Editing Rational choice model (section)

===Sociological critiques===
[[Pierre Bourdieu]] fiercely opposed rational choice theory as grounded in a misunderstanding of how social agents operate. Bourdieu argued that social agents do not continuously calculate according to explicit rational and economic criteria. According to Bourdieu, social agents operate according to an implicit practical logic – a practical sense – and bodily dispositions. Social agents act according to their "feel for the game" (the "feel" being, roughly, habitus, and the "game" being the [[Field (Bourdieu)|field]]).<ref>For an account of Bourdieu's work, see the wikipedia article on [[Pierre Bourdieu]]. See also Pierre Bourdieu (2005). ''The Social Structures of the Economy'', Cambridge: Polity 2005.</ref>

Other social scientists, inspired in part by Bourdieu's thinking have expressed concern about the inappropriate use of economic metaphors in other contexts, suggesting that this may have political implications. The argument they make is that by treating everything as a kind of "economy" they make a particular vision of the way an economy works seem more natural. Thus, they suggest, rational choice is as much ideological as it is scientific.<ref>A.M. McKinnon (2013). "Ideology and the Market Metaphor in Rational Choice Theory of Religion: A Rhetorical Critique of 'Religious Economies'". Critical Sociology, vol 39, no. 4, pp. 529–543.[http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141112222515/http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf|date=2014-11-12}}</ref>

==== Criticism based on motivational assumptions ====
Rational choice theorists discuss individual values and structural elements as equally important determinants of outcomes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hechter |first1=Michael |last2=Kanazawa |first2=Satoshi |date=1997-08-01 |title=Sociological Rational Choice Theory |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |journal=Annual Review of Sociology |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=191–214 |doi=10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |s2cid=14439597 |issn=0360-0572 |archive-date=2022-09-21 |access-date=2022-04-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921152923/https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, for [[Methodology|methodological]] reasons in the empirical application, more emphasis is usually placed on social structural determinants. Therefore, in line with [[structural functionalism]] and [[social network analysis]] perspectives, rational choice explanations are considered mainstream in [[sociology]] .<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldtborpe |first=John H. |date=1996-09-01 |title=The Quantitative Analysis of Large-Scale Data-sets and Rational Action Theory: For a Sociological Alliance |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018180 |journal=European Sociological Review |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=109–126 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018180 |issn=0266-7215}}</ref>

==== Criticism based on the assumption of realism ====
Some of the [[Skepticism|scepticism]] among sociologists regarding rational choice stems from a misunderstanding of the lack of realist assumptions. Social research has shown that social agents usually act solely based on habit or impulse, the power of emotion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rapetti |first=Martin |date=February 2012 |title=Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism, by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1057/eej.2010.16 |journal=Eastern Economic Journal |language=en |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=276–278 |doi=10.1057/eej.2010.16 |s2cid=153652492 |issn=0094-5056}}</ref> Social Agents predict the expected consequences of options in stock markets and economic crises and choose the best option through collective "emotional drives," implying social forces rather than "rational" choices.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fararo |first=Thomas J. |date=November 1993 |title=General Social Equilibrium: Toward Theoretical Synthesis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/201972 |journal=Sociological Theory |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=291–313 |doi=10.2307/201972|jstor=201972 }}</ref>

However, sociology commonly misunderstands rational choice in its critique of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory does not explain what rational people would do in a given situation, which falls under [[decision theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Haller |first=Max |date=2001-09-01 |title=Erklärt die Rational Choice Theorie die Ungleichheit der Bildungschancen? |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |journal=KZFSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie |language=de |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=569–574 |doi=10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |s2cid=141730470 |issn=1861-891X}}</ref> Theoretical choice focuses on social outcomes rather than individual outcomes. Social outcomes are identified as stable equilibria in which individuals have no incentive to deviate from their course of action.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Quackenbush |first=Stephen |date=2004-04-01 |title=The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620490462595 |journal=International Interactions |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=87–107 |doi=10.1080/03050620490462595 |s2cid=8811977 |issn=0305-0629}}</ref> This orientation of others' behaviour toward social outcomes may be unintended or undesirable. Therefore, the conclusions generated in such cases are relegated to the "study of irrational behaviour".<ref>{{Cite journal |title= Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of "Irrational Choice"|url=https://auth.uq.edu.au/idp/module.php/core/loginuserpass.php?AuthState=_1e3a271625f0748c647a27d5b571f765ed7a93240c%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fauth.uq.edu.au%2Fidp%2Fsaml2%2Fidp%2FSSOService.php%3Fspentityid%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Fsso%252Fmodule.php%252Fsaml%252Fsp%252Fmetadata.php%252Fuqlsso%26RelayState%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Flogin%253Freturn%253DaHR0cHM6Ly9hdXRoLmxpYnJhcnkudXEuZWR1LmF1L2xvZ2luP3R5cGU9ZXpwcm94eSZ1cmw9aHR0cHMlM2ElMmYlMmZkb2kub3JnJTJmMTAuMTA4MCUyZjAyNjkxNzI4LjIwMTYuMTE3MjM1OA%253D%253D%26cookieTime%3D1651224707 |access-date=2022-04-29 |journal=Social Epistemology | date=November 2016 | volume=30 | issue=5–6 | pages=728–763 |doi=10.1080/02691728.2016.1172358| s2cid=147848024 | last1=Zafirovski | first1=Milan }}</ref>