Editing Deng Xiaoping (section)

== Leadership of China (1978–1989) ==
=== Paramount leader ===
[[File:Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter at the arrival ceremony for the Vice Premier of China. - NARA - 183157-restored.jpg|thumb|Deng Xiaoping and [[Jimmy Carter]] at the arrival ceremony of [[State visit by Deng Xiaoping to the United States|Deng's visit to the US]] (1979)|alt=]]
Following Mao's death on 9 September 1976 and the purge of the Gang of Four in October 1976, Premier [[Hua Guofeng]] succeeded as [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party]] and gradually emerged as the ''de facto'' leader of China. Prior to Mao's death, the only governmental position Deng held was that of First Vice Premier of the State Council,<ref>1975–1976 and 1977–1980, Europa Publications (2002) "The People's Republic of Chine: Introductory Survey" ''The Europa World Year Book 2003'' volume 1, (44th edition) Europa Publications, London, p. 1075, col. 1, {{ISBN|1-85743-227-4}}; and Bo, Zhiyue (2007) ''China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing'' World Scientific, Hackensack, New Jersey, p. 59, {{ISBN|981-270-041-2}}</ref> but Hua Guofeng wanted to rid the Party of extremists and successfully marginalised the Gang of Four. On 22 July 1977, Deng was restored to the posts of vice-chairman of the Central Committee, vice-chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 July 1977 |title=1977: Deng Xiaoping back in power |work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/22/newsid_2516000/2516339.stm |url-status=live |access-date=21 July 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170728025020/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/22/newsid_2516000/2516339.stm |archive-date=28 July 2017}}</ref>

By carefully mobilizing his supporters within the party, Deng outmaneuvered Hua, who had pardoned him, then ousted Hua from his top leadership positions by 1980. In contrast to previous leadership changes, Deng allowed Hua to retain membership in the Central Committee and quietly retire, helping to set the precedent that losing a high-level leadership struggle would not result in physical harm.

During his paramount leadership, his official state positions were [[Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference]] from 1978 to 1983 and [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman of the Central Military Commission]] (an ''ad hoc'' body comprising the most senior members of the party elite) of the People's Republic of China from 1983 to 1990, while his official party positions were [[Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party]] from 1977 to 1982, Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party from 1981 to 1989 and Chairman of the [[Central Advisory Commission]] from 1982 to 1987. He was offered the rank of General First Class in 1988 when the PLA restored military ranks, but as in 1955, he once again declined. Even after retiring from the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] in 1987 and the Central Military Commission in 1989, Deng continued to exert influence over China's policies until his death in 1997.

Important decisions were always taken in Deng's home at No. 11 Miliangku Hutong with a caucus of eight senior party cadres, called "[[Eight Elders]]", especially with [[Chen Yun]] and Li Xiannian.<ref>{{cite web |title=百年老胡同米粮库中的那些名人"住客" |url=https://www.visitbeijing.com.cn/article/47QrNuQyRVf |website=visitbeijing.com |publisher=Beijing Tourism Network |access-date=30 April 2023 |archive-date=30 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230430003858/https://www.visitbeijing.com.cn/article/47QrNuQyRVf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title="家庭园艺师"邓小平 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0907/c69113-30278378.html |website=people.com |publisher=People's Daily |access-date=30 August 2024 |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830004907/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0907/c69113-30278378.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Despite Deng's recognition as paramount leader, in practice these elders governed China as a small collective leadership.<ref name=":26">{{Cite book |last=Ang |first=Yuen Yuen |url= |title=How China Escaped the Poverty Trap |date=2016 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5017-0020-0 |doi= |jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1zgwm1j |author-link=Yuen Yuen Ang}}</ref>{{Rp|page=78}} Deng ruled as "paramount leader" although he never held the top title of the party, and was able to successively remove three party leaders, including Hu Yaobang.<ref name="scmp20120420xiang">Xiang, Lanxin (20 April 2012). "Bo Xilai probe shows up China's outdated system of government". ''South China Morning Post''</ref> Deng stepped down from the Central Committee and its Politburo Standing Committee. However, he remained as the chairman of the State and Party's Central Military Commission and was still seen as the paramount leader of China rather than General Secretary [[Zhao Ziyang]] and Presidents Li Xiannian and [[Yang Shangkun]].

=== Boluan Fanzheng ===
{{Main|Boluan Fanzheng}}
Deng repudiated the Cultural Revolution and, in 1977, launched the "[[Beijing Spring]]", which allowed open criticism of the excesses and suffering that had occurred during the period, and restored the [[National College Entrance Examination]] (Gao Kao) which had been cancelled for ten years during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, he was the impetus for the abolition of the class background system. Under this system, the CCP removed employment barriers to Chinese deemed to be associated with the former landlord class; its removal allowed a faction favoring the restoration of the private market to enter the Communist Party.

Deng gradually outmaneuvered his political opponents. By encouraging public criticism of the Cultural Revolution, he weakened the position of those who owed their political positions to that event, while strengthening the position of those like himself who had been purged during that time. Deng also received a great deal of popular support. As Deng gradually consolidated control over the CCP, Hua was replaced by Zhao Ziyang as premier in 1980, and by [[Hu Yaobang]] as party chairman in 1981, despite the fact that Hua was Mao Zedong's designated successor as the "paramount leader" of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. During the Boluan Fanzheng period, the Cultural Revolution was invalidated, and victims of more than 3&nbsp;million "unjust, false, wrongful cases" by 1976 were officially rehabilitated.<ref>{{Cite web |title=1989年6月1日 吴林泉、彭飞：胡耀邦同志领导平反"六十一人案"追记-胡耀邦史料信息网 |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210103094052/http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |archive-date=3 January 2021 |access-date=29 April 2020 |website=www.hybsl.cn |language=zh}}</ref>

