Editing John Hay (section)

===Service===
[[File:John Hay Vanity Fair 24 June 1897.jpg|thumb|[[Caricature]] of Hay in ''[[Vanity Fair (British magazine)|Vanity Fair]]'', 1897]]
During his service as ambassador, Hay attempted to advance the relationship between the U.S. and Britain. The United Kingdom had long been seen negatively by many Americans, a legacy of its role during the [[American Revolution]] that was refreshed by [[Britain in the American Civil War|its neutrality in the American Civil War]], when it allowed merchant raiders such as the [[CSS Alabama|''Alabama'']] to be constructed in British ports, which then preyed on US-flagged ships. In spite of these past differences, according to Taliaferro, "rapprochement made more sense than at any time in their respective histories".{{sfn|Taliaferro|pp=316–17}} In his Thanksgiving Day address to the American Society in London in 1897, Hay echoed these points, "The great body of people in the United States and England are friends&nbsp;... [sharing] that intense respect and reverence for order, liberty, and law which is so profound a sentiment in both countries".{{sfn|Kushner & Sherrill|p=86}} Although Hay was not successful in resolving specific controversies in his year and a third as ambassador, both he and British policymakers regarded his tenure as a success, because of the advancement of good feelings and cooperation between the two nations.{{sfn|Kushner & Sherrill|pp=99–100}}

An ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Britain was over the practice of pelagic sealing, that is, the capture of seals offshore of Alaska. The U.S. considered them American resources; the Canadians (Britain was still responsible for that dominion's foreign policy) contended that the mammals were being taken on the high seas, free to all. Soon after Hay's arrival, McKinley sent former Secretary of State [[John W. Foster]] to London to negotiate the issue. Foster quickly issued an accusatory note to the British that was printed in the newspapers. Although Hay was successful in getting [[Lord Salisbury]], then both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, to agree to a conference to decide the matter, the British withdrew when the U.S. also invited Russia and Japan, rendering the conference ineffective.{{sfn|Kushner & Sherrill|pp=88–90}} Another issue on which no agreement was reached was that of [[bimetallism]]: McKinley had promised silver-leaning Republicans to seek an international agreement varying the price ratio between silver and gold to allow for free coinage of silver, and Hay was instructed to seek British participation. The British would only join if the Indian colonial government (on a silver standard until 1893) was willing; this did not occur, and coupled with an improving economic situation that decreased support for bimetallism in the United States, no agreement was reached.{{sfn|Kushner & Sherrill|pp=90–93}}

Hay had little involvement in the crisis over Cuba that culminated in the [[Spanish–American War]]. He met with Lord Salisbury in October 1897 and gained assurances Britain would not intervene if the U.S. found it necessary to go to war against Spain. Hay's role was "to make friends and to pass along the English point of view to Washington".{{sfn|Taliaferro|pp=322–23}} Hay spent much of early 1898 on an extended trip to the Middle East, and did not return to London until the last week of March, by which time the [[USS Maine (ACR-1)|USS ''Maine'']] had exploded in Havana harbor. During the war, he worked to ensure U.S.–British amity,{{sfn|Taliaferro|pp=323–28}} and British acceptance of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines—Salisbury and his government preferred that the U.S. have the islands than have them fall into the hands of the Germans.{{sfn|Kushner & Sherrill|pp=97–98}} Hay succeeded in making sure that the British were kept "in the loop" with regards to the U.S. invasion of Cuba, and in both reassuring the British that none of their interests in Cuba would be harmed by the invasion, while simultaneously communicating those interests to the McKinley administration (McKinley was himself keen on maintaining a good relationship with the British).<ref>{{cite book|title=President McKinley: Architect of the American Century|first=Robert W.|last=Merry|page=223|publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|year=2017|isbn=978-1-4516-2544-8}}</ref>

In its early days, Hay described the war "as necessary as it is righteous".{{sfn|Zeitz 2014a|p=329}} In July, writing to former Assistant Secretary of the Navy [[Theodore Roosevelt]], who had gained wartime glory by leading the [[Rough Riders]] volunteer regiment, Hay made a description of the war{{sfn|Taliaferro|p=330}} for which, according to Zeitz, he "is best remembered by many students of American history":{{sfn|Zeitz 2014a|p=324}}

{{quote|It has been a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that Fortune that loves the brave.  It is now to be concluded, I hope, with that fine good nature, which is, after all, the distinguishing trait of the American character.{{sfn|Taliaferro|p=330}}}}

Secretary Sherman had resigned on the eve of war, and been replaced by his first assistant, [[William R. Day]]. One of McKinley's Canton cronies, with little experience of statecraft, Day was never intended as more than a temporary wartime replacement.{{sfn|Taliaferro|pp=331–32}} With America about to splash her flag across the Pacific, McKinley needed a secretary with stronger credentials.{{sfn|Gould|p=129}} On August 14, 1898, Hay received a telegram from McKinley that Day would head the American delegation to the peace talks with Spain, and that Hay would be the new Secretary of State. After some indecision, Hay, who did not think he could decline and still remain as ambassador, accepted. British response to Hay's promotion was generally positive, and [[Queen Victoria]], after he took formal leave of her at [[Osborne House]], invited him again the following day, and subsequently pronounced him, "the most interesting of all the Ambassadors I have known."{{sfn|Taliaferro|pp=333–35}}