Editing Mu'tazilism (section)

===Reason and revelation===
[[File:Statue of Averroes (Córdoba) - BAE09705.jpg|thumb|[[Averroes]] insisted that all [[natural phenomena]] followed laws that God created.<ref name=Kadri-118>{{cite book|last1=Kadri|first1=Sadakat|title=Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ...|date=2012|publisher=macmillan|isbn=9780099523277|pages=118–9|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC&q=Heaven+on+Earth%3A+A+Journey+Through+Shari%27a+Law|access-date=2020-10-27|archive-date=2020-12-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201227213749/https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC&q=Heaven+on+Earth%3A+A+Journey+Through+Shari%27a+Law|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Ghazali 2000, pp.116-7">For al-Ghazali's argument see ''The Incoherence of the Philosophers''. Translated by Michael E. Marmura. 2nd ed, Provo Utah, 2000, pp.116–7.</ref><ref name="For [[Ibn Rushd]] 2005, p.162">For Ibn Rushd's response, see Khalid, Muhammad A. ed. ''Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings'', Cambridge UK, 2005, p.162)</ref>]]

The Mu'tazilis had a nuanced theory regarding reason, Divine revelation, and the relationship between them. They celebrated [[reason|power of reason]] and [[intellect|human intellectual power]]. To them, it is the human intellect that guides a human to know God, his attributes, and the very basics of morality. Once this foundational knowledge is attained and one ascertains the truth of Islam and the Divine origins of the Qur'an, the intellect then interacts with scripture such that both reason and revelation come together to be the main source of guidance and knowledge for Muslims. Harun Nasution in the Mu'tazila and Rational Philosophy, translated in Martin (1997), commented on Mu'tazili extensive use of rationality in the development of their religious views saying: "It is not surprising that opponents of the Mu'tazila often charge the Mu'tazila with the view that humanity does not need revelation, that everything can be known through reason, that there is a conflict between reason and revelation, that they cling to reason and put revelation aside, and even that the Mu'tazila do not believe in revelation. But is it true that the Mu'tazila are of the opinion that everything can be known through reason and therefore that revelation is unnecessary? The writings of the Mu'tazila give exactly the opposite portrait. In their opinion, human reason is not sufficiently powerful to know everything and for this reason humans need revelation in order to reach conclusions concerning what is good and what is bad for them."{{sfn|Martin|1997|page=187}}

The Mu'tazili position on the roles of reason and revelation is well captured by what [[Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari]] (died 324 AH/935 AD), the eponym of the Ashʿari school of theology, attributed to the Mu'tazili scholar [[Ibrahim an-Nazzam]] (died 231 AH/845 AD) (1969):
{{Quote| كل معصية كان يجوز أن يأمر الله سبحانه بها فهي قبيحة للنهي، وكل معصية كان لا يجوز أن يبيحها الله سبحانه فهي قبيحة لنفسها كالجهل به والاعتقاد بخلافه، وكذلك كل ما جاز أن لا يأمر الله سبحانه فهو حسن للأمر به وكل ما لم يجز إلا أن يأمر به فهو حسن لنفسه

''No sin may be ordered by God as it is wrong and forbidden, and no sin shall be permitted by God, as they are wrong by themselves. To know about it and believe otherwise, and all that God commands is good for the ordered and all that it is not permissible except to order it is good for himself''
}}

In the above formulation, a problem emerged, which is rendering something obligatory on the Divine being—something that seems to directly conflict with Divine omnipotence. The Mu'tazili argument is predicated on absolute Divine power and self-sufficiency, however. Replying to a hypothetical question as to why God does not do that which is ethically wrong (''la yaf`alu al-qabih''), 'Abd al-Jabbar replied:{{sfn|Martin|1997|page=96}} Because he knows the immorality of all unethical acts and that he is self-sufficient without them...For one of us who knows the immorality of injustice and lying, if he knows that he is self-sufficient without them and has no need of them, it would be impossible for him to choose them, insofar as he knows of their immorality and his sufficiency without them. Therefore, if God is sufficient without need of any unethical thing it necessarily follows that he would not choose the unethical based on his knowledge of its immorality. Thus every immoral thing that happens in the world must be a human act, for God transcends doing immoral acts. Indeed, God has distanced himself from that with his saying: "But Allah wills no injustice to his servants" (Qur'an 40:31), and his saying: "Verily Allah will not deal unjustly with humankind in anything" ([[Qur'an]] 10:44).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Vasalou |first=Sophia |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VASMAA-2 |title=Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Mu'tazilite Ethics |date=2008 |publisher=Princeton University Press}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Abd al-Jabbār |first=Al-Qāḍī |title=Al-mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl |url=https://albert.ias.edu/entities/publication/b795f609-3a80-4399-afcc-94c2f8c79eb8 |access-date=2024-12-15 |website=|doi=10.2143/MID.27.0.2036195 }}</ref>

The thrust of ʿAbd al-Jabbar's argument is that acting immorally or unwisely stems from need and deficiency. One acts in a repugnant way when one does not know the ugliness of one's deeds, i.e., because of lack of knowledge, or when one knows but one has some need, material, psychological, or otherwise. Since [[God]] is absolutely self-sufficient (a result from the cosmological "proof" of his existence), all-knowing, and all-powerful, he is categorically free from any type of need and, consequently, he never does anything that is ridiculous, unwise, ugly, or evil.<ref name=":1" />

The conflict between Mu'tazilis and Ash'aris concerning this point was a matter of focus. Mu'tazilis focused on divine justice, whereas the Ashʿaris focused on divine omnipotence. Nevertheless, Divine self-restraint in Mu'tazili discourse is part of divine omnipotence, not a negation of it.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ash-ariyya-and-mu-tazila/v-1# |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240803001911/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ash-ariyya-and-mu-tazila/v-1 |archive-date=2024-08-03 |access-date=2024-12-15 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |language=en}}</ref>