Deng's elevation to China's new number-one figure meant that the historical and ideological questions around Mao Zedong had to be addressed properly. Because Deng wished to pursue deep reforms, it was not possible for him to continue Mao's hard-line "class struggle" policies and mass public campaigns. In 1982 the Central Committee of the Communist Party released a document entitled ''[[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China]]''. Mao retained his status as a "great Marxist, proletarian revolutionary, militarist, and general", and the undisputed founder and pioneer of the country and the People's Liberation Army. "His accomplishments must be considered before his mistakes", the document declared. Deng personally commented that Mao was "seven parts good, three parts bad". The document also steered the prime responsibility of the Cultural Revolution away from Mao (although it did state that "Mao mistakenly began the Cultural Revolution") to the "counter-revolutionary cliques" of the Gang of Four and Lin Biao.

=== International affairs ===
[[File:Visit of Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to Johnson Space Center - GPN-2002-000077.jpg|thumb|left|Deng Xiaoping (left) and his wife Zhuo Lin (right) are briefed by [[Johnson Space Center]] director [[Christopher C. Kraft]] (extreme right)]]Deng prioritized China's modernization and opening up to the outside world, stating that China's "strategy in foreign affairs is to seek a peaceful environment" for the [[Four Modernizations]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=9 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> Under Deng's leadership, China opened up to the outside world, to learn from more advanced countries.<ref name=":2" /> Deng developed the principle that in foreign affairs, China should keep a low-profile and bide its time.<ref name=":2" /> He continued to seek an independent position between the United States and the Soviet Union.<ref name=":2" /> Although Deng retained control over key national security decisions, he also delegated power to bureaucrats in routine matters, ratifying consensus decisions and stepping in if a bureaucratic consensus could not be reached.<ref name=":2" /> In contrast to the Mao-era, Deng involved more parties in foreign policy decision-making, decentralizing the foreign policy bureaucracy.<ref name=":04">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=175–176 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=8 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref> This decentralized approach led to consideration of a number of interests and views, but also fragmentation of policy institutions and extensive bargaining between different bureaucratic units during the policy-making process.<ref name=":04" />

In November 1978, after the country had stabilized following political turmoil, Deng visited [[Bangkok]], Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and met with Singapore's Prime Minister [[Lee Kuan Yew]]. Deng was very impressed with Singapore's economic development, greenery and housing, and later sent tens of thousands of Chinese to Singapore and countries around the world to learn from their experiences and bring back their knowledge. [[Lee Kuan Yew]], on the other hand, advised Deng to stop exporting Communist ideologies to Southeast Asia, advice that according to Lee, Deng later followed.<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 December 2005 |title=MFA, Singapore Press Release |url=http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1538 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120302193654/http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1538 |archive-date=2 March 2012 |access-date=27 November 2011 |publisher=App.mfa.gov.sg}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Lee Kuan Yew|title=From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000|chapter=37. Deng Xiaoping's China|publisher=HarperCollins|year=2000|pages=595–603|isbn=0060197765|ol=OL9230669M}}</ref> In late 1978, the aerospace company [[Boeing]] announced the sale of [[Boeing 747|747 aircraft]] to various airlines in the PRC, and the beverage company [[The Coca-Cola Company|Coca-Cola]] made public their intention to open a production plant in Shanghai.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

On 1 January 1979, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China, leaving the (Taiwan) Republic of China's nationalist government to one side, and business contacts between China and the West began to grow.<ref>{{Cite web |title=United States announces that it will recognize communist China {{!}} 15 December 1978 {{!}} HISTORY |url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-announces-that-it-will-recognize-communist-china |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231205211107/https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-announces-that-it-will-recognize-communist-china |archive-date=5 December 2023 |access-date=15 January 2024 |website=HISTORY|date=13 November 2009 }}</ref>

In early 1979, Deng undertook an [[1979 visit by Deng Xiaoping to the United States|official visit to the United States]], meeting President Jimmy Carter in Washington as well as several Congressmen. The Chinese insisted that former President [[Richard Nixon]] be invited to the formal White House reception, a symbolic indication of their assertiveness on the one hand, and their desire to continue with the Nixon initiatives on the other. As part of the discussions with Carter, Deng sought United States approval for China's contemplated invasion of Vietnam in the [[Sino-Vietnamese War|Sino-Vietnamese war]].<ref name=":33">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1346366969 |title=The Dragon Roars Back Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford |pages=56 |oclc=1346366969}}</ref> According to United States National Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], Carter reserved judgment, an action which Chinese diplomats interpreted as tacit approval, and China launched the invasion shortly after Deng's return.<ref name=":33" />

During the visit, Deng visited the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center|Johnson Space Center]] in [[Houston]], as well as the headquarters of Coca-Cola and Boeing in [[Atlanta]] and [[Seattle]], respectively. With these visits so significant, Deng made it clear that the new Chinese regime's priorities were economic and technological development.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

Deng took personal charge of the final negotiations with the United States on normalizing foreign relations between the two countries.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=9–10 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> In response to criticism from within the Party regarding his United States policy, Deng wrote, "I am presiding over the work on the United States. If there are problems, I take full responsibility."<ref name=":8" />

[[People's Republic of China–Japan relations|Sino-Japanese relations]] improved significantly.<ref>(Article 2) "The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek [[hegemony]] in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html MOFA: Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170609105736/http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html |date=9 June 2017 }}</ref> Deng used Japan as an example of a rapidly progressing power that set a good example for China economically.<ref>{{cite book|last=Perkins|first=D.|date=1986|editor1-last=Barnett|editor1-first=A. Doak|editor2-first=Ralph N.|editor2-last=Clough|title=Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development|publisher=Westview|location=Boulder|isbn=0-8133-0333-8|ol=OL2537122M|chapter=The Prospects for China's Economic Reforms|page=58}}</ref>

