Editing Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (section)

==== 1916–1917: peace initiatives and submarine warfare ====
On 7 October 1916 the Centre Party passed a resolution in which it came around to the military's position and for the first time called for unrestricted submarine warfare. Bethmann Hollweg later wrote in his ''Reflections'' that parliament had completely surrendered political power to the OHL.<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Bethmann Hollweg |first=Theobald |url=https://archive.org/details/BehmannHollwegTheobaldVon-BetrachtungenZumWeltkriege-Band2/page/n149/mode/2up?view=theater |title=Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege |publisher=Hobbing |year=1919–1921 |volume=2 |location=Berlin |pages=128 |language=de |trans-title=Reflections on the World War}}</ref>

In the Ministry of State on 20 October 1916, the Chancellor proposed a separate peace offer by the Central Powers, citing the absence of a tangible initiative by the United States and the support of Austrian Foreign Minister Burián. He had in mind the restoration, as far as possible, of the pre-war situation. In mid-November 1916 Bethmann Hollweg sent an inquiry to Washington through Ambassador [[Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff]] about the prospect of a peace conference. But when the White House continued to show indecision, Bethmann Hollweg saw perhaps the last chance for a peace of reconciliation ({{Lang|de|Ausgleichsfrieden}}) in an offer of his own.{{Sfn|Ritter|1964|pp=346 ff.}}

After the [[Romania in World War I|victory over Romania]], when the military situation had changed in favor of the Empire, the Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag on 12 December 1916, offered a negotiated peace ({{Lang|de|Verständigungsfrieden}}) to the Entente. He had the full support of the Emperor, who wrote in approval of Bethmann Hollweg's efforts that the peace proposal was "a moral deed necessary to relieve the world of the pressures weighing on all".<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Bethmann Hollweg |first=Theobald |url=https://archive.org/details/BehmannHollwegTheobaldVon-BetrachtungenZumWeltkriege-Band2/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater |title=Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege |publisher=Hobbing |year=1919–1921 |volume=2 |location=Berlin |pages=152 f |language=de |trans-title=Reflections on the World War}}</ref> The governments of the Entente states, however, viewed the initiative skeptically.
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R73059, Wilhelm Solf.jpg|thumb|216x216px|[[Wilhelm Solf]]]]
On 18 December U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] revealed his long-awaited peace initiative. He called for the disclosure of clearly formulated war aims – which the Empire was prepared to do – including withdrawal from Belgium. In response to demands by the pan-Germans, [[Wilhelm Solf]] made the proposal to create a contiguous German colonial empire in central Africa, annexing the [[Belgian Congo]]. By creating a German Central Africa, future peace would not be burdened by annexations in Europe. The implementation of the colonial war goal was never a priority to Bethmann Hollweg. What mattered to him and Solf was the formulation of a German war objective acceptable at home and abroad in the event of a victorious peace, something which neither politician believed in any longer.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fischer |first=Fritz |title=Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 |publisher=Droste |year=1969 |location=Düsseldorf |language=de |trans-title=War of Illusions: German Politics from 1911 to 1914}}</ref>

When the Entente was unwilling to make such compromises, Bethmann Hollweg on 7 January 1917 called for immediate concessions or Germany would respond with unrestricted submarine warfare. The Chancellor's marginal note to the declaration, sent to Ambassador Bernstorff in Washington, showed his negative view of the situation: "Perhaps you know a way to avoid the break with America."{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=252}}

The following day the Reich Chancellor traveled to [[Pszczyna|Pleß]] in Silesia where a [[9 January 1917 German Crown Council meeting|meeting of the Crown Council]] was to make the decision on submarine warfare. After the OHL and the Reichstag had expressed their approval, the final decision lay with the Emperor. Bethmann Hollweg later wrote<ref>{{Cite book |last=von der Ropp |first=Friedrich |title=Zwischen Gestern und Morgen |publisher=J. F. Steinkopf |year=1963 |location=Stuttgart |pages=101 f |language=de |trans-title=Between Yesterday and Tomorrow}}</ref> that Wilhelm was already completely in support of Ludendorff, who claimed that America had "no soldiers" and that if it did, submarine warfare would already have defeated France and England by the time U.S. forces arrived. Ludendorff's line of reasoning led the Emperor to ask Bethmann Hollweg why he "still had misgivings".<ref>{{Cite book |title=Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller 1914–1918 |publisher=Musterschmidt |year=1959 |editor-last=Görlitz |editor-first=Walter |location=Göttingen |pages=249 |language=de |trans-title=Did the Emperor Govern? War Diaries, Records and Letters of the Chief of the Navy Cabinet Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller 1914–1918}}</ref>

It is difficult to argue against Bethmann Hollweg's later statement that the U-boat war had ultimately been waged because a majority in the Reichstag, the Supreme Army Command and the German people had wanted it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Bethmann Hollweg |first=Theobald |url=https://archive.org/details/BehmannHollwegTheobaldVon-BetrachtungenZumWeltkriege-Band2/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater |title=Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege |publisher=Hobbing |year=1919–1921 |pages=36, Vol. 2 |language=de |trans-title=Reflections on the World War}}</ref> The outcome led the Chancellor to thoughts of resigning. He later told Walther Rathenau that he had stayed on in order to preserve the chances of a negotiated peace in spite of the submarine warfare. To Riezler he said in 1919 that he had not wanted to give way to the "Pan-Germans' rule by the saber".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Meinecke |first=Friedrich |title=Erlebtes |publisher=Koehler & Amelang |year=1941 |location=Leipzig |pages=309 f |language=de |trans-title=Experiences}}</ref> According to his biographer von Vietsch, he was guided by a deep sense of loyalty to the Emperor, whom he did not want to put in a bad light by resigning. From that point on, Bethmann Hollweg was considered a failed politician in Germany.{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=255}}

After the decision at Pleß, Wilson on 22 January read a message to the U.S. Senate that was a precursor to his [[Fourteen Points|14-point program]]. In it he argued for peace without victors and the right of peoples to self-determination. In March 1917 the [[Russian February Revolution]] shook the European power structure. On 29 March Bethmann Hollweg appeared before the press and, contrary to the wishes of the conservatives, declared that the Reich would not reinstate the government of the Tsar under any circumstances. The internal affairs of Russia, he said, were a matter for the Russian people. The internal political turmoil seemed to him to increase the chance of a special peace with Russia. It was also at this time that Germany expressed its support for [[Lenin|Lenin's]] return from exile.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hahlweg |first=Werner |title=Lenins Ruckkehr nach Russland 1917: Die deutschen Akten |publisher=E.J. Brill |year=1957 |location=Leiden |pages=25 |language=de |trans-title=Lenin's Return to Russia in 1917: The German Files}}</ref>

Prompted by the changed circumstances and the declaration of war by the United States against Germany on 6 April, Wilhelm II initiated the 23 April Kreuznach Conference on War Objectives. Bethmann Hollweg proposed renouncing all annexations, but the idea was rejected in principle by the OHL. Everyone involved saw that Bethmann Hollweg then agreed to the OHL's war aims only because he thought that they would never be carried out. He noted, "I do not allow myself to be bound in any way by the protocol. If opportunities for peace open up anywhere, I pursue them."<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Westarp |first=Kuno |title=Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches. Band 1: Von 1908 bis 1914 |publisher=Deutsche Verlags-Gesellschaft |year=1935 |location=Berlin |pages=374 |language=de |trans-title=Conservative Politics in the Last Decade of the Empire. Volume 1: From 1908 to 1914 |author-link=Kuno von Westarp}}</ref>