Editing Metaethics (section)

=== Ethical intuitionism ===
[[Ethical intuitionism]] is the view according to which some moral truths can be known ''without'' inference. That is, the view is at its core a [[foundationalism]] about moral beliefs. Such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]]. Ethical intuitionism commonly suggests [[moral realism]], the view that there are [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] facts of morality and, to be more specific, [[ethical non-naturalism]], the view that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural fact. However, neither moral realism nor ethical non-naturalism are essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists simply happen to hold those views as well. Ethical intuitionism comes in both a "rationalist" variety, and a more "empiricist" variety known as [[moral sense theory]].