Editing Ethics (section)

=== Moral knowledge ===
The epistemology of ethics studies whether or how one can know moral truths. [[Foundationalism|Foundationalist]] views state that some moral beliefs are basic and do not require further justification. [[Ethical intuitionism]] is one such view that says that humans have a [[Intuition|special cognitive faculty]] through which they can know right from wrong. Intuitionists often argue that general moral truths, like "Lying is wrong", are [[self-evident]] and that it is possible to [[A priori and a posteriori|know them without relying on empirical experience]]. A different foundationalist position focuses on particular observations rather than general intuitions. It says that if people are confronted with a concrete moral situation, they can perceive whether right or wrong conduct was involved.<ref name="Sayre-McCord 2023 loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology">{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 6. Epistemological Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref>

In contrast to foundationalists, [[Coherentism|coherentists]] say that there are no basic moral beliefs. They argue that beliefs form a complex network and mutually support and justify one another. According to this view, a moral belief can only amount to knowledge if it coheres with the rest of the beliefs in the network.<ref name="Sayre-McCord 2023 loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology"/> [[Moral skepticism|Moral skeptics]] say that people are unable to distinguish between right and wrong behavior, thereby rejecting the idea that moral knowledge is possible. A common objection by critics of moral skepticism asserts that it leads to [[immoral]] behavior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2019|loc=Lead section, § 1. Varieties of Moral Skepticism, § 2. A Presumption Against Moral Skepticism?}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref>

[[File:Trolley Problem.svg|thumb|upright=1.25|alt=Diagram depicting a trolley that is headed towards a group of people. There is an alternate track with only one person and a switch to change tracks.|The [[trolley problem]] is a thought experiment about the moral difference between doing and allowing harm.]]

[[Thought experiment]]s are used as a [[Philosophical methodology|method]] in ethics to decide between competing theories. They usually present an imagined situation involving an [[ethical dilemma]] and explore how people's intuitions of right and wrong change based on specific details in that situation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|pp=195–196}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Baggini|Fosl|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mZvfEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA284 284]}} }}</ref> For example, in [[Philippa Foot]]'s [[trolley problem]], a person can flip a switch to redirect a trolley from one track to another, thereby sacrificing the life of one person to save five. This scenario explores how the difference between doing and allowing harm affects moral obligations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|p=195}} | {{harvnb|Woollard|Howard-Snyder|2022|loc=§ 3. The Trolley Problem and the Doing/Allowing Distinction}} | {{harvnb|Rini|loc=§ 8. Moral Cognition and Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref> Another thought experiment, proposed by [[Judith Jarvis Thomson]], examines the moral implications of [[abortion]] by imagining a situation in which a person gets connected without their consent [[A Defense of Abortion#The violinist|to an ill violinist]]. In this scenario, the violinist dies if the connection is severed, similar to how a fetus dies in the case of abortion. The thought experiment explores whether it would be morally permissible to sever the connection within the next nine months.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|p=195}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=§ 1. Important Characteristics of Thought Experiments}} }}</ref>