Deng initially continued to adhere to the Maoist line of the [[Sino–Soviet split]] era that the Soviet Union was a superpower as "hegemonic" as the United States, but even more threatening to China because of its close proximity.<ref>{{cite book|author=Michael E. Marti|title=China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping|location=Washington, D.C.|publisher=Brassy's|year=2002|isbn=1-57488-416-6|ol=OL8743093M|page=19}}</ref> Relations with the Soviet Union improved after [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] took over the Kremlin in 1985, and formal relations between the two countries were finally restored at the [[1989 Sino-Soviet Summit]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Parks |first=Michael |date=15 May 1989 |title=Gorbachev in China: The Communist Summit: Deng and Gorbachev: Great Reformers Battling Socialist Crises |work=Los Angeles Times |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-05-15-mn-141-story.html |url-status=live |access-date=8 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200729224552/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-05-15-mn-141-story.html |archive-date=29 July 2020}}</ref>

Deng responded to the Western sanctions following the Tiananmen Square protests by adopting the "twenty-four character guidelines" for China's international affairs: observe carefully (冷静观察), secure China's positions (稳住阵脚), calmly cope with the challenges (沉着应付), hide China's capacities and bide its time (韬光养晦), be good at maintaining a low profile (善于守拙), and never claim leadership (绝不当头).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=62 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref>

The end of the Cold War and [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] removed the original motives underlying rapprochement between China and the United States.<ref name=":7">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781503634152 |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2022 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |pages=51 |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |access-date=1 January 2023 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153307/https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781503634152/html |url-status=live }}</ref> Deng was motivated by concerns that the United States might curtail support for China's modernization, and adopted a low-profile foreign policy to live with the fact of United States hegemony and focus primarily on domestic development.<ref name=":7" /> In this period of its foreign policy, China focused on building good relations with its neighbors and actively participating in multi-lateral institutions.<ref name=":7" /> As academic [[Suisheng Zhao]] writes in evaluating Deng's foreign policy legacy, "Deng's developmental diplomacy helped create a favorable external environment for China's rise in the twenty-first century. His hand-picked successors, Jiang Zemin and [[Hu Jintao]], faithfully followed his course."<ref name=":7" />

In 1990 when he met Canadian Prime Minister [[Pierre Trudeau]] he stated "The key principle governing the new international order should be noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs and social systems. It won't work to require all the countries in the world to copy the patterns set by the United States, Britain and France."<ref>{{cite book|editor=Tiang Boon Hoo|title=Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi |date=2017|location=London|publisher=Routledge|page=115|doi=10.4324/9781315628981|isbn=9781317242673}}</ref> Deng championed the [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]] stating that they should be used as the "guiding norms of international relations".<ref>{{cite book|editor1=Neena Sondhi|editor2=Ramakrushna Panigrahi|editor3=Miao Pang|editor4=Rajashri Chatterjee|title=Comparative Development of India & China: Economic, Technological, Sectoral & Socio-cultural Insights|date=January 2021|publisher=SAGE Publishing|page=372|isbn=9789353886066}}</ref>

=== Reform and Opening-up ===
{{Main|Chinese economic reform}}At the outset of China's reform and opening up, Deng set out the [[Four Cardinal Principles]] that had to be maintained in the process: (1) the leadership of the Communist Party, (2) the socialist road, (3) Marxism, and (4) the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=136 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=8 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref> Overall, reform proceeded gradually, with Deng delegating specific issues to proteges such as Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang, who in turn addressed them under the guiding principle of "seeking truth from facts" - meaning that the correctness of an approach had to be gauged by its economic results.<ref name=":26" /> Deng described reform and opening up as a "large scale experiment" requiring thorough "experimentation in practice" instead of textbook knowledge.<ref name=":42">{{Cite book |last=Heilmann |first=Sebastian |url= |title=Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facilitated China's Rise |date=2018 |publisher=[[The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press]] |isbn=978-962-996-827-4 |author-link=Sebastian Heilmann}}</ref>{{Rp|page=65}}

In Deng's view, socialism could not be considered superior to capitalism unless it improved the lives of the people in material ways.<ref name=":11">{{Cite book |last=Chatwin |first=Jonathan |title=The Southern Tour: Deng Xiaoping and the Fight for China's Future |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781350435711}}</ref>{{Rp|page=xiv}} During Reform and Opening-up, he criticized those he deemed as the ideologues of the Cultural Revolution for seeking "poor socialism" and "poor communism" and believing that communism was a "spiritual thing".<ref name=":11" />{{Rp|page=xiv}} In 1979, Deng stated, "Socialism cannot endure if it remains poor. If we want to uphold Marxism and socialism in the international class struggle, we have to demonstrate that the Marxist system of thought is superior to all others, and that the socialist system is superior to capitalism".<ref name=":11" />{{Rp|page=xvi}}

==== Four modernizations ====
{{Main|Four Modernizations}}
Deng quoted the old proverb "it doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, if it catches mice it is a good cat", which summarizes his pragmatic "[[Cat theory (Deng Xiaoping)|cat theory]]". The point was that capitalistic methods worked.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=John Naisbitt |url=https://archive.org/details/chinasmegatrends00nais_0 |title=China's Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society |last2=Doris Naisbitt |publisher=HarperBusiness |year=2010 |isbn=9780061963445 |page=[https://archive.org/details/chinasmegatrends00nais_0/page/4 4] |url-access=registration}}</ref>  Deng worked with his team, especially as Zhao Ziyang, who in 1980 replaced Hua Guofeng as premier, and Hu Yaobang, who in 1981 did the same with the post of party chairman. Deng thus took the reins of power and began to emphasize the goals of "four modernizations" (economy, agriculture, scientific and technological development and national defense). He announced an ambitious plan of opening and liberalizing the economy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mason |first=David |year=1984 |title=China's Four Modernizations: Blueprint for Development or Prelude to Turmoil? |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=11 |pages=47–70 |doi=10.1080/00927678.1984.10553699 |number=3}}</ref>

