Editing James Longstreet (section)

====July 3====
{{main|Pickett's Charge}}
On the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union [[VI Corps (Union Army)|VI Corps]] under [[John Sedgwick]] was in position to block this move. Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=455–458}} Lee wrote in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected".<ref name="Lee Gettysburg"/>

[[File:Pickett's-Charge.png|thumb|upright=1.5|left|Pickett's Charge, July 3 {{legend|#ff0000|Confederate}}{{legend|#0000ff|Union}}|alt=Map with lines and arrows showing troops movements]]
Since his plans for an early morning coordinated attack were now infeasible, Lee instead ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union line at Cemetery Ridge with his corps. The Union position was held by the [[II Corps (Union Army)|II Corps]] under [[Winfield Scott Hancock]]. Longstreet strongly felt that this assault had little chance of success, and shared his concerns with Lee.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=283–284; 296–297}} The Confederates would have to march over close to one mile (1.6&nbsp;km) of open ground and negotiate sturdy fences under fire.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=386}}{{sfn|Coddington|1968|p=503}} Longstreet urged Lee not to use his entire corps in the attack, arguing that the divisions of Law and McLaws were tired from the previous day and that shifting them away from their positions would dangerously expose the Confederate right flank. Lee conceded and instead decided to use men from A.P. Hill's corps to accompany Pickett. The force would include about 14,000 or 15,000 men.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=386}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=283–285}} Longstreet again told Lee that he believed the attack would fail.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=283}}

Lee did not change his mind, and Longstreet relented. The final plan called for an artillery barrage by 170 cannon under Alexander. Then, the three brigades under Pickett and the four brigades in the division of [[Henry Heth]], temporarily commanded by Brigadier General [[J. Johnston Pettigrew]], positioned to Pickett's left, would lead the attack. Two brigades from [[William Dorsey Pender]]'s division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier General [[Isaac R. Trimble]], would fill in as support behind Pettigrew. Two brigades from R.H. Anderson's division were to support Pickett's right flank. Despite his vocal disapproval of the plan and although most of the units came from A.P. Hill's corps, Lee designated Longstreet to lead the attack. Longstreet dutifully saw to the positioning of Pickett's men. General Pickett placed the brigades of Garnett and Brigadier General [[James L. Kemper]] in front with Armistead behind them in support. However, Longstreet neglected to adequately check on Pettigrew's division. Pettigrew had never commanded a division before, and the division which he had just been appointed to lead had suffered one-third casualties in the fighting on July 1. His men were positioned behind Pickett's lines, leaving Pickett vulnerable, and the troops on his far left were dangerously exposed. Longstreet and Hill still had a tense relationship, which may have played a role in Longstreet not carefully overseeing Hill's troops. Hill was with Lee and Longstreet throughout much of the morning, but wrote after the battle that he had ordered his men to report to Longstreet, implying that he felt he was not responsible for arranging them.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=284–287}}

During preparations for the attack, Longstreet began to agonize over the assault. He attempted to pass the responsibility for launching Pickett's division to Alexander. The artillery bombardment began at about 1 P.M. Union batteries responded, and the two sides fired back and forth for about one hour and forty minutes. When the time came to actually order Pickett forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, unable to verbalize the order, thus beginning the assault known as [[Pickett's Charge]]. Beginning at about 3 P.M., Confederate troops marched towards the Union positions. As Longstreet had anticipated, the attack was a complete disaster. The assaulting units suffered massive casualties. Pettigrew and Trimble were wounded. Pickett's first two brigades were severely mauled. Kemper was wounded and Garnett was killed. Armistead's brigade briefly breached the stone wall that marked Hancock's lines, where Armistead fell mortally wounded, but the brigade was repulsed.{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=254–265}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=389–410}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=288–297}} To his men, Lee said, "It is all my fault."{{sfn|Piston|1987|p=61}} According to two of Longstreet's staff officers, Lee subsequently expressed regret for not taking Longstreet's advice.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=296–297}} On July 4, the Confederate army began its [[retreat from Gettysburg]]. Hampered by rain, the bulk of the army finally made it across the Potomac River on the night of July 13–14.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=293}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=174–176}}