Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

===NPT signatories===

====Egypt====
{{Main|Nuclear program of Egypt}}
In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high-enriched and [[low-enriched uranium]] particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.<ref name=SS2008>{{Cite web|url=http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2008.html|title=International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Statement for 2008 and Background to the Safeguards Statement|access-date=29 February 2012|archive-date=10 March 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120310091442/http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2008.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2008/safeguards.pdf|title=International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Annual Report (2008)|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-date=16 August 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090816062145/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2008/safeguards.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> In May 2009, ''Reuters'' reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-egypt-idUSTRE54543S20090506|title=High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA|date=6 May 2017|work=Reuters|access-date=2 July 2017|archive-date=9 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170909142945/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-egypt-idUSTRE54543S20090506|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Iran====
{{Main|Iran and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons}} {{See also|Nuclear program of Iran}}
In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.<ref>[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf GOV/2003/75] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025173821/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf |date=25 October 2007 }}, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003.</ref> In 2005, the [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]].<ref name="IAEAIran2005">{{Cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf|title=&#124; IAEA|website=iaea.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701200637/https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf|title=&#124; IAEA|website=iaea.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=4 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204170215/https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.<ref>[https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm Security Council demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140816102056/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm |date=16 August 2014 }} (UN News Centre Press Release, 31 July 2006)</ref><ref name="autogenerated1">{{Cite news|title=Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt uranium enrichment, unanimously adopting Resolution 1737|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|publisher=[[United Nations]]|date=23 December 2006|access-date=23 December 2006|archive-date=17 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240417034423/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=24 March 2007|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm|title=SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO|publisher=United Nations|work=UN News Centre|access-date=16 April 2007|archive-date=15 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210515133149/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>[https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140816214019/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9268.doc.htm |date=16 August 2014 }}. Department of Public Information, UN Security Council.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm|title=SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS EARLIER RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT, CALLS ON COUNTRY TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS 'FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY' – Meetings Coverage and Press Releases|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130522162257/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm|archive-date=22 May 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.<ref>{{cite web|date=23 December 2006|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|title=Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)|access-date=29 June 2017|archive-date=17 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240417034423/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hA01f9zNaIJ4IK_Hcuwqy4zf6MWg|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111218110855/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hA01f9zNaIJ4IK_Hcuwqy4zf6MWg|url-status=dead|title=''AFP'':Six powers to meet soon over Iran's nuclear program|archive-date=18 December 2011|access-date=8 January 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=207020|title=Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks|date=2 November 2009|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-date=6 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306185130/http://tehrantimes.com/index_view.asp?code=207020|url-status=live}}</ref> and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/|title=Iran's Nuclear Program|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100607145346/http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/|archive-date=7 June 2010|access-date=8 January 2010}}</ref><ref>[http://scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes American Institute of Physics: The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120715053949/http://scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes |date=15 July 2012 }}<blockquote>The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material</blockquote></ref> The director general of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], [[Yukiya Amano]], said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite news| last = Westall| first = Sylvia| title = No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head| work = [[Reuters]]| date = 3 July 2009| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true| access-date = 1 December 2009| archive-date = 10 July 2009| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090710174347/http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true| url-status = live}}</ref>

====Iraq====
{{more citations needed section|date=January 2013}}
{{See also|Iraq and weapons of mass destruction}}
Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.

Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, [[Osiraq]], was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the [[Iran–Iraq War]] and was [[Operation Opera|destroyed by Israeli bombers]] in June 1981.

Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.

After inspections in Iraq following the UN [[Gulf War]] cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme.

The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for [[electromagnetic isotope separation]] (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a [[mass spectrometer]] (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of [[uranium-238]] and [[uranium-235]] are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the [[Manhattan Project]] to make the highly enriched uranium used in the [[Little Boy|Hiroshima bomb]], but was abandoned soon afterwards.

The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near [[Baghdad]], and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.

The Iraqis were also very interested in [[Nuclear fuel cycle#Enrichment|centrifuge enrichment]], and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998, ''[[Newsweek]]'' reported that [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the [[United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission|UNMOVIC]] officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an [[ISI (Pakistan)|ISI]] sting operation, due to [[Iraq–Pakistan relations|strained relations]] between two countries.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan_memo.html|title=Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?|website=isis-online.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701200625/https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan_memo.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[Government of Pakistan]] and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent".<ref name="International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSI)">{{cite book |last=Fitzpatrick |first=Mark |contribution=Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network |title=Nuclear black markets |location=London, United Kingdom |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-86079-201-7 |publisher=International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)}}</ref>

They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid-1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.