The last position of power retained by Hua Guofeng, chairman of the Central Military Commission, was taken by Deng in 1981. However, progress toward military modernization went slowly. A [[Sino-Vietnamese War|border war]] with Vietnam in 1977–1979 made major changes unwise. The war puzzled outside observers, but Xiaoming Zhang argues that Deng had multiple goals: stopping Soviet expansion in the region, obtain American support for his four modernizations, and mobilizing China for reform and integration into the world economy. Deng also sought to strengthen his control of the PLA, and demonstrate to the world that China was capable of fighting a real war. Zhang thinks punishment of Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia was a minor factor.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Xiaoming |year=2010 |title=Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to go to War with Vietnam |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=3–29 |doi=10.1162/JCWS_a_00001 |s2cid=57559703}}</ref> In the event, the Chinese forces did poorly, in terms of equipment, strategy, leadership, and battlefield performance.{{sfnb|Vogel|2011|p=526–535}} Deng subsequently used the PLA's poor performance to overcome resistance by military leaders to his military reforms.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=230}}

China's primary military threat came from the Soviet Union, which was much more powerful despite having fewer soldiers, owing to its more advanced weapons technology. In March 1981, Deng deemed a [[military exercise]] necessary for the PLA, and in September, the [[North China Military Exercise]] took place, becoming the largest exercise conducted by the PLA since the founding of the People's Republic. Moreover, Deng initiated the [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|modernization of the PLA]] and decided that China first had to develop an advanced civilian scientific infrastructure before it could hope to build modern weapons. He therefore concentrated on downsizing the military, cutting 1&nbsp;million troops in 1985 (百万大裁军),<ref name=":02">{{Cite web |date=6 May 1985 |title=Troop Cut to Save Money, Deng Says |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-05-06-mn-4457-story.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622133140/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-05-06-mn-4457-story.html |archive-date=22 June 2020 |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=[[Los Angeles Times]]}}</ref> retiring the elderly and corrupt senior officers and their cronies. He emphasized the recruitment of much better educated young men who would be able to handle the advanced technology when it finally arrived. Instead of patronage and corruption in the officer corps, he imposed strict discipline in all ranks. In 1982 he established a new Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense to plan for using technology developed in the civilian sector.{{sfnb|Vogel|2011|p=535–552}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dreyer |first=June Teufel |year=1988 |title=Deng Xiaoping and Modernization of the Chinese Military |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=215–231 |doi=10.1177/0095327X8801400203 |s2cid=144391672}}</ref>

==== Three steps to economic development ====
In 1986, Deng explained to [[Mike Wallace]] on ''[[60 Minutes]]'' that some people and regions could become prosperous first in order to bring about common prosperity faster.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Paulson |first=Henry M. |title=Dealing with China : an insider unmasks the new economic superpower |date=2015 |isbn=9781455504213 |edition=First |location=New York |page=21}}</ref> In October 1987, at the Plenary Session of the National People's Congress, Deng was re-elected as Chairman of the [[Central Military Commission (People's Republic of China)|Central Military Commission]], but he resigned as Chairman of the [[Central Advisory Commission]] and was succeeded by Chen Yun. Deng continued to chair and develop the reform and opening up as the main policy, and he advanced the three steps suitable for China's economic development strategy within seventy years: the first step, to double the 1980 GNP and ensure that the people have enough food and clothing, was attained by the end of the 1980s; the second step, to quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of the 20th century, was achieved in 1995 ahead of schedule; the third step, to increase per capita GNP to the level of the medium-developed countries by 2050, at which point, the Chinese people will be fairly well-off and modernization will be basically realized.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Three-Step Development Strategy |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/38199.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180917215520/http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/38199.htm |archive-date=17 September 2018 |access-date=28 November 2010 |publisher=china.org.cn}}</ref>

==== Further reforms ====
{{Main|Socialist market economy|History of the People's Republic of China#Political reforms}}
{{More citations needed section|date=July 2020}}

Improving relations with the outside world was the second of two important philosophical shifts outlined in Deng's program of reform termed ''Gaige Kaifang'' (''lit.'' Reforms and Openness). China's domestic social, political, and most notably, economic systems would undergo significant changes during Deng's time. The goals of Deng's reforms were summed up by the [[Four Modernizations]], those of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military.

The strategy for achieving these aims of becoming a modern, industrial nation was the [[socialist market economy]]. Deng argued that China was in the [[primary stage of socialism]] and that the duty of the party was to perfect so-called "[[socialism with Chinese characteristics]]",<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 February 1997 |title=Deng Xiaoping Is Dead at 92; Architect of Modern China |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-is-dead-at-92-architect-of-modern-china.html |url-status=live |access-date=15 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123203613/http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-is-dead-at-92-architect-of-modern-china.html |archive-date=23 January 2017}}</ref><ref name="jac" /> and "[[seek truth from facts]]". (This somewhat resembles the Leninist theoretical justification of the [[New Economic Policy]] (NEP) in the 1920s, which argued that the [[Soviet Union]] had not gone deeply enough into the capitalist phase and therefore needed limited capitalism in order to fully evolve its means of production.) The "socialism with Chinese characteristics" settles a benign structure for the implementation of ethnic policy and forming a unique method of ethnic theory.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=万方数据知识服务平台 |url=http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/periodical/ghlc201105008 |url-status=live |doi=10.3969/j.issn.1004-1494.2011.05.008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217055507/http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/periodical/ghlc201105008 |archive-date=17 February 2021 |access-date=28 October 2020 |website=d.wanfangdata.com.cn}}</ref>

