Editing Robert McNamara (section)

===Systems analysis===
{{main|Systems analysis}}
McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters occasioned much debate. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara era, [[Alain C. Enthoven]] and [[K. Wayne Smith]], described the concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary... The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith said they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because they could apply independent points of view to force planning. McNamara's tendency to take military advice into less account than had previous secretaries and to override military opinions contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders. It was also generally thought that Systems Analysis, rather than being objective, was tailored by the civilians to support decisions that McNamara had already made.{{sfn|Enthoven|Smith|2005|p=48–58}}
[[File:U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited Rhein-Main Air Base at Frankfurt Germany.jpg|thumb|U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara accompanied by [[Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff]] General [[John P. McConnell (general)|John P. McConnell]] greeted by [[Commanding General, United States Army Europe|Commanding General]], [[United States Army Europe]] General [[Paul L. Freeman Jr.]] during a visit to [[Rhein-Main Air Base|Rhein-Main Air Force Base]] in [[Frankfurt|Frankfurt, Germany]], September 7, 1962]]
The most notable example of systems analysis was the [[Planning, Programming and Budgeting System]] (PPBS) instituted by [[United States Department of Defense]] [[Comptroller]] [[Charles J. Hitch]].{{sfn|Samuel|2006|p=450–451}}  McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented defense budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policymaking levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis, that is, each analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusions." In practice, the data produced by the analysis was so large and so complex that while it was available to all interested parties, none of them could challenge the conclusions.{{sfn|Amadae|2003|p=27–82}}

Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development Concept Paper (DCP). The annual FYDP was a series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years in mission-oriented, rather than individual service, programs. By 1968, the FYDP covered ten military areas: strategic forces, general-purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance, training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.

[[File:Meeting with the Shah of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.... - NARA - 194206.jpg|thumb|Kennedy and McNamara with [[Iran]]'s Shah [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] in April 1962]]
The Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM)—intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office—was a method to study and analyze major defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between 1961 and 1968 on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces, [[NATO]] strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs to the services and the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) for comment; in making decisions, McNamara included in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches, force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document. The DPM was hated by the JCS and uniformed military in that it cut their ability to communicate directly to the White House.{{sfn|Enthoven|Smith|2005|p=48–58}} The DPMs were also disliked because the systems analysis process was so heavyweight that it was impossible for any service to effectively challenge its conclusions.{{sfn|Enthoven|Smith|2005|p=48–58}}

The [[Development Concept Paper]] examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program.<ref name="Historical Office Robert S. McNamara" /> But in practice, it proved to be a cost burden that became a barrier to entry for companies attempting to deal with the military. It aided the trend toward a few large non-competitive defense contractors serving the military. Rather than serving any useful purpose, the [[Overhead (business)|overhead]] necessary to generate information that was often in practice ignored resulted in increased costs throughout the system.<ref name="Historical Office Robert S. McNamara" />

The Readiness, Information, and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.