The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.

====Libya====
{{Main|Libya and nuclear technology}}
[[Libya]] possesses ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons [[History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi|under the leadership]] of [[Muammar Gaddafi]]. On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including [[Libya and weapons of mass destruction|weapons of mass destruction]] and [[Intermediate-range ballistic missile|long-range ballistic missiles]].<ref>[http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513214815/http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology |date=13 May 2013 }}, Arms Control Association.</ref><ref name=LibyaTimeline>[https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml News Update on IAEA & Libya] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120328014901/https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml |date=28 March 2012 }}, Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 – September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency.</ref><ref name=NuclearThreat>{{Cite web| last =Rohlfing| first =Joan| title =Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview| work =Nuclear Threat Initiative| url =http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/nuclear/| access-date =18 March 2014| archive-date =6 October 2013| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20131006060954/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/nuclear/| url-status =live}}</ref> Libya signed the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) in 1980.<ref>[http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf GOV/2004/12] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170907014825/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf |date=7 September 2017 }}, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.</ref> In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate its formerly undeclared nuclear program, which it found had violated Libya's safeguards agreement, and approved Libya's Additional Protocol.<ref name=LibyaTimeline/><ref>{{cite web|title=Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Resolution adopted by the Board on 10 March 2004|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf|publisher=International Atomic Energy Agency|access-date=7 April 2013|date=10 March 2004|archive-date=29 July 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130729130546/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by the IAEA.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

====Myanmar====
{{Main|Myanmar and weapons of mass destruction}}
A report in the ''[[The Sydney Morning Herald|Sydney Morning Herald]]'' and ''[[Searchina]]'', a Japanese newspaper, report that two [[Myanmar|Myanma]] defectors saying that the [[State Peace and Development Council]] junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by [[Russia]] that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."<ref>''Searchina'', "Reasons for digging tunnels in Burma", 11 August 2009.</ref> In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} Recently, the [[David Albright]]-led [[Institute for Science and International Security]] (ISIS) rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help. {{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} During an [[ASEAN]] meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state [[Hillary Clinton]] highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between [[North Korea]] and [[Burma]] which we take very seriously," Clinton said.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20121025174440/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-02/rest-of-world/28184985_1_myanmar-junta-nuclear-reactor-burma "Myanmar building nuke reactor, says media report"]. ''[[The Times of India]]'', 2 August 2009.</ref> However, in 2012, after contact with the American president, Barack Obama, the Burmese leader, Thein Sein, renounced military ties with DPRK (North Korea).<ref>{{cite news|title=Goodbye clenched fist, hello sweaty palm|url=https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21566656-president-barack-obama-makes-unprecedented-visit-former-pariah-goodbye-clenched-fist-hello|access-date=25 November 2012|newspaper=The Economist|date=17 November 2012|archive-date=24 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121124212231/http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21566656-president-barack-obama-makes-unprecedented-visit-former-pariah-goodbye-clenched-fist-hello|url-status=live}}</ref>

====North Korea====
{{See also|North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|Six-party talks}}
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the [[Soviet Union|USSR]]. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 [[MWt]] (5 [[MWe]]), based on the [[UK]] [[Magnox]] design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.

In addition, it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox [[spent nuclear fuel]] safe, recovering [[uranium]] and [[plutonium]]. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at the [[Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center]] were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies that indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance.

Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the [[Agreed Framework]] in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.

While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as [[trade sanctions]]. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}}

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light-water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in [[Beijing]]; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever [[2006 North Korean nuclear test|nuclear weapon test]]. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a [[2009 North Korean nuclear test|second nuclear test]] on 25 May 2009.

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an [[2013 North Korean nuclear test|underground nuclear explosion]] with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter.