Deng's economic policy prioritized developing China's [[productive forces]].<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last=Boer |first=Roland |author-link=Roland Boer |date=1 October 2021 |title=From Belgrade to Beijing : Comparing Socialist Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and China |journal=World Review of Political Economy |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=309 |doi=10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.12.3.0296 |issn=2042-8928 |s2cid=247967541|doi-access=free }}</ref> In Deng's view, this development "is the most fundamental revolution from the viewpoint of historical development[,]" and "[p]oor socialism" is not socialism.<ref name=":9" /> His theoretical justification for allowing market forces was:

{{blockquote|The proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, because there is planning under capitalism too; a market economy is not capitalism, because there are markets under socialism too. Planning and market forces are both means of controlling economic activity. The essence of socialism is liberation and development of the productive forces, elimination of exploitation and polarisation, and the ultimate achievement of prosperity for all. This concept must be made clear to the people.<ref>Cited by John Gittings in ''[[iarchive:changingfaceofch00gitt|The Changing Face of China]]'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. {{ISBN|0-19-280612-2}}. Page 253.</ref>}}

Unlike Hua Guofeng, Deng believed that no policy should be rejected outright simply because it was not associated with Mao. Unlike more conservative leaders such as Chen Yun, Deng did not object to policies on the grounds that they were similar to ones that were found in capitalist nations.

This political flexibility towards the foundations of socialism is strongly supported by quotes such as:

{{blockquote|We mustn't fear to adopt the advanced management methods applied in capitalist countries&nbsp;... The very essence of socialism is the liberation and development of the productive systems&nbsp;... Socialism and market economy are not incompatible&nbsp;... We should be concerned about right-wing deviations, but most of all, we must be concerned about left-wing deviations.<ref>Cited by António Caeiro in ''Pela China Dentro'' (translated), Dom Quixote, Lisboa, 2004. {{ISBN|972-20-2696-8}}</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}}}

Although Deng provided the theoretical background and the political support to allow economic reform to occur, the general consensus amongst historians is that few of the economic reforms that Deng introduced were originated by Deng himself. Premier Zhou Enlai, for example, pioneered the Four Modernizations years before Deng. In addition, many reforms would be introduced by local leaders, often not sanctioned by central government directives. If successful and promising, these reforms would be adopted by larger and larger areas and ultimately introduced nationally. An often cited example is the [[household responsibility system]], which was first secretly implemented by a poor rural village at the risk of being convicted as "counter-revolutionary". This experiment proved very successful.<ref>Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China, Stanford University Press, 1996</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}} Deng openly supported it and it was later adopted nationally. Many other reforms were influenced by the experiences of the [[Four Asian Tigers|East Asian Tigers]].<ref>Cited by David Shambaugh in ''Deng Xiaoping: portrait of a Chinese statesman'', Oxford University, Oxford, 1995. {{ISBN|0-19-828933-2}}</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

This was in sharp contrast to the pattern of ''[[perestroika]]'' undertaken by [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], in which most major reforms originated with Gorbachev himself. The bottom-up approach of Deng's reforms, in contrast to the top-down approach of ''perestroika'', was likely a key factor in the success of the former.<ref>Cited by Susan L. Shirk in ''The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China'', University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993. {{ISBN|0-520-07706-7}}</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

Deng's reforms actually included the introduction of planned, centralized management of the macro-economy by technically proficient bureaucrats, abandoning Mao's mass campaign style of economic construction. However, unlike the Soviet model, management was indirect through market mechanisms. Deng sustained Mao's legacy to the extent that he stressed the primacy of agricultural output and encouraged a significant decentralization of decision making in the rural economy teams and individual peasant households. At the local level, material incentives, rather than political appeals, were to be used to motivate the labor force, including allowing peasants to earn extra income by selling the produce of their private plots at free market value.

Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the Cultural Revolution-era trend towards localizing authority over [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] was reversed, and SOE management was again centralized.<ref name=":023">{{Cite book |last=Hirata |first=Koji |title=Making Mao's Steelworks: Industrial Manchuria and the Transnational Origins of Chinese Socialism |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-38227-4 |series=Cambridge Studies in the History of the People's Republic of China series |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=260}}

==== Export focus ====
In the move toward market allocation, local municipalities and provinces were allowed to invest in industries that they considered most profitable, which encouraged investment in light manufacturing. Thus, Deng's reforms shifted China's development strategy to an emphasis on light industry and [[export-oriented industrialization|export-led growth]]. Light industrial output was vital for a developing country coming from a low capital base. With the short gestation period, low capital requirements, and high foreign-exchange export earnings, revenues generated by light manufacturing were able to be reinvested in technologically more advanced production and further capital expenditures and investments.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

However, in sharp contrast to the similar, but much less successful reforms in the [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]] and the [[People's Republic of Hungary]], these investments were not government mandated. The capital invested in heavy industry largely came from the banking system, and most of that capital came from consumer deposits. One of the first items of the Deng reforms was to prevent reallocation of profits except through taxation or through the banking system; hence, the reallocation in state-owned industries was somewhat indirect, thus making them more or less independent from government interference. In short, Deng's reforms sparked an industrial revolution in China.<ref>FlorCruz, Jaime (19 December 2008) [http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/18/china.reform.florcruz/index.html "Looking back over China's last 30 years"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180320230717/http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/18/china.reform.florcruz/index.html|date=20 March 2018}} ''CNN''</ref>

