Editing Prisoner's dilemma (section)

===International politics===
In [[international politics|international relations theory]], the prisoner's dilemma is often used to demonstrate why cooperation fails in situations when cooperation between states is collectively optimal but individually suboptimal.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Snyder |first=Glenn H. |date=1971 |title="Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3013593 |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=66–103 |doi=10.2307/3013593 |jstor=3013593 |issn=0020-8833}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jervis |first=Robert |date=1978 |title=Cooperation under the Security Dilemma |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/cooperation-under-the-security-dilemma/C8907431CCEFEFE762BFCA32F091C526 |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=167–214 |doi=10.2307/2009958 |jstor=2009958 |hdl=2027/uc1.31158011478350 |s2cid=154923423 |issn=1086-3338|hdl-access=free }}</ref> A classic example is the [[security dilemma]], whereby an increase in one state's security (such as increasing its military strength) leads other states to fear for their own security out of fear of offensive action.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Jervis |first=Robert |date=1978 |title=Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 |journal=World Politics |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=167–214 |doi=10.2307/2009958 |issn=0043-8871 |jstor=2009958 |hdl-access=free |hdl=2027/uc1.31158011478350|s2cid=154923423 }}</ref> Consequently, security-increasing measures can lead to tensions, escalation or conflict with one or more other parties, producing an outcome which no party truly desires.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Herz |first=John H. |title=Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma |year=1950 |pages=157–180}}</ref><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Snyder |first=Glenn H. |date=1984 |title=The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183 |journal=World Politics |volume=36 |issue=4 |pages=461–495 |doi=10.2307/2010183 |jstor=2010183 |s2cid=154759602 |issn=0043-8871}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Jervis |first=Robert |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qqAIuHgi2hoC |title=Perception and Misperception in International Politics |date=1976 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-10049-4 |pages=58–113 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Glaser |first=Charles L. |url=https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9207.html |title=Rational Theory of International Politics |date=2010 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9780691143729 |access-date= |archive-url= |archive-date= }}</ref> The security dilemma is particularly intense in situations when it is hard to distinguish offensive weapons from defensive weapons, and offense has the advantage in any conflict over defense.<ref name=":1" />

The prisoner's dilemma has frequently been used by [[Realism (international relations)|realist]] international relations theorists to demonstrate the why all states (regardless of their internal policies or professed ideology) under [[anarchy (international relations)|international anarchy]] will struggle to cooperate with one another even when all benefit from such cooperation.

Critics of realism argue that iteration and extending the shadow of the future are solutions to the prisoner's dilemma. When actors play the prisoner's dilemma once, they have incentives to defect, but when they expect to play it repeatedly, they have greater incentives to cooperate.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Axelrod |first1=Robert |last2=Hamilton |first2=William D. |date=1981 |title=The Evolution of Cooperation |url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.7466396 |journal=Science |language=en |volume=211 |issue=4489 |pages=1390–1396 |doi=10.1126/science.7466396 |pmid=7466396 |bibcode=1981Sci...211.1390A |issn=0036-8075}}</ref>