. |title=Utilitarianism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/utilitarianism-philosophy |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=29 December 2020 |language=en}}</ref> The task of philosophy in general and ethics in particular is not so much to create new knowledge but to systematize existing knowledge.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald M. |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Sidgwick, Henry}}</ref> Sidgwick tries to achieve this by formulating ''methods of ethics'', which he defines as rational procedures "for determining right conduct in any particular case".<ref name="Craig"/> He identifies three methods: [[Ethical intuitionism|intuitionism]], which involves various independently valid moral principles to determine what ought to be done, and two forms of ''hedonism'', in which rightness only depends on the pleasure and pain following from the action. Hedonism is subdivided into ''egoistic hedonism'', which only takes the agent's own well-being into account, and ''universal hedonism'' or ''utilitarianism'', which is concerned with everyone's well-being.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Craig"/>

Intuitionism holds that we have intuitive, i.e. non-inferential, knowledge of moral principles, which are self-evident to the knower.<ref name="Borchert"/> The criteria for this type of knowledge include that they are expressed in clear terms, that the different principles are mutually consistent with each other and that there is expert consensus on them. According to Sidgwick, commonsense moral principles fail to pass this test, but there are some more abstract principles that pass it, like that "what is right for me must be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances" or that "one should be equally concerned with all temporal parts of one's life".<ref name="Craig"/><ref name="Borchert"/> The most general principles arrived at this way are all compatible with ''utilitarianism'', which is why Sidgwick sees a harmony between ''intuitionism'' and ''utilitarianism''.<ref name="Honderich">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Sidgwick, Henry}}</ref> There are also less general intuitive principles, like the duty to keep one's promises or to be just, but these principles are not universal and there are cases where different duties stand in conflict with each other. Sidgwick suggests that we resolve such conflicts in a utilitarian fashion by considering the consequences of the conflicting actions.<ref name="Craig"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald M. |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Sidgwick, Henry [Addendum]}}</ref>

The harmony between intuitionism and utilitarianism is a partial success in Sidgwick's overall project, but he sees full success impossible since egoism, which he considers as equally rational, cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism unless ''religious assumptions'' are introduced.<ref name="Craig"/> Such assumptions, for example, the existence of a personal God who rewards and punishes the agent in the afterlife, could reconcile egoism and utilitarianism.<ref name="Borchert"/> But without them, we have to admit a "dualism of practical reason" that constitutes a "fundamental contradiction" in our moral consciousness.<ref name="Schultz"/>