These reforms were a reversal of the Maoist policy of economic self-reliance. China decided to accelerate the modernization process by stepping up the volume of foreign trade, especially the purchase of machinery from Japan and the West. In October 1978, to exchange the instruments of ratification for the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China", Deng Xiaoping visited Japan for the first time and was warmly received by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and others. Deng Xiaoping was only Vice Premier during the time of his meetings with Japanese officials, but the Japanese government received Deng as the effective paramount leader of China due to his long history with the CCP, nonetheless. Deng was deemed the first Chinese leader to receive an audience in addition to Japanese Emperor Showa. A news article  from NHK Japan in 1978 reported that Deng diplomatically stated "we talked about our past, but His Majesty's focus on building a better future is something I noticed." Deng's statement suggests the new era of China's political reform through foreign economic diplomacy.<ref>{{cite web |last1=NHK JAPAN |title=鄧小平副首相 天皇皇后両陛下と会見 |url=https://www2.nhk.or.jp/archives/movies/?id=D0009170072_00000 |website=NHK JAPAN |access-date=30 May 2024 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314235114/https://www2.nhk.or.jp/archives/movies/?id=D0009170072_00000 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China is an ongoing pact between the two nations to this day. Article 1 of the treaty describes mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. Article 2 proclaims anti-hegemony. Article 3 discusses the further development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries, and Article 4 addresses the relationship of this treaty with third countries. Although it took six years from the restoration of diplomatic relations for the peace treaty negotiations to be concluded as the "anti-hegemony" clause and the "third country" clause were considered the most contentious, the agreement still informs much of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Chae-Jin |title=The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty |journal=Pacific Affairs |date=1979 |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=420–445 |doi=10.2307/2757656 |jstor=2757656 }}</ref>  By participating in such export-led growth, China was able to step up the Four Modernizations by attaining certain foreign funds, market, advanced technologies and management experiences, thus accelerating its economic development. From 1980, Deng attracted foreign companies to a series of [[Special Economic Zones of the People's Republic of China|Special Economic Zones]], where foreign investment and market liberalization were encouraged.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stoltenberg |first=Clyde D. |date=1984 |title=China's Special Economic Zones: Their Development and Prospects |journal=Asian Survey |volume=24 |issue=6 |pages=637–654 |doi=10.2307/2644396 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=2644396}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Holmes |first=Frank |date=21 April 2017 |title=China's New Special Economic Zone Evokes Memories Of Shenzhen |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/04/21/chinas-new-special-economic-zone-evokes-memories-of-shenzhen/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190322005508/https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/04/21/chinas-new-special-economic-zone-evokes-memories-of-shenzhen/ |archive-date=22 March 2019 |access-date=22 March 2019 |website=Forbes}}</ref>

The reforms sought to improve labor productivity. New material incentives and bonus systems were introduced. Rural markets selling peasants' homegrown products and the surplus products of communes were revived. Not only did rural markets increase agricultural output, they stimulated industrial development as well. With peasants able to sell surplus agricultural yields on the open market, domestic consumption stimulated industrialization as well and also created political support for more difficult economic reforms.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

There are some parallels between Deng's [[market socialism]] especially in the early stages, and [[Vladimir Lenin]]'s NEP as well as those of [[Nikolai Bukharin]]'s economic policies, in that both foresaw a role for private entrepreneurs and markets based on trade and pricing rather than central planning. As academics [[Christopher Marquis]] and Kunyuan Qiao observe, Deng had been present in the Soviet Union when Lenin implemented the NEP, and it is reasonable to infer that it may have impacted Deng's view that markets could exist within socialism.<ref name=":10" />{{Rp|page=254}} In first meeting between Deng and [[Armand Hammer]], Deng pressed the industrialist and former investor in Lenin's Soviet Union for as much information on the [[new economic policy]] as possible.

=== Return of Hong Kong and Macau ===
[[File:Deng Thatcher 3.JPG|thumb|A model reconstruction of Deng Xiaoping's 1984 meeting with UK Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]], Shenzhen]]
From 1980 onwards, Deng led the expansion of the economy, and in political terms took over negotiations with the United Kingdom to [[Handover of Hong Kong|return Hong Kong]], meeting personally with then-Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]. Thatcher had participated in the meetings with the hopes of keeping British rule over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon—two of the three constituent territories of the colony—but this was firmly rejected by Deng.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hurst |first=Matthew |date=2022 |title=Britain's Approach to the Negotiations over the Future of Hong Kong, 1979–1982 |journal=The International History Review |volume=44 |issue=6 |pages=1386–1401 |doi=10.1080/07075332.2021.2024588 |s2cid=257431054 |doi-access=free }}</ref> The result of these negotiations was the [[Sino-British Joint Declaration]], signed on 19 December 1984, which formally outlined the United Kingdom's return of the whole Hong Kong colony to China by 1997. The Chinese government pledged to respect the economic system and civil liberties of the British colony for fifty years after the handover.<ref>Vogel, ''Deng Xiaoping'', pp. 487–511.</ref><ref>Nancy C. Jackson, "The Legal Regime of Hong Kong After 1997: An Examination of the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China". ''International Tax & Business Lawyer'' (1987): 377–423. [https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1072&context=bjil Online]{{Dead link|date=June 2022 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

Deng's theory of [[one country, two systems]] applied to Hong Kong and Macau and Deng intended to also present it as an attractive option to the people of [[Taiwan]] for eventual incorporation of that island, where sovereignty over the territory is still disputed.<ref>Vogel, ''Deng Xiaoping'', pp. 477–91.</ref> In 1982, Deng first explained the concept of one country, two systems in relation to Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Guoyou |title=An Ideological History of the Communist Party of China |last2=Ding |first2=Xuemai |date=2020 |publisher=Royal Collins Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-4878-0392-6 |editor-last=Zheng |editor-first=Qian |volume=3 |location=Montreal, Quebec |translator-last=Sun |translator-first=Li |translator-last2=Bryant |translator-first2=Shelly}}</ref>{{Rp|page=231}}

