Editing Luftwaffe (section)

====Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues====
The RLM's apparent lack of a dedicated "technical-tactical" department, that would have directly been in contact with combat pilots to assess their needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice, had never been seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the planning of the original German air arm.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287">{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=287}}</ref> The RLM did have its own ''Technisches Amt'' (T-Amt) department to handle aviation technology issues, but this was tasked with handling all aviation technology issues in Nazi Germany, both military and civilian in nature, and also not known to have ever had any clear and actively administrative and consultative links with the front-line forces established for such purposes. On the front-line combat side of the issue, and for direct contact with the German aviation firms making the Luftwaffe's warplanes, the Luftwaffe did have its own reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or {{lang|de|Erprobungstellen}} located at three coastal sites – [[Peenemünde Airfield|Peenemünde-West]] (also incorporating a separate facility in nearby [[Karlshagen]]), [[Tarnewitz test site|Tarnewitz]] and [[Priwall Peninsula|Travemünde]] – and the central inland site of [[Müritz Airpark|Rechlin]], itself first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire, with the four-facility system commanded later in World War II by {{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Edgar Petersen]]. However, due to lack of co-ordination between the RLM and the OKL, all fighter and bomber development was oriented toward short-range aircraft, as they could be produced in greater numbers, rather than quality long-range aircraft, something that put the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage [[Aircraft of the Battle of Britain#German fighter fuel capacity|as early as the Battle of Britain]].<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> The "ramp-up" to production levels required to fulfill the Luftwaffe's front-line needs was also slow, not reaching maximum output until 1944.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> 

Production of fighters was not given priority until the [[Emergency Fighter Program]] was begun in 1944; [[Adolf Galland]] commented that this should have occurred at least a year earlier.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> Galland also pointed to the mistakes and challenges made in the development of the [[Messerschmitt Me 262]] including the protracted development time required for its [[Junkers Jumo 004]] jet engines to achieve reliability. German combat aircraft types that were first designed and flown in the mid-1930s had become obsolete, yet were kept in production, in particular the Ju 87 Stuka, and the Bf 109, because there were no well-developed replacement designs.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>