====Russia====
{{Main|Russia and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons|l1 = Russia and nuclear weapons}}

Security of [[Russia and weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons in Russia]] remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian [[Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)|SVR]] defector [[Sergei Tretyakov (intelligence officer)|Tretyakov]], he had a meeting with two Russian businessmen representing a state-created ''C-W'' corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of [[Novaya Zemlya]] (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his [[dacha]] outside [[Moscow]]. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" ([[Vladimir Dmitriev|Vladimir K. Dmitriev]]) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".<ref name="Comrade J">Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", Penguin Books, 2007, {{ISBN|978-0-399-15439-3}}, pages 114–121.</ref>

====South Africa====
{{Main|Nuclear programme of South Africa}}
In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards.<ref>Von Wielligh, N. & von Wielligh-Steyn, L. (2015). The Bomb – South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme. Pretoria: Litera.</ref> At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.

The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.<ref name="fas-sanwp">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/|title=Nuclear Weapons Program|access-date=10 November 2006|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|year=2000|work=WMD Around the World – South Africa|archive-date=7 October 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061007024204/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Sweden====
{{Main|Swedish nuclear weapons program}}

After World War II, Sweden considered building nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion. From 1945 to 1972 the [[Government of Sweden|Swedish government]] ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program under the guise of civilian defense research at the [[Swedish National Defence Research Institute]]. By the late 1950s, the work had reached the point where underground testing was feasible. However, at that time the [[Riksdag]] prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons, pledging that research should be done only for the purpose of defense against nuclear attack. The option to continue development was abandoned in 1966, and Sweden subsequently signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. The program was finally concluded in 1972.{{citation needed|date=May 2021}}

====Syria====
{{Main|Syria and weapons of mass destruction}}
On 6 September 2007, [[Israel]] bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (''see [[Operation Outside the Box]]'').<ref name="Globalsecurity Airstrike">[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/070906-airstrike.htm 6 September 2007 Air strike] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025052954/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/070906-airstrike.htm |date=25 October 2007 }} at [http://www.globalsecurity.org globalsecurity.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170722053244/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/secret-cities.htm |date=22 July 2017 }}. Retrieved 24 October 2007.</ref> The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.<ref name=SS2008 /> Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.<ref name=SS2008 /> The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.<ref name=SS2008 /> Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8050478.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090110204457/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8050478.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=10 January 2009 |title=Syria rejects U.S. allegations on existence of nuclear activities |publisher=News.xinhuanet.com |date=25 April 2008 |access-date=15 May 2009}}</ref> IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.<ref name=IAEAHaaretz>{{cite web |url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/978043.html |title=IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian nuclear reactor |publisher=Haaretz.com |access-date=15 May 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080426141322/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/978043.html |archive-date=26 April 2008 }}</ref>

====Taiwan====
{{Main|Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons}}
During the [[Cold War]], the United States deployed nuclear weapons at [[Tainan Air Force Base]] of [[Taiwan]] as part of the [[United States Taiwan Defense Command]]. Nonetheless, Taiwan began its own nuclear weapon program under the auspices of the [[Institute of Nuclear Energy Research]] (INER) at the [[Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology]] since 1967. Taiwan was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from [[Canada]] and low-grade [[plutonium]] from the United States), which were subject to [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) safeguards, but which Taiwan used for its nuclear weapon program.<ref>{{cite book | last = Roy | first = Denny | title = Taiwan: A Political History | url = https://archive.org/details/taiwan00denn | url-access = registration | publisher = Cornell University Press | isbn = 0-8014-8805-2 | year = 2003 | access-date = 18 November 2019 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180403202247/https://archive.org/details/taiwan00denn | archive-date = 3 April 2018 | url-status = live }}</ref> In 1972, US president ordered to remove the nuclear weapons from Taiwan by 1974.<ref>{{cite web |title=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 20 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19991020/ |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |publisher=George Washington University |access-date=27 September 2020 |archive-date=7 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210207142738/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19991020/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Then recognized as the [[Republic of China]], Taiwan ratified the NPT in 1970. After the IAEA found evidences of Taiwan's efforts to produce the [[weapons-grade plutonium]], Taiwan agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapon program under U.S. pressure in September 1976. The nuclear reactor was shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S. However secret nuclear activities were exposed after the [[Lieyu massacre]] by Colonel [[Chang Hsien-yi]], deputy director of INER, who defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. This program was also halted under the U.S. pressure.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Ide|first=William|date=1999-10-14|title=How the US stopped Taiwan's bomb|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/1999/10/14/0000006401/1|work=Taipei Times|access-date=2020-02-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200202140227/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/1999/10/14/0000006401/1|archive-date=2 February 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>