Deng's statements during the 1987 drafting of the [[Basic Law of Hong Kong]] showed his view of the principle in the Hong Kong context.<ref name=":042">{{Cite book |last=Hu |first=Richard |title=Reinventing the Chinese City |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21101-7 |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=176}} At that time, Deng stated that the central government would not intervene in the daily business of Hong Kong, but predicted Hong Kong would sometimes have issues affecting national interests that would require the central government's involvement.<ref name=":042" />{{Rp|pages=178–179}} Deng said, "after 1997, we shall still allow people in Hong Kong to attack the Communist Party of China and China verbally, but what if the words were turned into action, trying to convert Hong Kong into a base of opposition to the Chinese mainland under the pretext of 'democracy'? Then there’s no choice but intervention."<!-- and the sentences that follow were: “First the administrative bodies in Hong Kong should intervene; mainland troops stationed there would not necessarily be used. They would be used only if there were disturbances, serious disturbances. Anyway, intervention of some sort would be necessary.” --><ref name="china.org.cn 1987 i438">{{cite web | title=Speech at a Meeting with the Members of The Committee for Drafting the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region | website=china.org.cn | date=16 April 1987 | url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103351.htm | access-date=1 January 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050508210613/http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103351.htm | archive-date=8 May 2005}}</ref><ref name="香港01 2022 z800">{{cite web | title=回歸25周年｜重溫鄧小平與香港的那些事 | website=香港01 | date=2 July 2022 | url= https://www.hk01.com/article/788065 | language=zh | access-date=1 January 2024}}</ref> In June 1988, Deng stated that "Hong Kong's political system today is neither the British system nor the American system, and it should not transplant the Western ways in the future."<ref name=":042" />{{Rp|page=179}}

=== Population control and crime control ===
{{Main|Family planning policy|1983 "Strike Hard" Anti-crime Campaign}}
China's rapid economic growth presented several problems. The 1982 census revealed the extraordinary growth of the population, which already exceeded a billion people. Deng continued the plans initiated by Hua Guofeng to [[One-child policy|restrict birth to only one child]], limiting women to one child under pain of administrative penalty.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Family Planning in China |url=http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176938.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180619013045/http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176938.htm |archive-date=19 June 2018 |access-date=28 November 2019 |website=www.china-un.ch}}</ref> The policy applied to urban areas, and included forced abortions.<ref>{{cite journal|author1=Wang Feng|author2=Yong Cai|author3=Baochang Gu|title=Population, policy, and politics: how will history judge China's one-child policy?|url=https://archive.org/details/625751-population-council-population-policy-and-politics|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=38|date=19 February 2013|pages=115–129|doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00555.x|doi-access=free}}</ref>

In August 1983, Deng launched the [[1983 "Strike Hard" Anti-crime Campaign|"Strike hard" Anti-crime Campaign]] due to the worsening public safety after the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web |title=People's Daily Online -- China rejects "strike hard" anti-crime policy for more balanced approach |url=http://en.people.cn/200703/14/eng20070314_357516.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018113603/http://en.people.cn/200703/14/eng20070314_357516.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=18 October 2020 |access-date=21 June 2020 |website=en.people.cn}}</ref><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> It was reported that the government set quotas for 5,000 executions by mid-November, and sources in Taiwan claimed that as many as 60,000 people were executed in that time,<ref>{{Cite web |title=In Human Rights, China Remains in the Maoist Era &#124; the Heritage Foundation |url=http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1985/06/in-human-rights-china-remains-in-the-maoist-era |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516232433/http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/1985/06/In-Human-Rights-China-Remains-in-the-Maoist-Era |archive-date=16 May 2011 |access-date=31 January 2017}}</ref> although more recent estimates have placed the number at 24,000 who were [[sentenced to death]] (mostly in the first "battle" of the campaign).<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=3 August 2013 |title=Strike less hard |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2013/08/03/strike-less-hard |url-status=live |access-date=23 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323192208/https://www.economist.com/china/2013/08/03/strike-less-hard |archive-date=23 March 2019}}</ref> A number of people arrested (some even received [[Death-penalty|death penalty]]) were children or relatives of government officials at various levels, including the grandson of [[Zhu De]], demonstrating the principle of "[[Equality before the law|all are equal before the law]]".<ref name=":4">{{Cite news|author=Choi Chi-yuk|date=26 January 2018 |title=Detentions, torture, executions: how China dealt with mafia in the past |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2130679/chinas-decades-long-battle-organised-crime |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622162409/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2130679/chinas-decades-long-battle-organised-crime |archive-date=22 June 2020 |access-date=21 June 2020 |work=South China Morning Post}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Tao |first=Ying |title=1983年"严打"：非常时期的非常手段 |url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/12999227.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622051609/http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/12999227.html |archive-date=22 June 2020 |access-date=21 June 2020 |website=history.people.com.cn |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=1 July 2010 |title="严打"政策的前世今生 |url=http://criminallaw.com.cn/article/default.asp |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203123314/http://www.criminallaw.com.cn/article/default.asp |archive-date=3 February 2020 |access-date=21 June 2020 |website=criminallaw.com.cn |language=zh}}</ref> The campaign had an immediate positive effect on public safety, while controversies also arose such as whether some of the legal punishments were too harsh and whether the campaign had long-term positive effect on public safety.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite journal |last=Trevaskes |first=Susan |date=2002 |title=Courts on the Campaign Path in China: Criminal Court Work in the "Yanda 2001" Anti-Crime Campaign |journal=Asian Survey |volume=42 |issue=5 |pages=673–693 |doi=10.1525/as.2002.42.5.673 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=10.1525/as.2002.42.5.673 |hdl-access=free |hdl=10072/6536}}</ref>

Increasing economic freedom was being translated into a greater freedom of opinion, and critics began to arise within the system, including the famous dissident [[Wei Jingsheng]], who coined the term "fifth modernization" in reference to democracy as a missing element in the renewal plans of Deng Xiaoping. In the late 1980s, dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime and growing inequalities caused the biggest crisis to Deng's leadership.

