Editing Meritocracy (section)

=== Critique of political meritocracy ===
Other Confucians have criticized Confucian meritocrats like Bell for their rejection of democracy. For them, Confucianism does not have to be premised on the assumption that meritorious, virtuous political leadership is inherently incompatible with popular sovereignty, political equality and the right to political participation.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kim |first=Sungmoon |title=Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-107-04903-1 |location=New York}}</ref> These thinkers accuse the meritocrats of overestimating the flaws of democracy, mistaking temporary flaws for permanent and inherent features, and underestimating the challenges that the construction of a true political meritocracy poses in practice—including those faced by contemporary China and Singapore.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Tan |first=Sor-hoon |title=Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction |publisher=State University of New York Press |year=2003 |isbn=0-7914-5889-X |location=Albany}}</ref> Franz Mang claims that, when decoupled from democracy, meritocracy tends to deteriorate into an oppressive regime under putatively "meritorious" but actually "authoritarian" rulers; Mang accuses Bell's China model of being self-defeating, as—Mang claims—the [[Chinese Communist Party]]'s authoritarian modes of engagement with the dissenting voices illustrate.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mang |first=Franz |date=2020 |title=Political meritocracy and its betrayal |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/MANPMA-6 |journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism |volume=46 |issue=9 |pages=1113–1126 |doi=10.1177/0191453720948386 |s2cid=225056766}}</ref> He Baogang and Mark Warren add that "meritocracy" should be understood as a concept describing a regime's character rather than its type, which is determined by distribution of political power—on their view, democratic institutions can be built which are meritocratic insofar as they favour competence.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=He Baogang |last2=Warren |first2=Mark |date=2020 |title=Can meritocracy replace democracy? A conceptual framework |journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism |volume=46 |issue=9 |pages=1093–1112 |doi=10.1177/0191453720948388 |s2cid=225056621}}</ref>

Roy Tseng, drawing on the New Confucians of the twentieth century, argues that Confucianism and liberal democracy can enter into a dialectical process, in which liberal rights and voting rights are rethought into resolutely modern, but nonetheless Confucian ways of life.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Tseng |first=Roy |date=2020 |title=Political meritocracy versus ethical democracy: The Confucian political ideal revisited |journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism |volume=46 |issue=9 |pages=1033–1052 |doi=10.1177/0191453720948398 |s2cid=224941702}}</ref> This synthesis, blending Confucians rituals and institutions with a broader liberal democratic frame, is distinct from both Western-style liberalism—which, for Tseng, suffers from excessive individualism and a lack of moral vision—and from traditional Confucianism—which, for Tseng, has historically suffered from rigid hierarchies and sclerotic elites. Against defenders of political meritocracy, Tseng claims that the fusion of Confucian and democratic institutions can conserve the best of both worlds, producing a more communal democracy which draws on a rich ethical tradition, addresses abuses of power, and combines popular accountability with a clear attention to the cultivation of virtue in elites.

Another illustration of the Meritocracy Gap can be seen in the ways that nations, like China, choose to promote many of its government officials. What is very troubling is the ways in which [[Princelings]] in the Chinese Government contradict the ideas "equal social classes" and "inherent ability" presented in the ideal operations of a meritocratic government.<ref name="Rule of the Princelings">{{cite web | url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rule-of-the-princelings/ | title=Rule of the Princelings }}</ref> The reality is that four out of the seven Community Party Officials of the Chinese Elite Government are Princelings.<ref name="Rule of the Princelings"/> It has been widely noted that large numbers of prominent party leaders and families have used their political power to convert state assets into their own private wealth.<ref name="Rule of the Princelings"/> In reality, the high number of Princelings in Chinese government contradicts the idea of "equal promotion of officials based on ability in a meritocracy government. The high presence of Princelings in Chinese government continues to illustrate that elite corruption still plays a significant role in the convergence and operation of state government.<ref name="Rule of the Princelings"/>