=== Crackdown of Tiananmen Square protests ===
{{Main|1989 Tiananmen Square protests|June 9 Deng speech}}

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, culminating in the June Fourth Massacre, were a series of demonstrations in and near Tiananmen Square in the People's Republic of China (PRC) between 15 April and 5 June 1989, a year in which many other [[Revolutions of 1989|communist governments collapsed]].

The protests were sparked by the death of [[Hu Yaobang]], a reformist official backed by Deng but ousted by the [[Eight Elders]] and the conservative wing of the politburo. Many people were dissatisfied with the party's slow response and relatively subdued funeral arrangements. Public mourning began on the streets of Beijing and universities in the surrounding areas. In Beijing, this was centered on the [[Monument to the People's Heroes]] in Tiananmen Square. The mourning became a public conduit for anger against perceived nepotism in the government, the unfair dismissal and early death of Hu, and the behind-the-scenes role of the "old men". By the eve of Hu's funeral, the demonstration had reached 100,000 people on Tiananmen Square. While the protests lacked a unified cause or leadership, participants raised the issue of corruption within the government and some voiced calls for economic liberalization<ref name="nathan" /> and democratic reform<ref name="nathan">{{Cite web |last=Nathan |first=Andrew J. |date=January–February 2001 |title=The Tiananmen Papers |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010101faessay4257-p0/andrew-j-nathan/the-tiananmen-papers.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081219055135/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010101faessay4257-p0/andrew-j-nathan/the-tiananmen-papers.html |archive-date=19 December 2008 |website=[[Foreign Affairs]]}}</ref> within the structure of the government while others called for a less authoritarian and less centralized form of socialism.<ref>{{Cite web |date=8 February 2006 |title=Voices for Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement |url=http://www.socialanarchism.org/mod/magazine/display/32/index.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180917215455/http://www.socialanarchism.org/mod/magazine/display/32/index.php |archive-date=17 September 2018 |access-date=13 March 2010 |website=[[Social Anarchism (journal)|Social Anarchism]]}}</ref><ref>Palmer, Bob (8 February 2006). [http://www.marxist.com/Asia/tiananmen_rl.html Voices for Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040623222014/http://www.marxist.com/Asia/tiananmen_rl.html |date=23 June 2004 }}. ''Social Anarchism''. '''20'''.</ref>

During the demonstrations, Deng's pro-market ally General Secretary [[Zhao Ziyang]] supported the demonstrators and distanced himself from the Politburo. Martial law was declared on 20 May by the socialist hardliner, Chinese premier [[Li Peng]], but the [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests#Attempt to enforce martial law on May 20–23|initial military advance on the city]] was blocked by residents. The movement lasted seven weeks. On 3–4 June, over two hundred thousand soldiers in tanks and helicopters were [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests|sent into the city to quell the protests by force]], resulting in hundreds to thousands of casualties. Many ordinary people in Beijing believed that Deng had ordered the intervention, but political analysts do not know who was actually behind the order.<ref name="macfarquhar" />{{page needed|date=July 2020}} However, Deng's daughter defends the actions that occurred as a collective decision by the party leadership.<ref>[http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/06/25/2003366781 Deng Xiaoping's daughter defends his Tiananmen Square massacre decision] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171014133929/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/06/25/2003366781 |date=14 October 2017 }}. ''[[Taipei Times]]''. 25 June 2007.</ref>

To purge sympathizers of Tiananmen demonstrators, the Communist Party initiated a one-and-a-half-year-long program similar to the [[Anti-Rightist Movement]]. Old-timers like Deng Fei aimed to deal "strictly with those inside the party with serious tendencies toward bourgeois liberalization", and more than 30,000 communist officers were deployed to the task.<ref name="miles" />{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

Zhao was placed under house arrest by hardliners and Deng himself was forced to make concessions to them.<ref name="macfarquhar" />{{page needed|date=July 2020}} He soon declared that "the entire imperialist Western world plans to make all socialist countries discard the socialist road and then bring them under the monopoly of international capital and onto the capitalist road". A few months later he said that the "United States was too deeply involved" in the student movement, referring to foreign reporters who had given financial aid to the student leaders and later [[Operation Yellowbird|helped them escape to various Western countries]], primarily the United States through Hong Kong and Taiwan.<ref name="macfarquhar" />{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

Although Deng initially made concessions to the socialist hardliners, he soon resumed his reforms after his 1992 southern tour. After his tour, he was able to stop the attacks of the socialist hardliners on the reforms through their "named capitalist or socialist?" campaign.<ref>Miles, James (1997). ''The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray.'' University of Michigan Press. {{ISBN|978-0-472-08451-7}}.</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}} Deng privately told former Canadian Prime Minister [[Pierre Trudeau]] that factions of the Communist Party could have grabbed army units and the country had risked a civil war.<ref name="miles">The Legacy of Tiananmen By James A. R. Miles</ref>{{Page needed|date=December 2017}} Two years later, Deng endorsed [[Zhu Rongji]], a Shanghai Mayor, as a vice-premier candidate. Zhu Rongji had refused to declare [[martial law]] in Shanghai during the demonstrations even though socialist hardliners had pressured him.<ref name="macfarquhar">The Politics of China By Roderick MacFarquhar</ref>{{Page needed|date=December 2017}}